1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 407 of 2025 1 - ABC D/o XYZ ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Bodhghat, Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Rajesh Habil S/o Shivnath Aged About 47 Years R/o Shanti Nagar Joshi Gali, P.S. Bodhghat, Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri Karan Kumar Bahrani, Advocate. For State : Ms. Isha Jajodiya, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 15.01.2026 1. The present Acquittal Appeal under Section 413 CrPC has been filed against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 28.06.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTSC) (Under POCSO Act), Jagdalpur, in Special Sessions Case (POCSO) No.15/2021 whereby the respondent No.2-accused has been acquitted from the offence of Section 354 IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. 2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No.2 is an accused in Sessions Case No.15/2021 which arose on account of written complaint Ex.P/8 lodged by the mother of victim on 18.03.2020. Based on the said written complainant, an unnumbered FIR was registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Bastar against the respondent No.2 for INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.01.15 17:50:54 +0530 2 the offence under Section 354 IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. The said FIR was transferred to Police Station Bodhghat, District Bastar and thereafter numbered FIR Ex.P/7 was registered. 3. Statement of victim as well as other witnesses were recorded and after completion of investigation charge sheet was filed against the respondent No.2 before the trial court for the offence under Sections Section 354 IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. The trial court framed charge against the respondent No.2 for the offence under Section 354 IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. After trial for the said offences, the respondent No.2-accused has been acquitted by the trial court which is under challenge in the present Acquittal Appeal by the complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant would submit that but for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are corroborative and supported the prosecution case. There are sufficient material available in the case against the accused that he committed the offence. There may be some delay in informing the incident to her parents, but in the offences under the POCSO Act, nominal delay could not dilute the offence against the accused. It is further case of the complainant that when the father of victim saw the act of accused, he informed the mother of victim and she lodged the report. The victim and her mother duly supported the prosecution case. The victim was subjected to outrage her modesty by the accused and in view of the evidence available on record, the trial court ought to have convicted the accused instead of acquittal. Therefore, the appeal may be allowed and the the respondent/accused may be convicted for the alleged offences. 3 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supported the impugned judgment and submits that trial court after meticulously examining the evidence available on record comes into conclusion that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, which does not suffer from any infirmity and illegality and the acquittal appeal is liable to be dismissed. She would further submit that father of victim was being prosecuted in a complaint made by the present accused for the offence under Section 354(D) of IPC and it is only thereafter, in order to create a ground for false implication, the present report has been lodged against the respondent accused herein. She would further submit that the mother of victim have admitted in her evidence that if the respondent-accused would not have lodged report against the father of victim, then she would not have lodged any report against present accused. Therefore, there are material discrepancies and suspicious circumstances in prosecution of the present respondent and after considering such discrepancies, the trial court has rightly acquitted the respondent/accused. 6. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record of trial court. 7. It is not disputed by the parties that on the report made by the present respondent/accused, the father of victim was being prosecuted for the offence under Section 354(D) IPC. It is also not in dispute that the respondent accused lodged an FIR against the father of victim on 04.03.2020 which also reflects from document Ex.D/3 which is the copy of final report submitted by the police against the father of victim. It was alleged in the case of father of victim that the daughter of respondent accused was being subjected to outrage her modesty by the father of 4 victim herein. The statement of daughter of respondent-accused is also available on record as defence document. It is also submitted by the parties that during pendency of trial, the father of victim had expired. 8. The mother of victim PW-5, have admitted in paragraph 18 of her evidence that the present accused had made allegation against her husband (i.e. father of victim) that he was outraging the modesty of the daughter of present respondent-accused since 2018 and since last one year their relation was over and they had no conversation with each other. In paragraph 19 she further admits that if the accused herein would not have lodged any report against her husband, they would also not have lodged report against the respondent-accused. The trial court has also considered omissions and contradictions in the evidence of witnesses in the present case. 9. In the evidence of victim PW-2 it comes that the allegation made against the respondent-accused in her chief examination have been disclosed by her to the police and if it is not there in her police statement, she could not tell the reason. She also admits in paragraph 11 of her cross examination that on 12.01.2020 she along with her mother, brother and other family members went to the house of respondent accused and asked to forgive them and requested to withdraw his complaint made against the father of victim and when he refused to withdraw his complaint the present report was lodged against him. She further admits in paragraph 13 that since August, 2019 till lodging of report, she has not made any complaint to anyone in between that period. 10. Considering the discrepancies available in the evidence of victim as well as her mother, the trial court considered it to be insufficient to 5 convict the respondent-accused for the alleged offence and by giving benefit of doubt, the accused has been acquitted by the trial court. Thus, taking into consideration the findings recorded by the trial court, I do not find any reason to admit the acquittal appeal. 11. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as under:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 12. In Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala, 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at para 25, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 13. Further, in case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Shyam Bihari & Others, 2023 (8) SCC 197, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 27 of its judgment that :- “27. It is trite law that in an appeal against acquittal, the power of appellate court to re-appreciate evidence and come to its own conclusion is not circumscribed by any limitation. But it is equally settled that the appellate court must not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because a contrary view is permissible, particularly, where the view taken by the trial court is a plausible view based on 6 proper appreciation of evidence and is not vitiated by ignorance/misreading of relevant evidence on record.” 14. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment passed by the learned trial court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position as held in case of Kistoora Ram, Jafarudheen and Shyam Bihari (Supra) that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial court taking one view favoured the accused, reversion of the findings of acquittal by the appellate court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused/respondent is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 15. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder