JUDGMENT : R.Mukhopadhyay, J. 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Tondon, the learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, the learned SC-IV. 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 12.04.2022, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 3828 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the writ application preferred against the order of dismissal dated 14.07.2004 and rejection of the appeal on the ground of delay has been dismissed. 3. The writ petitioner/appellant was posted as a Regional Education Deputy Director, Santhal Pargana Block, Dumka and vide order dated 03.10.2002 the writ petitioner was suspended from service and the departmental proceeding was initiated and charge-sheet was forwarded to the writ petitioner and the charges included indulging in corruption in payment to teachers of the Madarsa, disobeying the orders of her seniors by granting irregular promotion, illegally sending teachers of the Madarsa for training in Teachers’ Training College, indulging in corruption by colluding with her co- workers, fraud, illegal appointments and overlooking numerous rules and provisions and all these charges were for the period during which the writ petitioner was posted as District Education Superintendent, Deoghar, District Education Officer, Godda and Regional Education Deputy Director, Santhal Pargana Block, Dumka. The writ petitioner had denied the charges levelled against her by submitting a detailed reply. The departmental inquiry found the writ petitioner guilty of several charges and she was also exonerated in some of the charges. The writ petitioner was served with the inquiry report along with a second show-cause notice which was duly replied by her. Vide order dated 15.07.2004 the writ petitioner was dismissed from service under Rule- 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. The writ petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Minister of Human Resources Department, Jharkhand and despite the delay the authorities had sent it for Cabinet requisition for consideration under Rule-49 and 57(5) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. The Cabinet considered the appeal of the writ petitioner on the basis of merits and exonerated the writ petitioner. It has been stated that the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasa contended that the Hon’ble Governor was the competent appellate authority and thus it was recommended to put up the appeal for his perusal/ consideration. The Cabinet considered the appeal of the writ petitioner on the basis of merits and exonerated the writ petitioner. It has been stated that the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasa contended that the Hon’ble Governor was the competent appellate authority and thus it was recommended to put up the appeal for his perusal/ consideration. The Hon’ble Governor found the appeal to be barred by limitation as the appeal was preferred after a delay of two years, four months and eleven days. The appeal was sent to the Cabinet for reconsideration. The Cabinet reversed its own decision and dismissed the appeal being time barred. Being aggrieved the writ petitioner preferred a writ application being W.P.(S) No. 3828 of 2017 which was dismissed vide order dated 12.04.2022 and which is the order impugned to the present letters patent appeal. 4. It has been submitted by Mr. Manoj Tandon, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant that the learned Single Judge has not considered the fact that the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner was sent to the Cabinet which itself would suggest that the delay in preferring the appeal has been condoned. Mr. Tandon while referring to Rule-64(3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 has submitted that the authority instead of withholding the appeal found the same to be fit for placing it before the Cabinet and therefore the delay automatically stood condoned. It has been submitted that even for doing substantive justice the delay ought to have been condoned considering the fact that the writ petitioner has been dismissed from service and her avenue for review of the order of dismissal has been closed. 5. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, the learned SC-IV has submitted that the writ petitioner has failed to give appropriate reasons with respect to the delay in preferring the appeal. The learned State counsel has referred to paragraph no.8 of the impugned order while submitting that the writ petitioner had suppressed the fact that she had earlier approached this Court against the order of dismissal which however was withdrawn. Merely because the Cabinet has exonerated the writ petitioner at the first instance but it had overlooked the inordinate delay in preferring the appeal and on being referred to it on the point of delay it had dismissed the appeal on the said ground. 6. Merely because the Cabinet has exonerated the writ petitioner at the first instance but it had overlooked the inordinate delay in preferring the appeal and on being referred to it on the point of delay it had dismissed the appeal on the said ground. 6. It is a fact and noted in the impugned order dated 12.04.2022 that the writ petitioner had earlier approached this Court on two occasions; the order of suspension was challenged in W.P.(S) No. 2632 of 2004 which had become infructuous while the order of dismissal was challenged in W.P.(S) No.4914 of 2004 which was dismissed as withdrawn. Confronted with the said facts the learned counsel for the writ petitioner had not pressed prayer 1(b) of the writ application and had restricted his submission only with respect to the validity or otherwise of the appellate order which can be deciphered from paragraph no.10 of the impugned order. 7. The issue in question is whether it was justifiable on the part of the State Cabinet to dismiss the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner on the ground of being time barred and which led to the issuance of the impugned order to the writ application dated 02.05.2017. 8. Mr. Tandon, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner in support of his contention that once the appeal was entertained and the writ petitioner was exonerated by the Cabinet it was presumed that the delay in preferring the appeal has been condoned has relied upon the case of “Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur versus State Bank of India & another” reported in (2005) 1 SCC 13 in which it has been held as follows: “13. It is also pertinent to notice that the appellant in his appeal before the appellate authority admitted that he had committed misconduct of disbursing the loan to his wife in a Scheme, which is meant for educated unemployed youth. Mr Ramamoorthy submitted that the appeal filed by the appellant should not have been considered as the same was time-barred and cannot in our opinion be accepted. The appeal was required to be filed within 45 days of the date of receipt of the order appealed against. The order of the disciplinary authority is dated 23-10-1991 and the appeal was filed by the appellant on 10-1- 1992. The appeal was required to be filed within 45 days of the date of receipt of the order appealed against. The order of the disciplinary authority is dated 23-10-1991 and the appeal was filed by the appellant on 10-1- 1992. The appellant was well aware while filing the appeal that his appeal was not filed within the period of limitation as provided under Rule 51(2) of the Service Rules. The appellant having filed the appeal cannot now go around and say that the appeal should have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. The reason is obvious. We, therefore, do not find any merit or substance in the submission in regard to the consideration of the appeal on merits even though it is time-barred. It has to be presumed, that delay, if any, was condoned by the appellate authority while entertaining the appeal and decide the same on merits. Rule 69(5) expressly provides that the authority competent thereunder may, for good and sufficient reasons or if sufficient cause is shown, extend the time specified thereunder for anything required to be done thereunder or condone any delay. This rule is corresponding to Rule 51(2) of the old Rules.” 9. It is no doubt true that the writ petitioner had preferred the appeal beyond the statutory period of sixty days and the delay was of two years, four months and eleven days. Rule-64 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 reads as follows: “64. This rule is corresponding to Rule 51(2) of the old Rules.” 9. It is no doubt true that the writ petitioner had preferred the appeal beyond the statutory period of sixty days and the delay was of two years, four months and eleven days. Rule-64 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 reads as follows: “64. An appeal may be withheld by an authority not lower than the authority from whose orders it is preferred if (1) it is an appeal in a case in which under these rules no appeal lies, or (2) it does not comply with the provisions of rule 63, or (3) it is not preferred within six months after the date on which the appellant was informed of the order appealed against, and no reasonable cause is shown for the delay, or (4) it is repetition of a previous appeal and is made to the same appellate authority by which such appeal has been decided, and no new facts or circumstances are adduced which accord ground for a re-consideration of the case, (5) it is addressed to an authority to which no appeal lies under these rules: Provided that in every case in which an appeal is withheld the appellant shall be informed of the fact that the reasons for it; Provided also that an appeal withheld on account only of failure to comply with the provisions of rule 63 may be resubmitted at any time within one month of the date on which the appellant has been informed of the withholding of the appeal, and, if resubmitted in a form which complies with those provisions, shall not be withheld." (emphasis supplied) 10. Rule-64(3) of the Rules states about withholding an appeal if it is not preferred within six months if no reasonable cause is shown for the delay. The appeal preferred by the writ petitioner was not withheld but instead was placed before the Cabinet from which an inference can be deduced that the delay in filing the appeal was impliedly condoned. The Cabinet went on to exonerate the writ petitioner and the issue was once again reopened at the behest of Human Resources Department which finally led to reconsideration of the appeal and its dismissal being time barred. The Cabinet went on to exonerate the writ petitioner and the issue was once again reopened at the behest of Human Resources Department which finally led to reconsideration of the appeal and its dismissal being time barred. The notification as contained in Memo No.335 dated 02.05.2017 gives out the factual aspects and also refers to Rule-64(3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 but does not at all consider the implied condonation of delay based on the earlier decision of the Cabinet having been provided to it by the Department even after the provision of withholding the appeal in case of delay in terms of Rule-64(3) of the Rules. Rule-64(3) of the Rules makes it abundantly clear that the appeal shall not proceed unless reasonable cause is shown for the delay and it shall be withheld and once the appeal had been referred to the Cabinet and as we have noticed above the delay automatically got condoned. 11. The learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration the background facts of the case while dismissing the writ application so far as the question of preferring the appeal beyond the statutory period of sixty days is concerned. Based on the reasonings noted by us and in order to ensure substantial justice we hereby set aside the order dated 12.04.2022, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 3828 of 2017 and consequently quash Memo No.335 dated 02.05.2017 and remit the matter back to consider the appeal of the writ petitioner/ appellant afresh on the point of merit expeditiously. 12. This appeal is allowed. 13. Pending IA, if any, stands closed.