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2025 DAILYLAW 2343 (CHH)

DWARIKA PRASAD VIPRA MAHAVID. and ANR. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH and ORS.

WPS/6440/2009 · 2025-10-08

Shri Sachin Singh Rajput

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Judgment text

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1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6440 of 2009 1 - Dwarika Prasad Vipra Mahavidyalay, through the Principal, Dwarika Prasad Vipra Mahavidyalay, High Court Road, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 2- The Governing Body, Dwarika Prasad Vipra Mahavidyalay, Through its Chairman, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, through Secretary, Department of Higher Education, D.K.S. Bhawan, Mantralay, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2- Commissioner, Higher Education Department, Chhattisgarh Government Science College, Hostel No. 4, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3- Arun Kumar Kashyap, Son of Ram Prasad Kashyap, Aged about 48 years, Resident of Arti Computers, karabala Raod, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Ms. Anuja Sharma, Advocate For Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 : Mr. R. K. Gupta, Additional AG For Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Order On Board 09.10.2025 1. The challenge in the present writ petition is directed against the order dated 23.09.2009 passed by the respondent/State, whereby the termination order of respondent No. 3 was set aside and the appeal preferred by him was allowed. 2 2. The facts emerging from the pleadings are that respondent No. 3 was working as a Book Lifter in the petitioner’s college. His services were terminated vide order dated 02.02.2008 (Annexure P/15) issued by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Directorate of Higher Education, Raipur, under the relevant provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Shaskiya Shiksha Sansthan (Anudan Ka Praday) Adhiniyam, 1978 (for short Adhiniyam, 1978). The appellate authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of termination. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order is liable to be set aside on two grounds. Firstly, that before passing the impugned order no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner. Secondly, the order is non-speaking order. Therefore, the impugned order may be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 submits that, in terms of Section 6(a)(iii) of the Adhiniyam, 1978, a teacher or an employee of the petitioner’s institution can be removed or dismissed only by following the prescribed procedure. The said procedure is prescribed in [Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sansthan Adhyapak Tatha Anya Karmachari Padachyut Evam Seva Se Hatane Sambandhi Prakriya Niyam, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1983)] The petitioner, having failed to adhere to the mandatory provisions of the Rules of 1983, rendered the order of termination unsustainable. Therefore, the appellate authority rightly set aside the termination order. He further submits that, as per the proviso to Section 6(a) (iii) of the Adhiniyam, 1978, the appellate authority is empowered to hold such inquiry as it deems fit and may confirm, modify, or set aside the impugned order. In the present case, the appellate authority conducted an inquiry after giving due opportunity to the petitioner to participate. Upon 3 being satisfied with the inquiry findings, the appellate authority passed a reasoned order setting aside the termination. Thus, the order is both legal and speaking in nature. 5. Learned counsel for the State, referring to the original record, submits that upon presentation of the appeal by respondent No. 3, an inquiry officer was appointed, who conducted an inquiry in which due opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the impugned order was passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 7. The impugned order indicates that the termination of respondent No. 3 was set aside after due consideration. It also reflects that, in accordance with Section Section 6(a)(iii), the decision to set aside the termination order was taken after hearing the concerned parties. The provisions of Section 6(a)(iii), being material for adjudication, are reproduced herein below: Section 6 (a)(iii) “no teacher or other employee shall be dismissed or removed from service or his services terminated except by an order passed after following such procedure as may be prescribed): Provided that a teacher or other employee may prefer an appeal against his dismissal, removal or termination from service to an appellate authority as the State Government may, by notification, specify within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order by him and such authority may after holding such enquiry as it may deem fit in the manner prescribed, may either set aside or confirm or modify the said order and pending the disposal of appeal, the appellate authority may also stay the operation of order on such grounds, as it thinks fit;” 4 8. A perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly reveals that before passing any order of termination, the prescribed procedure must be followed. It also mandates that prior approval from the competent authority, i.e., the State Government, must be obtained. 9. Admittedly, when a specific query was put to learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether any inquiry was conducted prior to the termination of respondent No. 3, the answer was in the negative that no inquiry was conducted. The record further demonstrates that upon filing of the appeal by respondent No. 3, an inquiry was instituted under Section 6 of the Adhiniyam, 1978, in which the petitioner was duly notified and participated. Upon due consideration, a decision was taken to set aside the termination order. The impugned order merely communicates the outcome of that inquiry and, therefore, cannot be said to be in violation of the principles of natural justice or to be a non-speaking order. 10. Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality or irregularity in the passing of the impugned order. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge H.Ansari HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2025.10.14 18:03:11 +0530