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2025 DAILYLAW 22532 (HP)

SANDHYA DEVI v. DARSHNA DEVI AND OTHERS

CMPMO/497/2025 · 2025-08-29

Ajay Mohan Goel

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CMPMO No.497 of 2025 Decided on 29th August, 2025 Sandhya Devi …Petitioner Versus Darshna Devi and others …Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the petitioner: Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, Advocate. For the respondents: Dr. Lalit Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.3. Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge (Oral) Notice confined to respondent No.3 at this stage only. Dr. Lalit Sharma, Advocate, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.3. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the order passed by the Court of learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-1, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in terms whereof, an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing an application to recall the order, in terms whereof, the claim petition was dismissed in default was dismissed. 2 3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act on 10.09.2009, which was dismissed in default on 24.04.2013. For restoration of this petition, the petitioner approached the learned Tribunal by way of an application alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay on 28.08.2023. In terms of the impugned order, learned Tribunal has dismissed said application by assigning the following reasons:- “As discussed above, the applicant has thrown the entire blame on the head of her counsel who was appearing for the applicant in the Court by contesting that every time on inquiry, he used to disclose that the matter is pending. Though there is no cogent and convincing evidence in this regard to construe carelessness of counsel, this by itself cannot be a ground to consone long and inordinate delay of more than 10 years as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. As per evidence, the applicant was not at all vigilant about the petition which she filed in this Tribunal. The applicant did not bother to check out the fate of her petition for more than 10 years and as such, sufficient cause for condoning the delay has not been shown. The law relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is 3 not at all attracted to the present facts and circumstances as in the case of M/s Ultratech Pharmaceuticals (supra), there was no rebuttal evidence to refute the contentions of the applicant and in the case of Rama Nand (supra), the ground to condone the delay was different.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law for the reason that the learned Tribunal erred in not appreciating that there was no fault on the part of the petitioner, as it was on account of the non-communication of the order of dismissal by the learned counsel, who was representing the petitioner that the application was filed after a delay of 10 years. He argued that in this case unfortunately, the counsel, who was engaged by the petitioner passed away after the case was dismissed in default and, therefore, as the petitioner was not communicated about the matter having been dismissed in default by anyone. Therefore, when she came to know of this fact in the month of May 2023, she immediately took steps to file the application, which was thereafter filed without any delay. He argued that as the learned Tribunal has not appreciated these facts in correct perspective, the impugned order was liable to be set aside. Learned counsel 4 also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in DHANNALAL versus D.P. VIJAYVARGIYA AND OTHERS (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 652 and submitted that in terms of the said judgment when the accident took place, limitation was prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act to prefer a claim petition and, therefore also, learned Tribunal erred in dismissing the application filed for condonation of delay. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the 10 years delay in filing the application was totally unexplained and learned Tribunal rightly rejected the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He submitted that the case as was mentioned in the application to condone the delay was built on the foundation of falsity as was evident from averments made in Para-5 and 7 thereof and as the applicant had not only approached the Court belatedly, but had also not approached the Court with clean hands, therefore, learned Tribunal correctly dismissed the application. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 also made available for the perusal of the Court the reply filed to the said application by the owner of the vehicle, which demonstrated that in the interregnum, a 5 compromise was arrived between the claimant/petitioner and the owner of the vehicle. Learned counsel thus submitted that as this fact was concealed in the application and even in the present petition, therefore, no indulgence as is being prayed for by the petitioner is called for. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also carefully gone through the impugned order as well as other documents appended with the petition. 7. It is a matter of record that the claim petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed in default on 24.04.2013 and the application in issue was filed in the month of August, 2023. A perusal of the application that was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act demonstrates that in Para 5 thereof, it was mentioned that the petitioner after filing of the suit was under the bona fide belief that the case was being taken care of by the counsel. It is further averred in the application that the petitioner kept an inquiring of the status of the case from the counsel and the counsel consistently informed the petitioner that the matter was pending and as and when the presence of the petitioner would be required, the petitioner shall be intimated accordingly. 6 However, in Para-7 of the application, it is averred that after the cases of some other claimants were decided in the year 2018 and when the petitioner came to know of the said fact in the year 2023 and she made inquiry, then, she came to know that the counsel had expired in the year 2014. Now, this Court fails to understand that if the counsel representing the petitioner had already died in the year 2014, then, in terms of averments made in Para-5 of the application, the petitioner was inquiring the status of the case from whom. This demonstrates that the averments made in Para-5 of the application are per se false. The contention made by learned Counsel for the respondent that in between matter was compromised between the petitioner and the owner of the vehicle could also not be demonstrated to be incorrect. In this backdrop, if one peruses the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the reasoning given therein for dismissing the application cannot be faulted with. It is evident and apparent that the petitioner was careless and was trying to throw the entire onus upon the counsel, who unfortunately was no more in the world. Learned Tribunal has rightly held that as the applicant was not vigilant about the petition and did not bother to check the fate 7 of the petition for more than 10 years, such huge delay could not be condoned due to the lack of sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay. 8. As these findings arrived at by the learned Tribunal are borne out from the record including the evidence which was led by the parties before the learned Tribunal which was made available by the learned counsel for the parties for the perusal of the Court, this Court is of the considered view that the order under challenge calls for no interference. Otherwise also, the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands compromise affected between her and the owner of the vehicle has not been disclosed. 9. It is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and another versus Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LRs., 2024 INSC 262, in which Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the length of delay is a relevant matter with which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. versus Gopu and 8 another, 2025 INSC 511 has been pleased to hold that the Courts cannot extend the period of limitation for misplaced sympathy. 10. Coming to the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in DHANNALAL versus D.P. VIJAYVARGIYA AND OTHERS (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 652 (supra) has been pleased to hold that in terms of the Motor Vehicle Amendment Act, 1994, which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1994 Sub-section 3 of Section 166 of the Act was omitted and the fact thereof was that w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there was no limitation for filing the claim before the Tribunal in respect of an accident. This Court is of the considered view that this judgment has no applicability in the facts of this case because herein, learned Tribunal did not reject a claim petition filed by the petitioner inter alia on the ground that the same was time barred. This case would be applicable wherein the issue is with regard to the rejection of a claim petition itself on the ground that the same was time barred, obviously, taking into consideration the statutory provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, as they existed as on the day when the accident took place. 9 11. However, as observed hereinabove because herein this Court is only seized with the dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in restoring the petition, the petitioner cannot take benefit of the said judgment. 12. In the light of the above observations, this Court does not find any merit in the petition, the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge August 29, 2025 (Vinod)