JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. By way of present writ application petitioner has thrown challenge to the order dated 18.11.2016 as contained in memo No. 8204, passed by respondent No. 3, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service with retrospective date i.e. 18.06.2002 that too after retirement and without initiating any proceeding under the provisions of Rule-43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules and in violation of order dated 17.02.2016, passed in W.P.(S). No. 2747 of 2011. Petitioner has further prayed for direction upon the respondents to release the entire retiral benefits viz. Provident Fund, Gratuity, Leave Encashment, Group Insurance and further to fix the pension of the petitioner since he has retired from service on 28.02.2011 but till date his pension has not been fixed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the Petitioner was employed as an Assistant Teacher in Primary School, Mohanpur, Bokaro. While he was in service, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner in the year 1992 under Sections 307/148/34 IPC due to a land dispute and he was convicted by the Trial Court under the aforesaid Sections. Thereafter, the Petitioner preferred a Criminal Appeal No. 358/2002 before this Court against the Trial Court's order; whereby this Court modified the conviction and convicted him under sections 324/148/34 IPC vide order dated 05.11.2009. The Petitioner, thereafter, preferred a Criminal Appeal No. 2160/2010 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 16.11.2010 reduced the sentence imposed upon the Petitioner to the period already undergone by him. 3. Learned Amicus representing the petitioner submits that after the criminal case was over when the Hon’ble Apex Court modified the sentence for the period already undergone vide its order dated 16.11.2010; the Petitioner was thereafter suspended vide an office order no. 3753 dated 26.11.2010 issued under the signature of the Respondent No. 3 without issuing any show-cause as against the Petitioner wherein it has been stated that the Petitioner would only be entitled for subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. The Area Education Officer, Bermo was appointed as the Inquiry Officer in the instant matter. The Petitioner worked regularly till the order of suspension passed as against him and was being paid his salary regularly. 4. The Area Education Officer, Bermo was appointed as the Inquiry Officer in the instant matter. The Petitioner worked regularly till the order of suspension passed as against him and was being paid his salary regularly. 4. The Petitioner retired from service upon attaining the age of superannuation on 28.02.2011 during the period of suspension itself without any subsistence allowance paid to him during the entire period of suspension. After his retirement, the Petitioner represented before the Area Education Officer, Bermo-cum-Inquiry Officer vide his letter dated 07.03.2011, requesting him to withdraw the suspension order as the Petitioner has already retired from service. 5. Learned Amicus further submits that to the utter surprise of the petitioner, the Respondent No. 3 dismissed him from service with a retrospective date i.e. 18.06.2002 vide office order no. 517 dated 25.03.2011, without awaiting the enquiry report from the Inquiry Officer and directed that the Petitioner would only be entitled for the Group Insurance amount and the Provident Fund amount along with interest. The said dismissal order does not mention as to under which provisions of Rule/ Act the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 6. Learned Amicus further submits that being aggrieved by the said action of the respondents, the Petitioner preferred W.P.(S). No. 2747/2011 as against the dismissal order dated 25.03.2011, in which this Court vide its order dated 17.02.2016 has quashed and set aside the dismissal order and directed the Respondents to pass appropriate orders with respect to the period when the Petitioner was put under suspension. He further submits that the Court has observed in Para 7 of the judgment that after the employee has superannuated, the only punishment that can be inflicted upon him is under Rule 43 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules. The Petitioner then preferred Cont. (Cvl.) No. 351/2016 for compliance of the High Court's order dated 17.02.2016. During the pendency of the said contempt, the respondent No. 3 again passed an office order No. 8204 dated 18.11.2016, dismissing the Petitioner with retrospective date i.e. 18.06.2002 without initiating any proceeding under Rule 43(b) of Jharkhand Pension Rules. 7. Ld. Counsel for the State Respondents opposed the contention of the Petitioner and submits that the Petitioner was a named accused in Chandan Kiyari P.S. Case No. 1/1992 and was also charge-sheeted. 7. Ld. Counsel for the State Respondents opposed the contention of the Petitioner and submits that the Petitioner was a named accused in Chandan Kiyari P.S. Case No. 1/1992 and was also charge-sheeted. The Learned Trial Court convicted the Petitioner vide order dated 18.06.2002 and passed an order for sentence of 4 years Rigorous Imprisonment; thereafter the Petitioner was taken into custody but he failed to inform his employer. The Petitioner is fit to be dismissed with effect from the date of conviction as per the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera , AIR 1995 SC 1364 8. He further submits that the Petitioner assailed the order of conviction upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but the conviction was sustained. This Court in W.P. (S) No. 1581/2005 has held vide order dated 06.04.2005 that after conviction, convicted employees are fit to be dismissed without initiating any departmental proceedings. The Petitioner never brought to the knowledge of the authorities that he had been taken into custody after his conviction vide order dated 18.06.2002 and the said fact was first reported by the Block Education Extension Officer, Chandan Kiyari vide his letter no. 145 dated 13.10.2010 addressed to the DSE, Bokaro. Thereafter, the matter was placed by the DSE, Bokaro before the District Education Establishment Committee, Bokaro in its meeting dated 11.03.2011 and the Committee took a decision to apply the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in the instant matter and resolved to set naught the service of the Petitioner with effect from his date of conviction i.e. 18.06.2002. 9. He furher submits that only thereafter, the District Superintendent of Education, Bokaro gave effect to the aforesaid decision taken by the District Education Establishment Committee, vide office order contained in Memo No. 517 dated 25.03.2011. He further argues that the Petitioner assailed the said office order before this Court vide W.P. (S) No. 2447/2011 which was allowed by the High Court vide order dated 27.02.2016 but it gave liberty to the Respondents to initiate de novo proceedings in accordance with law. Thereafter, a proceeding was initiated as against the Petitioner and an opportunity of being heard was provided to him and the Petitioner conceded that he had preferred an application for medical leave for the period that he was in custody. Thereafter, a proceeding was initiated as against the Petitioner and an opportunity of being heard was provided to him and the Petitioner conceded that he had preferred an application for medical leave for the period that he was in custody. The matter of disciplinary proceeding against the Petitioner was placed before the District Education Establishment Committee, Bokaro in its meeting dated 02.11.2016 and the Committee took a decision to dismiss the Petitioner with effect from his date of conviction. The District Superintendent of Education, Bokaro gave effect to the said order vide office order no. 8204 dated 18.11.2016. 10. Learned counsel lastly contended that though Petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal under Rule 10 of the Bihar State Nationalized Primary School Teacher (Transfer and Disciplinary proceedings) Rules 1995 but without exhausting the said remedy he has straightway approached to this Court. He submits that in a similar case being W.P.(S). No. 7048/2006 dated 13.04.2009, this Court has been pleased to dismiss the matter on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 11. Having heard learned Amicus Curiae and counsel for the respondents, it appears that in the earlier round of litigation being W.P.(S). No. 2747 of 2011, this Court vide its order dated 17.02.2016, has quashed the impugned order by holding as under: “7. After hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties at length and on perusal of the other relevant records, it appears that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference on the following grounds: - Admittedly, the petitioner retired from service on 28.02.2011 and the impugned order of punishment of dismissal from service has been passed on 25.03.2011 vide Annexure-4, which inter alia, states that the order of dismissal from service is given effect to retrospectively, with effect from 18.06.2002. Once a Government servant retires on attaining the age of superannuation, the only punishment that can be inflicted is by resorting to Rule 43 of the Bihar Pension Rules. On perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-4), there is no doubt that the proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Pension Rules has not been initiated prior to infliction of punishment order (Annexure-4) and therefore, the impugned order on that score is not legally sustainable.” 12. On perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-4), there is no doubt that the proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Pension Rules has not been initiated prior to infliction of punishment order (Annexure-4) and therefore, the impugned order on that score is not legally sustainable.” 12. The stand of the respondents that though the Court has given liberty to the respondents to start de novo proceeding in accordance with law but since the petitioner has retired before the order passed by this Court; as such, the de novo proceeding would not have been started and the impugned order has been passed. 13. The said stand of the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the fact that there are provisions under the Jharkhand Pension Rules to initiate any proceeding if the State founds that there is some misconduct. Moreover, the Court has categorically quashed the impugned order of termination and also has granted liberty to the respondents to initiate de novo proceeding, if so advised. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Amresh Shrivastava Vs. the State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 10590 of 2024] has held at para-17 as under: “17. As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at the stage of the chargesheet itself, suffice it to say that this varies from case to case. However, in the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceeding despite the alleged misconduct being withing the knowledge of the department, but still no departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases where the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself woold not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process of departmental proceedings.” 14. At this stage it is also relevant to point-out that the earlier order passed by the Writ Court in W.P.(S). No. 2747 of 2011 has neither been assailed by the respondents; rather, they acted upon but not specifically in view of the direction given by the Writ Court. 15. At this stage it is also relevant to point-out that the earlier order passed by the Writ Court in W.P.(S). No. 2747 of 2011 has neither been assailed by the respondents; rather, they acted upon but not specifically in view of the direction given by the Writ Court. 15. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. The respondents would be at liberty to comply the order passed by the Writ Court in true letter and spirit keeping in mind the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Amresh Shrivastava (supra). 16. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed. 17. It goes without saying that since learned counsel for the petitioner was not appearing in the instant case, accordingly, Ms. Soumya S. Pandey, Advocate was appointed as learned Amicus to assist the Court. As such, she shall be entitled for her admissible fees from the JHALSA, Ranchi on submissions of her Bill which will be as per the applicable rules. 18. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Ld. Amicus and also to the Member Secretary, JHALSA, Ranchi, for the needful.