Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Rajasthan · body

2025 DAILYLAW 22836 (RAJ)

JAMEEL KHAN v. STATE HOME DEPARTMENTANR

SAW/568/2014 · 2025-05-07

Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, Mukesh Rajpurohit

Public Interest Litigationbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

[2025:RJ-JP:19256-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 568/2014 Jameel Khan Son Of Shri Pilley Khan, aged about 44 years, resident of House No. 353, Behind Hostel, Kundan Nagar, Ajmer ----Appellant Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Collector, Ajmer 2. Superintendent Of Police, Collectorate Campus, Ajmer ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Prem Kumar Sharma For Respondent(s) : Ms. Sunita Meena & Mr. Vishnu Dutt Sharma on behalf of Mr. Bhuwnesh Sharma, AAG HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKESH RAJPUROHIT Order 07/05/2025 1. Application (1/2023) for early hearing of the appeal is considered and allowed. 2. With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 3. This appeal is directed against the order dated 10.01.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby, the writ petition of the petitioner seeking to challenge termination order on the ground of violation of provisions contained under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’), has been dismissed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that irrespective of the merits of the case, since the respondents themselves have processed the matter for payment of compensation in part, the respondents are liable to be directed to make payment of retrenchment compensation. It is also submitted [2025:RJ-JP:19256-DB] (2 of 4) [SAW-568/2014] that earlier also when appellant was terminated, he had approached the Labour Court and order was passed in his favour, which attained finality, despite challenge made to the same before this Court. Therefore, when again termination order was passed, the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated this factual and legal position and allowed the petition, rather than holding that police department is not an industry. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A Rajappa & Ors. (AIR 1978 SC 548), the police department is not an industry, as it discharges sovereign functions. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. The learned Single Judge in order to hold that the police department discharges sovereign functions and, therefore, is not an industry and accordingly, provisions of the Act of 1947 shall not apply, has relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra). In the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the exclusions were categorically noticed in paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment as below: “5. Each of us is likely to have a subjective notion about "industry". For objectivity, we have to look first to the, words used in the statutory provision defining industry in an attempt to find the meaning. If that meaning is clear, we need proceed no further. But, the trouble here is that the words found there do not yield a meaning so readily. They refer to what employers or workers may do as parts of their ordinary avocation or business in [2025:RJ-JP:19256-DB] (3 of 4) [SAW-568/2014] life. When we turn to the meaning given of the term "worker" in S. 2 (s) of the Act, we are once more driven back to find it in the bosom of "industry", for the term "worker" is defined as one : "employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute". The definition, however, excludes specifically those who are subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy Discipline Act, 1934, as well as those who are employed in the Police Service or Officers and other employees of a Prison, or employed in mainly managerial or administrative capacities or who, being employed in supervisory capacity, draw wages exceeding Rs.500/- per mensem.” 8. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, the learned Single Judge held that the Act of 1947 will not apply in the matter of service disputes of those who are engaged/employed in the police department of the State. 9. An argument that in the earlier round of litigation between the parties, the order of the Labour Court was upheld, does not come to the aid of the appellant principally for the reason that present case is based on different cause of action. Earlier termination order was set aside. However, later on, the appellant was again terminated after some time. On a subsequent and different cause of action, fresh writ petition was filed and the legal position as enumerated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), was applied to hold that provisions of Section 25F of the Act of [2025:RJ-JP:19256-DB] (4 of 4) [SAW-568/2014] 1947 could not apply in the case of the appellant, as he was employed in the police department of the State Government. Once the legal position is crystal clear, no relief could be granted to the appellant. The learned Single Judge, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition as no mandamus can be issued in such cases to comply with the provisions of Section 25 of the Act of 1947, which has no application. 10. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that rightly or wrongly the respondents had proceeded to make payment of compensation during the pendency of the cases, even though the writ petition was dismissed and certain part payments have been made, does not entitle him to a writ of mandamus from this Court. 11. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed being devoid of merit. (MUKESH RAJPUROHIT),J (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA),CJ RAJAT/ANAND TANWAR/59