Page No.# 1/23 GAHC020005452023 2025:GAU-NL:374 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WP(C)/231/2023 SHRI HOWOTO SUMI, PERMANENT R/O SURUHUTO TOWN, P.O AND P.S SURUHUTO, DISTRICT ZUNHEBOTO , NAGALAND VERSUS THE STATE OF NAGALAND AND 2 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND, DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION, NAGALAND, KOHIMA 2:THE PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION NAGALAND KOHIMA 3:THE SUB-DIVISIONAL EDUCATION OFFICER ZUNHEBOTO NAGALAN Advocate for the Petitioner : LIMAWAPANG, PFOSEKHO PFOTTE,AREPLA CHANG Advocate for the Respondent : GOVT ADV NL, Page No.# 2/23 BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA Advocates for the petitioner : Mr. Limawapang, Advocate Mr. Pfosekho Pfotte, Advocate Advocate for the respondents : Ms. V Suokhrie, Additional AG, Nagaland Date of hearing : 07.11.2024, 12.11.2024, 10.02.2025 & 23.06.2025 Date of Judgment : 13.08.2025 Judgment and Order (CAV) Heard Mr. Limawapang, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. V Suokhrie, learned Additional Advocate General, Nagaland, for the respondents. 2] The case projected by on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner while in service as a primary teacher at GPS Surumi under the establishment of Deputy Inspector of Schools, Zunheboto tendered his resignation by a letter dated 31.10.2017 requesting the authorities to accept his resignation from service. His resignation was stated to have been submitted in view of personal reasons. Subsequently, the petitioner after overcoming his personal difficulties by communication dated Page No.# 3/23 30.03.2021 informed the respondent no.2 about his willingness to continue in his service since his resignation tendered on 31.10.2017 was not accepted. However, the authorities by impugned communication dated 10.11.2022 accepted the resignation submitted by the petitioner with effect from 31.10.2017. The authorities, thereafter, processed the necessary papers for drawal of leave encashment in respect of the petitioner as well as GIS. A non-drawal certificate in favour of the petitioner was also issued by the Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto, Nagaland. 3] It is submitted on behalf of learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the petitioner was initially appointed on ad hoc basis as a primary teacher at GPS Surumi under the establishment of Deputy Inspector of Schools, Zunheboto by order dated 03.02.1999. Subsequently, his service stood regularized with effect 30.03.2001 along with other similarly situated employees/teachers. Thereafter, the petitioner continued to render his service, however, as the petitioner was suffering from unavoidable personal problems because of which it was difficult for him to discharge his duties as a teacher he tendered his resignation by communication dated 31.10.2017. The resignation was tendered to the respondent no.2, namely, the Principal Director, Department of School Education, Nagaland, Page No.# 4/23 Kohima. His resignation was also forwarded by the Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto, Nagaland with a request to issue the acceptance at an early date. Thereafter, on 30.03.2021 the petitioner submitted an application seeking withdrawal of his resignation expressing his desire to continue in his service. The petitioner expressed his desire to continue in his service as his resignation was not accepted by the Department. This communication was again forwarded by the Senior Sub- Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto to the Principal Director, Directorate of School Education, Nagaland, Kohima by communication dated 06.04.2021. However, instead of permitting the petitioner to continue in service without considering his application dated 30.03.2021, praying for withdrawal of his resignation, the respondent no.2 issued the impugned order dated 10.11.2022, whereby his resignation was accepted with effect from 31.10.2017. Subsequent thereto the leave encashment and non drawal certificate as well as release of GIS was processed by the authorities but the petitioner was not allowed to withdraw his resignation. 4] It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is evident from the communication dated 31.10.2017 issued by the Sub- Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto, that the proposal for tendering resignation of the petitioner was forwarded to the Principal Director, Page No.# 5/23 Department of School Education, Kohima, Nagaland with a request to issue acceptance at the earliest. However, no such order was issued by the respondent authorities and as no step was taken to process his resignation, the petitioner submitted his application seeking withdrawal of the resignation. However, the authorities accepted the resignation with effect from 31.10.2017 only on 10.11.2022 and thereby, denying the petitioner to resume his service as a primary teacher GPS Surumi under the establishment of Deputy Inspector of Schools, Zunheboto. 5] In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Air India Express Limited and Others vs. Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu reported in (2019) 17 SCC 129 and Sambhu Murari Sinha vs. Project & Development India and Another reported in (2000) 5 SCC 621. 6] Pressing these judgments into service learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the law laid down by the Apex Court provides that the resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted. It is submitted that since the petitioner had already applied for withdrawal of his resignation with a request to permit him to continue his service by an application dated 30.03.2021, and it is evident that his resignation was Page No.# 6/23 accepted well after his application dated 30.03.2021 was filed seeking withdrawal by the order dated 10.11.2022. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 10.11.2022 could not have been issued without consideration of the application seeking withdrawal of his resignation by the communication dated 30.03.2021. Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court, it is submitted that where the petitioner has clearly expressed his desire to permit him to continue in service, there is no question of acceptance of the resignation tendered on 31.10.2017 without first considering his resignation. 7] Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General, Nagaland has strongly disputed the case projected by the petitioner and the respondents have contested the matter by filing an affidavit. Referring to the said affidavit, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the petitioner’s resignation dated 31.10.2017 was formally received by the Directorate only on 02.02.2018. However, due to over cite the petitioner was paid his salary for November and December, 2017 erroneously. It is submitted that proper instructions have been issued to the Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto, to initiate the recovery process. This direction was communicated by communication dated 19.04.2018 outlying the necessary steps to retrieve the salary for over payment. It is further Page No.# 7/23 submitted that the Covid-19 pandemic had also contributed the delay in reclaiming the overpayment and the process for recovery of the salary of the payment of the petitioner was only concluded on 22.08.2022 (Page 4 of the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents no.1, 2 & 3). It is submitted that pursuant to his resignation submitted, the petitioner did not attend his service with effect from November, 2017 and he has expressed his desire to continue in service only in the year 2021 and therefore, for practically 4 years the petitioner did not attend his service and therefore, it has to be accepted that the petitioner has abandoned his services without applying for leave as per rules. It is also submitted that the petitioner is projecting a contradictory stand, inasmuch as, while the petitioner is claiming leave encashment and GIS, which have already been processed, on the other hand, the petitioner is also simultaneously seeking continuation of service. Therefore, it has to be accepted that the petitioner is not interested in continuing in his services and therefore, there is no infirmity in issuing the order accepting the resignation of the petitioner and therefore, consequently, there is no question of allowing the petitioner to continue his service as the petitioner has already abandoned his duties for the past approximately 4 (four) years. It is also stated that the request for continuation of service issued by the petitioner Page No.# 8/23 which is enclosed as Annexure- 5 to the writ petition although shown to have been issued by the petitioner, however, the signature on the said letter is of one ‘H Jakholu’. It is, therefore, submitted that this letter requesting for continuation of service does not appear to be submitted by the petitioner and it is, therefore, to be treated as non est in the eye of law. Consequently, the petitioner has been treated to have been voluntarily resigned from service and ceased to be in service with effect from 31.10.2017. In support of her contention, learned Additional Advocate General, Nagaland has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Vijay S. Sathaye vs. Indian Airlines Limited and Others reported in (2013) 10 SCC 253 and Rajasthan State Electricity Board and Others vs. Brij Mohan Parihar reported in (2000) 9 SCC 269. 8] Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and pleadings available on record have been carefully perused. The judgments pressed into service have also been carefully perused. 9] In AIR India Expresses Limited (supra) the Apex Court had examined the earlier precedents and had held that normally, until the resignation became effective it is open to an employee to withdraw his resignation. When the resignation would become effective would depend the Page No.# 9/23 governing service regulation and/or the terms and condition of the office/post. Referring to the earlier judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Misra reported in (1978) 2 SCC 301, it was held that in the absence of anything to the contrary in the governing the terms and conditions of the office/post or in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a 'prospective' resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective. Relevant paragraphs of AIR India Expresses Limited (supra) is extracted below : ”11. The circumstances under which an employee can withdraw the resignation tendered by him and what are the limitations to the exercise of such right, have been dealt by this Court in a number of decisions. 11.1. In Jai Ram v. Union of India [Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 584] , the government servant concerned was to attain age of 55 years on 26-11-1946. He applied on 7-5-1945 for leave preparatory to retirement in terms of Fundamental Rule 86. The request was finally allowed and he was given 6 months' leave which was to expire on 25-5-1947. Ten days before such expiry i.e. on 16-5-1947, he sent an intimation that he would resume his duties which request was rejected. The submission that the age of retirement was 60 years was rejected by this Court. The submission that in terms of Rule 56(b)(i) of Chapter IX of the Fundamental Rules, if found efficient, he could have continued till he attained the age of 60 years, was rejected. It was observed that when a public servant himself expresses his inability to continue in service any longer and seeks permission for retirement, the required exercise in terms of said Rule 56(b) (i) to decide whether to continue him beyond the age of 55 years was rightly not undertaken and the age of retirement for him would be 55 years. Page No.# 10/23 In the context whether he could apply for resuming duties on 16-5-1947, it was observed by the Constitution Bench of this Court : (AIR pp. 586-87, para 7) “7. … It may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has expressed a desire to retire from service and applied to his superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus obtained; but he can be allowed to do so long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated. As we have said above, the plaintiff's service ceased on 27-11-1946; the leave, which was allowed to him subsequent to that date, was post-retirement leave which was granted under the special circumstances mentioned in FR 86. He could not be held to continue in service after 26-11-1946, and consequently it was no longer competent to him to apply for joining his duties on the 16-5-1947, even though the post-retirement leave had not yet run out. In our opinion, the decision [Union of India v. Jai Ram, 1952 SCC OnLine P&H 52 : ILR (1952) 1 P&H 562] of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court is right and this appeal should stand dismissed.” 11.2. In Raj Kumar v. Union of India [Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 857 : AIR 1969 SC 180] , an officer belonging to the Indian Administrative Service tendered resignation and addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan on 30-8-1964 that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with remarks of the State Government. The State Government recommended that the resignation be accepted and on 31-10- 1964 the Government of India requested the Chief Secretary to the State Government “to intimate the date on which the appellant was relieved of his duties so that a formal notification could be issued in that behalf”. Before the date could be intimated and formal notification could be issued, the officer withdrew his resignation by letter dated 27-11-1964. On 29-3-1965 an order accepting his resignation was issued. The challenge raised by the officer was rejected and the High Court held [Raj Kumar v. Union of India, 1965 SCC OnLine P&H 187 : ILR (1966) 1 P&H 236] that the resignation became effective on the date the Government of India had accepted it. While dismissing the appeal, a Bench of three Judges of this Court observed Page No.# 11/23 : (AIR p. 182, paras 4-5) “ 4. The letters written by the appellant on 21-8-1964, and 30-8- 1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to become effective until acceptance thereof was intimated to the appellant. The appellant informed the authorities of the State of Rajasthan that his resignation may be forwarded for early acceptance. On the plain terms of the letters, the resignation was to become effective as soon as it was accepted by the appointing authority. No rule has been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which enacts that for an order accepting the resignation to be effective, it must be communicated to the person submitting his resignation. 5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika [State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313] in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on which the order was actually written out by the said authority; such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the officer concerned or was otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of India. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties.” 11.3. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] the issue for consideration was whether a High Court Judge, who had by letter in his own handwriting sent to the President intimated his intention to resign the Page No.# 12/23 office with effect from a future date would be competent to withdraw the resignation before the date had reached? The decisions in Jai Ram [Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 584] and Raj Kumar [Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 857 : AIR 1969 SC 180] were considered and while dealing with the scope of clause (a) of the proviso to Article 217 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench of this Court stated : (Gopal Chandra Misra case [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] , SCC pp. 309-10, paras 20 & 22) “20. Here, in this case, we have to focus attention on clause (a) of the proviso. In order to terminate his tenure under this clause, the Judge must do three volitional things : Firstly, he should execute a “writing under his hand”. Secondly, the writing should be “addressed to the President”. Thirdly, by that writing he should “resign his office”. If any of these things is not done, or the performance of any of them is not complete, clause (a) will not operate to cut short or terminate the tenure of his office. 22. It may be observed that the entire edifice of this reasoning is founded on the supposition that the “Judge” had completely performed everything which he was required to do under proviso (a) to Article 217(1). We have seen that to enable a Judge to terminate his term of office by his own unilateral act, he has to perform three things. In the instant case, there can be no dispute about the performance of the first two, namely : (i) he wrote a letter under his hand, (ii) addressed to the President. Thus, the first two pillars of the ratiocinative edifice raised by the High Court rest on sound foundations. But, is the same true about the third, which indisputably is the chief prop of that edifice? Is it a completed act of resignation within the contemplation of proviso (a)? This is the primary question that calls for an answer. If the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the appeals must fail. If it be in the negative, the foundation for the reasoning of the High Court will fail and the appeals succeed.” 11.4. The tenor and the effect of resignation were then considered in para 28 and it was held that the letter in question was merely an intimation or notice to resign the office on a future date and it was open to withdraw the resignation before the arrival of the indicated future date. The observations were : (Gopal Chandra Misra case [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] , SCC p. 311, para 28) “28. The substantive body of this letter (which has been extracted in full in a foregoing part of this judgment) is comprised of three Page No.# 13/23 sentences only. In the first sentence, it is stated:‘I beg to resign my office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.’ Had this sentence stood alone, or been the only content of this letter, it would operate as a complete resignation in praesenti, involving immediate relinquishment of the office and termination of his tenure as Judge. But this is not so. The first sentence is immediately followed by two more, which read:‘I will be on leave till 31-7-1977. My resignation shall be effective on 1-8-1977.’ The first sentence cannot be divorced from the context of the other two sentences and construed in isolation. It has to be read along with the succeeding two which qualify it. Construed as a whole according to its tenor, the letter dated 7-5-1977, is merely an intimation or notice of the writer's intention to resign his office as Judge, on a future date viz. 1-8-1977. For the sake of convenience, we might call this communication as a prospective or potential resignation, but before the arrival of the indicated future date it was certainly not a complete and operative resignation because, by itself, it did not and could not, sever the writer from the office of the Judge, or terminate his tenure as such.” 11.5. The Court went on to state the principles as : (Gopal Chandra Misra case [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] , SCC pp. 314-15 & 317, paras 41 & 50) “41. The general principle that emerges from the foregoing conspectus, is that in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/post, an intimation in writing sent to the competent authority by the incumbent, of his intention or proposal to resign his office/post from a future specified date can be withdrawn by him at any time before it becomes effective i.e. before it effects termination of the tenure of the office/post or the employment. *** 50. It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a “prospective” resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office-tenure of the resigner. This general rule is equally applicable to government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of a government servant/or functionary/who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office-tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a constitutional functionary and under proviso (a) to Article 217(1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own Page No.# 14/23 volition, chooses to quit office. If in terms of the writing under his hand addressed to the President, he resigns in praesenti, the resignation terminates his office-tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date the act of resigning office is not complete because it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective, withdraw it, because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal.” 11.6. As regards the applicability of the rule in Jai Ram [Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 584] , it was stated : (Gopal Chandra Misra case [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] , SCC p. 317, para 49) “49. In our opinion, none of the aforesaid reasons given by the High Court for getting out of the ratio of Jai Ram case [Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 584] is valid. Firstly, it was not a “casual” enunciation. It was necessary to dispose of effectually and completely the second point that had been canvassed on behalf of Jai Ram [Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 584] . Moreover, the same principle was reiterated pointedly in 1968 in Raj Kumar case [Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 857 : AIR 1969 SC 180] . Secondly, a proposal to retire from service/office and a tender to resign office from a future date for the purpose of the point under discussion, stand on the same footing. Thirdly, the distinction between a case where the resignation is required to be accepted and the one where no acceptance is required, makes no difference to the applicability of the rule in Jai Ram case [Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 584] .” 11.7. In Balram Gupta v. Union of India [Balram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126] the officer concerned was an accountant in the Photo Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. While holding that the matter was covered by the decisions of this Court in Raj Kumar [Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 857 : AIR 1969 SC 180] and Gopal Chandra Misra [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] , this Court considered the relevant guidelines and observed : (Balram Gupta case [Balram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126] , SCC pp. 235-36, para 12) “12. In this case the guidelines are that ordinarily permission should not be granted unless the officer concerned is in a position to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances in consideration of which the notice was originally given. In the facts of the instant case such indication has been given. The appellant has stated that on the persistent and personal requests of the staff members he had dropped the idea of seeking voluntary retirement. Page No.# 15/23 We do not see how this could not be a good and valid reason. It is true that he was resigning and in the notice for resignation he had not given any reason except to state that he sought voluntary retirement. We see nothing wrong in this. In the modern age we should not put embargo upon people's choice or freedom. If, however, the administration had made arrangements acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available for his job, that would be another matter but the appellant's offer to retire and withdrawal of the same happened in such quick succession that it cannot be said that any administrative set-up or arrangement was affected. The administration has now taken a long time by its own attitude to communicate the matter. For this the respondent is to blame and not the appellant.” 11.8. The principles laid down in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] have since then been followed by this Court in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology [P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, (1981) 1 SCC 405 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 192] , Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal [Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 175 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 143] , Moti Ram v. Param Dev [Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725] , Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia [Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia, (1997) 4 SCC 280 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 941] , Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd. [Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd., (1998) 5 SCC 461 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1379] , J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India [J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India, (1998) 9 SCC 559 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1251] , Union of India v. T. Parthasarathy [Union of India v. T. Parthasarathy, (2001) 1 SCC 158 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 180] , Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India Ltd. [Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 437 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 444] , Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar [Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar, (2003) 2 SCC 721 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 200] , RBI v. Cecil Dennis Solomon [RBI v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, (2004) 9 SCC 461 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 737] , Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. [Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 314 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1119] , Secy., Technical Education v. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay [Secy., Technical Education v. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay, (2007) 4 SCC 492 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 41] , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Raghuvir Singh Narang [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Raghuvir Singh Narang, (2010) 5 SCC 335 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 409 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 15] and Union of India v. Hitender Kumar Soni [Union of India v. Hitender Kumar Soni, (2014) 13 SCC 204 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 279] . 11.9. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal [Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 175 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 143] a permanent officer in the bank sent a letter of resignation on 21-1-1986 in terms of Regulation 20 Page No.# 16/23 of PNB (Officers) Service Regulation, 1979, which was to become effective on 30-6-1986. By communication dated 7-2-1986, he was informed that his resignation was accepted with immediate effect. The resignation was withdrawn by the officer on 15-4-1986. The issue therefore arose in the context of said Regulation 20, whether the officer could withdraw the resignation. Regulation 20 was as under: “20. (1) Subject to sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 16, the bank may terminate the services of any officer by giving him three months' notice in writing or by paying him three months' emoluments in lieu thereof. (2) No officer shall resign from the service of the bank otherwise than on the expiry of three months from the service on the bank of a notice in writing of such resignation: Provided further that the competent authority may reduce the period of three months, or remit the requirement of notice.” 11.10. The submission that clause (2) of Regulation 20 and its proviso were intended only to safeguard the bank's interest and as such the bank could accept the resignation before the date when it was to come into effect was rejected by this Court in following terms : (P.K. Mittal case [Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 175 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 143] , SCC pp. 179-80, paras 7-8) “7. Dr Anand Prakash emphasises that as clause (2) and its proviso are intended only to safeguard the bank's interests they should be interpreted on the lines suggested by him. We are of the opinion that clause (2) of the regulation and its proviso are intended not only for the protection of the bank but also for the benefit of the employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to resign often wavers in this decision and even in a case where he has taken a firm decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out immediately. In most cases he would need a period of adjustment and hence like to defer the actual date of relief from duties for a few months for various personal reasons. Equally an employer may like to have time to make some alternative arrangement before relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the employee a period of adjustment and rethinking. It also enables the bank to have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an appropriate case, to accept the resignation of an employee even without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The proviso in our opinion should not be interpreted as enabling a bank to thrust a resignation on an employee with effect from a date different from the one on which he can make his resignation effective under the terms of the regulation. We, therefore, agree with the High Court [Pradeep Kumar Mittal v. Punjab National Bank, 1986 SCC OnLine Del 162 : (1986) 2 LLN 729] that in the present case the resignation of the employee could have become effective only on or about 21-4- Page No.# 17/23 1986 or on 30-6-1986 and that the bank could not have “accepted” that resignation on any earlier date. The letter dated 7-2-1986 was, therefore, without jurisdiction. 8. The result of the above interpretation is that the employee continued to be in service till 21-4-1986 or 30-6-1986, on which date his services would have come normally to an end in terms of his letter dated 21-1-1986. But, by that time, he had exercised his right to withdraw the resignation. Since the withdrawal letter was written before the resignation became effective, the resignation stands withdrawn, with the result that the respondent continues to be in the service of the bank. It is true that there is no specific provision in the regulations permitting the employee to withdraw the resignation. It is, however, not necessary that there should be any such specific rule. Until the resignation becomes effective on the terms of the letter read with Regulation 20, it is open to the employee, on general principles, to withdraw his letter of resignation. That is why, in some cases of public services, this right of withdrawal is also made subject to the permission of the employer. There is no such clause here. It is not necessary to labour this point further as it is well settled by the earlier decisions of this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India [Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 857 : AIR 1969 SC 180] , Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] and Balram Gupta v. Union of India [Balram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126] 12. It is thus well settled that normally, until the resignation becomes effective, it is open to an employee to withdraw his resignation. When would the resignation become effective may depend upon the governing service regulations and/or the terms and conditions of the office/post. As stated in paras 41 and 50 in Gopal Chandra Misra [Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] , “in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/post” or “in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional bar, a ‘prospective resignation’ can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective”. Further, as laid down in Balram Gupta [Balram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126] , “If, however, the administration had made arrangements acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available for his job, that would be another matter.” 10] The judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Sambhu Murari Sinha (supra) was also considered in the judgment rendered by the Apex Page No.# 18/23 Court in AIR India Express Limited (supra). In Sambhu Murari Sinha (supra), it was held that the resignation tender could be withdrawn before the person is actually relieved from service. 11] Coming to the judgments referred to by the respondents in Vijay S. Sathaye (supra) it has been held that an employee has the right to abandon his service any time voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternative, not joining the duty and remaining absent for a long. While absence from duty in the beginning may be misconduct but when such absence is for a long period, it may amount to voluntarily abandonment of service, resulting in termination of service automatically without necessitating any further order to be passed from the employer. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board (supra), on the facts of the case therein, the employee therein had tendered resignation with effect from 25.11.1983 and thereafter, he absented himself for 4 years, subsequently on 24.08.1987 the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (supra) accepted his resignation. The Apex Court held that the view expressed by the High Court that in the absence of any formal order accepting resignation, the employee was deemed to have been continued in service who was held to be unsustainable. The Apex Court held that the conduct of the employee therein was sufficient to indicate that he himself resigned from the post Page No.# 19/23 which he was holding with effect from 25.11.1983, particularly, when he himself had thereafter demanded payment of gratuity and other post retirement benefits. 12] From a careful analysis of the judgments referred to and discussed above, it is clear that the intention of the employee is significant to determine whether his intention to resign from service was evident. Unless the rules otherwise prescribed, an employee may ordinarily withdraw their resignation before it has been accepted. But where the rules do not provide, it is the conduct of the employee as well as that of the respondent authorities must be examined to determine whether the employee’s resignation was accepted and/or whether the employee considered himself to have severed the jural ties with the employer. 13] Coming to the facts of the case, it is evident that the petitioner tendered his resignation on 31.10.2017. This resignation was duly forwarded by the Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto, Nagaland by his communication dated 31.10.2017 which is seen to have been processed in the file from the endorsement reflected on the said document. The communication forwarding the proposal is enclosed to the writ petition as Annexure-4. The proposal clearly requested the authority Page No.# 20/23 to issue acceptance of the resignation of the petitioner at the earliest. As such, it appears that the resignation tendered by the petitioner was required to be accepted by the authority at the earliest. Pursuant to the resignation being submitted and the same being forwarded to the higher authority, no materials is placed before the Court to suggest that the respondent authorities have processed the request for tendering the resignation of the petitioner and thereafter, processing his claims, if any, for retiral benefits. The proposals for processing for leave encashment and GIS were sent only in the year 2023. There is no material placed before the respondent authorities before this Court as to what action was taken on the said proposal, if any, between the date of submission of the resignation by the petitioner i.e. 31.10.2017 and the withdrawal of the resignation stated to have been submitted by him on 30.03.2021. The said withdrawal of resignation and request for continuation of service was also forwarded by the Sr. Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Zunheboto on 06.04.2021. It appears that it is only after the request for continuation of service and/or the withdrawal of the resignation submitted by the petitioner, the impugned order dated 10.11.2022 was issued by the respondent authorities accepting his resignation. Ordinarily, in view of the law laid down by the Court it would be evidently clear that the petitioner Page No.# 21/23 had indeed requested for continuation of service pursuant to his application seeking resignation from service and which can be construed to be an application seeking withdrawal of his resignation. However, there is an objection raised by the respondents that the communication dated 30.03.2021, stated to have been submitted by the petitioner, requesting for withdrawal of the resignation letter dated 31.10.2017 and allowing him to continue in service although shown to have been sent in the name of the petitioner, the signature which is reflected on the said communication which is enclosed as Annexure-V to the writ petition is that of one ‘H Gakholu’. Whether the said ‘H Gakholu’ and the writ petitioner namely, Howoto Sumi are one and the same person is not clear from the materials available before this Court. In addition thereto in the affidavit supporting the writ petition, the petitioner is shown to be the son of one Inahe Zokhalu. As such, it is possible that the petitioner, namely, Howoto Sumi and ‘H Gakholu’ whose name appears in the communication requesting for continuation of service, may be one and the same person. However, as discussed above, there is no proper materials available before this Court in this regard. The petitioner has also not filed any rejoinder affidavit disputing the contention of the respondent authorities in so far as the controversy regarding the name of the sender in the communication dated Page No.# 22/23 30.03.2021 (Annexure-V of the writ petition) is concerned, this Court is of the view that ends of justice will be met, if the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondent no.2, namely, the Principal Director, Department of School Education to conduct a detailed enquiry as to whether the petitioner, namely, Howoto Sumi and ‘H Gakholu’ are one and the same person. If, after conclusion of the enquiry, if the writ petitioner and H Gakholu are found to be one and the same person then the respondent authority will pass detailed order examining the circumstances as to why the resignation of the writ petitioner was submitted on 31.10.2017 and although forwarded on the same day by the Sub Divisional Education Officer was not accepted. 14] The matter is, therefore, remanded back to the respondent authority, namely, the respondent no. 2 to carry out the directions as issued by this Court in the light of the judgment and law laid down by the Apex Court in AIR India Expresses Limited (Supra). The impugned order dated 10.11.2022 accepting the resignation of the petitioner with effect from 31.10.2017, therefore, is set aside to enable the respondent authority to pass a speaking order a fresh in the said order. If the application for continuation of service is found to have been submitted by the petitioner than the petitioner will be allowed to continue in service, in Page No.# 23/23 that event the question of release of payment of back wages is left to the authority to be decided by the respondents. 15] With the above observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant