AMRO DEVI v. THE SERCRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND OTHERS
CMP.M/1787/2023 · 2025-08-26
Bipin Chander Negi
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 22894 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 22894 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMP(M) No.1787 of 2023
Date of Decision: 26TH August, 2025
Amro Devi
.....Applicant/Appellant Versus The Secretary to GOI & Ors.
….non-Applicants/respondents
Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Applicant : Ms. Suman Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Nand Lal Thakur, Sr. Panel Counsel,
for respondents no. 1 to 3.
: Respondents No. 4 to 10 proceeded against ex parte vide
order dated 24.4.2024 passed by the learned Additional Registrar (Judicial). Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). Present application had been filed by the present applicant seeking condonation of delay of nine years and eleven months in filling the present appeal. 2. The appellant in the case at hand had filed a suit seeking declaration to the effect that she is a widow of one Sh. Saligram son of Gopi Chand to whom, it was alleged that she was married on 28.04.1954. On his death, a claim to the pensionary benefits had been made by the present applicant/appellant. The suit so filed was dismissed. 3. Both the Courts below arrived at a categorical finding that the present applicant/appellant is not a legally
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 valid wife of Saligram and on his death she was not entitled to any pensionary benefits. It would be pertinent to mention herein that a claim for pension had been rejected by the authorities on 9.10.1997. The suit in the case at hand was filed on 8.4.2004 i.e. after more than three years of rejection of a claim for family pension on
9.10.1997. Hence, the Courts below were of the view that suit filed was time barred. 4. The suit filed on 8.4.2004 and was decided on
27.2.2009. The appeal preferred therefrom before the first appellate Court was presented on 27.3.2009 and the same was decided on 7.12.2013. 5. In the application filed for condonation of delay, all that is submitted is that the applicant is 87 years of age, she is a illiterate lady, who does not understand the intricacies of law and she is in dire need of financial support. It is further submitted that the pension being sought for is a recurring cause of action and hence the same can be claimed at any time. 6. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in SLP (C) No.17575 of 2023 Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran &
3 Anr. decided on 13.05.2025, relevant extract whereof is being reproduced herein below;
“Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party.
In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet”. 7. Other than the aforesaid it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
4
“605.
Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
(2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.”
8. Ignorance of law is not an excuse, law applies with full vigour to all. “None are exempt from the applicability of the law of limitation”. 9. Admittedly, the delay in the case at hand is nine years eleven months. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not
5 have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part (Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81). 10. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’.
In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under:
“…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication. 6
11. Admittedly, in the case at hand, the matter was finally decided by the 1st Appellate Court on 07.12.2013. In the proceedings before the 1st Appellate Court, the present applicant was duly represented by the counsel. 12.
In the application for condonation of delay, it is pleaded by the applicant that she is an illiterate rustic villager not aware of the limitation period of 90 days for filing the regular second appeal before the High Court. In the attending
facts and circumstances, the least that was accepted of the applicant was to have ascertained the period of limitation for filing the further appeal before this Court i.e. High Court.
13.
A want of diligence on account of not having ascertained the period of limitation from the counsel who represented the applicant before the 1st Appellate Court can be attributed to the applicant as ascertaining the period of limitation for filing the regular second appeal in the case at hand was required to be done by the applicant. Previously also the applicant had preferred an appeal before the 1st Appellate Court. For filing of the same, also there exists a period of limitation.
14.
The application for condonation of delay in the case at hand has been made in casual and routine manner without indicating facts which would constitute sufficient cause to permit condonation of delay.
7
15.
In view of the aforesaid, present application is dismissed being devoid of merit.
(Bipin Chander Negi)
Judge
26th August, 2025 (Tarun)