JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant review petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking review/recall of the order dated 01.05.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.5280 of 2018. Facts 4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition which also carried in the instant review petition, needs to be referred which reads as under:- 5. It is the case of the review petitioner/writ petitioner that the Central Fuel Research Institute, a unit of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Dhanbad vide Advertisement No. 1/87 issued advertisement calling upon candidates for various posts including 1 post of Security Officer. It was stated in the said advertisement that the pay scale for the post of Security Officer would be Rs. 700-40-900-EB-40-1100-50-1300. 6. The review petitioner was duly selected for the said post of security officer and on perusal of the memo no.8/3110/88-E.I. dated 10th May, 1988, it appears that under reference of Office O.M No. 2- 23/86-PL(vii) dated 02/07th March, 1988, he was appointed on the post of Security Officer and has joined on 9 th May, 1988 on an initial salary of Rs. 2200-75-2800-E8-100-4000. 7. In the year 1999, a scheme was floated by the government called the Assured Career Progression Scheme (ACP). The said scheme was brought to obviate the financial destitution being faced by an employee on account of stagnation in a particular post. Under the said scheme, an employee stagnating on a particular post would be eligible for first and second financial upgradation on completion of 12 years and 24 years of service respectively from the date of appointment. Vide memo no. 1- 1/99-P.L. dated 21st January, 2009, the Administrative Officer of the CIMFR had issued office memorandum on the recommendation of Departmental Promotion Committee which met on 24th September, 2008 and consequent upon approval thereof by the Competent Authority conveyed vide CSIR letter no. 4-45(4) 2008-E11 dated 5 th January, 2009, the Director, Central Institute of Mining & Fuel Research has been pleased to approve the up-gradation of the petitioner as Sr. Security Officer from the scale pay of 8000-275-13500 (pre-revised) to the scale of Rs.10000-325-15200 (pre-revised) w.e.f. 9th May, 1999 i.e. from the date of completion of 11 years of continuous service in the scale of Rs.8000-275-13500 (pre revised). 8. Security Officer from the scale pay of 8000-275-13500 (pre-revised) to the scale of Rs.10000-325-15200 (pre-revised) w.e.f. 9th May, 1999 i.e. from the date of completion of 11 years of continuous service in the scale of Rs.8000-275-13500 (pre revised). 8. The ACP scheme was substituted with another scheme called the "Modified Assured Career Progression" Scheme (MACP) w.e.f. 1st September, 2008. Under the said scheme, financial upgradation in case of stagnation at a pay scale/post was to be given at an interval of 10, 20 and 30 years. The CSIR had framed specific policy for isolated category of employees vide CSIR Order no. 6 bearing file no. 33(89) E-II dated 12th November, 1981 which was known as "Recommendation of Sidhu Committee for Career Development of staff belonging to isolated cadre in CSIR”. As per the recommendation of the said committee, it was stated that an employee working on an isolated post will be eligible for promotion after completion of 11 years of service. The petitioner filed a representation before the Director, CIMFR dated 23rd August, 2011 praying for promotion/financial upgradation as per the Sidhu Committee report. In this context, it is stated that it was categorically stated by the petitioner that despite working for the respondents, the petitioner has been stagnating on a post for more than 12 years, and, therefore prayed for upgradation as per the Sidhu committee recommendation. 9. Pursuant to the representation filed by the petitioner before the respondent authorities, the Controller of Administration issued an office memorandum being memo no. 1(2)2006/ DPC/ Isolated/ RU/ 706 dated 3rd October, 2011, wherein it was stated that the request of the petitioner for the financial upgradation could not be entertained because as per the CSIR rules, there was no provision of financial upgradation of security officer beyond the grade pay of Rs.6600/- PB-3 under the 11 year promotional scheme for isolated category and the MACP scheme has not been made applicable to the isolated category of employees. The writ-petitioner again filed a representation on 22nd June, 2012 before the respondent authorities, whereby the writ-petitioner stated that he was appointed on the post of Security Officer on 09.05.1988 and has been working for the respondents since the date of appointment to the satisfaction of the respondent authorities. The writ-petitioner again filed a representation on 22nd June, 2012 before the respondent authorities, whereby the writ-petitioner stated that he was appointed on the post of Security Officer on 09.05.1988 and has been working for the respondents since the date of appointment to the satisfaction of the respondent authorities. The review petitioner even pointed out in the aforesaid representation that the petitioner was being adversely affected by the decision of the respondents as the other incumbents working as security for the respondent concern were being eligible to be considered for the new scheme i.e. MACP and the case of the writ-petitioner was being unjustifiably being discriminated. 10. The review petitioner being aggrieved with the rejection of the application for consideration for the financial upgradation, preferred an appeal before the appellate forum being the Joint Secretary, CSIR, New Delhi. That it was categorically stated by the petitioner that the petitioner was recruited by way of direct recruitment against a vacant sanctioned post, on 9th May, 1988 and after completion of 11 years of service, he was upgraded to the post of Senior Security Officer on the pay scale of Rs.10000-325-15200 (Pre-revised) w.e.f. 9th May, 1999 which was subsequently revised to pay band of 15600-39000 (PB-3) with a grade pay of Rs. 6600. 11. In pursuance of the appeal filed by the petitioner, the Controller of Administration, forwarded his consideration to the said appeal to the Joint Secretary, memo no.1(2)/ 2006 /DPC/ Isolated /RU/ 70 dated 21/28.01.2014 whereby it was informed that as there is no provision for giving upgradation above Rs. 6600/-(PB-3) and in light of the fact that the MACP benefits have not been extended upon the isolated post holders of the respondent institute, the application of the petitioner cannot be given effect to. The Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACP) was implemented w.e.f. 01.09.2008 notified vide O.M. No. 35034/3/2008-Esst. (D) dated 19th May, 2009. On 21st March, 2014, vide memo no. 1(2) /2006 /DPC/ Isolated/ RU/1106, it was informed by the Controller of Administration that the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, for the same reason, as was rejected by the director, CSIR. i.e., there is no provision for consideration of the case of the petitioner for the next financial upgradation. 12. On 21st March, 2014, vide memo no. 1(2) /2006 /DPC/ Isolated/ RU/1106, it was informed by the Controller of Administration that the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, for the same reason, as was rejected by the director, CSIR. i.e., there is no provision for consideration of the case of the petitioner for the next financial upgradation. 12. The review petitioner, being aggrieved with the order passed in the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority, preferred an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench at Ranchi, which was registered as O.A. No. 051/00078/2015, was also dismissed on 9th August, 2018. Being aggrieved with the same, writ petition being W.P.(S) No.5280 of 2018 has been filed but the same was dismissed, which is the subject matter of the instant review petition. Argument advanced on behalf of the Review Petitioner 13. Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the review petitioner has assailed the impugned order by taking the following grounds:- (i) The ground for review of the judgment passed by this Court in the writ petition has been taken by making reference of the condition stipulated at running page 187 of the writ petition (annexure-18 to the writ petition), wherein, a condition has been assigned that if an employee has got pay scale which is saturated one, then also, the promotion/upgradation can be granted. (ii) The case of the review petitioner, therefore, is that the aforesaid policy decision has not been taken into consideration, while, it has been considered with respect to other co-employee by granting upgradation in pay scale above than the pay scale of Rs. 10000- 15200 and issue of parity on the aforesaid account has also been raised. (iii) Therefore, the present review petition has been filed for review of the order passed by this Court by upholding the order passed by the learned Tribunal. Argument advanced on behalf of the respondent-CIMFR 14. Per-contra, Mr. Abhay Prakash learned counsel for the respondent-CIMFR has submitted that the said policy decision is not applicable in strict sense to all, rather, the said policy has been taken depending upon the needs of the employee concerned, which would be evident from the very word that ‘the employee may be granted promotion in a case of pay scale of one or the other employee if such employee has got saturated pay scale in the single cadre post. 15. It has been contended that since the case of the review petitioner is of isolated post having no hierarchal promotional scope and hence, no benefit of upgradation is to be given to the higher pay scale. 16. So far as the pay scale as provided under MACP Scheme is concerned, the same has not been adopted by the respondent and in absence thereof, no right will be said to be accrued in favour of the review petitioner. 17. The ground has also been taken that the employee which has been considered and granted upgradation is concerned, that is prior to issuance of office order dated 30.01.2003. While, the petitioner is claiming the benefit of upgradation after issuance of the said office order dated 30.01.2003, hence, the case of the present review petitioner is different to that of the cases of the employees who have been granted upgradation in pay scale. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent, based upon the aforesaid grounds, therefore, has submitted that, it is not a fit case for exercising the power of review, since, whatever order has been passed by the learned Tribunal having been upheld by this Court suffers from no error, which would be evident from the face of the order passed by this Court. Analysis 19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, pleadings and the order sought to be reviewed. 20. This Court, before coming to the power/scope to exercise the scope of review seeking review of the said order, needs to refer the underlined principle on which the power of review, is to be exercised. 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., [ AIR 1954 SC 526 ] , particularly, at paragraph-32 has observed as under: “32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.” 22. Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India , (1980) Supp. SCC 562 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under: “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed: ‘A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ….. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 23. ….. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 23. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under: “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:— (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 24. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred on the face of the order or the factual aspect could not have been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of the due diligence having been taken in the matter of making available the factual aspect of the relevant documents. 25. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of the due diligence, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra). 26. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the power of review can be exercised only the two folds ground, i.e., (i) if there is any error apparent on the face of the order; or (ii) the fact which could not have been brought to the notice of the court in spite of the due diligence having been taken by the concerned party. 27. Further, law is well settled that a review petition, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”, as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , for ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” 28. Similarly, in S. Murali Sundaram Versus Jothibai Kannan and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “15. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC are required to be referred to? In the case of Perry Kansagra (supra) this Court has observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order. It is observed that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is further observed that review is not appeal in disguise. It is observed that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed that it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which the controversy has been finally decided. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under: “(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1. (ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.” 29. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review. 30. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 31. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 32. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr . , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7, which reads as under:- “16.1. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr . , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7, which reads as under:- “16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. 16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. 16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review. 16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". 16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. 16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.—" 33. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussion it is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognized and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order was made. 34. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. 34. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of review. Further an error which is not self- evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. 35. It is evident from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the parameters have been fixed in the recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra ) , and in sum and substance, the power of review can only be exercised if there is error apparent on the face of order or the fact could not have been produced in spite of due diligence. 36. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case by taking into consideration the ground, as has been agitated on behalf of the petitioner, we are now proceeding to examine as to whether, the same can be said to be a ground to exercise the power of review. 37. The law is well settled that so far as financial upgradation is concerned or the implementation of the revision in pay scale is concerned, it is exclusive domain of the employer and there can be limited interreference only by way of command by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity when they find such a decision to be unreasonable, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation and others Vs. G.S. Uppal and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 375 , for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: "21. G.S. Uppal and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 375 , for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: "21. There is no dispute nor can there be any to the principle as settled in the above-cited decisions of this Court that fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties is the function of the Executive and the scope of judicial review of administrative decision in this regard is very limited. However, it is also equally well-settled that the courts should interfere with the administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity when they find such a decision to be unreasonable, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and taken in ignorance of material and relevant factors." 38 . Further, it is settled position of law that any revision of pay structure or revision in other terms and conditions, of Central Government personnel cannot and do not automatically apply to the any establishment even under the control of the State, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority vs. Narender Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 11 SCC 641 , for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: “30. The other reason why the High Court went wrong, in holding what it did, is that DDA is an autonomous – a statutory – organization. No doubt, it largely follows the Central Government’s policies, in respect of pay and allowances, and other benefits for its employees. However, any revision of pay structure or revision in other terms and conditions, of Central Government personnel cannot and do not automatically apply to the DDA; it has to consider the new or fresh scheme formulated by the Central Government, and adopt it, if necessary, after appropriate adaptation, to suit its needs. Therefore, the Central Government’s MACP Scheme did not apply to it automatically. The DDA decided to apply it, through an office order dated 6-10- 2009. The High Court has overlooked this aspect, and apparently assumed that the MACP Scheme applied automatically, upon its adoption by the Central Government, to the DDA.” 39. This Court, is now proceeding to examine the grounds agitated on behalf of the review petitioner, the first ground is by taking aid of the policy decision dated 30.01.2003. 40. The High Court has overlooked this aspect, and apparently assumed that the MACP Scheme applied automatically, upon its adoption by the Central Government, to the DDA.” 39. This Court, is now proceeding to examine the grounds agitated on behalf of the review petitioner, the first ground is by taking aid of the policy decision dated 30.01.2003. 40. We thought it proper to refer the policy decision as available at running page 187 of writ petition (Annexure-18 to the writ petition), for ready reference, the relevant part of the policy decision is being referred as under:- “Group -B-Posts “Relaxation in age limit for Ex-servicemen/SC/ST/OBC candidates, as prescribed by the GOI from time to time will continue to be operative. As per the existing provisions incumbents in the pre- revised scale of Rs. 1500-2000 may be considered for next higher grade of Rs. 2000-2250 (pre-revised) after they have been held up for one year at the maximum of the grade. In view of revision of pay scales, the G.B. has approved promotion of incumbents belonging to isolated category of posts. In the pay scale of Rs. 12000-16500 (pre-revised Rs. 1500-2000) on completion of 8 years of service, or after having been held up for one year at the maximum of the grade whichever is earlier on merit based on the recommendations of the DPC, which shall invite the candidates for personal discussions and with the approval of Member (Finance). However, for other categories of staff the existing system of 11 years residency period will continue.” 41. It is evident from the aforesaid policy decision that the post of Security Officer being the isolated post and the aforesaid fact has been admitted by the learned counsel for the review petitioner. 42. The Policy decision, so taken as quoted and referred hereinabove, is with respect to the general decision depending upon the need of the State to consider to give pay scale higher than the pay scale attached to the post but that depends upon the discretion of the State which would be evident from the very content of the said policy decision. 43. 43. This Court, therefore, is of the view that when any decision is to be taken by the State which exactly the case herein, since, the word starts that ‘the respondent may grant higher pay scale, the word “may” is of paramount bearing which does not specify as a mandatory command upon the establishment to enforce by way of a right said to be created in favour of the employee, rather, if the entire words of said policy decision will be taken into consideration, the same is obligatory in nature. 44. The law is well settled that the right will be said to be accrued if there is any specific provision either of promotion in the rule of promotion saying the same to be the service condition and if the said promotion is not being granted, even though, the same is available in the Rules of promotion, then only, it can be said that the consideration being not given to the promotion to the higher post in denial of the accrued right as per the Rules of promotion. But that is not the case herein, rather, the respondent has been conferred with the power to utilize its discretion depending upon its need and the financial viability. 45. The second question has been agitated on the principle of parity, which according to the review petitioner, has not been followed in his case, while, the benefit has been given in favour of another employee namely S.K. Khanna. 46. It needs to refer herein that these points had not been taken before the learned Tribunal or before this Court rather for the first time these points have been taken. 47. We being conscious of the fact that new facts cannot be allowed to be raised for the purpose of review of the order, unless due diligence is to be shown. But no reason has been assigned showing the due diligence as to why these facts have not been brought to the notice either before the Tribunal, the original court. But even then, in the ends of justice, we thought it proper to consider the same. Accordingly, the same is being considered. 48. But no reason has been assigned showing the due diligence as to why these facts have not been brought to the notice either before the Tribunal, the original court. But even then, in the ends of justice, we thought it proper to consider the same. Accordingly, the same is being considered. 48. It is evident from the affidavit wherein the clarification has been given by the respondent when it was pointed out on behalf of the review petitioner regarding the issue of parity by explaining the reason that the said person, was granted higher pay scale which is prior to coming into policy decision dated 30.01.2003 as available at running page 187 to the writ petition (Annexure-18 to the writ petition). 49. The law is well settled that the principle of parity is to be made applicable without any discrimination amongst similarly situated but the principle of parity is to be assessed on the basis of applicable facts and circumstances. 50. Herein, what has been stated as a reason that the one person namely S.K. Khanna has been granted benefit of upgradation which is prior to the issuance of policy decision dated 30.01.2003. 51. Admittedly, the review petitioner is claiming the benefit of upgradation in pay scale is after issuance of policy decision dated 30.01.2003, hence, the principle of parity is not being applicable. 52. The ground as has been agitated on behalf of the review petitioner, therefore, is having no foundation, hence, the same is rejected. 53. This Court, on consideration of the ground for review, as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the review petitioner, is of the view that all the grounds have been considered by this Court exhaustively and nothing has been brought on record to attract the principle of error apparent on the face of record or anything could have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence. 54. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the fact of the present case so far as exercising the power of review is concerned, is not coming under the law laid down by way of formulating the parameters as in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra ) , hence, it is not a case where the power of review is to be exercised. 55. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra ) , hence, it is not a case where the power of review is to be exercised. 55. In the result, the instant review petition fails and is, dismissed. 56. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.