JUDGMENT Rajesh Shankar, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 28.04.2025 passed in W.P.(L) No. 3018 of 2012 whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner/appellant has been dismissed and the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal no. 2, Dhanbad in Reference case no. 12 of 2006 has been affirmed. 2. The factual background of the case is that the respondent no. 1 namely Awinash Kumar Sinha while working as Clerk-cum-Cashier at Jharkhand Gramin Bank, Jamua Branch, Giridih (the erstwhile Giridih Kshetriya Gramin Bank) from 08.03.1995 to 07.06.1996, had committed lapses, irregularities and misconduct. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the respondent no. 1 and he was served a chargesheet dated 09.05.1997 issued under the signature of Chairman-cum-Disciplinary Authority whereby five charges were framed against him and he was asked to submit his defence within 15 days. 3. The respondent no. 1 submitted his explanation which was found unsatisfactory and an enquiry officer was appointed to inquire into the charges framed against him. 4. The enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report observing that out of five charges framed against the respondent no. 1, charge nos. 1, 2 and 5 were fully proved, Charge No. 3 was partially proved and Charge No. 4 was not proved. 5. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority issued show cause notice to the respondent no. 1 on 01.09.2001 intending to impose punishment which was replied by him accepting his mistake with respect to all the charges levelled against him except charge no.1. 6. The respondent no. 1 also requested the disciplinary authority to take sympathetic view against him. The Chairman-cum- Disciplinary Authority finally awarded the punishment to the respondent no. 1 vide order as contained in letter no. HO:IR:01- 02/890 dated 15.10.2001 degrading him to 10 lower stages in his incremental scale w.e.f. the date of the said order. 7. The respondent no. 1 filed appeal before the Board Members in the capacity of Appellate Authority who dismissed the said appeal vide order dated 15.04.2002 which was issued under the signature of Chairman of the Board. 8. Thereafter, the General Secretary of the Bank Staff Association raised industrial dispute which was subsequently referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad vide Reference Case No.12 of 2006. 9. The learned Tribunal set aside the order of punishment of the respondent no. 8. Thereafter, the General Secretary of the Bank Staff Association raised industrial dispute which was subsequently referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad vide Reference Case No.12 of 2006. 9. The learned Tribunal set aside the order of punishment of the respondent no. 1 vide award dated 19.01.2012 observing that the said punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the charges framed against him. The appellant thereafter filed writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 3018 of 2012 which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 28.04.2025 affirming the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.2, Dhanbad. Hence, the present L.P.A. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider the gravity of misconduct committed by the respondent no. 1 who being an employee of the appellant had knowingly and deliberately sponsored the cause of fictitious person namely Gokul Rana in obtaining loan and on being asked, he failed to produce any chit of paper to show the genuineness of the said person. 11. It is also submitted that both the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have committed error in interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 12. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the respondent no. 1 had admitted his guilt. The respondent no. 1 is a bank employee who failed to execute his assigned work with absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty while dealing with public money and as such, the punishment imposed upon him was proper. 13. It is also argued that the present case was beyond the scope of judicial review as the punishment was not shockingly disproportionate and hence, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is fit to be set aside. 14. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate a established legal principle that if the officer/employee acts without authority, it is of no defence to say that no loss has resulted to the employer as acting beyond one’s authority by itself is a breach of discipline amounting to misconduct. 15. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 submits that no financial loss was caused to the appellant-Bank and as such the order of punishment passed against the respondent no. 1 was improper. 15. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 submits that no financial loss was caused to the appellant-Bank and as such the order of punishment passed against the respondent no. 1 was improper. Moreover, the order of punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the charge levelled against the respondent no. 1 and as such the learned Tribunal has rightly quashed the same. 16. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant duly appreciating the issues involved in the same which needs no interference of this Court. 17. It is further submitted that the appeal filed by the respondent no. 1 was dismissed vide passing a non-speaking order dated 15.04.2002 which was issued under the signature of same authority i.e. Chairman of the Board who had passed the order of punishment dated 15.10.2001 and as such the appellate order too was illegal. It is contended that the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal was correctly not interfered by the writ court in exercise of the power of judicial review and as such, the writ petition filed by the petitioner/appellant was rightly dismissed. 18. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record. 19. Before coming to the respective contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. S. Viswanathan reported in (2005) 3 SCC 193 wherein it has been held as under: - “ 12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere has he come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court was either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court. 13. The Division Bench too in appeal, in our opinion, has committed the same error. Maybe, there was some justification, since if it had to allow the appeal, then it had to consider the points on facts decided by the learned Single Judge. In that process it also took up for consideration every bit of evidence that was considered by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge and disagreed with the finding of the learned Single Judge. 20. Thus, an order passed by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is required to be interfered by the High Court exercising power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution only when it is found that the finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence. In absence of any such defect in the order/award of the Labour Court, the writ court is not supposed to enter into the realm of factual disputes and the finding given thereon. 21. Now reverting to the present case, altogether five charges were framed against the respondent no. 1. Out of these, charge nos. 1, 2 and 5 were found proved, charge no. 3 was found partly proved whereas charge no. 4 was found not proved. 22. Charge No. 1 framed against the respondent no. 21. Now reverting to the present case, altogether five charges were framed against the respondent no. 1. Out of these, charge nos. 1, 2 and 5 were found proved, charge no. 3 was found partly proved whereas charge no. 4 was found not proved. 22. Charge No. 1 framed against the respondent no. 1 was that he had misappropriated the loan amount of Rs. 7,500/- by fraudulently obtaining sanction of the same sponsoring his guarantee in the name of a fictitious person namely Gokul Rana. 23. Charge No. 2 was that the respondent no. 1 had posted two debit vouchers for Rs. 5600/- (cash) and Rs. 211.95/- in his saving bank account without having sufficient balance resulting into a debit balance of Rs. 19.35 and later on posted a credit entry of Rs. 30/- in his account to cover up the said debit balance without any supporting voucher. 24. Charge No. 3 was that the respondent no. 1 had received payment of Rs. 70/- against his withdrawal form without posting the same in his account, whereas Charge No. 5 was that the respondent no. 1 had made payment of Rs. 7000/- and Rs. 1000/- to Shri Dayanand Prasad Sahu and Shri B.N Verma respectively against their withdrawal forms without posting the same in their accounts and without cancelling their withdrawal forms. 25. Both the Tribunal as well as the writ court concluded that the order of punishment passed against the respondent no. 1 was shockingly disproportionate which did not commensurate with the nature of charges proved against him. 26. So far the charge no. 1 is concerned, the amount of the loan was already recovered by the appellant-Bank and as such no financial loss was caused to it. So far the Charge Nos. 2, 3 and 5 are concerned, the learned Tribunal had observed that the said mistakes were committed unintentionally and the amounts involved in the said allegations were quite meagre. However, the respondent no. 1 was awarded major punishment of “degradation to ten lower stages in his incremental scale” which was shockingly disproportionate. The learned Single Judge has also affirmed the order/award passed by the Tribunal. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India Vs. R. Dhandapani reported in (2006) 13 SCC 613 has held as under: - “ 7. 1 was awarded major punishment of “degradation to ten lower stages in his incremental scale” which was shockingly disproportionate. The learned Single Judge has also affirmed the order/award passed by the Tribunal. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India Vs. R. Dhandapani reported in (2006) 13 SCC 613 has held as under: - “ 7. It is not necessary to go into detail regarding the power exercisable under Section 11-A of the Act. The power under the said Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, is expected to interfere with the decision of the management under Section 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that punishment imposed by the management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. To support its conclusion the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the words “disproportionate” or “grossly disproportionate” by itself will not be sufficient.” 28. It is a well settled principle of law that the award of punishment by the disciplinary authority may be interfered by the Tribunal or by the High Court if the same is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against the delinquent employee or if the order of punishment is found to be perverse or irrational. Since it is a case where the order of punishment passed against the respondent no. 1 was strikingly disproportionate, the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have rightly interfered with the same. 29. For the reasons as aforesaid, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 28.04.2025 passed in W.P.(L) No. 3018 of 2012. 30. The present appeal being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.