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2025 DAILYLAW 23263 (HP)

VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

LPA/452/2024 · 2025-04-02

Ranjan Sharma, Vivek Singh Thakur

body2025

Judgment text

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( 2025:HHC:10400 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No.452 of 2024 Date of decision: 2nd April, 2025 Vinod Kumar …Appellant Versus State of HP & others …Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Appellant: Mr. Kishore Pundeer, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Govind Korla, Additional Advocate General. Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge Appellant has approached this Court against judgment dated 21st June, 2024 passed in CWPOA No. 6591 of 2020 titled Vinod Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2 The operative portion of judgment is as under:- “11. In result, the impugned order dated 9.10.2018 passed by respondent No.2 is set aside and quashed. Petitioner is held entitled to grant-in-aid w.e.f. the date of his appointment by SMC i.e. 26.4.2010. The petitioner is also held entitled to all the consequential benefits. The respondents shall do the needful in terms of this judgment within eight weeks from the date of production of a copy of this judgment.” ( 2025:HHC:10400 ) 3 The only grievance of appellant is that he has been held entitled for grant-in-aid w.e.f. 26.4.2010 i.e. the date of his appointment by School Management Committee whereas he was engaged on PTA basis by the Parents Teachers Association Committee on 7th August, 2008 and was dis-engaged on 25th February, 2010 and thereafter, he was again re-engaged by School Management Committee w.e.f. 26th April, 2010 as the School Management Committee had substituted the PTA in terms of the provisions of RTE Act, 2009. 4 The petitioner has made the following prayers in CWPOA No. 6591 of 2020:- (i) That the Annexure A-6 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondents may kindly be directed to release the due and admissible Grant-in-Aid to the applicant with effect from 07.08.2008 till date with interest @ 18% p.a. and keep in paying future also. (ii) That the respondent may kindly be directed to extend the benefit of Grant-in-Aid to PTA Rules 2006 to the applicant without any discrimination from the date of initial appointment. 5 We have gone through the record. The appointment of appellant on 26th April, 2010 was based on the Resolution of School Management Committee which was in continuity of earlier engagement. 6 Prayer made by petitioner in Writ Petition would be relevant to decide the issue as to whether the petitioner is entitled for grant-in-aid 2 ( 2025:HHC:10400 ) from 7.8.2008 or from 26.4.2010. To substantiate the claim, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on judgments i.e. CWP No. 379 of 2018 titled Vinod Kumar vs. State of H.P.; CWP No. 4670 of 2015 titled Raj Kumar Pathania vs State of H.P.; CWP No. 1364 of 2015 titled Poonam Kumari vs. State of H.P.; and CWP No. 2259 of 2017 titled Rajeshwari Devi vs. State of HP along with connected matter. 7 Though learned Single Judge has held the appellant entitled for grant-in-aid from the date of his appointment by School Management Committee on 26.04.2010 but has ignored his own observations made in para 8 of the judgment where it has been recorded that petitioner was re- engaged by School Management Committee w.e.f. 26.4.2010 as School Management Committee had substituted the PTA in terms of provisions of RTE Act, 2009. 8 In reply to petition also, State has not claimed that appellant was appointed afresh but has taken a stand that he was re-engaged by School Management Committee. Re-engagement of a person can only be considered when his earlier service is to be considered as his engagement. Therefore, re-engagement of petitioner by School Management Committee, which had substituted the PTA, has to be considered to have been made in continuation of earlier engagement of petitioner as PTA teacher. From the facts that PTA was replaced by School Management Committee and it is only name of the School Management Committee which was converted from PTA to School 3 ( 2025:HHC:10400 ) Management Committee but with the same power to engage PTA/SMC teachers to fill up the vacancies whenever necessity arises to engage the teachers to teach the children in various subjects. 9 From the impugned judgment also, it is apparent that learned Single Judge has held the petitioner entitled for grant-in-aid from the date of his appointment. Since initial appointment of petitioner was made by PTA which was followed by appointment by School Management Committee, therefore, petitioner would be entitled for grant-in-aid w.e.f. 7.8.2008, i.e. the date of his initial appointment but except for the months in which he has not done the work at all i.e. 24.2.2010 to 26.4.2010. 10 At this stage, learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that since appeal i.e. LPA No. 166 of 2025 (with application i.e. CMP(M) No.1989 of 2024 for condonation of delay in filing appeal), preferred by State assailing the judgment challenged in present appeal has also been dismissed vide judgment dated 27th March, 2025, therefore, present appeal also deserves to be dismissed. 11 Appeal of State has been dismissed for settled exposition of law in the matter as the judgment passed in CMP(M) No. 1458 of 2017 in LPA No 53 of 2018 titled State of HP vs. Villam Singh on the basis of which impugned judgment has been passed, has attained finality after dismissal of SLP preferred by State against Villam Singh’s judgment. Therefore, dismissal of LPA preferred by State has no bearing on present appeal. 4 ( 2025:HHC:10400 ) 12 In view of above, impugned judgment is modified and petitioner is held entitled for grant-in-aid from the date of his initial appointment i.e. 7th August, 2008 as prayed by him in paras (i) and (ii) of the prayer of writ petition, but he shall not be entitled for any amount for the period during which he has not performed his duty. Other benefits extended to petitioner shall remain the same. The respondents/State is directed to ensure the compliance within eight weeks from today. Appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms including all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Vivek Singh Thakur), Judge. 2nd April, 2025(ms) (Ranjan Sharma), Judge. 5