Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:27085 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No. 408 of 2024. Reserved on 10.07.2025 Pronounced on:12.08.2025 Smt. Usha Sharma .....Appellant. Versus Municipal Corporation, Shimla and others…..Respondents. Coram: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Appellant : Mr.Shrawan Dogra, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arjun Lall, Mr. Tejasvi Dogra and Mr. Harsh Kalta, Advocates. For the respondents: Mr.Hamender Singh Chandel and Mr. Aashir Kaith, Advocates, for respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate Genera, for respondents No. 2 and 3-State. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Appellant, by the medium of the present Letters Patent Appeal, has laid challenge to the judgment dated 09.08.2024, rendered by the learned Single Judge in CWP No.3863 of 2023, titled Usha Sharma vs. Municipal Corporation, Shimla & Ors, whereby the writ petition 2 filed by the petitioner-appellant herein has been dismissed and the eviction order passed by the Collector dated 21.02.2023, (Annexure P-9) and upheld in appeal by the Divisional Commissioner dated 05.06.2023, (Annexure P- 14), passed against the petitioner, which otherwise has been executed, was upheld. 2. A brief narration of the conspectus of facts may be necessary to highlight the issue that arises and appreciate the direction in which we propose to go. 3. It appears that an application was moved by respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation, Shimla, before the Collector on 18.03.2019 (Annexure P-5) under Section 5 of the H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act”) seeking eviction of the petitioner from the premises commonly known as 'Pashu Padav' Boileauganj, Shimla, on the grounds that the premises were leased out to Sh. Lakhu Ram (petitioner's father-in-law) for a period of one year only, w.e.f. 01.04.1952 to 31.03.1953. Since the four structures had been constructed in the premises, the petitioner was stated to be in unauthorized possession of two structures in which the petitioner was running a nursery 3 of plants & a shop for selling the plants & seeds and 'Pashu Padav' in the other two structures. It was further averred that the petitioner was also trying to encroach the adjacent land of the respondents. Notice was issued to the petitioner on the aforesaid application on 18.03.2019 under Section 4(1) of the 1971 Act to show cause as to why eviction order be not passed against her from the aforesaid premises. The notice was served upon the petitioner on 29.03.2019. 4. Petitioner appeared before the Joint Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla, who was exercising powers of Collector under the 1971 Act, and opposed the application moved by respondent No.1- Municipal Corporation, seeking her eviction. Petitioner, inter alia, took the pleas that the premises in question do not fall within the ambit of the 1971 Act, the premises was governed by the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, as was applicable at that point of time and now by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The eviction petition instituted against the petitioner under the 1971 Act was not maintainable. It was further averred that the property in question had been leased out by the Municipal Corporation to petitioner's father-in-law (Sh. Lakhu Ram) which 4 authorized him to charge traders, who come to sell & purchase cattle herds and used the premises-'Pashu Padav' for temporary stay. The petitioner, as authorized, was charging the traders for using the property as such and the Eviction petition instituted against the petitioner was stated to be not for bona fide purpose but out of malice. The allegations made in the application/Notice were denied by the petitioner in toto. 5. Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions and on considering and examining the record, the Collector on 21.02.2023 (Annexure P-9) allowed the application moved by respondent No.1- Municipal Corporation and ordered the petitioner's eviction from the premises in question. 6. Aggrieved by the said eviction order, the petitioner instituted an Appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, before the Divisional Commissioner on 17.03.2023 accompanied by an application for staying the execution and operation of the order dated 21.02.2023. The Divisional Commissioner, after considering the fact that the impugned order passed by the Collector had already been executed, dismissed the Appeal as infructuous on 03.04.2023. 5 7. The petitioner, thereafter, invoked jurisdiction of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and preferred CMPMO No.144 of 2023 against the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner on 03.04.2023, whereby her her application seeking interim relief was rejected. This Court on 06.04.2023, passed an interim order in the aforesaid CMPMO, that till the next date of hearing, the petitioner and her attendants would be permitted to open and use the residential premises. 8. On the next date of hearing, i.e., on 17.04.2023, the CMPMO was finally disposed of by this Court with direction to the Appellate Authority/Divisional Commissioner, to decide the pending appeal expeditiously, preferably within six months. It was also ordered that till such time petitioner's possession of the said premises, as restored to her under order dated 06.04.2023, will not be disturbed and during this period, electricity and water connection were ordered to be provided by Municipal Commissioner to the petitioner. On 05.06.2023, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. 6 9. The petitioner again invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ petition for issuance of a writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution on 14.06.2023 seeking quashing of the final order dated 05.06.2023 (Annexure P-14), passed by the Divisional Commissioner and consequentially to quash the proceedings initiated under Section 5 of the 1971, Act, as being without jurisdiction. 10. The said Writ petition was admitted on 22.06.2023 and the prayer for grant of interim relief made by the medium of CMP No.7286 of 2023 was not accepted on account of the concurrent findings by the authorities below in the impugned orders holding that the applicant/ petitioner was an unauthorized occupant of the subject land. 11. In the meantime, during the pendency of the proceedings, the respondents are stated to have executed the impugned orders and evicted the petitioner from the premises in question. However, when the matter came up before the learned Single Judge, directions were issued that no steps will be taken by the respondents to create third 7 party interest which were apparently continued during the pendency of the matter before the learned Single Judge. 12. On 17.07.2024, the Writ petition, challenging the orders passed by the Authorities below came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the Writ petition on 09.08.2024, mainly on the ground that the petitioner had remained unsuccessful in her pursuits before the authorities below for restraining the respondent- Corporation from obstructing her possession over the premises in question and the eviction orders concurrently passed against her had been executed during the pendency of the proceedings. It is in such circumstances, the petitioner is before this Court by way of present Letters Patent Appeal, against the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, as noticed. 13. When the matter was listed in appeal, it was directed that the suit premises as such would be preserved to avoid precipitation of the matter for creation of third party interest or changing the nature of the premises since the Corporation was keen to construct residential colonies/flats for which Detailed Project Report (DPR) had been approved. 8 Reasoning of the learned Single Judge. 14. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the premise that the premises in question falling in khasra Nos. 451 to 453 measuring 427.07 Sq. meters as per the jamabandi for the year 2000-2001 (Annexure P-16), showed that the State of Himachal Pradesh was reflected as the owner of the premises and the Municipal Corporation was in possession of the same and therefore, the objection that the 1971 Act was not applicable, was rejected by holding the premises in question as public premises. The lease deed having been executed between the Corporation and the father-in-law of the petitioner way back on 01.04.1952 which was to expire on 31.03.1953 was kept in mind and it was noticed that no fresh lease deed was ever executed but the petitioner’s father-in-law Lakhu Ram had continued to occupy the premises. The claim that the Rent Act would be applicable as some amount of rent had been paid to the respondent-Corporation was held not to create the relationship as such as neither there was any lease deed or any valid document authorizing the petitioner to stay and use the premises and only on account of the lease 9 deed furnished as such by the appellant, would not make the possession lawful. It was noticed that the stand of the Corporation was that the area which was leased out in favour of the father-in-law of the petitioner had been sought to be improved upon by encroaching upon the adjoining land which was leased out to Pashu Padav and which now is being used for running a dairy farm, a shop for selling plants and seeds for running a nursery and also for residential purposes. The same fact having been verified by the report of the Committee of Officers on inspection on 17.02.2019 and four structures have been found raised on it. 15. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that there was change of user of the property. While placing reliance upon the interim order, it was noticed that it was the case of the petitioner herself that she wanted to open and use the residential premises which had been sealed and permission had also been granted. The purpose for which the land had been leased out had lost its efficacy in modern times and the Corporation intended to put the premises to better use and the argument as such that the proceedings had been wrongly initiated in contravention of 1971 Act was rejected. No such contention had been raised 10 in the the reply to the notice or in the application and therefore, falling on the ambit of Section 3 of the 1971 Act therefore, as such the learned Single Judge upheld the eviction by holding that the full opportunity had been given to the appellant to defend herself under Section 5 of the 1971 Act. The fact that the civil proceedings had also been resorted to protect her possession and the appellate Court had stepped in while granting the relief not to dispossess her in accordance with law vide order dated 08.05.2019, (Annexure P-21) after the trial Court had declined the same on 24.10.2018, was accordingly kept in mind while noting that the said suit was dismissed in default thereafter. While noticing that there was no authority letter, agreement, or lease deed executed in favour of the appellant, the possession of the appellant was held to be unauthorized and the fact that the premises had been converted for residential and commercial purposes and there was change of user as such without authorization in violation of the terms of the allotment led the learned Single Judge to uphold the orders as such of eviction dated 21.02.2023 (Annexure P-9) and also upheld by the Divisional Commissioner on 05.06.2023 (Annexure P-14). 11 Arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant: 16. Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned Senior Counsel has vehemently submitted that the public premises as defined under Section 2 (e) of the 1971 Act would mean the premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government and accordingly placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead) through his LRs. (1990) 1 SCC 193, that once there was a defect of jurisdiction as such, the order could be set aside on that ground. Similarly reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and others (2013) 10 SCC 136 that once the Authorities had no jurisdiction over the matter, the orders would be nullity as such. 17. The argument raised was that under Section 4 of the 1971 Act, notice has to be issued specifying the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and 12 in the absence of any specific ground as such, the procedure has not been complied with. The Issues No. 2 and 3 which had been framed by the Collector had been wrongly decided which pertained to the unauthorized construction and contravention of the terms and conditions of the authorization to occupy the public premises and whether the appellant was in unauthorized occupation of the same. It was thus contended that the appellate Court as such had applied the penal clause of the lease agreement to hold that the premises could only be used for the purpose of Pashu Padav and no other purposes which was not the ground for eviction. Resultantly, it was argued that the learned Single Judge had failed to examine that the orders suffered from patent illegality or infirmity. 18. It was argued that the reply filed by the Corporation, the stand taken by the Corporation could not improve the case of the Corporation. It was argued that the Rent Act would protect the appellant as some rent had been paid and she was a tenant since 1987 on account of the fact that there was some correspondence way back in the year 1989 inter se with the MC Shimla. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ashoka Marketing 13 Ltd. and another vs. Punjab National Bank and others (1990) 4 SCC 406, in support of his case and it was contended that the restitution had to be done if an eviction had been wrongly done and the tenant could not be thrown out by resorting to summary procedure under the 1971 Act. 19. The Counsel for the Municipal Corporation, on the other hand, submitted that the land in question as such was admittedly leased out by the Municipal Corporation and therefore, being beneficiary of the lease deed of her father- in-law, and in possession, she could not now turn around and say that the lessor did not have any authority and the Rent Act would apply. It was accordingly contended that if any premises belonging to have taken on lease by or on behalf of the Municipal Corporation, they would also be covered under the definition in Section 2 (d) & (e) of the 1971 Act. It was argued that the proper opportunity was given before the Authorities and no such objection was taken, the evidence was recorded and thereafter order was passed by giving valid reasons and the conclusion made was that she was in unauthorized occupation of the premises in question. The Writ Court had only to see the modalities that the proper procedure as such had been 14 followed and that the principles of natural justice had not been violated. The Additional District Judge, Shimla while exercising jurisdiction had protected her vide order passed on 08.05.2019 (Annexure P-21) and the Corporation was only seeking to recover its land which was in her unauthorized occupation and in view of the orders passed by this Court in CWPIL No. 17 of 2015 dated 03.01.2019 (Annexure P-4). History of the Case: 20. As noticed, initially the lease deed in favour of the father-in-law of the petitioner was made on 01.04.1952 (Annexure P-2) between the then Municipal Committee with Lakhu Ram for a period of one year till 31.03.1953 for a sum of Rs.1030/- and for the purpose of “Cattle Parao”. Clause (2) of the said lease deed provided that for no other purpose except the purpose it was granted the premises would be used. Clause 7 further provides that the lessee will not sell or cause to be sold at the premises any articles of food at rates higher than those fixed by the Municipal Committee nor shall he close the shop or stall and thereby cause inconvenience to the public without the permission of the President of the said Municipal Committee and default of the 15 payment of rent or in non-performance of the covenants and conditions, it shall be lawful for the lessors to re-enter and take possession of the premises and to recover the rent. 21. In the meantime, on account of the Resolution No.74 way back on 21/23.5.1955, passed by the Municipal Committee, premises was to be rented out to one Parma Nand and Lakhu Ram was ejected. Resultantly, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla as such in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 12 of 1954-55, titled Lakhu Ram vs. M.C. Shimla came to the conclusion on 27.10.1955 (Annexure P-3) that the possession of the old tenant as such should not be disturbed and advised the committee to consider the matter in the light of those observations, since Lakhu Ram was only offering Rs.600/- whereas Parma Nand had offered Rs.1010/- as rent. The order passed by the then Deputy Commissioner, reads as under: “In the Court of Shri Chand Narain Raina, IAS Deputy Commissioner Shimla. Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1954-55 Lakhu Ram……………………..Vs. The Municipal Committee, Simla. Present: L. Puran Chand Advocate with the Appellant. L. Shankar Nath for the respondent. Order 16 This is a petition called by Lakhu Ram a Lessee of the cattle Parao, Tilak Nagar, Boilegaunj, against the order of the Municipal Committee, Simla, contained in resolution No. 74 of 21/23rd May, 1955, by which the lessee, the petitioner, was ejected from the cattle parao at Tilak Nagar and the same was leased on to someone else. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that he was lessee of the parao since 1st April, 1952, and was regularly paying the rent to the Municipal Committee. He paid Rs. 1000/-as rent for the year 1954-55. The committee as usual asked for the quotations for the current year from 1.4.1955 to 31.3.1956 and renewed the lease deed for the current year with a provision that he should pay the existing rent, by resolution No.8 dated the 5/14th March, 1955, The petitioner accepted the offer in writing on 21.3.55, i.e. on the last day. The learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that inspite of the opinion of the legal advisor to the Municipal Committee in favour of the petitioner, the Committee decided to rent out the Parao to Parma Nand. On representation by the petitioner, the Committee adhered to the previous decision. The learned counsel further stressed that the action of the Municipal Committee was illegal and unjust for the reasons that he accepted the offer before the expiry of the previous lease that is 31.3.55. He is in possession of the Parao and the Committee is not competent to disturb his possession action of the committee was against the provisions of the East Punjab Restriction Act. He cannot be objected if he pays the agreed rent and the Committee is not justified grant lease to other person on the same or enhanced. The learned counsel for the respondent urged that the Committee by its resolution No.8 dated the 5th March, 1955 decided to renew the lease for the year 1955-56 in the name of petitioner, provided the rent of Rs.1000/-/- was paid within days three days instead of 600/-/- offered by him, but he did not agree. The applications were again called and "Parma Nand who offered 1010/- was given the Parao. The petitioner when asked to hand over the possession refused to do so. Action was as desired by the petitioner under Section 232 is not desirable in this case. 17 I have examined the file of the Committee and have also considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel the petitioner and the respondent. I am of the opinion that there is considerable force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel or the petitioner. The opinion of the learned counsel for the respondent as contained in his report dated the 11th April, 1955, can not be ignored. I see no justification in disturbing the possession of an old tenant when he accepts the offer. Before I take action under Section 232, I advise the Committee to consider the matter in, the light of these observations. SD Chand Narain Announced: Deputy Commissioner, Shimla” 27.10.1955 22. Apparently, another such lease deed was executed on 21.09.1957, (Annexure P-2 Colly) for the same amount which was to expire on 31.03.1958 on the same terms and conditions. Thereafter what is on record is that Lakhu Ram had filed representation dated 15.09.1983, to reduce the lease money and add the name of the present appellant. Resultantly, vide communication dated 02.03.1984 (Annexure P-20) he was asked to clear arrears within one week and then only needful will be considered, failing which, action would be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. The said communication reads as under: “SIMLA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION From The Tax Superintendent, Shimla Municipal Corporation, To Sh. Lakhu Ram Sharma, Cattle Shed’s Boilegaunj, 18 Simla. MCS/RA/4394/Sevg153-1063 dated 2/3/84 Shimla. Subject: Request for reduction of lease money-Change of name. D/Sir, Reference your request date 15.9.83 whereby you have requested to reduce the lease money of 1/4th portion of cattle paraw and also to add the name of Smt. Usha Sharma with your name. I am directed to inform you that commissioner M.C. has passed orders to change the rent of 3/4th portion which is in your possession, as regards to add the name of Smt. Usha Sharma, that will be considered after making full payment of outstanding dues. You are advised to make the payment clean within a week positively otherwise future action will be initiated against you in accordance with the provisions of rules please note.” 23. Vide communication dated 29.08.1984 (Annexure P-15), the appellant being the occupier was informed that the lease deed could be executed subject to payment of rent within one week. The said communication reads as under: “SIMLA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION From The Tehsildar, Shimla Municipal Corporation Simla. MCS/RA/299/Sevg184-2541 dated 29/8/84 To Smt. Usha Sharma, Occupier of the Cattle, Shed at Biolegaunj Shimla. Subject: Request for transfer of lease of cattle shed. Madam, 19 The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Shimla has passed orders to transfer of lease of cattle shed at Bioleauganj in your favour on your request. You are, therefore, advised to execute the lease deed and also make the payment of rent within a week positively. Yours Faithfully,” 24. Nothing has been shown whether a valid lease deed had been executed between the parties as per the terms and conditions of the Municipal Corporation. 25. In Public Interest Litigation No. 17 of 2015, an order came to be passed on 03.01.2019 (Annexure P-4), wherein the issues were as such of the enhancement of the lease amount of the commercial properties leased out in Shimla and the defaulters of rent as such regarding various shop-keepers, who were not willing to pay the arrears of enhanced amount. Resultantly, directions had been issued to put them to auction to avoid any loss to the Municipal Corporation. Regarding the property in question, learned Amicus Curiae had pointed out to the Bench that the said property was being misused in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement and therefore, directions were issued to the Municipal Corporation to verify the facts. 20 The relevant portion of order dated 03.01.2019 passed in CWPIL No. 17 of 2015 reads as under: “7.Learned Amicus Curiae further points out that there are two Municipal properties one known as ‘Pashu Padav’ at Boileaguanj and the other is Park Cafe on the Mall Road which have been either sublet and/or are being misused by the lessee in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. Commissioner Municipal Corporation is directed to immediately verify the facts and if there is any substance in the facts pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae, let eviction proceedings, in accordance with law be taken and concluded within two months.” 26. It was further directed that no Civil Court at Shimla shall entertain any Civil Suit with reference to the Resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation on 24.12.2018. It is in such circumstances, notice as such was served under Section 4 (1) of the 1971 Act upon the appellant wherein it was pointed out that she had constructed four structure/sheds for nursery plants and “Pashu Parao” and inspite of various notices issued by the Corporation, she has not removed the said encroachment and she had become the unauthorized occupant of the said premises and was asked why the eviction order should not be made against her. Necessary schedule of public premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation which had been 21 leased out to the father-in-law has been mentioned by referring that the lease had expired on 31.03.1953. 27. Resultantly, an application was filed for eviction (Annexure P-6) which revealed that on site inspection dated 06.02.2019, members of the Committee constituted by the Joint Commissioner, had found that there were four structures which had been constructed and nursery plants had been found and plants and seeds were found selling from the shop. A site plan was then prepared, photographs were also clicked and statements of witnesses have been recorded. 28. In the reply filed, the plea taken was that the applicant was a tenant and the premises was not a public premises, the Rent Act would be applicable and the premises had been leased out to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, prior to coming into force of the Public Premises Act. It was admitted that the plants were propagated at some other place than the leased out property and were only kept on the land leased for commercial purpose to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent. The alleged shop was also in existence right from the beginning which was started by Lakhu Ram for 22 livelihood of his family. The Collector as such proceeded to record evidence. The Municipal Corporation examined as many as four official witnesses and the appellant, on the other hand, examined as many as seven witnesses. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues as such were framed by the Collector: “1. Whether the petition is maintainable under HP PP Act, 1971? 2. Whether the respondent has carried out unauthorized construction and acted in contravention of the terms under which she was originally authorized to occupy the public premises ? 3. Whether the respondent is in unauthorized occupation of the said premises? 4. Final Order regarding eviction. 9. On the basis of the reasons recorded here-in-after, my findings on these above issues are as below:- 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. Yes. 4. As provided in the operation part of this order.” 29. It was noticed that in view of Section 3 (2) of the HP Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, there was an exemption as such of any land or building and premises owned by the Government of H.P. and possessed by MC Shimla. It was accordingly held that the petition was maintainable under 23 the 1971 Act and as per Ext. AW-1/A, the Committee of six officers have found the construction raised of four structures which was used for selling nursery plants. The appellant, however, had refused to get her statement recorded. The unauthorized residential house over the said land was also noticed and resultantly, it was noticed that the purpose of use of the area of the allotted land has been changed, there was illegal construction for residential and commercial purposes and lease deed had not been executed. Therefore, it was held that there was contravention of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, unauthorized occupation of the premises in question and the eviction order was passed with direction to vacate the possession and hand it over to the Municipal Corporation, Shimla. 30. The appellate Court also noticed that the stand taken was that the lease in favour of the father-in-law was transferred in the name of the appellant and therefore, she had a licence to run the shop. Accordingly, it was held that there is only one valid agreement of 1952 and in absence of any signed lease deed by the Corporation, the possession as such was unauthorized and there is violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement as property was used 24 for commercial and residential purposes. It was held that since 1957, the appellant was not only in illegal occupation of the premises but was using the public property for commercial purposes and earning money. Thus the appeal was dismissed. Reasons to uphold the orders of the Authorities below: 31. From the findings recorded by the authorities below, it would be apparent that adequate notice was issued to the appellant. The appellant had submitted her defence to the notice issued and examined 7 witnesses in her defence thereafter even reasonable opportunity was given to her. The Collector had satisfied himself for the reasons recorded and passed the order of eviction. 32. Section 3 of the 1971 Act provides that there will be eviction of an unauthorized occupation if there is possession otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant or where the lease has ceased and there is any contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorized to occupy such public premises, the eviction is liable to be made under 25 Section 5 of the 1971 Act. Sections 3 and 5 of the said Act read as under: “3. Unauthorized occupation of public premises.- For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises- (a) where he has whether before or after the commencement of this Act entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or (b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee, has by reason of the determination or cancellation of his allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy or hold such public premises; or (c) where any person authorised to occupy any public premises has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act (i) sub-let in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, without the permission of the State Government or of any other authority competent to permit such sub-letting the whole or any part of such public premises, or (ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such public premises. Explanation.-For the purposes of clause (a) a person shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee. 4.xxx xxx xxx 5. Eviction of unauthorized occupants.-(1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in 26 pursuance of a notice under section 4 and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Collector is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the Collector may, on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein directing that the public premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in unauthorised occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises or of the estate in which the public premises are situate: [Provided that subject to the provisions of this Act or any rules made thereunder, the Collector shall make an order of eviction within a period of six months from the date of issuance of notice under section 4, however, the period may further be extended by three months for the reasons to be recorded in writing.] [(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within fifteen days of the date of its publication under sub-section (1), the Collector or any other officer duly authorized by him in this behalf may evict that person, within fifteen days after expiry of the above mentioned period, and take possession of the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary. (3) The Collector shall impose upon the person evicted under this section a fine upto ten thousand rupees or the market value of the premises whichever is higher.] 33. The definition of Section 2 (e) of the 1971 Act would go on to show that a public premises would include any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf 27 of the State Government and also includes, any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any Municipal Corporation in any notified area Committee, Panchayat Samiti, Panchayat or improvement trust. Thus it is apparent that any lessee as such in occupation by way of lease from any Municipal Corporation would be in occupation of land which could be termed as public premises. There was no such objection also taken before the Authorities that there was no jurisdiction on this aspect as the only objection as such was raised that the Rent Act was applicable. Section 2 (e) of the 1971 Act reads as under: “Section 2 (e) “Public premises” means any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government and includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of- (i) any municipal corporation/committee, notified area panchayat samiti, Panchayat committee, improvement trust XXXXXXXXXXX], (ii) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government, ²[XXXXX] (iii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act as defined in clause (7) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or a Himachal Pradesh Act and owned or controlled by the State Government ³[, and] 4[(iv) any Co-operative Society registered or deemed to have been registered under the Himachal Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1968;]” 28 34. Similarly if one is to look at the Exemption Clause under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. Section 3 (2) specifically provides that the Act would not be applicable to any building or rented land owned by the Government. Similarly the definition of tenant is provided under Section 2 (j) of the Act, which includes a person placed in occupation of a rented land or other person to whom the land has been leased out by Municipal Corporation. The definition of Section 2 (j) reads as under: “2 (j) Tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a residential or non-residential building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy, a deserted wife of a tenant who has been or is entitled to be in occupation of the matrimonial home or tenanted premises of husband, a divorced wife of a tenant who has a decree of divorce in which the right of residence in the matrimonial home or tenanted premises has been incorporated as one of the conditions of the decree of divorce and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule-I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him or carrying on business in the premises at the time of his specified, respectively in Explanation-I and Explanation-II to death, subject to the order of succession and conditions this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council or a Nagar Panchayat or a Cantonment Board; 29 Explanation I. -The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows:- (a) firstly, his surviving spouse; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased persons as a member of his family upto the date of his death; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre- deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent (s), or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death: Provided that the successor has ordinarily been living or carrying on business in the premises with the deceased tenant as a member of his family upto the date of his death and was dependent on the deceased tenant: Provided further that a right to tenancy shall not devolve upon a successor in case he or his spouse or any of his dependent son or daughter is owning or occupying a premises in the urban area in relation to the premises let. Explanation-II. The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation-I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs; and]” 35. Nothing has been shown to this Court that there was any registered lease deed thereafter executed with the present appellant by the Municipal Corporation. Apparently 30 no effort has been made by the father-in-law of the appellant during his life time to transfer the lease in favour of the present appellant, which was subject to deposit of the outstanding rent. Apparently, the same having not been done, the lease deed had not been executed and when the matter had been raised before the Division Bench of this Court in a CWPIL the respondent-Corporation has got up from its slumber and initiated proceedings after getting the premises inspected. As noticed, Clause (2) as such provided that the property was not to be used for any other purpose and once there was contravention of the terms of the allotment, the petitioner having continued possession by way of relationship was also bound by the same terms and conditions. Having raised construction both in the form of residential and commercial, apparently, she was mis- utilizing the premises. 36. A perusal of Annexure P-17 would also go on to show that there was construction raised on account of which she has also paid use and occupation charges on 12.11.2021, to the tune of Rs.27654/- from the year 1920- 21 after the eviction order. Therefore, it does not lie in her mouth now to say that the premises was only being used as 31 such for the purpose for which it had been initially allotted, as she herself got the premises which had been sealed opened on the ground that she was using the same for residential premises. Therefore, the appellant cannot now turn around and challenge the jurisdiction of the authorities to initiate proceedings under the Public Premises Act. In the absence of any rent having been paid and any receipt and on account of just depositing the use and occupation charges, would not as such make her status in the premises as such legal, keeping in view the fact that there was her own request as such for entry of her name in the lease deed on the request of the original lessee, namely Lakhu Ram, and which was subject to the payment of the full payment of the outstanding dues. Failure to execute the lease deed with the Municipal Corporation therefore, now binds the appellant of the fact that she had herself asked for the transfer of the lease in her name and for reduction of lease money and change of name. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the needful was done and therefore, the action which was taken on the ground of violation of the earlier terms and conditions, by the authorities, cannot be faulted in any manner. 32 37. The appellant has a finding of the Additional District Judge dated 08.05.2019 against her that there is a breach of the terms and conditions but protection was given to dispossess only in acordance with law on account of the settled possession. The suit was however, not pressed and taken to its logical end. The said findings read as under: “15.Hence, on the above discussion and observations as the lease has not been yet renewed by the applicant/plaintiff despite the notice, therefore, possession of the applicant was unauthorized and steps had already been taken by the defendant/respondent. Moreover, the applicant has caused breach to the conditions of the lease by making encroachment and making construction herself and also the rearing cattle by opening dairy farm on the suit property as the applicant has breached the condition no. 2 of the lease deed that she will use the premises only for the purpose granted that she shall comply with all the directions, orders, rules and bye-laws of the Municipal Corporation and it is provided that in case of breach or contravention, on the part of the lessee, the applicant shall be liable for the penalty or forfeiture of the security in accordance with law. 16. Hence, from the above observations and discussions, I am of the considered opinion that though the appellant has breached the conditions of the lease, but from the law cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, it is clear that even the trespasser cannot be dispossessed except in due process of law. 17. For the forgoing reasons, the impugned order dated 24.10.2018, passed by the learned trial court suffers from legal infirmity and as such, the same is required to be set-aside. Hence, this point is answered in the affirmative.” 33 38. The judgment in Sushil Kumar Mehta (supra), thus would be of no help for the Senior Counsel for the appellant as the issue there was pertaining to defect of jurisdiction wherein it was held that the Civil Court had lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree once there was relationship of landlord and tenant inter se, and the Rent Act would apply and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted. 39. Similarly, in Ashoka Marketing Ltd (supra), it has been rather held by the Constitution Bench that the Public Premises Act is a special Act and overrides the Rent Control Act and has to prevail over the same and provides a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises while dealing with the Public Premises Eviction of unauthorized Occupant Act, 1971 enacted by the Union of India. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: “54. The Public Premises Act is a later enactment, having been enacted on August 23, 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted on December 31, 1958. It represents the later will of Parliament and should prevail over the Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the Public Premises Act is a general enactment, whereas the Rent Control Act is a special enactment and being a special enactment the Rent Control Act should prevail 34 over the Public Premises Act. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Rent Control Act is a special enactment dealing with premises in occupation of tenants, whereas the Public Premises Act is a general enactment dealing with the occupants of public premises and that insofar as public premises in occupation of tenants are concerned the provisions of the Rent Control Act would continue to apply and to that extent the provisions of the Public Premises Act would not be applicable. In support of this submission reliance has been placed on the non-obstante clauses contained in Sections 14 and 22 of the Rent Control Act as well as the provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the said Act. On the other hand the e learned counsel for the respondents have urged that the Rent Control Act is a general enactment dealing with the relationship of landlord and tenant generally, whereas the Public Premises Act is a special enactment making provision for speedy recovery of possession of public premises in unauthorised occupation and that the provisions of the Public Premises Act, a later special Act, will, therefore, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act insofar as they are applicable to public premises in occupation of persons who have continued in occupation after the lease has expired or has been determined. The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on Section 15 of the Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of all courts in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and other matters specified therein. It has been submitted that the said provision is also in the nature of a non-obstante clause which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act. Thus each side claims the enactment relied upon by it is a special statute and the other enactment is general 35 and also invokes the non-obstante clause contained in the enactment relied upon. 55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law in regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to of be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order of eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In other words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt d with therein. Since, the Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the exception contained in the principle that a sub- sequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle that the later laws 36 abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act must prevail over e the Rent Control Act. 56. We arrive at the same conclusion by applying the principle which is followed for resolving a conflict between the provisions of two special enactments made by the same legislature. We may in this context refer to some of the cases which have come before this Court where the provisions of two enactments made by the same legislature were found to be inconsistent and each enactment was claimed to be a special enactment and had a non-obstante clause giving overriding effect to its provisions.” 40. The said observations thus would be against the appellant himself as the purpose of the Act is to ensure that the speedy remedy is resorted to especially when there is contravention of the terms and conditions of the lease deed which could be defined as public premises. 41. The procedure as such has been followed by the authorities and orders passed suffer from no illegality which have been duly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. 42. The judgment in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat’s case (supra) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case as the Apex Court in that judgment came to the conclusion that the Consumer Court would have no jurisdiction as such regarding the claim as such for retiral benefits of a government employee and the appropriate 37 forum would be the State Administrative Tribunal or the Civil Courts etc. 43. Having requested the Municipal Corporation itself for legalizing the occupation as per the terms and conditions of the earlier lease deed executed between her father-in-law and failed in her endeavour and without any receipt of payment of rent, she cannot claim to be a tenant and thus, we are of the considered opinion that the orders passed by the authorities below suffer from no illegalities. Resultantly, we dismiss the appeal. 44. All interim orders passed in favour of the appellant will come to end. The Municipal Corporation would thus be entitled to use the property for its own benefit. 45. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly, as indicated hereinabove, along with pending miscellaneous applications, if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Ranjan Sharma) Judge August 12, 2025. (cm Thakur)