Page No.# 1/5 GAHC030001052025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Crl.)/7/2025 Smt. Judy H. Lalmuanpuii D/o. H. Zaliana, R/o. Khatla South, Aizaw, Mizoram VERSUS Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Imphal Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr C Lalramzauva Sr. Adv. Advocate for the Respondent : BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN ORDER 06.03.2025 Heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Stephen Lalbuatsaiha, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned counsel for the respondent, CBI. 2. This interlocutory application under Section 430, read with Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, is preferred by the applicant for suspension of her conviction imposed, vide judgment and order dated 02.02.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, Mizoram, Aizawl, in SR (PCA) No. 11/2014 (Reference: RC/ Page No.# 2/5 (A)/2013-IMPH, CBI Imphal dated 30.04.2013). 3. Mr. Lalramzauva, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant stood convicted under Sections 120B, read with Sections 409/419/420/467/468/471 of the IPC, and Sections 13(2), read with Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and against the said judgment and order of conviction, the applicant/appellant had preferred an appeal, being Crl.A. No. 11/2024, which is pending before this Court and that in the said appeal this Court was pleased to suspend the sentence so imposed by the learned trial Court upon the applicant/appellant in I.A.(Crl.) No. 8/2024. Mr. Lalramzauva also submits that thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority had served a Memorandum upon the applicant on 02.12.2024, stating that as the conviction of the applicant by the Court of Law on criminal charges is under Sections 120B, read with Sections 409/419/420/467/468/471 of the IPC, and Sections 13(2), read with Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and her conviction being not suspended by this Court, the Disciplinary Authority has decided to recommend imposition of major penalty of dismissal from services against the applicant as per provision of Rule 19(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and therefore, Mr. Lalramzauva has contended to suspend the conviction of the applicant/appellant. In support of his submission, Mr. Lalramzauva has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang and Ors., reported in (1995) 2 SCC 513, especially to paragraph No. 19. 4. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned counsel for the respondent, CBI submits that the sentence of two years, so imposed upon the applicant herein, has already been suspended by this Court, vide order dated 23.02.2024, in I.A.(Crl.) No. 8/2024, and that another Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated Page No.# 3/5 14.02.2024, in I.A.(Crl.) No. 7/2024, has suspended the judgment and order of conviction dated 02.02.2024, in SR (PCA) No. 11/2014, in case of another co- accused and since the present case is also covered by the aforesaid order, she has no objection in the event of granting similar relief to the present applicant. 5. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the application and the documents placed on record, also gone through the decision referred by Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant. 6. It appears that the present applicant stood convicted under Sections 120B, read with Sections 409/419/420/467/468/471 of the IPC, and Sections 13(2), read with Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the applicant has already preferred an appeal, being Crl.A. 11/2024, which is pending before this Court and in the said appeal, in connected I.A.(Crl.) No. 8/2024, this Court was pleased to suspend the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court upon the applicant, being the period of conviction is of two years only. It also appears that another Coordinate Bench of this Court in I.A.(Crl.) No. 7/2024, has already granted similar relief to the applicant therein, namely, Smt. Lalnunziri, another co-accused in SR (PCA) No. 11/2014, till final disposal of the main appeal. 7. It is to be noted here that Section 389(1) of the CrPC does not confer any power on the appellate Court to stay operation of the order of conviction. But, in absence of such a provision, whether the appellate Court can stay operation of the order of conviction was the issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein in the case of Rama Narang (supra), wherein in paragraph No. 19, Hon’ble Supreme has held as under: Page No.# 4/5 “19. That takes us to the question whether the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the order of conviction. As stated earlier, if the order of conviction is to result in some disqualification of the type mentioned in Section 267 of the Companies Act, we see no reason why we should give a narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code to debar the court from granting an order to that effect in a fit case. The appeal under Section 374 is essentially against the order of conviction because the order of sentence is merely consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentence can be independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and therefore, we see no reason to place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1) of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction, although that issue in the instant case recedes to the background because High Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay was not right in holding that the Delhi High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if it was confronted with a situation of there being no other provision in the Code for staying the operation of the order of conviction. In a fit case if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the convicted person does not suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may exercise the power because otherwise the damage done cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of the Companies Act and given effect to cannot be undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is Page No.# 5/5 set aside by the Appellate Court. But while granting a stay of (sic or) suspension of the order of conviction the Court must examine the pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so doing it may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as are considered appropriate to protect the interest of the shareholders and the business of the company.” 8. Thus, taking note of the dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rama Narang (supra), and also considering the given facts and circumstances on the record, and further considering the fact that in connection with the same case No. SR (PCA) No. 11/2014, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has extended similar benefit to another applicant, this Court is satisfied to hold that there exist sufficient ground to suspend the judgment and order of conviction of the applicant and therefore, this Court is inclined to grant the same benefit to the present applicant. 9. Accordingly, it is provided that till disposal of the connected appeal, being Crl.A. 11/2024, the impugned judgment and order of conviction dated 02.02.2024, stands stayed, upon the same terms and conditions on which this Court, vide order dated 23.02.2024, in I.A.(Crl.) No. 8/2024, was pleased to suspend her sentence. 10. In terms of above, this interlocutory application stands disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant