Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:23986 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWPIL No. 61 of 2024 Reserved on 30.06.2025 Pronounced on:24.07.2025 Dr. Sanjeev Kumar .....Petitioner. Versus Union of India and others …..Respondents. Coram: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the petitioner: Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sharma, Advocate, For the respondents: Mr. Avinash Jaryal, Senior Panel Counsel, for respondent No. 1-Union of India. Ms. Archana Dutt, Advocate, for respondents No. 2 & 3. Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Senior Advocate with Mr. Kush Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No. 4. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The present Public Interest Litigation has been filed seeking a writ in the nature of quo warranto for setting aside the appointment of respondent No. 4 Dr. Yashwant Singh Harta, Assistant Professor, Department of Life Long Learning as Field Officer and Director of Cost of Cultivation Scheme, in place of the petitioner, who is working as 2 Associate Professor in the Department of Economics. The said appointment, on 26.08.2023,(Annexure P-5) was in addition to the duties being performed by respondent No. 4 and had led to a service dispute as such. Initially, the petitioner had filed Civil Writ Petition No.7633 of 2023, titled Dr. Sanjeev Kumar vs. Union of India and others, which was eventually withdrawn before the learned Single Judge on 23.07.2024 (Annexure P-6) with liberty to file the present Public Interest Litigation. 2. Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the appointment was in violation of the provisions contained in Clause (xxix) of the Memorandum of Understanding as only the Assistant/Associate Professor or equivalent officer in the Department of Agricultural Economics in the University will be deputed as Field Officer as such and therefore, since the private respondent was Assistant Processor in the Department of Life Long Learning and did not have any connection with the department of Cost of Cultivation Scheme, a writ of quo warranto as such has been prayed for by way of petition which has been filed as Public Interest Litigation. The necessary averments have been duly made that there is no personal interest of the 3 petitioner and the petitioner is not guided by self gain and there is no oblique motive and respondent No. 4 is a usurper of the post. The petitioner has been candid enough to mention the fact that he had laid challenge to the action of the respondents in the earlier round of litigation filed by him. 3. Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.4 has raised serious objection as such to the maintainability of the Public Interest Litigation on the ground that it is a settled principle of law that in service law litigation, the petitioner cannot file petition by way of Public Interest Litigation as the purpose of the Public Interest Litigation is different and meant for down trodden persons. It is accordingly submitted that even for a writ of quo warranto where there is malice or ill will and the bonafide of the litigant would have to be examined and therefore, the dispute which is more in the form of a service jurisprudence and there is personal gain or private benefit, the locus standi of the petitioner can always be questioned. It has been argued that time and again it has been held by the Apex Court that there is misuse of Public Interest Litigation and where there is as such rivalry inter se and when public 4 interest petition has been filed for achieving oblique motive, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. In contrast, the counsel for the petitioner has also argued that where there is usurption of public office and the alleged illegality continues, the writ of quo warranto as such would always be maintainable. 5. It is in such circumstances, we firstly proceed to decide whether the writ petition as such would be maintainable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 6. It is not disputed that initially on 19.03.2020, (Annexure P-4) the petitioner being Associate Professor in the Department of Economics was appointed as Field Officer for Cost of Cultivation Scheme in addition to his own duties with immediate effect. The same reads as under: “Office Order The Vice Chancellor is pleased to appoint Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Associate Professor, Department of Economics as Field Officer for Cost of Cultivation Scheme in addition to his own duties with immediate effect, till further orders.” 7. Apparently, the responsibility continued and he was divested of the same, vide order dated 26.08.2023, which reads as under: 5 “Office Order. In reference to letter No. 9-36/2001-HPU (Genl.)-1322 dated 25th August 2023 received from the Assistant Registrar (Adma.) and further reference to order bearing No.SVC/HPU/2023-24 dated 19.08.2023 the Hon'ble Vice- Chancellor, H.P. University is pleased to appoint Dr. Yashwant Singh Harta, Assistant Professor, Department of Life Long Learning as Field Officer of Cost of Cultivation Scheme in place of Dr. Sanjeev Kumar, Associate Professor, Department of Economics in addition to his own duties till further order.” 8. The said order was subject matter of CWP No. 7633/2023, referred to earlier, challenging the dispensing of his services as illegal, arbitrary and void and in contravention of the provisions contained in Clause xxi of the Memorandum of Understanding executed between the Union of India and the University. He had further prayed by way of a writ of mandamus directing that he be allowed to continue with the services as Field Officer and in addition to his own post of Associate Professor in the University, in which notice had been issued at one stage. However, on 22.07.2024, when the matter came before the learned Single Judge, the following order came to be passed: “After hearing learned Counsel for the petitioner, this Court is convinced that the present petition is not maintainable as the petitioner does not has the locus to 6 file and maintain the petition, in the light of the relief prayed therein. Learned Counsel for the petitioner prays that case be taken up tomorrow to enable him to have instructions. List on 23.07.2024, as prayed for.” 9. Thereafter the petition was withdrawn vide order dated 23.07.2024, with liberty to file a Public Interest Litigation on account of which the present Petition has been filed. The said order reads as under: “Learned Counsel for the petitioner prays that the petitioner be permitted to withdraw this writ petition but with liberty to file a Public Interest Litigation, highlighting the illegalities that have been committed by the respondents. Accordingly, the petition is permitted to be withdrawn, with liberty, as prayed for. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.” 10. The present petition then came to be filed on 01.10.2024 before this Court and since the locus standi as such was doubted, a sum of Rs. 1 lacs was ordered to be deposited in this Court vide order dated 18.11.2024. The needful having been done, the pleadings were directed to be completed. 11. It is apparent that the petitioner has a vested interest and is personally aggrieved against the order dated 26.08.2023, having been divested of the additional charge 7 which he had continued to hold for a period of more than three years on account of the fact that he was already serving in the University. It is not disputed that there are some additional benefits which accrued on account of the Scheme for the additional charge of which he was a beneficiary. 12. As per Clause (xxviii), the honorarium will be 5% of basic or Rs.5000/- whichever is less, per month drawn from the Grants-in-Aid of the Scheme. As per the the latest Memorandum of Understanding, which has now been placed on record by respondents No. 2 and 3, in principle, the said Clause (xxix) further provides that the Assistant/Associate Professor or equivalent officer in the Department of Agricultural Economics in the University will be deputed as Field Officer. Clauses (xxviii) and (xxix) read as under: “(xxviii) The Professor or equivalent officer in the Department of Agricultural Economics in the University will be the Honorary Director of the Scheme. The Honorarium will be 5% of basic or Rs.5000/- whichever is less, per month drawn from Grants-in-aid of the Scheme. (xxix) The Assistant Associate Professor or equivalent officer in the Department of Agricultural Economics in the University will be deputed as Field Officer of the scheme. Accordingly, the Salary and other allowances will be drawn from Grants-in-aid of the Scheme during the period of posting only.” 8 13. As per the initial Memorandum of Understanding between the Director of Economic and H.P University, it is provided under Clause (xxi) that the Associate Professor or equivalent officer in the Department of Economics in the University will be appointed as Field Officer of the Scheme. The said Clause reads as under: “(xxi)The Associate Professor or equivalent officer in the Department of Economics in the University will be appointed as Field Officer of the Scheme.” Law on PIL, maintainability and Personal Interest: 14. Thus, one has to examine whether there is element of not only personal interest involved at the hands of the petitioner in challenging the appointment of private respondent which he was unsuccessful before the learned Single Judge, though it is contended that he was asked to withdraw and file the present petition but he has chosen not to file any Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge. The University in its reply has on merits also commented on the performance of the petitioner for the period he worked and held out that he was not up to the mark. The relevant part reads as under: 9 “1…..Before joining in the University Petitioner has worked as Assistant Professor (college cadre) on contractual basis from June 2010 and regularized his services as Assistant Professor at college cadre on March 2016. It is significant to mention here that due to the short period joining in the university and lack of research experience the work of C.C.S. scheme has suffered very badly as evident from various queries raised by the Ministry of Agriculture, GOI, to the data supplied during the time the petitioner has worked as Field Officer, C.C.S. Even the Utilization Certificate (UC) was pending very long time resulting it also affected the work of the scheme. The copy of queries raised by the Ministry is hereby placed at Annexure R-4. It is pertinent to mention here that after joining of Respondent No.4 as Field Officer, CCS the queries raised by the Ministry, GOI, has been examined and the necessary corrections have been made according to the requirements of the funding agency. The Utilization Certificate has also been submitted in time. Thus, it is apparent that present petition filed in its present form, has been filed in self motivated and there is no public interest is filling the petition. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.” 15. In Hari Bansh Lal vs. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and others (2010) 9 SCC 655, it has been held that public interest litigation is not maintainable in service matters and the Court would not judge the suitability or otherwise of the candidates. The following principles were laid down: “34. From the discussion and analysis, the following principles emerge: 10 (a) Except for a writ of quo warranto, PIL is not maintainable in service matters. (b) For issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (c) Suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a post in government service is the function of the appointing authority and not of the court unless the appointment is contrary to statutory provisions/rules.” 16. A similar view was followed in Bholanath Mukherjee and others vs. Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Centenary College and others (2011) 5 SCC 464. The relevant part reads as under: “45. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel. As noticed in the earlier part of the judgment, the entire pleadings in the writ petition are founded on the personal grievance of the writ petitioners/ appellants. The writ petitioners have not come before this Court as educationists. Merely because they are senior most teachers in the same institution, would not necessarily give rise to the presumption, that they had filed the writ petition in public interest. In our opinion, a pure and simple service dispute is sought to be camouflaged as a public interest litigation. 46 & 47. xxxx xxxx xxxx 48. We are, therefore, unable to accept the aforesaid submission as it is tantamount to treating the writ petition as a public interest litigation. As noticed above, the entire grievance of the writ petitioners/appellants was personal. They were all aggrieved and humiliated for being 11 compelled to serve under a Principal junior to them in service. Therefore, it could not be treated as a public interest litigation.” 17. The Apex Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal and others (2010) 3 SCC 402, has held that the exemplary costs are to be imposed or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations and the bonafide of public interest litigation had to be examined and directions were issued to the High Courts to frame its Rules. The judgments came in the wake of the view that it has time and again been held that the public interest litigation is to make justice available to the down-trodden as had been held in Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee and another vs. C.K. Rajan and others, AIR 2004 SC 561, a Three Judge Bench, keeping in view the law laid down that the Courts are not to be used for personal litigation as held in Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. State of West Bengal and others, AIR 2004 SC 280. The relevant paras read as under: “11. The relevant paras read as under: “11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine 12 litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system. 13 12.Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. 13. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows: “Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant 14 interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others." 14. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.” 18. In Dr. B. Singh vs. Union of India and others (2004) 3 SCC 363, it was held that a meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers have no public interest except for personal gain or private profits and the Court has to satisfy about the credentials of the applicant and that the Judiciary has to be extremely careful that there is no ugly private 15 malice and vested interest in the public interest litigation which is a weapon to be used with great care and circumspection. Similarly in R.K. Jain vs. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119, it has been held that the public law declaration can only be made at the behest of public spirited person and for a non-appointee in service jurisprudence he has to assail the legality of the offending action. Principles of Quo Warranto: 19. Regarding the issue of quo warranto in A.N. Shashtri vs. State of Punjab and others (1988) Supp. SCC 127, it was found that the writ petitioner were one time students of the appellant and the writ petition was outcome of a malice and ill will and resultantly decision of the High Court was set aside wherein it was held that the appellant did not possess the qualifications. Resultantly, the appeals had been allowed of the employee by giving him the benefits of the post of Director. 20. Similarly in B.Srinivasa Reddy vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees’ Association and others, (2006) 11 SCC 731 (II), the Apex Court had come to the conclusion that the writ petition 16 was not maintainable by the Union and the appointment of the appellant who had been appointed as a Managing Director had been wrongly set aside. It was noticed that the second respondent had nourished a grudge against the appellant and therefore, the High Court should have refused to issue quo warranto which was purely discretionary though the strict rules are liable to be relaxed to the extent of quo warranto proceedings. Lack of violation of Statutory Rules. 21. In Hari Bansh Lal’s case (supra), it has also been held that a writ of Quo Warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to Statutory provisions. The relevant part reads as under: “16.Writ of quo warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. In High Court of Gujarat and Another vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others (2003) 4 SCC 712, (three-Judges Bench) Hon'ble S.B. Sinha, J. concurring with the majority view held: "22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ, the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective impact of the candidates or other factors 17 which may be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (Se R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119 SCC para 74.) 23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. To Govt. of Haryana)" 17. In Mor Modern Cooperative Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. To Govt. of Haryana and another, (2002) 6 SCC 269, the following conclusion in para 11 is relevant. "11. ... .... The High Court did not exercise its writ jurisdiction in the absence of any averment to the effect that the aforesaid officers had misused their authority and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellants. In our view the High Court should have considered the challenge to the appointment of the officials concerned as members of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground of breach of statutory provisions. The mere fact that they had not acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellant could not lend validity to their appointment, if otherwise, the appointment was in breach of statutory provisions of a mandatory nature. It has, therefore, become necessary for us to consider the validity of the impugned notification said to have been issued in breach of statutory provision." 18.In B. Srinivasa Reddy vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Assn. And Others, (2006) 11 SCC 731, this Court held: "49. The law is well settled. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine, at the outset, as to 18 whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one which can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules." 19. It is clear from the above decisions that even for issuance of writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. In the later part of our judgment, we would discuss how the appellant herein was considered and appointed as Chairman and whether he satisfied the relevant statutory provisions.” 22. Resultantly, keeping in view the above stated position, we are of the considered opinion that the locus standi of the petitioner as such to question the order dated 26.08.2023 is not available to him as he himself has been the beneficiary of the post in question from which he had been divested. Having failed to sustain his legal challenge in the earlier round of litigation and not having pursued his remedies in accordance with law, the shifting of the track by way of Public interest litigation would not be maintainable at his hands, on account of any violation of any statutory rules as the violation of Memorandum of Understanding cannot be put at the same pedestal. 23. Accordingly, the present Public Interest Litigation is dismissed for want of locus or violation of statutory Rules 19 and on account of personal interest of the petitioner. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances we order that the sum of Rs.1 lakh deposited be refunded to him. Pending applications if any, shall also stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Ranjan Sharma) Judge July 24, 2025. (cm Thakur)