[2025:RJ-JP:27091] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 168/1988 Hari Singh son of Shri Budhiram, resident of village Palikhera, Post Krishna Nagar, Mathura (U.P.) at present Inspector Phones, District Manager Telephones, Jaipur ----Accused-Appellant Versus The State of Rajasthan, through C.B.I. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Shri Mahesh Gupta For Respondent(s) : Shri Shyam Singh Yadav, Special Public Prosecutor HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL Judgment / Order Judgement reserved on : : 07/07/2025 Judgement pronounced on : : 25/ 07/20 2 5 This criminal appeal is directed against the judgement dated 04.05.1988 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, CBI Cases, Jaipur (for short- “the learned trial Court”) in Special Criminal Case No.3/1984 whereby, the accused-appellant was convicted and sentenced as under: 1) Section 161 IPC: One year rigorous imprisonment plus Rs. 500 fine; in default whereof, three months simple imprisonment. 2) Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short- “the Act of 1947”): one year rigorous imprisonment plus Rs. 500 fine; in default whereof, three months simple imprisonment. Both the sentences to run concurrently. [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (2 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] The relevant facts in brief are that the complainant Shri Gopal Krishna Bihani lodged a written report dated 17.11.1983 (Ex.P2) with the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short-`ACB’) alleging therein that for shifting telephone of his partnership firm M/s. Rajasthan Plywood and Allied Agencies from his residence situated in Shastri Nagar, Jaipur to Janta Colony, Jaipur, the accused-Hari Singh-the Telephone Inspector, has demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.300. The accused was apprehended having accepted the tainted money whereafter, the ACB handed over investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short-`CBI’) which, after investigation, submitted charge-sheet against him. The accused was charged with the offence under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947. He pleaded not guilty and demanded trial. After trial, the accused has been convicted and sentenced vide judgement dated 04.05.1988 as stated hereinabove. During pendency of the appeal, the appellant-Hari Singh expired. On an application filed by Smt. Swaroop Devi, his wife, she was granted leave of the Court to continue the appeal. Assailing the judgement, the learned counsel for the appellant Shri Mahesh Gupta submitted that the learned trial Court did not appreciate that the allegation of demand of illegal gratification levelled by the complainant-Gopal Krishna Bihani (PW-3) was not corroborated by any other evidence and his sole testimony was not sufficient to warrant a finding of conviction. He submits that from the prosecution evidence, it is apparent that [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (3 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] except Shri Bihani, no other prosecution witness has either heard, or seen the demand raised by him or exchange of money. Shri Gupta submits that although, Shri Jaswant Singh Yadav (PW-8), the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, who carried out the trap proceeding, deposes that he has not only seen the complainant giving the illegal gratification to the appellant; but, also heard the accused demanding it; however, Shri Bihani, during his cross-examination as PW-3, has categorically stated that Shri Yadav was not in a position either to hear the demand or to see the exchange of money. He submits that in view thereof, the learned trial court erred in relying upon the testimony of Shri Jaswant Singh Yadav. Shri Gupta further submits that from the evidence on record, it is apparent that the money was forcibly thrust in the pocket of the pant of the accused by the complainant and he neither demanded it nor, accepted it as alleged. Lastly, Shri Gupta submitted that since, the accused was a Central Government employee, the ACB, being a State Investigating Agency, was not competent to carry out the investigation. However, in the same breath, he admitted that it did not vitiate the trial. He, therefore, prays that the judgement of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Special Judge be quashed and set aside and the accused be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. He, in support of his submissions, relies upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. The District Inspector of Police & Anr.: Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2009 dated 14.09.2015 and a [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (4 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] coordinate Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Gajanand vs. State of Rajasthan-1989 (2) WLN 391. Per contra, Shri Shyam Singh Yadav, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI, supporting the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge vide judgement dated 04.05.1988, would submit that the prosecution was able to establish the demand of illegal gratification by the accused as well as its acceptance. Shri Yadav, referring to and relying upon the prosecution evidence, would submit that not only the complainant- Shri Bihani; but, other witnesses have also corroborated the demand of illegal gratification by the accused. Learned counsel, inviting attention of this Court towards the testimony of complainant-Gopal Krishna Bihani (PW-3) and Shri Jaswant Singh Yadav (PW-8), submits that since, there was urgency involved in the matter and on account of paucity of time, the CBI was not in a position to lay down the trap proceeding immediately, the ACB was requested by the CBI itself to conduct the trap proceeding and to handover the papers to it for further investigation. He submits that even otherwise, it is permissible for a State agency to lay the trap proceeding/carry out investigation in corruption matters as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.C. Sharma vs. Delhi Administration-(1973) 1 SCC 726 and as also under the CBI Crime Manual. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. Heard. Considered. Indisputably, the deceased-appellant was a public servant being employed as Telephone Inspector with the Telephone Department at the relevant time. It is also an admitted position [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (5 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] that the complainant-Shri Bihani has submitted an application with the Telephone Department for shifting the telephone of his partnership firm from Shastri Nagar to Janta Colony. As per the testimony of Shri Tilak Raj Nanda (PW-4)-Assistant Engineer (Vigilance), Telephone Department, the commercial office of the department examines the validity and genuineness of the request for transfer of the telephone and on being satisfied about it, issues “O.B.” for shifting the telephone. He further deposed that the telephone is to be shifted within a period of 15 days from the date of issuance of the “O.B.” by the concerned Junior Engineer and Telephone Inspector. The learned trial court has held, vide judgement dated 04.05.1988, that from the concerned file (Ex.P10), it was reflected that the “O.B.” for shifting the subject telephone was issued on 07.11.1983 and till the trap proceeding was conducted on 17.11.1983, it was not shifted. The defence taken by the accused that he, along with the Junior Engineer, went to the residence of the complainant to verify the genuineness of the request of transfer, was rejected by the learned trial court holding that from the prosecution evidence, it was established that once the “O.B.” was issued, it was not open for the Junior Engineer or the Telephone Inspector to examine the validity or genuineness of the request for transfer as the commercial office issues it only after verifying the details. The complainant-Shri Bihani as PW-3 has categorically stated in his deposition that the accused approached him and demanded a sum of Rs.300 for shifting the telephone. In his cross examination, he has specifically stated that the demand was raised a day prior to the day the accused was trapped. Although, [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (6 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] in his cross examination, he has stated that the accused had come with another person when the demand was raised; but, it is not mentioned in the written report (Ex.P2); however, the learned trial Court has held the same to be a minor contradiction not materially affecting the prosecution case which otherwise establishes the demand of illegal gratification by the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the learned trial Court has also relied upon the testimony of Shri Nand Kishore Bihani (PW-7), brother of the complainant who has deposed that on 16.11.1983, i.e., a day prior to the trap proceeding, the accused came to the shop and met his brother. The learned trial Court has further held that the accused himself has admitted in his written statement of defence that he had visited the shop of the complainant twice on the day he was trapped, i.e., 17.11.1983 and his plea that he did so to collect the documents, did not find favour for the cogent reason that it was not expected in normal course of nature from a public servant to visit the shop of an applicant for shifting the telephone for getting the relevant documents unless interested otherwise, more so, when, it was not open for him to have examined the validity of the “O.B.” already issued by the commercial office after verifying the details. This Court, upon perusal of the record, is in respectful agreement with these findings. Further, it is found that the demand stands corroborated from the testimony of Shri Jaswant Singh Yadav (PW-8), the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB who conducted the trap proceeding. He has categorically stated that he heard the demand raised by the accused inside the shop of the complainant on 17.11.1983 immediately before he was trapped. Although, Shri [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (7 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] Gupta, inviting attention of this Court towards the cross examination of the complainant (PW-3), has canvassed that he has stated therein that Shri Yadav was not in a position either to hear their conversation or to see the exchange of money; but, from the site plan (Ex.P6), it is apparent that there was no obstruction of any nature in between the places where Shri Yadav and the accused along with the complainant were standing. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is not satisfied that the prosecution has not been able to prove the demand of illegal gratification by the accused and the findings recorded by the learned trial court in this regard deserve confirmation. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the accused that the money was forcibly thrust in his pocket is concerned, it is established beyond the pale of doubt that the tainted money was recovered from the left pocket of the pant of the accused. While, defence of the accused is that it was forcibly thrust in his pocket by the complainant, the prosecution has come out with a case that it was knowingly and willingly accepted by him. From the evidence on record including the testimony of S/Shri Gopal Krishna Bihani (PW-3), Sampat Raj Purohit (PW-5) and Jaswant Singh Yadav (PW8), it is established that the accused accepted the illegal gratification from the complainant, had put it in the left pocket of his pant and was caught once he had walked 4-5 feet after accepting the illegal gratification and not immediately after putting the money in the pocket. The learned trial court has held that even assuming that the money was forcibly thrust in the pocket of the accused by the complainant, he could have thrown it away immediately; but, he was caught when he had already traversed [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (8 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] 4-5 feet with the money in the pocket which shatters his defence. After critical analysis of the evidence on record, the learned trial court has further held that apart from the prosecution evidence which established demand of illegal gratification and its acceptance by the accused, his unnatural conduct, i.e., to visit the shop of the complainant twice on the day he was trapped without any plausible reason, to go further inside the shop along with the complainant after coming out from the cabin as he seems to have developed a suspicion on account of presence of one of the shadow witnesses Shri Om Prakash Mishra (PW2) in the cabin and recovery of the tainted money from his pocket, lends credentials to the prosecution case. After going through the material on record, this Court agrees with the aforesaid findings. The last submission of the learned counsel for the accused that he being a Central Government employee, the State Investigating Agency, i.e., the ACB was not authorised and competent to lay the trap proceeding, is misconceived and does not merit acceptance. A three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of A.C. Sharma (supra), after examining the scheme of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 as also the Act, 1947, proceeded to hold as under: “13. Turning to the D.S.P.E. Act it extends to the whole of India. For the constitution and powers of the establishment, we have to turn to Section 2 of this Act which reads :- "2. Constitution and Powers of Special Police Establishment: (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861, the Central Government may constitute a special police force [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (9 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the investigation in any Union territory of offences notified under Section 3. (2) Subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, members of the said police establishment shall have throughout any Union territory in relation to the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police officers of that Union territory have in connection with the investigation of offences committed therein. (3) Any member of the said police establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, exercise in any Union territory any of the powers of the officer in charge of a police station in the area in which he is for the time being and when so exercising such powers shall, subject to any such orders as aforesaid, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station discharging the functions of such an officer within the limits of his station." Section 3 which empowers the Central Government to specify the offences to be investigated by the D.S.P.E. has already been set out. The Notification, dated November 6, 1956 referred to earlier specifies numerous offences under various enactments including a large number of ordinary offences under I.P.C. Clauses (a) to (j) of this notification take within their fold offences under a number of statutes specified therein. Clause (k) extends the sweep of this notification by including in its scope attempts, abetments and conspiracies in relation to or in connection with offences mentioned in clauses (a) to (h) and also any other offence committed in the course of those transactions arising out of the same facts. It may also be stated that after 1956 in a number of further notifications the list of the offences specified under Section 3 [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (10 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] has increased manifold. We consider it unnecessary to refer to them in detail. According to Section 4 the superintendence of D.S.P.E. vests in the Central Government and Section 5 empowers the Central Government to extend to any area in a State not being a Union territory the powers and jurisdiction of members of this establishment for the investigation of any offences or classes of offences specified under Section 3. Subject to the orders of the Central Government the members of such Establishment exercising such extended powers and jurisdiction are to be deemed to be members of the police force of that area for the purpose of powers, functions, privileges and liabilities. But the power and jurisdiction of a member of D.S.P.E. in such State is to be exercised only with the consent of the Government of the State concerned. The scheme of this Act does not either expressly or by necessary implication divest the regular police authorities of their jurisdiction, powers and competence to investigate into offences under any other competent law. As a general rule, it would require clear and express language to effectively exclude as a matter of law the power of investigation of all the offences mentioned in this notification from the jurisdiction and competence of the regular police authorities conferred on them by Cr.P.C. and other laws and to vest this power exclusively in the D.S.P.E. The D.S.P.E. Act seems to be only permissive or empowering, intended merely to enable the D.S.P.E. also to investigate into the offences specified as contemplated by Section impairing any other law empowering the regular police authorities to investigate offences. 14. Turning now to the Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947), we find that this Act was enacted in March, 1947 several months after the enactment of the D.S.P.E. Act for the more effective prevention of bribery and corruption. By virtue [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (11 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] of Section 3 of the Act an offence under Section 165-A, I.P.C. was made a cognizable offence for the purposes of Cr. P.C. notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that Code. Section 4 provides for presumptions in certain cases. Section 5 defines criminal misconduct and also provides for punishment for such offences. It further provides for punishment for habitual commission of offences under Sections 162, 163 and 165 IPC and also renders punishable attempts to commit some offences. Section 5 is expressly stated to operate in addition to and not in derogation of other laws. Section 5-A which is of importance may here be set out: "5-A. Investigation into cases under this Act.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no police officer below the rank- (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police; (b) in the presidency-towns of Calcutta and Madras, of an Assistant Commissioner of Police; (c) in the presidency-town of Bombay, of a Superintendent of Police; and (d) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, shall investigate any offence punishable under Section 161, Section 165 or Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or under Section 5 of this Act without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without a warrant : Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also investigate [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (12 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] any such offence without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a warrant; Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. (2) If, from information received or otherwise, a police officer has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate under subsection (1) and considers that for the purpose of investigation or inquiry into such offence, it is necessary to inspect any bankers' books, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, he may inspect any bankers' books in so far as they relate to the accounts of the person suspected to have committed that offence or of any other person suspected to be holding money on behalf of such person, and take or cause to be taken certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom, and the bank concerned shall be bound to assist the police officer in the exercise of his powers under this sub- section : Provided that no power under this sub-section in relation to the accounts of any person shall be exercised by a police officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police, unless he is specially authorised in this behalf by a police officer of or above the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Explanation.-In this sub-section, the expressions 'bank’ and 'bankers' books' shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891." Sub-section (1) of this section, while regulating the competence of the officers both of D.S.P.E. and of the regular police force to investigate offences to the extent considered necessary, over-rides the provisions of Cr.P.C. It expressly [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (13 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] prohibits police officers, including those of the D.S.P.E., below certain ranks, from investigating into offences, under Sections 161, 165 and 165-A, I.P.C. and under Section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, without orders of Magistrates specified therein and from effecting arrests for those offences without a warrant. The plain meaning of this sub-section appears to be that Inspectors of Police of D.S.P.E. in all places, Assistant Commissioners of Police in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta and Madras, Superintendents of Police in the Presidency Town of Bombay, and Deputy Superintendents of Police in all places, other than Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, are authorised to investigate into the offences mentioned therein. The word "elsewhere" in clause (d) does not indicate, as was contended by Mr. Anthony that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is debarred from investigating offences mentioned in this clause even when so ordered by a Magistrate of the First Class in the areas in which D.S.P.E. is also empowered to function. The word "elsewhere" in clause (d) appears to us to refer only to the three Presidency Towns mentioned in clauses (b) and (c). This sub-section, therefore, does not confer sole power on D.S.P.E. to investigate into the offences mentioned therein to the complete exclusion of the regular police force. It is merely concerned with the object of making provision for safeguarding against arbitrary use of power of investigation by officers below certain ranks, so that public servants concerned are saved from frivolous harassment at the hands of disgruntled persons. In this connection it is also noteworthy that apart from the restriction contained in s. 5-A(1) the applicability of the provisions of Cr.P.C. to the proceedings in relation to the aforesaid offences is, subject to certain modifications contained in Section 7-A, expressly recognised. The schemes of the two enactments, namely, D.S.P.E. Act, 1946 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, suggest that they are intended to serve as supplementary provisions of law designed to function [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (14 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] harmoniously in aid of each other and of the existing regular police investigating agency for effectively achieving the object of successful investigation into the serious offences mentioned in Section 5-A without unreasonably exposing the public servant concerned to frivolous and vexatious proceedings. Mr. Nariman also drew our attention to D.O. No. 21/8/63GD dated October 5, 1963, addressed by the Central Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India to the Inspector General of Police inviting their attention to the Government of India Resolution No. 4/31/61-T, dated April 1, 1963 establishing the Central Bureau of Investigation consisting of six Divisions to assist the State Police Forces. The authority of Central Bureau is stated therein to have been derived from the D.S.P.E. Act. In this letter Para 6, reads : "6. In this connection it may also be mentioned that, on account of inadequacy of staff, it is not possible for the S.P.E. Division to take up every one of the cases which might fall under the categories mentioned in the Annexure to the Government of India Resolution and which might be considered suitable for investigation by the S.P.E. Division. A certain discretion has, therefore, to be exercised in taking up cases for investigation. In some instances it may not be possible for it to take up even those cases which are committed by Central Government servants, i.e., petty cases of theft, misappropriation, cheating. Such cases could be dealt with easily and more expeditiously by the local police which has concurrent jurisdiction over these cases also." In para 7 it is stated that for successful investigation of cases it is most essential that a quick decision is taken about the Agency which has to investigate them: One of the Agencies mentioned therein is S.P.E. Division of the C.B.I. In para 8, it is stated that in respect of cases involving Public Servants or Public Concerns there is an administrative arrangement and understanding between the S.P.E. and the State Police about [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (15 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] the manner in which they are to be dealt with so as to avoid difficulties and delays. This para then refers to the existing procedure and practice which, it is suggested, should continue to be valid in future. No doubt, this letter contains only administrative instructions but it clearly shows the construction placed during all these years by the administrative officers concerned with administering this law on the provisions of the S.P.E. Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act. If the views stated in this letter is not clearly against the language and scheme of these Acts then it is entitled to due consideration and has some persuasive value. The contention raised by Mr. Anthony that Delhi not being a State but only a Union territory, the directions contained in D.O. No. 21/8/63-GD are, inapplicable and that in Delhi it is only the D.S.P.E. which has exclusive authority to investigate into the offences mentioned in Section 5-A is not easy to accept. Reference to the State Police Force in that D.O. in our view includes the police force of the Union territory of Delhi. 15. As the foregoing discussion shows the investigation in the present case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot be considered to be in any way unauthorised or contrary to law. In this connection it may not be out of place also to point out that the function of investigation is merely to collect evidence and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence, can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial by an otherwise competent Court of the offence so investigated. In H.N. Rishabud & Inder Singh v. State of Delhi-AIR 1955 SC 196, it was held that an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. When any breach of the mandatory provisions [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (16 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] relating to investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such re-investigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it consider appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1952. This decision was followed in Munna Lal vs. The State of U.P.-AIR 1964 SC 28, where the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Mubarak Ali-AIR 1959 SC 707, was distinguished. The same view was taken in the State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Venugopal-AIR 1964 SC 33 and more recently in Khandu Sonu Dhobi vs. State of Maharashtra- (1972) 3 SCC 118. The decisions of the Calcutta, Punjab and Saurashtra High Courts relied upon by Mr. Anthony deal with different points : in any event to the extent they contain any observations against the view expressed by this Court in the decisions just cited those observations cannot be considered good law.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, from the aforesaid judgement, it is apparent that the State Investigating Agency is not precluded from carrying out investigation in a corruption case involving a Central Government employee; but, it has to be by a Police Officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Indisputably, in the instant case, the trap proceeding was laid by an Officer in the rank of Deputy Superintendent Police. Further, the CBI Manual (Crime)-1982, as was applicable at the relevant time, also provides as under: “9. It has also been agreed that:- (a) The State Police may take immediate action in respect of the Central Government Employees in the following circumstances:- [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (17 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] (i) Where a `trap’ has to be laid to catch a Central Government employee red-handed and there is no time to contact any representative of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Division, the trap may be laid by the State Police and thereafter the Delhi Special Police Establishment Division should be informed immediately and it should be decided in consultation with them whether the further investigation should be carried out and completed by the State Police or by the Delhi Special Police Establishment Division. (ii) Where there is likelihood of destruction or suppression of evidence if immediate action is not taken, the State Police may take necessary steps to secure the evidence and thereafter handover the case to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Division for further investigation. (b) Information about cases involving Central Government Servants which are being investigated by the State Police should be sent by them to the Head of the Department and/or the Office concerned as early as possible but, in any event, before a chargesheet or a Final Report is submitted. (c) All cases against Central Government servants which are investigated by the State Police and in which it is necessary to obtain sanction for prosecution from the Central Government Department, shall be referred to the Inspector General, Delhi Special Police Establishment Division, who will take necessary action to obtain the required sanction.” It is not disputed before this Court that the conditions enumerated in Clause-9 of the Manual stand satisfied in the instant case. As is evident from the material on record, the ACB, before conducting the trap proceeding, contacted the CBI office at Jaipur as it was found that the accused happens to be a Central Government employee; but, the CBI Officer requested the ACB to conduct the trap proceeding in view of urgency involved in the [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (18 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] matter and the paucity of time to arrange the same by it and thereafter, to handover papers to it for further investigation. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the backdrop of the prcedential law, this Court finds no illegality in the trap proceeding carried out by the ACB and the trial does not stand vitiated on this count as also admitted by the learned counsel for the accused in all his fairness. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the accused on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra) is of no help to him. In that case, it was held that the proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offence under the provisions of the Act of 1947, in absence whereof, mere acceptance of an amount by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, would not be sufficient to warrant conviction. However, in the instant case, after appreciation of the evidence on record, it is found that the prosecution has been able to establish the demand of illegal gratification by the accused as also its accpetance. Similarly, the judgement of a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Gajanand (supra) would not come to rescue of the accused wherein, it was held that solitary statement of the complainant was not sufficient, in a bribery case, to return the finding of guilt when his testimony was not found at all of worth reliability and credibility. However, in the instant case, not only the credibility of the testimony of the complainant is found to be of sterling worth; but, stands corroborated from the testimony of other prosecution witnesses as well. [2025:RJ-JP:27091] (19 of 19) [CRLA-168/1988] The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that this Court finds the judgement of conviction and sentence dated 4.5.1988 to be well reasoned, based on appreciation of cogent evidence on record, and not to be suffering from any illegality or perversity and further, is of the considered view that the prosecution has been able to bring home the charge under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947 by proving the demand as well as acceptance of the tainted money by the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit. (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J RS/1