[2025:RJ-JP:11082] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11063/2023 Mrs Promila Srivastava W/o Shri Anil Kumar Shrivastava, Aged About 64 Years, Resident Of 50/180, Rajat Path, Mansarovar, Jaipur ----Petitioner Versus The Secretary, Rajasthan Khadi Gramodyog Board, Jaipur (Raj.) J.L.N. Marg, Jaipur. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vishweshwar Dutt For Respondent(s) : Mr. Divanshu Gupta with Ms. Shubhi Gaur and Mr. Anurag Gupta JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 11/03/2025 1. By way of filing this petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned award dated 09.08.2017 passed by the Labour Court-First, Jaipur in LCR Case No.167/2002, by which the statement of claim submitted by the petitioner-workman against his termination order dated 01.06.1986 has been rejected on the ground that the petitioner has failed to prove that he worked with the respondent-establishment continuously for a period of 240 days in the preceding calendar year. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was engaged as daily wager by the respondent- department on 06.09.1984 and she continued to work with it till 31.05.1986, hence, she has worked for more than 240 [2025:RJ-JP:11082] (2 of 3) [CW-11063/2023] days in the preceding year, but this fact has been overlooked by the Labour Court while passing the impugned award and the claim petition filed by the petitioner has been erroneously rejected, hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner has worked with the respondent in parts, and not for a continuous duration of more than 240 days. Counsel submits that the last appointment was given to the petitioner on 24.12.1985 and thereafter, her services were terminated on 01.06.1986 and during this period, the petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days, rather she has worked for 160 days only. Counsel submits that after considering the entire length of service of the petitioner, the Labour Court has recorded a definite finding in this regard, that the petitioner has failed to establish on record that she has worked with the respondent, continuously for a period of more than 240 days in the preceding year. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, interference of this Court is not warranted. 4. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on the record. 5. Perusal of record indicates that initially the petitioner was appointed as daily wager by the respondents on 06.09.1984 and she worked till 07.11.1984, thereafter, she was re-engaged on 23.05.1985 and continued to work till [2025:RJ-JP:11082] (3 of 3) [CW-11063/2023] 10.11.1985. Thereafter, there was a gap of more than one and half month and the, she was re-engaged on 24.12.1985, hence, it is clear that the petitioner has hardly worked for a period of 160 days with the respondents. 6. It is an admitted position that though the petitioner has worked with the respondent w.e.f. 06.09.1984 till 01.06.1986, but there was break in her service during the year 1984, 1985 and 1986 and from 24.12.1985 till 01.06.1986, hence, the petitioner has worked only for 160 days prior to the date of her termination, which is lower then the required period of 240 days of working, as per the mandate contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 7. The issue involved in this petition has already been decided by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Ali vs. State of H.P. and Others while deciding Civil Appeal No.3803/2018 on 16.04.2018. 8. A finding of fact has been recorded on the basis of the evidence led by both sides that the petitioner has failed to establish that she has worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days in a preceding calendar year. A reasoned and cogent order has been passed by the Labour Court while rejecting the claim of the petitioner, which requires no interference of this Court. 9. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J KuD/38