JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J. I.A. No.4213 of 2025 1. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and for the reasons stated in the present Interlocutory Application, we find sufficient cause to condone the delay of 160 days that has crept into filing the appeal. 2. Accordingly, the present Interlocutory Application is allowed and the delay of 160 days in filing the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 408 of 2025 3. This appeal is preferred by the appellants-State against the order dated 24.09.2024 passed by the learned Writ Court in W.P. (S) No. 6763 of 2019. 4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-State. 5. The parties shall be referred to as they were before the learned Writ Court. 6. The writ petitioner had approached the learned Writ Court for setting aside Memo No. 1946 dated 10.06.2019 (Annexure 5)issued by the Special Secretary, S.T./S.C. Minority and OBC Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi (respondent No.4), whereby the petitioner was dismissed from the post of Head Clerk. The petitioner also prayed for quashing the appellate order dated 22.10.2019 (Annexure 6) passed by respondent No.2 i.e. the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, dismissing the appeal prayed for quashing the entire departmental proceeding. 7. The case of the petitioner was that while he was posted as Head Clerk at District Welfare Office, Chatra, embezzlement of Rs.9,33,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Crore Thirty Three Lakh) was alleged to have been committed by the employees of District Welfare Office, Chatra. 8. Accordingly, police case being Chatra P.S. Case No. 165 of 2018 corresponding to G.R. No. 945 of 2018 came to be registered for the offence allegedly committed under Sections 467, 468, 469, 471, 420, 409, 406, 120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 9. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner, pursuant to which he was taken into custody and at the time of filing of the writ petition, the petitioner had been enlarged on bail. 10. As regards the Department, it conducted a preliminary inquiry in which the allegations against the petitioner prima facie were found to be proved and accordingly, a regular departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. 11. 10. As regards the Department, it conducted a preliminary inquiry in which the allegations against the petitioner prima facie were found to be proved and accordingly, a regular departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. 11. It was the case of the petitioner before the learned Writ Court that during the course of regular departmental proceeding, the respondents led no oral evidence and the petitioner had been found guilty on the basis of the findings recorded in the preliminary inquiry and subsequently was ordered to be dismissed from service. 12. The learned Writ Court found the contentions of the petitioner to be correct and accordingly, set aside both the impugned orders and remanded the matter back to the respondents directing the respondents to conduct a fresh departmental inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law. 13. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Writ Court, the State has filed the instant appeal and we are at the complete failure to understand as to why the State has chosen to do so, as, it is more than settled law that the evidence recorded in the preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it and the opportunity to cross-examine persons examined in preliminary inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of principles of natural justice. 14. Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [ AIR 1960 SC 992 ], held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and only on the basis of the finding recorded in the preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. 15. In Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another [ (2013) 4 SCC 301 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under – “42. 15. In Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another [ (2013) 4 SCC 301 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under – “42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [ AIR 1960 SC 992 ] , held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held. 43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [ AIR 1964 SC 1854 ] a Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry should not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to whether a regular inquiry must be held. The Court further held as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12) “12. … There must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that article [, nor prior to that].” (emphasis added) (See also Govt. of India v. Tarak Nath Ghosh [ (1971) 1 SCC 734 : 44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 1 SCC 299 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC 2148 ] this Court dealt with the issue and held as under: “… a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 1 SCC 299 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC 2148 ] this Court dealt with the issue and held as under: “… a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and, whether preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by observing principles of natural justice of (sic) nor, remains of no consequence.” (emphasis added) 46. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra [ (2013) 4 SCC 465 : AIR 2013 SC 58 ] this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of earlier judgments held that cross-examination is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, and a statement recorded behind back of a person wherein the delinquent had no opportunity to cross- examine such persons, the same cannot be relied upon. 47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry.” 16. Guided by the law declared in the aforesaid decisions, we can safely conclude that inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer in a manner not authorised by law could not have been formed the basis of the order of punishment and has rightly been set aside by the learned Writ Court. 17. In addition to that, it has also been observed that the respondents during the course of inquiry had not examined any witness to prove the preliminary inquiry report, whereas, it is more than settled that the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand, what it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by person who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. On the other hand, what it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by person who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a document is produced before an Inquiry Officer, the question that naturally arises is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. Even in such circumstances, mere production of the document does not amount to proof of it or of the truth of the contents therein. If these documents are challenged, the Opposite Party must prove each of such documents and an opportunity has to be afforded to the party who challenges this fact. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and Others [ (1971) 2 SCC 617 ]. 18. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others [ (2009) 2 SCC 570 ], it was held that an officer conducting inquiry has a duty to arrive at a finding in respect of the charges upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. It has also been held therein that any evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. 19. Thus, what can be taken to be settled and what applies to the facts of the instant case is that the materials brought on record by the parties to which consideration has to be confined, would mean only such materials which have been brought on record in a manner prescribed by the law. Only such materials can be considered to be ‘legal evidence’ which can be acted upon. 20. This is not to suggest that the provisions of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 could be strictly applicable to the departmental inquiry, as these are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Only such materials can be considered to be ‘legal evidence’ which can be acted upon. 20. This is not to suggest that the provisions of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 could be strictly applicable to the departmental inquiry, as these are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. 21. Accordingly, this Court has no difficulty in concluding that the documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of annexures of the charge-sheet, on which the Department seeks to rely on in the inquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself in the inquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-upon documents have to be provided by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. In the instant case, no such exercise was admittedly undertaken by the respondents (appellants herein) by producing any evidence and, therefore, the learned Writ Court has rightly set aside the impugned orders and at the same time, kept the right of the appellants herein intact for conducting a fresh departmental proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law. However, it is made clear that since the petitioner has been charge-sheeted and has filed his reply to the same, the inquiry shall proceed from that stage onwards. 22. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant appeal stands dismissed. 23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand closed.