JUDGMENT : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. 1. Heard, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2 . Petitioner, in this writ petition, has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(i) For issuance of a writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the Office Order dated 20.5.2019 as contained in memo no. 2265 (Annexure-6) passed by the Respondent No. 6, whereby and whereunder petitioner has been dismissed from the service w.e.f. 21.5.2019 and his Gratuity has also been forfeited in terms of Section 4 Clause of 6(b)(i) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; (ii) For that above named petitioner prays for issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s) for quashing of appeal order dated 04.08.2021 (Annexure-12) as contained in memo no.1467 issued under the signature of respondent no.2, whereby and whereunder the departmental appeal filed by the petitioner against his order of dismissal from the service w.e.f. 21.05.2019 has been rejected by the appellant authority. (iii) For issuance of a further appropriate writ, order or direction, commanding/directing the respondents to make payment of after reinstating the petitioner into the service, make payment of arrears of salary with all consequential benefits to which he was otherwise entitled from the date of the dismissal i.e. from 20.5.2019 uptil the date of reinstatement in service along with interest.” 3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner while working as Pump Operator at Patratu, Sayal ‘D’ Colliery, was served with a charge sheet contained in memo No. 1765 dated 27.10.2007 whereby the petitioner was charged to have fraudulently managed to get compassionate employment in place of deceased Mathura Singh under 9.3.2 of NCWA in connivance with the wife of the deceased, as son of the ex-employee, which he actually was not. The petitioner replied to the charge sheet and denied all the allegations. Thereafter, after lapse of about nine years, the petitioner was directed to participate in the enquiry proceedings, which the petitioner participated and also submitted his defence statement against the allegations along with relevant documentary evidences. Vide enquiry report dated 07.01.2019, the enquiry officer found the charges levelled against the petitioner as proved and considering the same, the petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 21.05.2019 vide office order dated 20.05.2019 by the disciplinary authority who also forfeited the Gratuity amount. Vide enquiry report dated 07.01.2019, the enquiry officer found the charges levelled against the petitioner as proved and considering the same, the petitioner was dismissed from service w.e.f. 21.05.2019 vide office order dated 20.05.2019 by the disciplinary authority who also forfeited the Gratuity amount. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred departmental appeal vide letter dated 06.01.2020 which got dismissed vide order dated 04.08.2021 as contained in memo No. 1467. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts forth his arguments stating that the respondent authorities have not taken into consideration the defense statement and relevant documentary evidences submitted by the petitioner. The learned counsel submits that the order in departmental appeal was passed during the pendency of this writ application and the petitioner was not given the opportunity to be heard. He also submits that forfeiture of the gratuity amount is bad and illegal. When admittedly he has worked, he is entitled for the gratuity. 5 . Learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the petitioner was given ample and sufficient opportunity to defend his case. The learned counsel states that there are sufficient evidences collected in course of departmental proceedings to hold the petitioner guilty of misconduct. The learned counsel further submits that even in the departmental appeal the appellate authority had considered all the evidences produced i.e. statement of witnesses, enquiry report, documentary evidences and pleadings of the petitioner and thereafter, affirmed the punishment order. He also submits that the order forfeiting the gratuity is justified as petitioner is an impersonator and obtained employment by fraud. Fraud vitiates all actions, thus, even on this ground he is not entitled for any benefits. 6 . After hearing the parties, I find that the petitioner has challenged the punishment order passed in disciplinary proceeding. Jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in reviewing Departmental Proceeding is very limited. This Court is not a Court of appeal, rather is sitting in judicial review. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13 . Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” In the case of Union of India v. Subrata Nath, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the courts ought to refrain from interfering with the findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are grossly incompatible with the evidence on record and has held as under: “21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.” Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 has held as under: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’” 7. The petitioner has been departmentally proceeded against. Charge against the petitioner is that he fraudulently got appointment on compassionate ground in place of the deceased employee, posing to be his son. The petitioner has been departmentally proceeded against. Charge against the petitioner is that he fraudulently got appointment on compassionate ground in place of the deceased employee, posing to be his son. Thus, it is clear that the charge is of impersonation. Ample opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend his case as there were 41 sittings in the Departmental Enquiry. The Enquiry Officer on the basis of oral evidence adduced as also the documentary evidence, had come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not the son of the deceased employee, rather was his brother. Impersonating thus, the petitioner had procured employment and in that view charge against the petitioner was proved. The entire finding of the departmental enquiry is finding of fact, which this Court cannot interfere with. Be it noted that this finding of fact has been arrived at based on documentary and oral evidence. Finding is neither illegal nor perverse. As this Court is not an appellate Court, it cannot substitute its own views. Further, I find that there is no error in the fact finding of the disciplinary authority. 8. Once the Enquiry Officer found the guilt of the petitioner as proved, the appropriate punishment was required to be inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority. In this case, after giving second show cause notice and copy of the enquiry report and after considering the reply of the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority inflicted the punishment of dismissal from service and forfeiture of gratuity amount. 9. Since it was found that the petitioner has obtained service by playing fraud and the same has been established in the Departmental Proceeding, the only punishment, which commensurate to the proved charge is that of dismissal from service and forfeiture of gratuity amount. In this case, I find that the charges are proved by cogent evidence and the punishment commensurate to the proved misconduct. 10. Second limb of argument of the petitioner is that the entire gratuity cannot be forfeited. I am not in agreement with the said argument. Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act is definition Clause. In this case, I find that the charges are proved by cogent evidence and the punishment commensurate to the proved misconduct. 10. Second limb of argument of the petitioner is that the entire gratuity cannot be forfeited. I am not in agreement with the said argument. Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act is definition Clause. Section 2(e) defines ‘employee’, which reads as under: - “ 2(e) "employee" means any person (other than an apprentice) who is employed for wages, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of a factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company, shop or other establishment, to which this Act applies, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity;” Section 4 deals with payment of gratuity. Section 4(6) provides for forfeiture of gratuity, which reads as under: - “(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), - (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee 16[may be wholly or partially forfeited]- (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment.Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (5) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees and in the case of a continuing offence with a further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for each day during which the offence continues.” As per Section 4(6)(b)(i) and (ii) entire gratuity can be forfeited if the service is terminated for an offence involving moral turpitude. Obtaining an employment by fraudulent means attracts moral turpitude. Obtaining an employment by fraudulent means attracts moral turpitude. Further, a person, who has obtained employment by fraudulent means and commits fraud, cannot be said to be a bonafide employee of the company. By no stretch of imagination, he can come within the definition of employee as frauds vitiates all acts. His appointment, which was obtained by fraud gets vitiated and so all consequent actions. Once the very basis is vitiated by fraud, the entire edifice must fall, thus, in my opinion, he cannot be said to be an employee at all. If he is not an employee, he is not entitled for any gratuity. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 345 at para 15 has held as follows: “15. The appointment itself being illegal, there is no question of the terminated employee seeking fruits of his employment by way of gratuity. We uphold the decision of the PSU forfeiting his entire gratuity....” 11. Considering what has been held above, I am of the opinion that there is no ground to entertain this writ petition inasmuch as the concerned authority has correctly forfeited the gratuity of the petitioner. There being no merit, this writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.