Page No.# 1/10 GAHC030000772025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/20/2025 Union of India and 5 Ors Through the Secretary to Govt. of India, Ministry of Surface Transport, New Delhi/Ministry of Defence 2: The Chief Engineer (BRTF) 3: The Commander 4: The Officer Commanding 5: The Secretary 6: The Director Genera VERSUS Sh. Hmingdailova and 4 Ors. S/o Hrangkima (L), Tuikhuahtlang, Aizawl - 796001 2:The State of Mizoram 3:The Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram 4:The Director 5:The Deputy Commissione Advocate for the Petitioner : Ms Zairemsangpuii, CGC Advocate for the Respondent : Mr A.R. Malhotra for R1 Page No.# 2/10 JUDGMENT / ORDER Date : 26-06-2025 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA 1. Heard Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC appearing for the applicants. Also heard Mr. A. R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 as well as Ms. Vanneihsiami, learned Government Advocate for the State respondents. 2. This application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by the applicants, namely, the Union of India and others praying for seeking condonation of delay of 574 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation in filing of Regular First Appeal No. 4/2025 by the said applicants whereby they have impugned the judgment and order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge-II, Aizawl in Civil Suit No. 3/1997, whereby, the applicants were directed to pay rental charges to the private respondent at the rates fixed in the judgment. The applicants were also directed to pay a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) to the private respondent. 3. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned Central Government Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the applicants, namely, the Union of India and others have decided to prefer an appeal against the impugned Judgment dated 21.04.2023 passed in Civil Suit No. 3/1997. However, she submits that due to the usual time taken in governmental proceeding for completing procedural formalities before an appeal is preferred, delay of 574 days has been caused, which was unintentional and without any mala fide on the part of the applicants. She submits that the administrative approval for filing an appeal has to be taken from the competent authority and for the said purpose, a lot of correspondence was made over a long period of time and ultimately, the appeal could be filed on Page No.# 3/10 13.02.2025 and in the process, an unintentional delay of 574 days has been caused. 4. The learned Central Government Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the applicants have explained each and every steps taken by the applicants in taking a decision to prefer the connected appeal in Paragraph No. 5 to Paragraph No. 59 of the application for condonation of delay. She submits that delay has been caused due to inadvertence and reasons beyond the control of the applicants and there was no mala fide in causing the delay neither the applicants gain anything by causing such delay. Rather, she submits that the cause shown by the applicants may be treated as sufficient cause and the said period of delay may be condoned. She also submits that while considering the application for condonation of delay, a liberal approach may be adopted by Court and it is not necessary for the applicants to explain every day's delay. 5. She submits that in their application for condonation of delay, the applicants have sufficiently explained the cause of the delay, which were beyond the control of the applicants. She also submits that applicants have a good case in the appeal and, therefore, a liberal approach may be taken while considering the instant application for condoning the delay. In support of her submission, she has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “State Of Haryana –Vs- Chandra Mani & Ors“ reported in “(1996) 3 SCC 132”. 6. She has submitted that in the instant case, on perusal of the cause shown by the applicants in their application for condonation of delay, it would be clear that there was nothing on record which would show that there was any mala fide or deliberate delay or adopting dilatory tactics by the applicants. Hence, she submits that a liberal approach may be adopted by condoning the delay of 574 days caused in preferring the connected appeal. Page No.# 4/10 7. On the other hand, Mr. A. R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has vehemently opposed the prayer for condonation of delay made by the applicants. He has raised a preliminary objection by pointing out that the instant interlocutory application has been filed by Shri Vikash Kumar Singh, Officer Commanding, 74 RCC (GREF) has failed to show any documents executed by appellant Nos. 1 to 6 authorizing him to file the instant interlocutory application. He submits that as this application has been filed by an unauthorized person, it is hit by the provision of Section 79 read with Order 27 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that in the instant case, the applicants have taken usual excuse of file pushing and administrative exigency in a very casual manner. He submits that even from the documents annexed with the condonation of delay application, it is clear that on 20.09.2023, the Assistant Legal Adviser, Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice had opined that the impugned judgment dated 21.04.2023 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-II, Aizawl in Civil Suit No. 3/1997, prima facie, appears to be reasonable one and there is no sufficient ground to challenge the same. In spite of that, the applicants took more than 574 days in the name of administrative exigencies only to prefer the connected appeal belatedly. 9. The leaned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that by merely annexing several correspondences which relates mainly to the question of taking a decision whether to file an appeal or not and thereafter, again a spate of correspondence for vetting of the memo of appeal does not constitute sufficient grounds for condoning the delay of 574 days. More so, in the light of advancement of modern technologies and use of information technology tools for correspondence even at Government level, such long periods cannot be Page No.# 5/10 condoned merely on the ground that procedure in Government sector takes longer time. 10. He submits that the Government Departments are rather under special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment, more so, when there is statutory period of limitation in preferring the appeal in this case. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “State of Madhya Pradesh and Others –Vs- Bherulal” reported in “(2020) 10 SCC 654”. 11. He also submits that apart from mentioning that correspondence were made at one and or other by the officials of the Union Government, nothing has been specifically mentioned in the petition for condonation of delay as to why the appeal could not be filed within the prescribed period of limitation. He submits that most of the explanation which has been given by the applicants in their application is regarding the period which is after the lapse of the prescribed period of limitation. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Anr. –Vs- State of Gujarat“ reported in “(1981) 1 SCC 495” “6. At the outset, it is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal, and the appeal should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. We have examined the facts carefully. It appears that initially the State Government took a decision not to file an appeal and it allowed the period of limitation to lapse. Subsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering a revision petition by Bhulabhai that it was a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the State Government in the matter, the appeal was filed. It was filed three months after limitation had expired. A faint Page No.# 6/10 attempt was made to show that when the initial decision was taken not to file an appeal all the papers had not been considered by the department concerned, but we are not impressed by that allegation. The truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court had observed — and that was long after limitation had expired — that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay.” 12. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has, therefore, submitted that the applicants have miserably failed to explain the delay of 574 days caused by them in preferring the connected Regular First Appeal. He, therefore, prays for rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 13. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have gone through the materials available on record. 14. As regards the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel of the respondent, the learned Central Government counsel has produced a notification dated 16th of September, 1998 which give a general authorization to the Officer Commanding of Road Construction Companies for signing and Page No.# 7/10 verification of pleadings in any Court on civil jurisdiction in proceedings by and against the Central Government. As the deponent Shri Vikash Kumar Singh, who has sworn the supporting affidavit annexed with application for condoning of delay is also an Officer Commanding, 74 RCC, he falls within the category of authorized persons under the aforesaid notification, therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the respondent No. 1 is not maintainable. 15. In the instant case, though the statutory period of limitation for filing the connected Regular First Appeal is only 90 days, the connected Regular First Appeal has been filed after a delay of 574 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 16. On perusal of the reasons cited by the applicants in their application for condonation of delay, it appears that the main reason cited for causing the delay is the time taken for getting approval from the competent authority for filing the connected Regular First Appeal. Most of the time is consumed for taking the decision as to whether to file an appeal or not. 17. In the instant case, it appears from record that as early as on 20.09.2023, though, same is also beyond the prescribed period of limitation, a legal opinion was rendered by the Assistant Legal Adviser, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India that no sufficient ground are there to challenge the impugned judgment of the Trial Court. In spite of that more than one year time was taken even to take decision as to whether to prefer an appeal or not and thereafter, ultimately, after 574 days only, the connected appeal was filed. 18. The Apex Court in the case of “State of Madhya Pradesh and Others –Vs- Bherulal” (supra) has observed as follows:- “3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies Page No.# 8/10 but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] ]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] wherein the Court observed as under : (Postmaster General case [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-30) “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was Page No.# 9/10 bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.” Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!” 19. In the instant case, though the plea of time consumed during usual Government process in taking decision has been taken by the learned Central Government counsel. However, in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Apex Court wherein, it has been observed that Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment, the said plea is not sustainable and cannot be accepted. 20. It is expected that the Government and its instrumentalities are supposed to devise their internal procedure involved for taking decisions for preferring an appeal in such a manner so that in case a decision to prefer an appeal is taken, same may be preferred within the period of limitation prescribed by the law. The Government cannot take the statutory provisions regarding limitation for granted and give a total go by to the period of limitation so prescribed by the statute. 21. In the instant case, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this Page No.# 10/10 case and the decisions of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, as well as the reasons mentioned in forgoing paragraphs, this Court is of considered opinion that the applicants have failed to show that the reasons cited by them in their application for condoning the delay of 574 days may not be regarded as sufficient cause which prevented them from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. 22. Accordingly, the prayer for condonation of delay of 574 days in preferring the connected Regular First Appeal No. 4/2025 is hereby rejected and this interlocutory application is dismissed. 23. The connected Regular First Appeal No. 4/2025 is accordingly dismissed on being barred by the law of limitation. JUDGE Comparing Assistant