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2025 DAILYLAW 23116 (RAJ)

HARKESH SON OF SHRI NARAYAN v. ASSISTANT ENGINEER

CW/10928/2019 · 2025-01-24

Anoop Kumar Dhand

Transfer Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

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[2025:RJ-JP:3585] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10928/2019 Harkesh Son of Shri Narayan, Aged About 52 Years, Resident of Vill. Bandha Ki Dogri, Tehsil Sapotra, District Karauli (Rajasthan) Through General Secretary District Atak 622 Rajendra Nagar Bharatpur (Raj). Now By Self. ----Petitioner Versus Assistant Engineer, Irrigation, Moral Sub Division, Malarnachod, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Bhardwaj For Respondent(s) : Mr. Saumil Sharma for Mr. Gopal Krishan Sharma, AGC JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 24/01/2025 1. By way of filing of the instant writ petition, a challenge has been made to the impugned order dated 06.01.2015, passed by the Labour Court, Bhartpur in LCR No.28/2005. 2. By passing the impugned order, the Labour Court has rejected the claim petition filed by the petitioner-workman (hereinafter referred as ‘Workman’) on the ground of delay of 15 years as well as on the ground that the workman fail to establish on record that he worked with the respondent- department for more than 240 days in a calendar year. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was engaged in the office of the respondent as a Beldar on daily wages on 01.12.1985 and he continued to work [2025:RJ-JP:3585] (2 of 4) [CW-10928/2019] till 17.12.1988, and his services were terminated in violation of the provisions contained under Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. Counsel submits that though there was a delay in raising the industrial dispute before the Labour Court but the delay has occurred on account of ignorance about the period of limitation. Counsel submits that services of similarly situated persons were also terminated by the respondent, thereafter, they approached this Court by way of filing writ petition and the same was disposed of on 17.02.1995, granting them liberty to present the dispute under the Industrial Dispute Act, but petitioner was not aware about this order, hence he could not present his dispute at that time. 4. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, the petitioner also raised this industrial disputes before the Labour Court, which has been declined on the ground of delay. Hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the workman has not worked in their office even for a day and no documentary evidence in this regard was produced before the Labour Court to prove otherwise. Counsel submits that the workman has failed to establish on record that he worked for 240 days in a calander year. Counsel submits that the dispute was raised after a delay of 15 years, hence, under these circumstances, the Labour Court rightly rejected the claim petition filed by the workman which does [2025:RJ-JP:3585] (3 of 4) [CW-10928/2019] not require any interference of this Court and the instant petition is liable to be rejected. 6. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on the record. 7. Perusal of the record indicates that the workman has raised an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer against his termination of service order after a delay of 15 years, thereafter, his matter was referred to the Labour Court for its adjudication. It was stated in the claim petition that he worked with the respondent-department with effect from 1.12.1985 till 17.12.1988 and his services were terminated orally in violation of provisions contained under Sections 25F & 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 8. But the Labour Court came to the conclusion that no evidence was proved on record which shows that the workman worked with the respondent-department continuously for a period of 240 days in a calendar year. The Labour Court also noted that the dispute was raised after a delay of 15 years. Hence, on the ground of delay, the claim petition was rejected. 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Raj. State Agriculture Marketing Board Vs. Mohanlal reported in 2013 LLR 1009 (Supreme Court) has held as under: “We are clearly of the view that though Limitation Act 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the I.D. Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this in Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation Vs. Gilam Singh (2013) 5 SCC 136, [2025:RJ-JP:3585] (4 of 4) [CW-10928/2019] that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute must be invariably followed.” 10. Similary the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shakuntala Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Decided on 24.11.2014 in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.1791/2014 as held as under:- “We also find that after such a long delay, it cannot be said that any industrial dispute survives, nor the employer can be asked to adduce evidence after a period of 23 years to justify the order, by which the services of the appellant-workman were dispensed with.” 11. Considering the above proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mohanlal (supra) & Shakuntala (supra), the Labour Court has passed a detailed, reasoned and cogent order which requires no interference by this Court. 12. Accordingly, the civil writ petition stands dismissed. 13. All pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J Garima/34