STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. (DELETED) Sonu Ram (Died)
ACQA/449/2010 · 2025-09-18
Shri Bibhu Datta Guru
body2025
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[ 2025 DAILYLAW 23550 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2025 DAILYLAW 23550 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 ACQA No.449 of 2010 ;
2025:CGHC:48241-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 449 of 2010 State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, P.S. Jainagar District Sarguja., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh
... Appellant versus 1- Sonu Ram (Died) 2 - Babulal S/o Sonuram Rajwar Aged About 30 Years Caste Rajwar, Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Moharlal S/o Sonuram Rajwar Aged About 27 Years Caste Rajwar, Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 4 -Mahadeo @ Panda (Died) 5 - Darogiha @ Somar Sai S/o Mangalsai Rajwar Aged About 35 Years Caste Rajwar, Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 6 - Lachhan S/o Sonsai Rajwar Aged About 31 Years Caste Rajwar, Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 7 - Khiruram S/o Munnaram Rajwar Aged About 45 Years Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 8 - Dhannjay S/o Girija Shankar Aged About 29 Years Caste Rajwar, Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.09.24 16:49:41 +0530
2 ACQA No.449 of 2010 9 - Deepa @ Deepnarayan S/o Jagdeeshwar Rajwar Aged About 26 Years Caste Rajwar, Occup. Agriculturist, R/o Gram Sundarganj, Thana Jainagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Dy.A.G. For Respondents : Ms. Meena Shastri, Advocate with Mr. Shakti Raj Sinha, Advocate Hon'ble Shri
Ramesh Sinha,
Chief Justice
Hon'ble
Shri Bibhu Datta Guru
, Judge
Judgment
on Board
Per
Ramesh Sinha
, Chief Justice
19.09.2025
1. In this present case, there were total nine accused persons, and out of them accused/respondent No.1 Sonu Ram and accused/respondent No.4 Mahadeo have died during pendency of this appeal.
2. The State has preferred the instant appeal against the impugned
judgment of acquittal dated 27.03.2003 passed in Sessions Trial No. 107/1996 by the learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Surajpur, Sarguja CG, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent from the offence punishable under Sections 148, 302, 323 of IPC. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on September 6, 1995, at 4:00 p.m., Mahendra went to the house of Ramprasad to participate in the Karma dance. Meanwhile, Babulal Rajwar chased the wife of Ramprasad with a club on the road, due to which, she fled into her house for safety. Thereafter, Babulal, accompanied by others, gathered
3 ACQA No.449 of 2010 in front of the house of Ramprasad, where they abused, broke the roof, and assaulted Mahendra and Rajrup. Then, Shivcharan informed Khaleshwar (deceased) about the incident and he along with Shivcharan, went to the house of Sonu Rajwar. Inside the house, the respondents allegedly conspired and attacked Khaleshwar with clubs and tangi, resulting in his death. Subsequently, the incident was reported by Rajrup at P.S. Ambikapur, on the basis of which, offence was registered against the respondents. During investigation, crime details form was prepared vide Ex.P-44. Memorandum statements were recorded vide Ex.P-9 to P-17. Dead body of deceased was sent to postmortem examination and postmortem report is marked as Ex.P-
1. After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the respondents herein. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined 17 witnesses. Statements of the respondents under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C were recorded wherein they have pleaded that they have been falsely implicated. 5. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 27.03.2003 acquitted the respondents/accused herein from the charges framed against them. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the State submits that the trial court has acquitted the accused persons giving the advantage of the right of private defense which is grave error. The learned trial Court should have
4 ACQA No.449 of 2010 considered that the deceased was unarmed at the time of Incident and accused persons were armed with clubs and Tangia. The contents of the postmortem report indicates prima facie that the motive of the accused persons was to kill the deceased Khaleshwar, since the accused persons inflicted fatal injuries on the vital parts of the body of the deceased.
The deceased received deadly injuries on his head which were inflicted with clubs and Tangi which caused his death and all the injuries were fatal. Learned counsel submits that on perusal of the entire document, it is well established that the alleged offence has been committed by the accused respondent and the trial Court has erred in not looking to the prosecution case in proper perspective. Hence, looking to the act committed by the respondent, the impugned
judgment is bad in law and liable to be set-aside.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose the submission made by learned counsel for the State and submits that the
judgment of acquittal is well merited and does not require any interference.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment passed by the trial Court along with the trial Court record annexed with the present appeal with utmost circumspection.
9. This is appeal against the judgment of acquittal filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. in exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 378(1) or under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court had the
5 ACQA No.449 of 2010 advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box and also required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.
10. The Supreme Court in the matter of C.Antony v. Raghavan Nair (AIR 2003 SC 182), unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav V. Prabhunath Jha (AIR 2004 SC 1053), the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned
judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 11. The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 1083), the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:-
“. . . . the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a
6 ACQA No.449 of 2010 valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous."
12. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram (2022 SCC OnLine SC 984) has held as follows:-
"8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views
7 ACQA No.449 of 2010 are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.”
13.
In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala (2022 8 SCC 440), the Supreme Court held as under:
"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."
14. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of acquittal, the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully empowered to appreciate and reappreciate the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The appellate
8 ACQA No.449 of 2010 Court is required to discuss the grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. 15. In the present case, the learned trial Court while acquitting the accused/respondent has observed as follows:-
“6. Among the witnesses produced by the prosecution, PW-2 Rajroop stated that after reaching the house of Sonu/accused, and when Khaleshwar asked the accused Sonu regarding assaulting Mahendra, Sonu pulled him inside and beat him. This witness had lodged the report about the incident. In cross-examination, he said that he had also written this statement but could not explain why it was not included in the FIR. However, in the FIR, it is clearly mentioned that Khaleshwar, while interrogating those people, entered the house of Sonu and went to his courtyard.
Similarly, it is not mentioned in the FIR that Babulal dragged Khaleshwar inside the house and beat him with a rod. Thus, it is clear that the deceased Khaleshwar and his associates reached the house of Sonu, by opening the door, and entered the courtyard of the house. The act of forcibly opening the door of the house of Sonu by the deceased Khaleshwar and his companions amounts to the offence of house trespass.”
16. PW-2, Rajroop stated in his evidence that Ramprasad came to his house to call him, so Mahendra and he went to Ramprasad's house to
9 ACQA No.449 of 2010 witness the karma dance. While they were watching the karma, Ramprasad's wife had left the house, and Babulal was chasing her to kill her, then Ramprasad's wife came running inside and locked the door. At that time, Mahendra, Raju, and children of Ramprasad were inside. Babulal, came and slammed the door, and abusing and began hammering the roof. After pounding the door, Badulal fled. Thereafter, Nandkumar and Dhaneshwar had arrived. From there, they walked down the street and sat down at Dhurtu's door. At that time, Sonu, Babulal, Somar Sai, and Lachhan came and assaulted Mahendra. After hearing about the incident Khileshwar deceased came and went to the house of Sonu along with Nandkumar, Thaneshwar and Jairam. When Khaleshwar asked Sonu why he assaulted Mahendra, then Sonu along with accused persons have assaulted Khileshwar by means of Tangi and Sabbal. Babulal/accused assaulted Nandkumar and Thaneshwar with rod. 17. PW-3 Nandkumar Singh stated in his evidence that on the date of incident, he was attending his grandfather's house to watch Karma dance. On the way, Ramprasad from Sundarganj came running to him and told him that Mahendra was having a fight with Babulal at Ram Prasad's house. After sometime, Babulal, Sonu and other accused persons emerged from the house, carrying wooden sticks. They came and grabbed Mahendra and assaulted him too. He tried to rescue, then Babulal assaulted him with stick. After sometime, Khileshwar came and questioning who had killed Mahendra.
Then, he told gun that Sonu's
10 ACQA No.449 of 2010 family had beaten him. Thereafter, they went to the house of Sonu and knocked on the door. Then Khileshwar asked Sonu why he assaulted Mahendra then, Sonu replied, "Come inside, sir, I'll tell you". Sonu was sitting in the courtyard, and Khaleshwar was hit on the head with a stick. Babulal also assaulted Khaleshwar with a stick. 18. PW-5, Thaneshwar also that on the date of incident he was at his home and Moharbai informed him that Babulal assaulted Mahendra, then he along with Ram went to the spot and saw that Mahendra was lying down. After sometime, Khaleshwar came and asked Mahendra about the incident, then he told that Sonu and other accused persons assaulted him. Subsequently, Khaleshwar, Rajroop, Nandkumar went to the house of Sonu, where Sonu dragged Khaleshwar and assaulted him by means of stick. Other accused persons also assaulted Khaleshwar with stick. PW-5 further stated that when they intervene the matter, Sonu and other accused persons also assaulted them. 19. Based on the foregoing analysis and it is manifest from the above evidence that deceased Khaleshwar and his companions went to the house of the accused Sonu by their own, where Khaleshwar was assaulted, resulting in his death. At the time of incident, Sonu and other accused persons were sitting inside the house. Khaleshwar knocked the door of the house of Sonu. It is to be noticed that Khaleshwar alone had not went to Sonu’s house, Thaneshwar, Nandkumar, and others had gone with Khaleshwar. At that moment, the accused had right to assault them in self-defense. 11 ACQA No.449 of 2010
20. In such a situation, where a group of individuals arrives at one’s residence in a potentially threatening manner, the occupants are entitled under law to take necessary steps to protect themselves and their property.
Therefore, any action taken by the accused in the heat of the moment, in anticipation of harm or intrusion, would fall within the scope of the right to private defense as recognized under Section 96 to 100 of the Indian Penal Code. The circumstances indicate that the accused acted not as aggressors but in self-defense against a perceived threat. 21. With regard to the allegation that Mahendra had sustained voluntary injuries at the hands of the accused Babulal prior to the present incident, it is pertinent to note that no statement of Mahendra has been recorded in the course of the present proceedings. His testimony would have been crucial in establishing the nature and circumstances of the injuries allegedly inflicted upon him. In the absence of such a statement, the allegation remains unsubstantiated and cannot be treated as credible evidence against the accused. Therefore, the claim that Mahendra was voluntarily injured by Babulal lacks evidentiary foundation and cannot be relied upon for drawing any adverse inference. In the state of evidence on record, the respondents are entitled for the benefit of doubt. 22. Given the fact that more than 30 years have elapsed since the date of the incident, and taking into consideration the protracted nature of the proceedings, as well as the findings recorded by the trial Court which do not appear to suffer from perversity or manifest illegality, this Court finds
12 ACQA No.449 of 2010 no merit in interfering with the acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of substance, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 23. The Registry is directed to transmit the certified copy of this judgment along with the record to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Gowri/ Amardeep