2025:HHC:28890 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1945 of 2025. Reserved on: 14.08.2025. Date of Decision: 27.08.2025. Harsh Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : M/s Harneet Singh Oberoi, Rakesh Mogta and Aryan Mogta, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking pre-arrest bail, in FIR No. 59 of 2025, dated 21.05.2025, registered at Police Station Parwanoo District Solan, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) corresponding to Sections 316, 334(2) & 336 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 2. It has been asserted that the FIR was registered in violation of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:28890 Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Satinder Antil Vs CBI, without conducting any preliminary investigation. The petitioner is innocent. He had joined the investigation on more than five occasions, according to the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, H.P. The petitioner is being called repeatedly to harass and humiliate him at the instance of the complainant. The petitioner has supplied his specimen signatures as demanded by the Investigating Agency. The averments made in the FIR disclose a financial dispute involving Legen Healthcare and its partners. The petitioner’s employer and his father were considering purchasing a medicine manufacturing factory. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was entered into between the parties on 05.09.2022 specifying the terms and conditions. The informant harassed the petitioner by not giving a no-objection certificate. Mr. Gunwant Rai Satija and Bikramjit Stija coerced the petitioner’s employer into giving a 20% share of Legen Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. to them. They also lodged an FIR regarding forgery and cheating in Panchkula. Two cheques of ₹ 13,10,000/- each were issued to Mr. Nikhil Arya and his father, which were dishonoured on two occasions i.e. 24.04.2025 and 16.05.2025. The present FIR was lodged to prevent the filing of a complaint for the dishonour of the cheques. There is a delay of more than two years in lodging the 3 2025:HHC:28890 FIR. The allegations in the FIR are false. The tender in issue was due on 23.05.2023 and was submitted by Mr. Bikramjet Satija and Gunwant Rai Satija, after consulting Nikhil Arya and the petitioner. The petitioner did not derive any benefit. Mere breach of contract does not constitute any offence unless the dishonest intention is disclosed from the beginning. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the pre-arrest bail be granted to the petitioner. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant, Bikramjit Satija, made a complaint to the police, stating that he was a partner of M/s Legen Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. He retired from the partnership. Nikhil Arya and Sanjiv Arya joined as partners w.e.f. 02.11.2023. The informant again became a partner on 21.10.2024, on the retirement of Nikhil Arya and Sanjiv Arya. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between Nikhil Arya and Sanjiv Arya on the one side and the informant and his father, Gunwant Rai Satija, on the other side. Nikhil Arya and Sanjiv Arya forged the signatures of Gunwant Rai Satija in the account opening form of M/s Legen Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. The matter was reported to SSP Panchkula. The informant found from information obtained under RTI that the accused had participated in the tender floated by the Department of Health and 4 2025:HHC:28890 Family Welfare in the name of Legen Healthcare without the informant’s consent. The accused forged and used various documents to cheat the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The letterhead of Legen Healthcare was forged by mentioning the wrong address and WhatsApp number. The official stamp of Legen Healthcare, the signatures of the informant and his father were also forged. A false authorisation distribution letter in the name of Royal Pharma was prepared. A false declaration was made by Harsh Parmar. The signatures of State Drugs Controller Baddi were also forged on the manufacturing and marketing certificate. A fake registration ID, a forged balance sheet and a forged turnover certificate were used. Forged signatures of the informant and his father were used at various places. When the informant enquired from the accused, they threatened to kill him. The police registered the FIR and obtained the record. It was found after the preliminary investigation that the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC were committed. Hence, the FIR was registered. The informant made a statement that Harsh Parmar had put his signatures and the signatures of his father. A forged letterhead, affidavits and authorisation letters were used. The petitioner applied for bail as per the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan. The bail was subsequently cancelled by the 5 2025:HHC:28890 learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan. The petitioner was directed to join the investigation on 11.08.2025, as per the order passed by this Court, but he failed to do so. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr. Harneet Singh Oberoi, Mr. Rakesh Mogta and Mr. Aryan Mogta, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Harneet Singh Oberoi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the averments made in the status report that the petitioner did not join the investigation are incorrect. He has filed various documents showing his location to establish this fact. He submitted that the dispute between the parties is purely civil. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Kumar & Anr Vs State of Karnataka & Anr. 2024 INSC 196, and Bijender Vs State of Haryana, SLP (Crl.) No. 1079/2024, dated 06.03.2024 and Delhi High Court in Shashi Prabha Jindal Vs State (2024) ibclaw.In 482 HC, in support of his submission. 6. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was directed to join the investigation on 11.08.2025, but he failed to do 6 2025:HHC:28890 so. His earlier bail application filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan was rejected on the ground that he had not joined the investigation. The petitioner is not cooperating with the investigation, and his custodial interrogation is necessary. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors are considered to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that 7 2025:HHC:28890 exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 9. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 10. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in 8 2025:HHC:28890 striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 11. It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed at page 501: “21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution. 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563], wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34) “34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the 9 2025:HHC:28890 witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. A perusal of the status report shows that the complaint was received by the police. The police collected various documents and conducted a preliminary investigation. The police found after going through the record that offences punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC were committed. Hence, the police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. Therefore, the grievance of the petitioner that the police did not conduct a preliminary investigation and registered the FIR straightaway is 10 2025:HHC:28890 not correct. However, it is pertinent to mention here that the judgments of Arnesh Kumar and Satender Kumar (supra) cited in support of this proposition do not lay down any such proposition. In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, directions were issued not to arrest a person unnecessarily and in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2021) 10 SCC 773, guidelines were issued for granting bail. 14. The allegations in the FIR show that the letterhead of Legen Healthcare was forged, which is evident from the fact that the original letterhead is quite different from the letterhead submitted to the Department of Health and Family Welfare. The signatures of the informant and his father were also forged, and they had not put their signatures on various documents submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner was named as the person who had forged the certificates. The letterheads and signatures were used for obtaining the tender from the Department of Health and Family Welfare. Thus, a representation was made by Legen Healthcare that it had submitted the tender, whereas Legen Healthcare had not submitted any such tender. Thus, a misrepresentation was made to obtain pecuniary advantage, and the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 471 of the IPC are prima facie satisfied. 11 2025:HHC:28890 15. It was submitted that there was a dispute between the partners of Legen Healthcare. The dispute, if any, has nothing to do with the forgery of letterhead, signatures and other documents. Hence, the dispute will not help the petitioner. 16. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, shows that the petitioner had failed to join the investigation. Hence, the pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner was rejected. The status report filed in the present case shows that the petitioner was directed to join the investigation on 11.08.2025, but the petitioner failed to join the investigation. The petitioner filed the printouts of WhatsApp chat, in which he claimed to have visited the Police Station. However, the authenticity of these documents is yet to be seen. None of the WhatsApp chats show that the petitioner was available in the Police Station on 11.08.2025, when he was directed to join the investigation. Prima facie, there is no reason to disbelieve the averments made in the status report that the petitioner had failed to join the investigation despite the directions issued by the Court. Thus, the submission made on behalf of the State that the petitioner is not cooperating with the investigation and the investigation cannot proceed further without his custodial interrogation has to be accepted as correct. 12 2025:HHC:28890 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed:- “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disintering many useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of investigating offences would not conduct themselves as offender” 18. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must also be kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of 13 2025:HHC:28890 the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 19. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knew that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 20. Naresh Kumar (supra) deals with the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and is irrelevant to decide the bail petition. Further, it has been noticed above that the allegations in the FIR in the present case prima facie show cheating and forgery. In Bijender (supra), the petitioner had joined the investigation, whereas the petitioner had failed to do so in the present case. Therefore, this judgment will also not help the petitioner. In Shashi Prabha Jindal (supra), the Delhi High Court held that the process of investigation cannot be used for obtaining a confession. In the present case, there is nothing that the police are obtaining any confession from the petitioner. The police simply stated that the petitioner is to be interrogated to know about the circumstances in which the forgery 14 2025:HHC:28890 was committed and the involvement of other persons in the forgery and cheating, which is an essential part of the investigation. A letterhead, seal and the signatures could not have been forged without the involvement of other persons. Therefore, the police are within their right to inquire about the role of other persons. Hence, the cited judgments do not apply to the present case. 21. Since the petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of a cognizable offence and non-bailable offences and has not joined with the investigation, despite the directions of this Court, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of pre-arrest bail. 22. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 23. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27 August, 2025 (Pramod)