JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J. ( Oral) 1. The instant writ petition has been filed for grant of the following substantive relief:- “for directing the respondent no. 2. the Commissioner (Appeal) to accept the appeal which the petitioners now intend to file under section 107(1) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017, against the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Additional Commissioner, CGST & CX Hqrs, Ranchi, as the same stands beyond the statutory limit as prescribed under section 107(1) of CGST Act, considering the extra-ordinary circumstances of the petitioners preventing him to file the appeal, by condoning the delay of about 2 months 10 days. OR/In Alternative For quashing of the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the respondent no. 3 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), as the same has been passed without proper application of mind and without considering the entirety of the reply (undated) filed on behalf of the petitioners and duly received by the respondent office on 11.10.2023. AND During the pendency of the present writ application, the respondents may be constrain from taking any coercive steps as against the petitioners for recovery of the alleged amount as determined vide order dated 13.01.2025 .” 2. Clearly the relief as claimed for is totally misconceived for the reason that Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (in short ‘the Act’) stipulates the procedure for filing of appeal before the appellate authority which reads as under: “107. Appeals to Appellate Authority: (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may Appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person. (2) …………………….. (3) …………………….. (4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the Appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month” …………………………………………..” 3. (2) …………………….. (3) …………………….. (4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the Appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month” …………………………………………..” 3. A plain reading of Section 107 of the Act makes it absolutely clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow an appeal to be presented beyond the period of one month from the date of filing of such appeal. 4. How this provision is to be construed would be determined on the basis of somewhat similar provision contained in the Central Excise Act which came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, (2008) 3 SCC 70 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court therein was considering a case wherein the Commissioner had dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was time barred and filed beyond the period of 30 days from the expiry of the period of 60 days, as prescribed for filing of a statutory appeal. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and the matter reached before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was argued that the Commissioner has no power to condone the delay. However, the High Court could condone the delay by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since such power is untrammelled by the statutory provision. Negating the above contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 8 observed as under:- “8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Limitation Act”) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Limitation Act”) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.” 5. The three Judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise Vs. M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791 , while dealing with the issue of condoning the delays beyond the period specified in Section 35-H of the Central Excise Act, 1944 reiterated the view of Singh Enterprises (Supra) and held that time limit prescribed for making reference and appeal to High Court is absolute and unextendable by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We shall have to reproduce relevant observations contained in para 32, which reads as under: - “32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.” 6. In Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada & Ors. Versus M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, reported in (2020) 19 SCC 681 while dealing with the question as to whether the High Court can exercise the power of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought to entertain challenge to the assessment order on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against the order stood foreclosed by the law of limitation. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of power of appellate authority to condone delay under Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax, 2005 held that a complete mechanism is provided for challenging the assessment orders, that mechanism solely has to be followed, neither the writ Court nor Section 5 of the Limitation Act can condone the delay beyond prescribed statutory period. We shall have to reproduce the relevant observations contained in Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23 and 25, which reads as under:- “16. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision otiose. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision otiose. In a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in ONGC v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corpn. Ltd., the statutory appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time-limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result, this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh Enterprises v. CCE, CCE v. Hongo (India) (P) Ltd., Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC and Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Electricity Deptt. and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act. 17. The principle underlying the dictum in this decision would apply proprio vigore to Section 31 of the 2005 Act including to the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Notably, in this decision, a submission was canvassed by the assessee that in the peculiar facts of that case (as urged in the present case), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, so that complete justice can be done. This argument has been considered and plainly rejected in the following words: (ONGC case, SCC pp. 48-51, paras 12-16) “12. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak while explicating and elaborating the principles under Article 142, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) opined thus: (SCC p. 656, para 50) ‘50. … The fact that the rule was discretionary did not alter the position. 48-51, paras 12-16) “12. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak while explicating and elaborating the principles under Article 142, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) opined thus: (SCC p. 656, para 50) ‘50. … The fact that the rule was discretionary did not alter the position. Though Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order to do complete justice between the parties, the court cannot make an order inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. No question of inconsistency between Article 142(1) and Article 32 arose. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the majority of the Judges of this Court said that Article 142(1) did not confer any power on this Court to contravene the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article 145 confer power upon this Court to make rules, empowering it to contravene the provisions of the fundamental right. At AIR pp. 1002-03, para 12 : SCR p. 899 of the Reports, Gajendragadkar, J., reiterated that the powers of this Court are no doubt very wide and they are intended and “will always be exercised in the interests of justice”. But that is not to say that an order can be made by this Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It was emphasised that an order which this Court could make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. The court, therefore, held that it was not possible to hold that Article 142(1) conferred upon this Court powers which could contravene the provisions of Article 32.’ 13. The said decision has been clarified by a Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, wherein M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority, ruled that: (SCC pp. 634-35, para 83) ‘83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. v. Union of India, wherein M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority, ruled that: (SCC pp. 634-35, para 83) ‘83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., as well as A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, cases the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 Cr PC or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers — limited in some appropriate way — is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. Shri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg case, said that limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from “inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law” must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression “prohibition” is read in place of “provision” that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. He suggested that if the expression “prohibition” is read in place of “provision” that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the Supreme Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what is or is not “complete justice” of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.’ 14. In this regard, another Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India opined : (SCC pp. 437-38, para 56) ‘56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbide case, A.R. Antulay case and Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case. It is one thing to say that “prohibitions or limitations in a statute” cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending “cause or matter” arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. This Court did not say so in Union Carbide case either expressly or by implication and on the contrary it has been held that the Supreme Court will take note of the express provisions of any substantive statutory law and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. …’ 15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay case or in Union Carbide Corpn. case with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC, lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution. 16. We had stated earlier that we will be adverting to the passage in Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Electricity Deptt. There, the Court had referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It fundamentally relied on M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, wherein the Court after referring to certain authorities, analysed thus : (M.P. Steel Corpn. case, SCC p. 91, para 43) ‘43. Ltd. v. Electricity Deptt. There, the Court had referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It fundamentally relied on M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, wherein the Court after referring to certain authorities, analysed thus : (M.P. Steel Corpn. case, SCC p. 91, para 43) ‘43. … when a certain period is excluded by applying the principles contained in Section 14, there is no delay to be attributed to the appellant and the limitation period provided by the statute concerned continues to be the stated period and not more than the stated period. We conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section 14 which is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice would certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case.’ (emphasis in original and supplied) Similarly, in State v. Mushtaq Ahmad, this Court opined that where minimum sentence is provided for an offence then no court can impose lesser punishment on ground of mitigating factors. 18. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what this Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take a different approach in the matter in reference to Article 226 of the Constitution. The principle underlying the rejection of such argument by this Court would apply on all fours to the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd., which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Co. v. CCE. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 2005 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 2005 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction — by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also non-suit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner chooses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in ONGC. In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose. 22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such. 23. Arguendo, reverting to the factual matrix of the present case, it is noticed that the respondent had asserted that it was not aware about the passing of assessment order dated 21-6 2017 although it is admitted that the same was served on the authorised representative of the respondent on 22-6-2017. The date on which the respondent became aware about the order is not expressly stated either in the application for condonation of delay filed before the appellate authority, the affidavit filed in support of the said application or for that matter, in the memo of writ petition. On the other hand, it is seen that the amount equivalent to 12.5% of the tax amount came to be deposited on 12-9-2017 for and on behalf of respondent, without filing an appeal and without any demur — after the expiry of statutory period of maximum 60 days, prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. Not only that, the respondent filed a formal application under Rule 60 of the 2005 Rules on 8-5-2018 and pursued the same in appeal, which was rejected on 17-8-2018. Furthermore, the appeal in question against the assessment order came to be filed only on 24-9 2018 without disclosing the date on which the respondent in fact became aware about the existence of the assessment order dated 21-6-2017. On the other hand, in the affidavit of Mr Sreedhar Routh, Site Director of the respondent Company (filed in support of the application for condonation of delay before the appellate authority), it is stated that the Company became aware about the irregularities committed by its erring official (Mr P. Sriram Murthy) in the month of July 2018, which presupposes that the respondent must have become aware about the assessment order, at least in July 2018. In the same affidavit, it is asserted that the respondent Company was not aware about the assessment order, as it was not brought to its notice by the employee concerned due to his negligence. In the same affidavit, it is asserted that the respondent Company was not aware about the assessment order, as it was not brought to its notice by the employee concerned due to his negligence. The respondent in the writ petition has averred that the appeal was rejected by the appellate authority on the ground that it had no power to condone the delay beyond 30 days, when in fact, the order examines the cause set out by the respondent and concludes that the same was unsubstantiated by the respondent. That finding has not been examined by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order at all, but the High Court was more impressed by the fact that the respondent was in a position to offer some explanation about the discrepancies in respect of the volume of turnover and that the respondent had already deposited 12.5% of the additional amount in terms of the previous order passed by it. That reason can have no bearing on the justification for non-filing of the appeal within the statutory period. Notably, the respondent had relied on the affidavit of the Site Director and no affidavit of the employee concerned (P. Sriram Murthy, Deputy Manager-Finance) or at least the other employee [Siddhant Belgaonker, Senior Manager (Finance)], who was associated with the erring employee during the relevant period, has been filed in support of the stand taken in the application for condonation of delay. Pertinently, no finding has been recorded by the High Court that it was a case of violation of principles of natural justice or non-compliance of statutory requirements in any manner. Be that as it may, since the statutory period specified for filing of appeal had expired long back in August 2017 itself and the appeal came to be filed by the respondent only on 24-9-2018, without substantiating the plea about inability to file appeal within the prescribed time, no indulgence could be shown to the respondent at all. 25. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the High Court ought not to have entertained the subject writ petition filed by the respondent herein. The same deserved to be rejected at the threshold.” 8. Even otherwise, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act is a specific statute and a self-contained code. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the applicability of the Limitation Act. The same deserved to be rejected at the threshold.” 8. Even otherwise, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act is a specific statute and a self-contained code. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the applicability of the Limitation Act. It is a trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the limitation and in absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the above provision. 9. In the present case, the petitioner has come to this writ Court after the limitation has expired for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the Act and obviously the writ petition cannot be entertained for the simple reason that the delay cannot be condoned by this Court. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated above, we find the writ petition to be not maintainable. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending Application, if any, stands disposed of.