ORDER : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The appeal is under clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 20.11.2013 passed in W.P.(S) No. 753 of 2013 whereby and whereunder the order dated 12.05.2012 passed by Director in Chief Health Service, Govt. of Jharkhand has been quashed and the writ Court has further held that the petitioner would be entitled for appointment with effect from 12.05.2012 but petitioner would not be entitled for salary, allowances etc. and further observed that other consequential benefits such as, seniority, etc. would be granted to the petitioner notionally with effect from 12.05.2012. 2. Before entering into the merit of the instant appeal it requires to refer herein that the original writ petitioner namely, Umesh Pandey had died during the pendency of the instant appeal and original writ petitioner (deceased) was being substituted by his wife namely, Rajwanti Pandey i.e. present respondent. Factual Matrix 3. The brief facts of this case as per the pleading made in the writ petition has been incorporated in the memo of appeal and taken note in the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2013 reads hereunder: “The original writ petitioner (deceased) was appointed on the post of non-Medical Assistant by order dated 28.10.1986 and his service was terminated on 22.08.1988. The petitioner was again called for interview alongwith one Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh. In the meantime, a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2249 of 1990 (R) was filed which was withdrawn on 23.11.1990 in view of the subsequent development. Another Writ Petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2037 of 1991(R) was preferred by Rajendra Prasad Gupta which was disposed of on 26.09.1991 with a direction to fill up the vacant posts. An enquiry report was submitted in which it was found that (i) no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner before termination of his service and, (ii) the case of one Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta was identical to the petitioner and there was one post of non-Medical Assistant on which the petitioner can be adjusted. In the mean-time the said Rajendra Prasad Gupta was appointed pursuant to order passed in C.WJ.C. No. 2037 of 1991(R). Other similarly situated persons including Satyendra Narayan Singh took the matter to Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of order passed in SLP(C) No 9102-07 of 1990, those persons were also appointed. In the mean-time the said Rajendra Prasad Gupta was appointed pursuant to order passed in C.WJ.C. No. 2037 of 1991(R). Other similarly situated persons including Satyendra Narayan Singh took the matter to Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of order passed in SLP(C) No 9102-07 of 1990, those persons were also appointed. However, the petitioner was not re-appointed and therefore, the petitioner moved this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2360 of 2003 which was disposed of vide order dated 16.12.2009 with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner afresh in the light of the findings recorded by the Court. The claim of the present petitioner was rejected by order dated 12.05.2012. In the meantime, the petitioner had preferred Cont. Civil Case No. 463 of 2009 which was disposed of by order dated 21.12.2012 with a liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order of termination. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 12.05.2012 had preferred writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 753 of 2013 before the learned writ Court and the same was allowed vide order dated 20.11.13 against which the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the original writ petitioner was appointed on the post of non-Medical Assistant by order dated 28.10.1986 but was terminated from service on 22.08.1988. The other co-employees, namely, one Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh had also been dismissed from service who have been appointed alongwith the original writ petitioner (deceased) and they had preferred writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2249 of 1990(R) which was withdrawn in view of the subsequent development. 5. Again, another writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2037 of 1991(R) was preferred by Rajendra Prasad Gupta which was disposed of on 26.09.1991 with a direction to fill up the vacant posts. 6. Accordingly, the said Rajendra Prasad Gupta was appointed pursuant to order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2037 of 1991(R). However, the other similarly situated persons, including Satyendra Narayan Singh has approached the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing a special leave petition which was registered as S.L.P(C) No.9102-07 of 1990 and in view of the order passed in the said case Satyendra Narayan Singh was also appointed; however, the original writ petitioner was not reappointed. 7. However, the other similarly situated persons, including Satyendra Narayan Singh has approached the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing a special leave petition which was registered as S.L.P(C) No.9102-07 of 1990 and in view of the order passed in the said case Satyendra Narayan Singh was also appointed; however, the original writ petitioner was not reappointed. 7. Therefore, the respondent-writ petitioner has moved to this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2360 of 2003, and raised the ground that the co-employees namely, Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta, identically placed, have been appointed but leaving aside the writ petitioner. 8. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 16.12.2009 with a direction to the appellant-State to consider the case of the original writ petitioner afresh for re- appointment in the light of the finding recorded by the Court and if the case of the petitioner is found to be exactly similarly situated to that of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta then the respondent shall pass consequential order. 9. In the pursuance of the order dated 16.12.2009 the respondent authority vide order 12.05.2012 had rejected the claim of original writ petitioner on the ground that the case of the original writ portioner namely Umesh Pandey is different from the case of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. 10. The respondent-writ petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 12.05.2012 has preferred writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 753 of 2013. 11. The learned Single Judge has passed the order by quashing and setting aside the order dated 12.05.2012 and being aggrieved, the present appeal has been preferred by the State of Jharkhand. Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the State-appellant: 12. Learned counsel appearing for the State-appellant has assailed the impugned order dated 12.11.2013 by taking the following grounds: (i) The case of the original writ petitioner even though, was identical but he has approached this Court much after the writ petition having being preferred by the Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh who had preferred the writ petition sometime in the year 1990-91 while the respondent-writ petitioner has preferred the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2630 of 2003, in the year 2003. (ii) It has been contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration the principle of fence-sitter by applying the principle of delay and laches, since, respondent-writ petitioner has approached this Court in the year 2003 after waiting for the outcome of the lis which has been preferred by Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh. (iii) The State based upon the aforesaid grounds has preferred the instant appeal. Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent: 13. On the other hand, Mr. Lalan Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has taken the following grounds in defending the impugned judgment: (i) It is incorrect on the part of the appellant-State to take the ground that merely because the original writ petitioner has approached to this Court in the year 2003, he is not entitled to get any relief regarding his reinstatement in service. (ii) It has been contended that the principle of parity was to be followed by the State while dealing with the cases of like nature but the State has acted arbitrarily leaving aside the case of the original writ petitioner merely because he has not come to the Court sometime in the year 1990-91 while the cases of Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh have been considered, since they have approached to Court for their grievances in the year 1990-91 and also moved to the Hon’ble Apex Court. (iii) It has been contented that the law is settled that the identically placed persons are to be dealt with identically by the State and there cannot be any discrimination, but the case of the original writ petitioner has not been considered in the righteous manner by the appellant-State. (iv) Learned counsel based upon aforesaid grounds has submitted that learned Single Judge has taken into consideration these aspects of the matter and had interfered with the order dated 12.05.2012 which cannot be said to be suffer from an error. Analysis 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. 15. Analysis 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. 15. The question which requires consideration as has been agitated on behalf of appellant-State that merely because the respondent-writ petitioner has approached this Court subsequent to the outcome of lis by Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh, even if, the case of the respondent-writ petitioner is identical to that of Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh, will it be proper for the State to deny the relief of reinstatement in the service to the original writ petitioner? 16. This Court before considering the aforesaid issue needs to refer herein the settled position of law that the principle of delay and laches is to be applicable in the Court of equity which is being exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the applicability depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and it cannot be applied universally. 17. The consideration is to be made as to whether there is any laches said to be committed on the part of the original writ petitioner or the appellant-State has chosen not to take decision even though the case of the respondent-writ petitioner is identically placed to the other in whose favour the positive decision has been taken in terms of the order passed by this Court. 18. But before considering the said issue the principle of delay and laches as has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court needs to be referred herein. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others 2024 INSC 314 has categorically observed that delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution and if the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances delay can be condoned and there may be circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. It has further been observed that the ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled, for the ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 20. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held that there is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court and the question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 21. The applicability of delay and laches has also been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basanti Prasad vs. Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and Ors. reported in (2009) 6 SCC 791 wherein the writ petition was filed after lapse of about 17 years in a case where the writ petitioner was convicted and on the ground of conviction he was dismissed from service. The said appellant had preferred appeal against the judgment of conviction which has been resulted into the acquittal but that has taken 17 years of time, since the appeal was lying pending before the superior forum. The said appellant had preferred appeal against the judgment of conviction which has been resulted into the acquittal but that has taken 17 years of time, since the appeal was lying pending before the superior forum. The appellant, on acquittal, has made an application before the authority for recall/review of the order of dismissal but was rejected which led the litigant to approach the concerned High Court which ultimately travel up to Hon’ble Apex Court. 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court while taking into consideration the fact that the dismissal solely was based upon the conviction against which the litigant was before the superior forum which took about 17 years and the moment the appeal from which conviction was resulted into acquittal and thereafter, when the application was filed for recall of the order of dismissal, the same should not have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, reason being that the appeal was lying pending before the superior forum upon which the litigant concerned was having no control for early disposal, reference of the relevant paragraphs needs to be made herein which reads hereunder: 25. In the present case, we are of the opinion that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part of the appellant as may disentitle her for grant of a writ. Having said so, the matter requires to be remanded back to the High Court for taking a decision on the merits of the case. But taking into consideration the pendency of the litigation between the parties from the last one decade and taking also into consideration the plight of the poor widow who is fighting the litigation before various forums with limited resources, we desist from remanding the matter and we intend to decide the matter on merits here itself in order to give quietus to this litigation. 23. This Court also deem it fit and proper to refer the principle of fence-sitter as to when and in which circumstances the same has to be applied. 24. The issue of fence sitter has elaborately been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 , wherein, at paragraph 18 and 19, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold as under: “18. 24. The issue of fence sitter has elaborately been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347 , wherein, at paragraph 18 and 19, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold as under: “18. Both these judgments, along with some other judgments, were taken note of in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] . That was a case where the issue pertained to entitlement of the employees of U.P. Jal Nigam to continue in service up to the age of 60 years. In Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik [ (2005) 13 SCC 300 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1063] this Court had earlier held that these employees were in fact entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years. After the aforesaid decision, a spate of writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court by those who had retired long back. The question that arose for consideration was as to whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement orders, and accepted the same, and had collected their post-retirement benefits as well, could be given relief in the light of the decision delivered in Harwindra Kumar [ (2005) 13 SCC 300 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1063] . The Court refused to extend the benefit applying the principle of delay and laches. It was held that an important factor in exercise of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is laches and delay. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces into the situation, his writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to the persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and challenged their retirement. In para 7, the Court quoted from Rup Diamonds [Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 356 : AIR 1989 SC 674 ] . In para 8, S.M. Kotrayya [State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya, (1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488] was taken note of. 19. In para 7, the Court quoted from Rup Diamonds [Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 356 : AIR 1989 SC 674 ] . In para 8, S.M. Kotrayya [State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya, (1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488] was taken note of. 19. Some other judgments on the same principle of laches and delay are taken note of in paras 9 to 11 which are as follows : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 469-70) “9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana [ (1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550 : AIR 1997 SC 2366 ] this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 542) ‘The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan [ (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813] . The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage.’ 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta [ (1997) 3 SCC 395 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 821] it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 398, para 9) ‘9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi v. Union of India [ OA No. 497 of 1986, decided on 17-3-1987 (Tri)] gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case [ OA No. 497 of 1986, decided on 17-3-1987 (Tri)] . In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief. 11. In Govt. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case [ OA No. 497 of 1986, decided on 17-3-1987 (Tri)] . In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief. 11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] , Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows : (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) ‘34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in State of W.B. v. Debdas Kumar [1991 Supp (1) SCC 138 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 841 : (1991) 17 ATC 261] . The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.’” 25. This Court on consideration of the judgment as referred hereinabove is of the view that the principle of delay and laches although is applicable but its applicability depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. This Court on consideration of the judgment as referred hereinabove is of the view that the principle of delay and laches although is applicable but its applicability depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. Further, the principle of fence-sitter is also applicable but it also depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and in a case where the State is the final authority to take decision and if the State is not taking decision uniformly in favour of all the identically placed litigants and only taking decision against one or in favour of one or the other litigants who have come to this Court and made prayer for consideration in the light of the order passed by this Court in the earlier judgments and in the facts and circumstances of the cases if such litigants have been considered, leaving aside the case of the other identical placed persons and if the concerned litigant whose case has not been considered approaches this Court, in such circumstances, the principle of fence-sitter will not be applicable. 27. The reason being that if the State who has to take decision uniformly as a model employer and has not taken any decision uniformly with respect to all identically placed persons, then the State will be said to be a wrong-doer and it is a settled position of law that a wrong-doer cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and Others reported in (2007) 11 SCC 447 wherein it has been held that a man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, “a wrongdoer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong. For ready reference paragraphs 15 and 16 are being quoted hereunder as:- “15. In Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav [ (1996) 4 SCC 127 ] the accused army personnel himself was responsible for delay as he escaped from detention. For ready reference paragraphs 15 and 16 are being quoted hereunder as:- “15. In Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav [ (1996) 4 SCC 127 ] the accused army personnel himself was responsible for delay as he escaped from detention. Then he raised an objection against initiation of proceedings on the ground that such proceedings ought to have been initiated within six months under the Army Act, 1950. Referring to the above maxim, this Court held that the accused could not take undue advantage of his own wrong. Considering the relevant provisions of the Act, the Court held that presence of the accused was an essential condition for the commencement of trial and when the accused did not make himself available, he could not be allowed to raise a contention that proceedings were time barred. This Court (at SCC p. 142, para 28) referred to Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 191 wherein it was stated: “It is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure.” 16. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, “a wrongdoer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong”. 28. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) through legal representatives and others reported in (2018) 3 SCC 412 at paragraph 143 which is being quoted hereunder as:- “143. ----. It is a settled proposition that one cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The doctrine commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet means convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have advantage of his own wrong. A litigant may be right or wrong. Normally merit of lis is to be seen on date of institution. The doctrine commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet means convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have advantage of his own wrong. A litigant may be right or wrong. Normally merit of lis is to be seen on date of institution. One cannot be permitted to obtain unjust injunction or stay orders and take advantage of own actions. Law intends to give redress to the just causes; at the same time, it is not its policy to foment litigation and enable to reap the fruits owing to the delay caused by unscrupulous persons by their own actions by misusing the process of law and dilatory tactics.” 29. After having discussed the aforesaid judgments and adverting to the factual aspect of the present case herein, the original writ petitioner ought to have been appointed alongwith Rajendra Prasad Gupta and Satyendra Narayan Singh. The said persons have been reinstated in service after quashing of the order of termination, although in pursuant to the order passed by the Court of law. 30. But the grievance of the respondent-writ petitioner has not been taken care of which led the respondent-writ petitioner to file a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2360 of 2003 which was disposed of vide order dated 16.12.2009 with a direction to the appellant-State to consider the case of the respondent-writ petitioner afresh in the light of the finding recorded by this Court. 31. The authority concerned has passed an order on 12.05.2012. The said order is appended as Annexure-3 of the memo of appeal which has been passed in pursuant to the order passed in W.P.(S) No. 2360 of 2003. 32. The authority has denied the claim of the original writ petitioner as it would reveal from paragraph-4 of the said order of the authority thereof wherein, based upon the report submitted by the Enquiry Committee, the case of the original writ petitioner has not found to be identical to that of the case of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. The same has been quashed and set aside by the learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned. 33. The same has been quashed and set aside by the learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned. 33. We have heard it and had also gone through the order dated 12.05.2012, particularly at paragraph-4, wherein, save and except the reference of the case of the writ petitioner having not found to be identical to that of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta, no specific reason has been assigned that on what basis the authority concerned had come to the conclusion that the case of the original writ petitioner has been found to be not identical to that of the Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. 34. The learned Single Judge, while considering the propriety of the said order has taken into consideration the fact that when there is no specific denial of the State that the case of the original writ petitioner has not been identical rather it is the specific case of the original writ petitioner that the case of the original writ petitioner is identical to that of the case of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta and, as such, the learned Single Judge by relying upon the judgment rendered in the case of State of Karnataka and ors. Versus C. Lalitha reported in (2006) 2 SCC 747 wherein it has been laid down that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly has observed that the decision to that effect has already been taken in favour of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta and there is no reason not to take the same decision for the purpose of giving benefits. 35. On the basis of discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the view that once the case of the original writ petitioner is identical to that of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta and there is no averment rather it is a specific case as has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the State in course of interaction by posing specific question as to whether the case of the writ petitioner is identical to that of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta, learned State counsel has fairly submitted that, on fact, the case of the original writ petitioner is identical to that of the case of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. 36. 36. The question, therefore, arises herein that when the State has taken decision for reinstatement of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta that although on the basis of the order passed by the Court, then at the time of taking decision in favour of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta, why such decision was not taken in favour of the original writ petitioner. 37. The State is having no response and there cannot be any response contrary to the law laid down as has been considered by the learned Single Judge in the case of W.P.(S) No. 753 of 2013 by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C. Lalitha (supra), wherein it has been laid down that the identically placed person is to be treated similarly. 38. Further it requires to refer herein that in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the ratio led down in the case of C. Lalitha (supra) and had seconded the "normal rule" that when a set of employees has been given relief by the Court, all other identically placed persons need to be treated alike by extending the benefit to them, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein which reads as under: 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 39. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 39. Thus, it is considered view of this Court that the State by not taking decision similar to the decision so taken in favour of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta has committed gross illegality and in that view of the matter even if the writ petitioner has come to this Court in the year 2003, the said approach cannot hit by the principle of delay and laches reason being that the State was to take decision along with the decision which was taken in favour of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. So far as the case of writ petitioner is concerned and if decision has not been taken, the State cannot be allowed to take aid of the principle of delay and laches. It is admitted case that there is no difference so far as the case of the original writ petitioner is concerned with that of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. 40. So far as the reasons as assigned in the order dated 12.05.2012 is concerned, according to our considered view, no cogent reason has been assigned that how the case of the original writ petitioner is different to that of the case of Satyendra Narayan Singh and Rajendra Prasad Gupta. 41. This Court based upon the aforesaid reason is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference. 42. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed. 43. Since the original writ petitioner has died on 06.06.2019 and in his place his widow namely Rajwanti Pandey (present respondent) has been substituted vide order dated 03.01.2024 passed in I.A. No. 4460 of 2021 by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and as such, now the question of monetary benefit would be there. 44. 43. Since the original writ petitioner has died on 06.06.2019 and in his place his widow namely Rajwanti Pandey (present respondent) has been substituted vide order dated 03.01.2024 passed in I.A. No. 4460 of 2021 by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and as such, now the question of monetary benefit would be there. 44. This Court, in view thereof, is of the view that specific direction is required to be passed upon the State- respondent to release all the monetary benefits both by way of arrears of salary as also the arrears of difference of pensionary benefit including the benefit of family pension which shall be paid within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. 45. Consequent to the dismissal of the instant appeal, order dated 28.09.2015 passed in I.A. No.5589 of 2014 by which stay has been granted by this Court, stands vacated. 46. Pending I.As., if any, stands disposed of.