Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Himachal Pradesh · body

2025 DAILYLAW 22791 (HP)

FATEH SINGH v. C.D. COOPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETY LTD

CRMP/3581/2025 · 2025-09-08

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Fateh Singh versus The C.D. Co-operative Credit Society Limited Cr. M.P. No. 3581 of 2025 in Cr. Revision No. 557/2024 Reserved on: 27.08.2025 08.09.2025 Present: Mr. K.K. Chauhan, Advocate, vice Mr.Nand Lal Thakur, Advocate, for the applicant/petitioner. None for respondent No.1. Ms. Sunaina Chaudhary, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.2-State. The main revision petition was filed against the judgment dated 03.08.2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi. This Court ordered the issuance of notice to the respondent on 02.09.2024 on taking steps within a week. Steps were not taken repeatedly. This Court passed an order dated 21.03.2025 that the steps be taken within a week, failing which, the petition shall be dismissed for non-prosecution. Again, steps were not taken, and the revision petition stood dismissed in terms of the order dated 21.03.2025. 2. The applicant/petitioner has filed the present application for the recall of the order. It has been asserted that the steps for service of respondent No.1 could not be taken due to bona fide reasons and an unintentional lapse on the part of the office of the counsel. The applicant was unaware of the order dated 13.05.2025 and came to know of the same only on 07.08.2025 when he was informed that the learned Trial Court had issued the non-bailable warrants of arrest against him. He approached the learned counsel and was apprised of the dismissal of the application and the consequences thereof. The applicant has a meritorious case. No prejudice would be caused to the respondent if the revision petition is restored. Hence, the present application. 3. Mr. K.K.Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing the applicant, submitted that the steps could not be taken within a period prescribed by the Court due to inadvertent lapse. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the present petition be restored. 4. I have given considerable thought to his submissions and have gone through the records carefully. 5. Section 362 of Cr.P.C. reads as under: - 362. Court not to alter judgment. - Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 6. In the present case, the order passed by the Court that the petition would stand dismissed for non- prosecution in case of not taking the steps is a final order and not an arithmetic or clerical error. Hence, the provisions of Section 362 of the CrPC will prevent the Court from reviewing it. 7. It was submitted that the application has been filed under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., which vests inherent jurisdiction in the Court to do complete justice between the parties, and the Court has the power to modify its order in the interest of justice. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327 that inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to circumvent Section 362 of CrPC. It was observed at page 439: “5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error, save as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such an order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, are controlled by principle and precedent, as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of the law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. 6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh [(1975) 3 SCC 706: 1975 SCC (Cri) 156] this Court held that Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must therefore exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. In that case, the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court vis-à-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision. 7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override the bar of review under Section 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal [(1981) 1 SCC 500: 1981 SCC (Cri) 188], that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage. 8. A similar view was taken in Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783, wherein it was observed as under:- 34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well-settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC, which this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It is also clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a “procedural review” that the bar would not apply, and not a substantive review, where the bar as contained in Section 362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu. 10. Therefore, it is impermissible to exercise the jurisdiction conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to defeat the provision of Section 362 of Cr.P.C. 11. No other point was urged. 12. In view of the above, the present application fails, and the same is dismissed. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 08th September, 2025 (y.s)