1 2025:CGHC:22352-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 342 of 2025 1 - Indian Institute Of Management Raipur, Through Chief Executive Officer, Po Kuru, Tehsil Abhanpur, District Raipur C.G. 2 - Dr. Ram Kalani, Director, IIM Raipur, Office Address at IIM Raipur, Tehsil Abhnpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus 1 - Dr. Parikshit Charan S/o Shri Mool Singh Charan Aged About 49 Years R/o Flat No.5, Block 1, Faculty R/o, IIM Raipur Campus, Dist- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Board Of Governor Through The Chairman Shri Puneet Dalmia, Dalmia Bharat Limited, R/o 11 And 12 Floor, Hansalaya Building, 15 Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 110001 ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr.G.Vidhya Sagar, Senior Advocate assisted by Dr.Shiv Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr.Sudeep Johri, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 27.05.2025 BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP 2 1. Heard Mr. Mr.G.Vidhya Sagar, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Dr.Shiv Kumar Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr.Sudeep Johri, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1. 2. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 9.5.2025 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in WPS No. 3209/2025 by which learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein. 3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this writ appeal are that initially respondent No.1 was appointed on the post of Assistant Professor in the Indian Institute of Management, Raipur on 27/05/2013. Subsequently, he was appointed as Associate Professor on 01/07/2019. When in the month of July, 2023, his candidature was not considered for promotion to the post of Professor he approached the authorities however, the authorities denied the claim of respondent No.1 on the basis of bogus complaint and issued the chargesheet against respondent No.1 and even respondent No.1 was placed under suspension. Against the said charge sheet and the suspension order, respondent No.1 approached this Court by filing WPS No.2832/2024 and WPS No.218/2025 which were allowed by this Court by common order dated 24/04/2025. When respondent No.1 submitted the copy of the order of this Court, appellant No.2 again placed respondent No.1 under suspension by the order impugned dated 28/04/2025 3 by referring the charge sheet dated 18/04/2024, despite the fact that the said charge sheet has already quashed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petitions. Against which, respondent No.1 approached this Court by filing WPS No.3209 of 2025, which was allowed by learned Single Judge by the impugned order. Hence, this writ appeal. 4. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants submits that learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated facts, grounds and law applicable the case in passing of the impugned order dated 09/05/2025 (Annexure A/1). Learned Single Judge has erred in interpretation of Section 11(2) (i) of the IIM Act that BOG is appointing authority of respondent No.1 because reading together Sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the IIM Act, it is vivid that BOG has only powers to make policies and not to discharge any executive actions. He further submits that learned Single Judge has not considered that respondent No.1 was appointed in the Appellant Institute in the year 2013, i.e. before enactment of the IIM Act, 2017, hence his service will be governed treating that "held had this Act not been enacted and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment is terminated". Accordingly, only on this count the service condition of respondent No.1 will be governed as per provisions of the HR Policy and Service Rules (updated up to 2023). Since respondent No.1 was appointed in the Appellant Institute prior to enactment of IIM Act, hence his services shall be governed under the provisions of HR Policy and Service Rules, 4 considering that IIM Act has not been enacted, as provided under Section 5(d) of the Act. He also submits that learned Single Judge has not considered arguments of the appellants in passing of the impugned order and only in cryptic noted arguments of the appellants in a para in precise manner but none of them has been declined by learned Single Judge. On one hand learned Single Judge has held in its order dated 24/04/2025 that the provisions of the IIM Act 2017 will prevail, but to the contrary provisions given under Sections 5(d), 11 (1) and 35 of the Act has not been considered in passing of the impugned order, though these were duly argued and demonstrated by the appellants. He contended that in the matter of WPS No. 6831 of 2024 Lata Goyal v. The Union Of India and other (order dated 5/5/2025), learned Single Judge Court has upheld the validity and applicability of HR Policy and Service Rules on employees of the Institute. He further contended that learned Single Judge has not considered the submission of the appellants that respondent No.1 has failed to demonstrate that in place of existing HR Policy and Service Rule which rule or regulation has been framed by the BOG to regulate service condition of faculties and employees in the Appellant Institute. He also contended that learned Single Judge has wrongly interpreted law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath because respondent No.1 has not terminated by the Director of the Institute but disciplinary proceedings was initiated. He submitted that learned Single Judge 5 has wrongly held that the Director is not competent to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein, in which no interference is called for. He further submits that earlier also, the writ petitions being WPS Nos.2832 of 2024 and 218 of 2025 filed by respondent No.1 were allowed by the same Bench vide its order dated 24/04/2025 and writ appeal filed against the said order by the appellants was withdrawn by them vide order dated 22.05.2025 with liberty to take recourse to law before learned Single Judge and in the meantime, the appellants herein again on 28.04.2025 placed respondent No.1 under suspension, which has been set aside by learned Single Judge by the impugned order and as such, the present writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 7. Earlier respondent No.1 herein preferred two writ petitions before this Court bearing WPS No.2832/2024 and WPS No.218/2025 wherein he sought a relief for quashment of the charge sheet, 6 disciplinary proceedings as also the earlier suspension order. The said writ petition were allowed by common order dated 24/04/2025 observing thus at paras 8 to 12 : 8) Section 11 of the Act, 2017 speaks about 'Powers and Function of the Board', subject to the provisions of the Act, the Board of every institute shall be responsible for the general superintendence, directions and control of the affairs of the institute and shall have the power to frame or amend or modified or rescind the regulation governing the affairs of the institute to achieve the objects of the Institute specified in Section 6. Section 11 (2) (i) of the Act, 2017 provides that the Board shall have the power to create academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to make appointments thereto. From the said provisions, it is crystal clear that the BOG is the appointing authority of the petitioner. Thus, the charge-sheet can only be issued upon approval of the BOG, but the same has not been followed in the case in hand. Even, the respondents failed to show that the powers delegated by the BOG upon the Director. The charge-sheet issued by the other authority than the specified authority was wholly without jurisdiction and vitiated the whole disciplinary proceedings. 9) Such procedure adopted by the Director would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311 (2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Such a charge sheet 7 can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority, in the case at hand, it is BOG, not the Director. (See: Union of India v. B.V.Gopinath & Others). 10) It is well settled proposition of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. (See: Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Others). 11) As far as the HR Policy is concerned, the same is nothing but internal arrangement of the establishment. Even otherwise, the policy/guidelines cannot supersede the statutes i.e. the Act, 2017. Even the respondents failed to show that the provisions of the Act, 2017 will not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 12) Guidelines/policy per se do not partake to the character of statute. Such guidelines/policy in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. This is because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall into the category of legislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary. They have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence to or deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible if the circumstances of any particular fact or law situation warrants the same. Judicial control takes over only where the deviation either involves arbitrariness or discrimination or is so fundamental as to undermine a basic public purpose which the guidelines and the statute under which they are issued are intended to achieve. (See: Poonam Verma & Others v. Delhi Development Authority). 8 8. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that learned Single Judge held that on going through the pleadings and documents, it is manifest that the respondents completely placed reliance upon the HR Policy of the IIM whereas Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the first regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye-laws of each Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Learned Single Judge further held that bare perusal, it is quite vivid that as per Section 11(2)(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing authority of the petitioner and the disciplinary action including passing of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the respondent is inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the provision regarding the appointing authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 in its true perspective. By applying the provisions of the Act, 2017, the earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner were allowed and granted liberty to the IIM to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised. Despite granting the said liberty, again without following the provisions of the Act, 2017 on the strength of the HR Policy the 9 impugned suspension order has been passed by the respondent No.2 and allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein and quashed the order dated 28/04/2025. However, liberty was reserved in favour fo the IIM to proceed against the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) as per the provisions of the Act, 2027, if so advised. Even otherwise, writ appeal filed against the order dated 24/04/2025 was withdrawn by the appellants with liberty to take recourse to law before learned Single Judge and thereafter no review was filed. 9. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties, perusing the order dated 24/04/2025 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in WPS Nos.2832 of 2024 and 218 of 2025, further perusing the order dated 22/05/2025 passed in writ appeal and also considering the findings recorded by learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein, we are of the considered opinion that learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court. 10. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bini/Bablu