(2025:JHHC:25499) 1 Cr. M.P. No.3082 of 2018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr.M.P. No.3082 of 2018 ------ Shyamlendu Chatterjee S/O Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee aged about 73 yeas serving as an Independent Director at SREI Towers, V-10, Block EP, Sector IV, PO & PS Salt Lake, Dist Kolkata, State- West Bengal … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Uday Kumar Tiwari S/O Late Ram Sundar Tiwari, R/O H. No.16, Village Tengrakhurd & PO Pordag, PS Nimiaghat, Dist. Giridih … Opposite Parties ------ For the Petitioner : Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, Advocate (Through Video Conferencing) For the State : Mr. Gautam Rakesh, Addl.P.P. For the O.P. No.2 : Mr. Suraj Kumar, Advocate ------ P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY By the Court:- Heard the parties. 2. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with a prayer to quash the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 18.06.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate- 1st Class, Dhanbad in connection with C.P. Case No.3231 of 2017 registered for the offence punishable under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code whereby and where under the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Dhanbad took cognizance for the offence punishable under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. (2025:JHHC:25499) 2 Cr. M.P. No.3082 of 2018 3. The brief fact of the case is that the co-accused gave a second-hand J.C.B Machine to the complainant without any registration number and without any ownership documents of the vehicle after taking some money with a promise to handover the ownership documents of the vehicle to the complainant but till the date of filing of the case, he did not give the ownership of the said vehicle to the complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation against the petitioner is false. It is next submitted that there is no allegation against the petitioner of committing any acts, deeds or things which will constitute the offence punishable under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Anup Praveen & Others vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another reported in 2024:JHHC:27963 and submits that in that case this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S. K. Alagh vs. State of U.P. & Others reported in 2008 2 Supreme 152 paragraphs-19 and 20 of which read as under:- “19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself. {See Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya,1 [(2006) 10 SCC 581]}. 20. We may, in this regard, notice that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, Negotiable Instruments Act, Employees’ Provident Fund (Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1952 etc. have created such vicarious liability. It is interesting to note that Section 14A of the 1952 Act specifically creates an offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount deducted from the employees by the company. In terms of the explanations appended to Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, a legal fiction has been (2025:JHHC:25499) 3 Cr. M.P. No.3082 of 2018 created to the effect that the employer shall be deemed to have committed an offence of criminal breach of trust. Whereas a person in charge of the affairs of the company and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company along with the company but even in a case falling under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code vicarious liability has been held to be not extendable to the Directors or officers of the company. {See Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors.,2 [2007 (11) SCALE 318]}.” (Emphasis supplied) and submits that the Director cannot be said to have committed any offence in the absence of any allegation against him and in the absence of any provision in any relevant statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself. It is also submitted that the petitioner is an independent Director of the company. 5. It is next submitted that in that case this Court also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Another reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 paragraph-6 of which reads as under:- “6. Xxxx xxxx xxxx It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) and submits that unless the deception is played at the very inception of the transaction between the parties, the offence of cheating is not made out. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer, as prayed for in the instant Cr.M.P., be allowed. (2025:JHHC:25499) 4 Cr. M.P. No.3082 of 2018 6. Learned Addl.P.P. appearing for the State and the learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 vehemently oppose the prayer of the petitioner made in the instant Cr.M.P. and submit that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed. 7. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, this Court finds that there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of having done any overt act, deed or thing in any manner in committing any offence and the only allegation against the petitioner is that he is a Director of SERI Equipment Finance Limited. 8. In view of the discussions made above and in the absence of any specific allegation against the petitioner or any specific role attributed to the petitioner, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety still the offence punishable under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioner, hence, the continuation of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 18.06.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Dhanbad in C.P. Case No.3231 of 2017, be quashed and set aside. 9. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 18.06.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Dhanbad in C.P. Case No.3231 of 2017, is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner only. 10. In the result, this Cr.M.P. stands allowed. (2025:JHHC:25499) 5 Cr. M.P. No.3082 of 2018 11. In view of disposal of the instant Cr.M.P., pending interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of being infructuous. (Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated the 26th of August, 2025 AFR/ Animesh