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2025 DAILYLAW 2349 (ALL)

AMRESH PANDIT v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

CRLA/5307/2025 · 2026-04-26

Madan Pal Singh

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 5307 of 2025 Court No. - 51 HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J. Heard Sri Giri Ram Rawat, learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State, and learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and perused the record. 1. The present appeal under Section 14A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been preferred against the summoning order dated 19.12.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Agra, as well as the entire proceedings arising out of Case Crime No. 122 of 2024, under Sections 354A, 294, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, P.S. Khergarh, district Agra. 2. As per the prosecution case, the complainant, who belongs to a Scheduled Caste community, alleged in the FIR that on 19.05.2024 at about 9:00 P.M., when she had gone to an agricultural field outside the village for nature's call, the appellant caught hold of her and attempted to outrage her modesty. Upon her raising alarm, her husband and certain villagers reached the spot, whereupon the appellant fled away. It has also been alleged that caste-related abusive words were used and threats were extended. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order is illegal and has been passed without proper application of mind. It is contended that there are material contradictions in the statements of the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the alleged incident took place at night in an agricultural field and there were no independent public witnesses present at the time of the alleged occurrence. Thus, the essential ingredient of “public view” as required under the SC/ST Act is not satisfied. It is also argued that there is no medical evidence and the prosecution has been initiated due to ulterior motive. 4. Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Arvind Kumar Pandey, Giri Ram Rawat, Indra Deo Mishra, Sangam Kumar, Sangeeta Yadav, Shri Ram (Rawat), Vivekanand Rai Counsel for Respondent(s) : Hanuman Prasad Kushwaha, G.A. Amresh Pandit .....Appellant(s) State of U.P. and Another .....Respondent(s) Per contra, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 as well as learned A.G.A. submit that the FIR and the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. disclose commission of cognizable offences and at this stage, detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted. It is argued that the learned trial court has rightly taken cognizance. 5. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record. 6. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the essential ingredient of “public view” as required under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out in the present case. 7. Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act reads as follows: “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 8. In Mahesh Sakharam Patole V.The State of Maharashtra 2010 (1) RCR it has been held that " The expression 'within public view' will have to be read to mean that the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989 should take place in view of the public". If no member of the public has either seen the incident or heard the remarks, then even if the place is a "public place" or a place "visible to the public", it would not attract the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of Act. 9. In K. Venugopal Reddy and Others V. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and others 2016 (1) ALT (cri) 177 (A.P.), it has been held that in order to launch prosecution under Section 3(1)(x) of Act, two necessary and indispensable ingredients must exist. Victim should belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and there must be humiliation of such person in public view. 10. In Daya Bhatnagar Vs. State of Delhi 2004 (109) DLT 915, the expression within 'public view' occurring in Section 3(1) (x) of the Act means within the view which includes hearing, knowledge or accessibility also, of a group of people of the place/locality/village as distinct from few who are not private and are as good as strangers and not linked with the complainant through any close relationship or any business, commercial or any other vested interest and who are not participating members with him in any way. If such group of people comprise anyone of these, it would not satisfy the requirement of 'public view' within the meaning of the expression used. 11. The expression “any place within public view” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 and reiterated in subsequent decisions including 12. CRLA No. 5307 of 2025 2 Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy and Others, 2025 INSC 132, wherein it has been held that “... It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.” Thus, the presence of public persons at the time of the alleged incident is a sine qua non for attracting the provisions of the SC/ST Act. 13. From the aforesaid judgments, the following legal principles emerge: firstly, the expression “public view” is distinct from a “public place”; secondly, even a private place may fall within public view if members of the public are actually present and capable of witnessing or hearing the incident; and thirdly, mere allegation of use of caste-related words is not sufficient unless it is shown that such words were uttered in the presence of public persons. 14. Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the alleged occurrence is stated to have taken place in an agricultural field at about 9:00 P.M. during night hours. The FIR as well as the statements of the victim do not clearly indicate that any independent member of the public was present at the time when the alleged caste-based abuses were made. 15. Though it has been stated that the husband and certain villagers reached the spot after hearing alarm, there is no categorical assertion that the alleged abusive words were uttered in their presence. 16. The timing and place of occurrence are also important factor to consider. An agricultural field outside the village during night hours cannot, by itself, be presumed to be a place within public view in absence of specific material showing actual presence of public persons. The requirement of “public view” is not a matter of presumption but must be supported by factual foundation. 17. In the absence of any clear and specific material indicating that the alleged caste-based insult was made in the presence of members of the public, this Court is of the considered opinion that the foundational requirement for attracting the provisions of Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied. 18. However, so far as the allegations relating to offences under Sections 354A, 294, 504 and 506 IPC are concerned, the same cannot be said to be inherently improbable or absurd at this stage. The FIR and the 19. CRLA No. 5307 of 2025 3 statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. disclose a prima facie case, and the veracity of such allegations is a matter for trial. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the summoning order dated 19.12.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Agra, in so far as it relates to offences under Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 20. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellant under Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the proceedings under Sections 354A, 294 504 and 506 IPC shall continue in accordance with law. 21. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. 22. April 27, 2026 pks CRLA No. 5307 of 2025 4 (Madan Pal Singh,J.) Digitally signed by :- PANKAJ KUMAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Digitally signed by :- PANKAJ KUMAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad