MAHENDER SINGH AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER
CRMMO/763/2025 · 2025-08-19
Virender Singh
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 22574 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 22574 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.763 of 2025 Date of Decision: 19.08.2025 Mahender Singh & Anr. …Petitioners
Versus State of H.P. & Anr. …..Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners : Petitioners in person with Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma and Mr. H.S Rawat, Additional Advocates General, with Ms. Ranjna Patial, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Respondent No.2, in person with Mr. Arun Kumar, Advocate. Virender Singh,
Judge
(Oral)
The petitioners have filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for quashing of FIR No.126 of 2023, dated 24.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the FIR in question’), registered under Sections 341, 323, 506, 325 & 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’) with Police Station, Puruwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) H.P., as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’). 2. The relief of quashing has been sought on the basis of the compromise, effected between the parties. 3. According to the petitioners, on the statement of respondent No.2, the FIR, in question, has been registered against them. 4. After registration of the FIR, the police has conducted the investigation and submitted the final report, which is now pending adjudication, before the learned trial Court. 5. According to the petitioners, the matter has been compromised between the parties. The terms and conditions of the compromise have been reduced into writing, which are annexed with the petition, as, Annexure P-2. 6. On the basis of the said compromise, a prayer has been made to allow the petition, as prayed for, by quashing of FIR No.126 of 2023, as well as, all proceedings resultant thereto, which are pending before the learned trial Court. 3 ( 2025:HHC:28228 )
7.
When put to notice, respondents No.1/State has filed the status report, disclosing therein that on 24.08.2023, respondent No.2, moved a complaint before the police, mentioning therein, that on that day, at about 11:00 AM, he was on his way to Rampur in his village, when, he reached, near Rampur Nunj Company, then, petitioner Mahender Singh alias Galu, came their in vehicle No.HP.17C-7900. He parked the vehicle there, in front of the complainant and started beating him. He had also shown him gun and threatened to kill him, in case, he made a complaint. As per the complaint, Servjeet Singh was also with accused Mahender Singh. On the basis of the above facts, he has prayed that action be taken against them. 8. It is the further case of respondent No.1, that after registration of the FIR, criminal machinery swung into motion and the police had filed the charge sheet, after completion of the investigation, before the learned trial Court. 9. Apart from this, it has been mentioned in the status report that petitioner-Mahender Singh is having the following criminal history:-
4 ( 2025:HHC:28228 )
1. FIR No.51/2012, dated 06.02.2012, registered under Sections 452, 323 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.
2. FIR No.258/2013, dated 26.08.2013, registered under Sections 341, 323 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.
3. FIR No.377/2015, dated 29.10.2015, registered under Section 435 of IPC, with Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.
4. FIR No.10/2016, dated 11.01.2016, registered under Sections 147, 148, 313, 504, 451 & 427 of IPC. 5. FIR No.116/2016, dated 16.04.2016, registered under Section 307 of IPC, with Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.
6. FIR No.48/2018, dated 02.03.2018, registered under Sections 324 & 504 of IPC, with Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.
7.
FIR No.111/2018, dated 13.05.2018, registered under Sections 307 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.
8. FIR No.37/2020, dated 14.04.2020, registered under Sections 188, 269 & 270 of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
9. FIR No.116/2020, dated 25.08.2020, registered under Sections 382, 323, 341 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
10. FIR No.118/2021, dated 18.09.2021, registered under Sections 457 & 380 of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
11. FIR No.121/2023, dated 24.08.2023, registered under Sections 341, 323, 506 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
5 ( 2025:HHC:28228 )
12. FIR No.154/2023, dated 25.10.2023, registered under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 325, 427 & 120B of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
10. Similarly, the criminal history of applicant-Sarvjeet Singh alias Shempi has also been mentioned in the status report and the same has been reproduced as under:-
1. FIR No.116/2020, dated 25.08.2020, registered under Sections 341, 323 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
2. FIR No.118/2021, dated 18.09.2021, registered under Sections 457, 380, 201 & 34 of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
3. FIR No.154/2023, dated 25.10.2023, registered under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 325, 427, 120B of IPC, with Police Station, Puruwala, District Sirmour, H.P.
11. Respondent No.2, who, at one point of time, had levelled allegations against the petitioners and had lodged the FIR, in question, appeared, before this Court and has made a statement, on oath, that a minor scuffle had taken place, due to which, he had lodged FIR, in question, against the petitioners. He has deposed that with the intervention of the respectables of the society and in order to maintain their cordial relations and to live peacefully in the society, the matter has now been compromised.
The said compromise is Annexure P-2. 6 ( 2025:HHC:28228 )
12. On the basis of the compromise Annexure P-2, respondent No.2 has prayed that he has no objection, if, the present petition is allowed. The reason for entering the compromise between the petitioners and respondent No.2 have also mentioned that they are from same village and want to live peacefully in the society. 13. Similar type of joint statement has been made by the petitioners. 14. Heard. 15. The person, who at point of time, had levelled the specific allegations against the petitioners, upon which, the FIR in question, has been registered and thereafter, the police, after conducting the investigation, has filed the charge sheet before the learned trial Court, when appeared before this Court, has exonerated the petitioners, by stating that now, matter has been compromised between the parties. 16. The petitioners and respondent No.2 are from the same area and now, they have settled the inter se dispute on the basis of compromise Annexure P-2. Meaning thereby, a positive step has been taken by them, which must be recognized by this Court, as, the primary purpose of law, is to maintain the peace and harmony in the society. 7 ( 2025:HHC:28228 )
17. Considering the above fact, this Court is satisfied about the genuineness of the compromise entered upon between the parties. 18. Moreover, the present case does not fall within the exception, as carved out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases 466, whereby the Hon’ble Supreme Court has formulated the guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings. 19. Perusal of judgment, referred to above, clearly depicts that in para 29.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has returned the findings that power conferred under Section 482 CrPC, is to be distinguished from the power, which lies in the Court, to compound the offences under Section 320 CrPC. 20.
No doubt, under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings, even, in those cases, which are not compoundable, where, the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised in view of the guiding principles as decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh’s
8 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) case (supra). The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced, as under:-
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly,
9 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons
10 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material 7 mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under
11 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.
Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime”. 21. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Narinder Singh’s case (supra), this Court is satisfied that the parties, i.e. the petitioners and respondent No.2, have entered into compromise, in order to maintain their cordial relations. 22. When compromise has been entered into between the complainant (respondent No.2) and the accused (petitioners), then, the chances of success of the trial against the accused (petitioners) become very bleak. 23. Not only this, the acceptance of the petition will save the precious judicial time of the learned trial Court, which,
12 ( 2025:HHC:28228 ) the learned trial Court would be in a position to utilize for some other serious dispute to decide. 24. The criminal history of the petitioners has also been mentioned in the status report. Admittedly, all those cases are stated to be pending, but, accepting the compromise in the present case, this Court is of the view that the petition is liable to be allowed, subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- each, by both the petitioners. 50% of the said amount be deposited with the Secretary, State Legal Services Authority, and 50% be deposited with H.P. High Court Advocates, Welfare Fund. 25. It is further clarified that if the petitioners fails to deposit the said amount, as ordered by this Court, within a period of six weeks, then, the proceedings, in the present petition shall be revived automatically. 26. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of. (Virender Singh)
Judge August 19, 2025 (subhash)