2025:HHC:33304 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1986 of 2025 Reserved on: 15.09.2025 Date of Decision: 24.9.2025. Gopal ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Pranshul Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 100 of 2023, dated 19.08.2023, registered at Women Police Station Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376, 457, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim was alone in her house on 16.08.2023 at about 11:30 p.m. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:33304 The petitioner came to her home and raped her. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner. The charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner, who would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim was alone in her house on 16.08.2023. The petitioner came to her house at about 11:30 p.m. and raped her. She reported the matter to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The victim was medically examined. The Medical Officer reported that the victim was exposed to sexual intercourse within 3 to 4 days of the examination. The police arrested the petitioner and sent him for medical examination. As per the medical report, the petitioner was capable of performing sexual intercourse. Human semen was detected on the salwar of the victim and the blanket. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court on 16.10.2023. The 3 2025:HHC:33304 matter is now listed for the recording of the statements of witnesses on 19.12.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Pranshul Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Pranshul Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. The charge-sheet has been filed before the Court, and the petitioner’s custody is not required. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the grounds of arrest were duly communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 4 2025:HHC:33304 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of 5 2025:HHC:33304 society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order 6 2025:HHC:33304 for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: 7 2025:HHC:33304 (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion 8 2025:HHC:33304 must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. It was submitted that the petitioner was not informed of the grounds of arrest, and he is entitled to bail. This submission cannot be accepted. The petitioner was arrested on 20.08.2023 and it was laid down by the Karnataka High Court in RIYAZ H.Y. v. NIA, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 34 that the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrests is prospective. It was observed: “21. The judgment in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799, which has followed Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) cannot have a retrospective effect.” 11. The matter is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Karnataka by Arasikere Town Police Station Versus Hemanth Datta @ Hemantha @ Baby and Anr SLP (Crl) 9295/2025. 9 2025:HHC:33304 12. The police have filed a memo of arrest, which shows that the petitioner was told that he had committed an offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC, which was non- bailable, and that was why he was being arrested. Therefore, the plea that the petitioner was not told about the grounds of the arrest is not correct. He was informed that he had committed rape (the nature of the offence) and that it was non-bailable (the reasons for arrest). Therefore, the plea taken by the petitioner that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him is not correct. 13. The victim’s statement regarding the rape is duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the report of the SFSL, which shows that human semen was detected on the victim’s salwar. The victim is 85 years old, whereas the petitioner is aged only 28 years. The petitioner entered the victim’s house in the middle of the night and raped her. The victim’s age, time and nature of the offence disentitle the petitioner from the concession of bail. 14. No other point was urged. 10 2025:HHC:33304 15. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 16. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th September, 2025 (ravinder)