Page No.# 1/11 GAHC020004492025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : Bail Appln./12/2025 MR. S. SAMUEL TUNGOE FATHER OF THE ACCUSED-LIKAO TUNGOE, R/O H.NO. A/120 SOVIMA VILLAGE, CHUMOUKEDIMA, NAGALAND VERSUS STATE OF NAGALAND NAGALAND KOHIMA Advocate for the Petitioner : A. ZHO, B. SOTO,AJANO Advocate for the Respondent : P.P, NAGALAND, BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR ORDER Date : 21-08-2025 Heard Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Livika, learned P.P for the State of Nagaland. 2. This is an application filed under section 483 BNSS, 2023 seeking bail for one Mr. Likao Tungoe in connection with East Police Station Case No. 0087/2025, registered u/s 140(2)/308(2), (3) & (5) of the BNS, 2023. 3. The applicant is the father of Likao Tungoe, who is one of the accused in the aforesaid case. Notice was issued on 29.07.2025 and the Page No.# 2/11 CD was called for. The CD and the other relevant materials have been received and the matter has been taken up for final consideration. 4. The brief facts leading to the case is that one Pongshithung Yanthan, proprietor of Quinker Enterprises had lodged an FIR on 04.06.2025 before the Officer-in-Charge, East Police Station, Dimapur, Nagaland alleging that a group of four unknown miscreants had come to his office located at Burma Camp on 03/07/2025 at around 3:00 P.M and forcibly took away his manager Shri. Jaswant Kumar Tagore on allegations of selling expired goods. The FIR further alleged that Mr. Jaswant Kumar Tagore was held at gunpoint and a demand of Rs. 30 lakhs was made. The informant alleged that he was compelled to pay Rs. 12 lakhs to the individuals to ensure the safe release of his manager. The informant requested to register the complaint as an FIR and take immediate and appropriate action against the culprits involved. On receipt of the said FIR in the East Police Station, Dimapur, P.S Case No. 0087/2025 u/s 140(3)/308(2)(3)(5) BNS was registered and the matter was endorsed to UBSI for investigation. During the course of investigation, the victim of the case was examined on 05/06/2025. On 07/06/2025, two persons namely Akhato Awomi and Toluvi Zhimo appeared before the I.O and surrendered themselves. After medical examination, both were taken into custody and were forwarded to the Court of the CJM with prayer for granting 72 Hrs. of Police custody remand. In a similar manner, the son of the petitioner in this bail petition i.e. Likao Tungoe appeared before the East Police Station on 26/06/2025 and surrendered himself. After being sent for medical examination and on being found physically fit, he was taken into Police custody. Recovery of Rs. 1,50,000/- was found from his possession during search. The said accused was produced before the learned CJM, Dimapur, Nagaland on 27/06/2025 praying for 72 Hrs. Police custody remand. The prayer for Page No.# 3/11 Police remand was allowed by vide order dated 08/06/2025 in G.R Case No. 281/25 and the accused remained in Police remand till 30/06/2025. On that day he was produced before the CJM with the prayer seeking 15 days of judicial remand. On 10/07/2025, an application was filed by the I.O. before the learned CJM, Dimapur, Nagaland praying for alteration of section quoted as 140(3) BNS to 140(2) BNS. The prayer was allowed by the Court. On 14/07/2025, the I.O prayed for extension of judicial remand for a further period of 15 days which was also allowed. By another application filed on 31/07/2025, the judicial remand was prayed to be extended for another period of 15 days which was allowed. 5. The scanned copy of the record from the Court of the CJM, Dimapur called for by this Court, reveals that on production of the accused before the Magistrate on 27/06/2025, the learned CJM had recorded that the accused person has been informed the grounds of the arrest under section 47 & 48 of the BNSS. The record also shows that the accused had been informed of his right to legal counsel to which he replied that he will engage an Advocate of his choice. The order dated 30/06/2025 passed by the learned CJM, Dimapur shows that the accused had already engaged an Advocate. The order dated 02/07/2025 reflects that the bail application had been moved by the accused Likao Tungoe through his counsel praying for enlarging him bail pending trial. The CD/detailed enquiry was called for by the said order and the same was fixed on 11/07/2025. On 11/07/2025, two orders were passed by the learned CJM, Dimapur, Nagaland, one allowing the alteration of penal section from u/s 140(3) BNS to 140(2) BNS and the other order that the learned counsel for the petitioner had prayed for withdrawing the instant bail application with liberty to file afresh. Subsequently, bail petition bearing I.A No. 431/2025 was filed in the Court of the Principal District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge NDPS, Page No.# 4/11 Dimapur, Nagaland corresponding to G.R Case No. 231/2025, praying for releasing the accused namely, Likao Tungoe on bail. The said application for bail was considered by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge NDPS, Dimapur, Nagaland on 18/07/2025 and after perusal of the record and consideration of submission forwarded by both the learned counsels, the bail application came to be rejected as premature and being devoid of strong reasonable and justifiable grounds. The learned Court also took notice of the fact that the Police are at the liberty to seek for further Police remand within the first 40 days and 60 days as per section 187 of BNSS. The father of the accused Likao Tungoe is now before this Court praying for granting the privilege of bail. 6. I have heard Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and I have also heard Ms. Livika, learned P.P. appearing for the State of Nagaland. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the continuous detention of the son of the petitioner is unwarranted in law for several reasons. The learned counsel has submitted that the son of the petitioner had voluntarily surrendered before the police authorities on 25/06/2025 and this would display his bonafide intention. The learned counsel has submitted that there is no evidence yet collected by the Investigating Agency to link the son of the petitioner in any manner to the alleged offence reflected in the FIR. 8. Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the son of the petitioner has been held in custody on totally false allegation and therefore, he deserves to be set at liberty by granting him bail. The learned counsel has specifically emphasised the contention that the grounds of arrest was not made known to the son of the petitioner at the time of his arrest nor any copy of such grounds of arrest furnished to the accused Likao Tungoe. The learned counsel for the petitioner has Page No.# 5/11 stressed that it is a settled position of law that non-communication or non-formulation of the grounds of arrest to the arrestee renders the arrest illegal and constitutes a valid ground for grant of bail. He has relied upon the judgment & order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar -vrs- State of Haryana & Another, reported in 2025 SCC Online 269 and on the judgment rendered by Gauhati High Court in Sri. Neizosetuo Kire -vrs- State of Nagaland. To buttress his argument that the petitioner deserves to be released on bail. 9. Per contra, Ms. Livika, learned P.P appearing for the State has referred to the updated CD furnished to her by the I.O of the case to insist that record of the CD would show that necessary memos of arrest was made against Likao Tungoe to comply with the provision laid down in section 47 & 48 of BNSS, 2023. The CD specifically recorded that the accused was informed the grounds of arrest in the language “Nagamese” u/s 47 BNSS and information was also given to his wife of the grounds of arrest u/s 48 BNSS were attached to the memo of arrest for reference. She therefore, submits that the ground of non-communication of reasons for arrest thus fall flat and it deserves no consideration of this Court. 10. Ms. Livika, learned P.P thereafter has stressed that on production before the learned Magistrate at the first instance, the learned CJM had also recorded that the accused Likao Tungoe was made aware of his grounds of his arrest and he had also informed the Court that he would be engaging an Advocate of his choice. Ms. Livika, learned P.P further stated that a bail petition on behalf of the son of the petitioner was moved on 02/07/2025 by a counsel of his choice and therefore, it cannot be said that the son of the petitioner was unaware of the grounds of arrest. The learned P.P further submitted that one of the accused is yet to be arrested and therefore, releasing the son of the petitioner at this stage would open doors to create impediments for the investigation. The learned P.P has also submitted that the release of the son of the Page No.# 6/11 petitioner may not be in the interest of investigation and therefore she prayed for rejection of the bail petition. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I have pursued the CD made available through the learned P.P. I have also gone through the scanned copy of the record of Trial Court which were requisitioned since the learned counsel for the petitioner had raised an issue that the certified copy obtained by him did not content any document which can show that the son of the petitioner had been informed of the grounds of arrest. 12. This Court will first consider the ground of non-communication of the grounds of arrest to the arrested person as raised by Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a very recent judgment delivered on 14/08/2025 in the case of State of Karnataka -vrs- Shri. Darshan Etc. reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1702 has discussed the issue elaborately. For ready reference, the following paragraphs are quoted herein below; “20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for grant of bail. 20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents – accused contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr.P.C (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission, however, is devoid of merit. 20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that “no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice”. Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr.P.C. requires that “every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other Page No.# 7/11 grounds for such arrest. 20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest – but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown. 20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana22, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 23, it was observed that when arrest is made pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these post- Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an inflexible requirement in all circumstances. 2025 SCC Online SC 456 2025 INSC 768 20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice- oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend. 20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India24 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 – 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail. 20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally (2024) 7 SCC 576 represented from the outset and Page No.# 8/11 applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail. 22. We now turn to a detailed examination of the above contentions. (a) Nature and Gravity of the offence 22.1. The seriousness and heinous nature of the alleged offence is a significant factor for consideration, while evaluating a plea for cancellation of bail. 22.1.1. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh39, this Court held that “the nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail – the more heinous the crime, the greater the chance of refusal of bail, though the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters cannot be exhaustively defined.” 22.1.2. Similarly, in Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra 40 , the Court observed that “the object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty from tampering with the evidence in heinous crimes.” 22.1.3. In the present case, the accused along with the co-accused, is charged under Sections 120B, 302, 201 and 204 IPC, which relate to conspiracy, murder, destruction of evidence, and causing disappearance of evidence. The allegation is of a brutal and custodial murder of a young man, who was allegedly kidnapped, tortured, and beaten to death by the accused for sending objectionable messages to A2. The victim was Page No.# 9/11 a 26-year-old daily wage earner, and the crime was allegedly committed to protect the reputation of A1, the partner of A2, a celebrity. 22.1.4. This is not a case of sudden provocation or emotional outburst. The evidence indicates a pre-meditated and orchestrated crime, where the accused not only allegedly took the law into his own hands, but also engaged in systematic destruction of evidence, including: deleting CCTV footage, bribing co-accused (2002) 3 SCC 598 (2005) 3 SCC 143 to falsely surrender, and using police and local influence to derail the investigation.” 13. Thus, it is apparent that the rigor of Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the grounds of arrest in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Furnishing of individualized grounds are not an inflexible requirement in all circumstances. The constitutional and statutory framework mandates that the arrested person must be informed of the ground of arrest but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists on written communication in every case. The Hon’ble Apex Court has rejected the contention that an arrest would be illegal if the ground of arrest were not furnish immediately in writing. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in that case, had noticed that the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for that arrest, that they were legally represented from the very outset and had applied for bail shortly after the arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusation. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. It was held that when prejudice was not demonstrable, such irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. The Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified that the gravity of the charge and the existence of a prima facie case are determinative factor. 14. In the present case, I find that the scanned copy of the record of the Trial Court reveals that the format of information of grounds of arrest Page No.# 10/11 in compliance of the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the statutory provision under section 47 BNSS was filled up and the same also contained the acknowledgment of the arrested person i.e. the son of the petitioner. The record shows that the son of the petitioner was arrested at 2005 Hrs on 26/06/2025 and he was produced before the learned CJM Dimapur on 27/06/2025. The learned CJM has also recorded that the record reveals that the accused person has been informed the grounds of arrest and further he would be engaging Advocate of his choice. On the expiry of the Police remand on 30/06/2025, the accused had also already informed the Court that he had engaged Advocate of his choice and in fact the bail petition was moved on 02/07/2025. On perusal of the CD and the scanned copy record of the Trial Court we do not find that the petitioner has been able to make out a case that the grounds of arrest was not acknowledged by his own in due time. We have gone through the contents of the bail petition. Assuming for the sake of argument that the son of the petitioner was not given the ground of his arrest in writing immediately on his arrest, there is no assertion in the petition that he suffered any prejudice because of the same. The petitioner has not spelled out what prejudice his son allegedly suffered. 15. In view of the settled position of law that every case of non- furnishing of the grounds of arrest in writing, cannot be a case for grant of bail, more so, when no prejudice has been alleged, I am of the opinion that such allegation, which is not supported by the record of the case would not entitle the son of petitioner the privilege of being granted bail solely on that ground. The arrest memos and the remand record and the order of the learned CJM clearly reflect that the son of the petitioner had been informed the grounds of arrest in substance and he also had the opportunity to be legally represented from the outset and had in fact applied for bail shortly after his arrest. We are convinced that in the Page No.# 11/11 absence of demonstrable prejudice, this particular ground praying for bail of the son of the petitioner does not bear merit. 16. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment & order dated 11/04/2025 passed in B.A No. 2/2025 appears to be misplaced in the context of the present petition inasmuch as in that case the Court had come to specific finding that the record reveals that there was nothing mention about the formulation of ground of arrest on the basis of which the petitioner can be intimated of arrest. In the present case, the contemporaneous records maintain in the entry made in the CD reflects not only formulation of the ground of arrest but also the ground of arrest was communicated. 17. We have gone through the CD and also the scanned copy of the record of the Trial Court. It is noticed that the allegation against the son of the petitioner are grave. Although initially the case was registered under section 140(3)/308(2)(3) of BNS, Section 140(3) was later replaced by the section 140(2). It is also noticed that one of the accused is yet to be intercepted and the place where the alleged victim was held and the owner of such house are yet to be identified. The investigation although proceeded, the I.O is yet to intercept other co-accused. In the considered opinion of this Court, releasing the son of the petitioner namely, Likao Tungoe at this stage, may not be in the interest of the investigation. We therefore do not find this to be a fit case to grant privilege of bail at this stage of investigation. Bail application stands rejected. Sd/- JUDGE Comparing Assistant