JUDGMENT : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The Petitioner, in this writ petition, has prayed for the following reliefs:- i. “For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction particularly writ of certiorari for quashing the order and decision dated 11.03.2025 (Annexure-17) passed by Director, Refineries (On Behalf of Board of Directors) HPCL, whereby and where under the Review Application dated 12.07.2024 preferred by the petitioner under Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules against the order dated 29.05.2024 passed by the Chairman & the Managing Director (Additional Charge- Director- Mktg.), HPCL (respondent no.2-Appellate authority) has been dismissed. ii. For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, particularly writ of certiorari for quashing the order and decision dated 29.05.2024 (Annexure- 15) passed by Chairman & the Managing Director (Additional Charge- Director-Mktg.), HPCL (respondent no.2- Appellate authority), whereby and where under the Departmental Appeal preferred by the petitioner under Part II of Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules against the order dated 08.11.2021 passed by the Executive Director Corporate Finance and Disciplinary Authority, HPCL has been dismissed. iii. For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, particularly writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 08.11.2021 (Annexure-8) passed by the Executive Director Corporate Finance and Disciplinary Authority, HPCL whereby and where under the petitioner has been dismissed from the services of the respondent Corporation. iv. Upon quashing the aforesaid orders dated 11.03.2025, 29.05.2024 and 08.11.2021, for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, particularly writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondent Corporation to re-instate the petitioner on the post of Asst. Manager Finance, HPCL with all consequential benefits.” 3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner joined the services of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) in Ranchi Retail RO in the year 2011. On 01.12.2016, he was put under suspension on the allegation that he made certain transactions without supporting documents. Thereafter, vide memorandum dated 04.10.2018, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. On receipt of memorandum of charge, he submitted his reply denying all the charges against him. The inquiry was conducted on different dates and in the meantime the petitioner was arrested by CBI and then was released on bail by order of this Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court dated 06.03.2020. On receipt of memorandum of charge, he submitted his reply denying all the charges against him. The inquiry was conducted on different dates and in the meantime the petitioner was arrested by CBI and then was released on bail by order of this Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court dated 06.03.2020. Thereafter, in the departmental enquiry all the four charges had been established against him. The petitioner was then issued a show cause vide letter dated 24.05.2021 along with a copy of the enquiry report date 21.05.2021 by the disciplinary authority. He filed his reply to the show cause on 07.06.2021 denying all the charges leveled against him by the enquiry officer. However, punishment of dismissal from service was imposed upon the petitioner vide order dated 08.11.2021. Aggrieved by the order of punishment, he made request to the respondent corporation to reconsider the punishment order and exonerate him of the charges. On 21.12.2021, he preferred departmental appeal but the same was dismissed by order dated 23.08.2022. The petitioner thereafter preferred writ petition being W.P.S. No. 171 of 2023 which was disposed of by remitting the matter for passing fresh order by respondent no.2. The petitioner again appeared before the authority and also submitted his detailed submissions against the imposition of penalty of dismissal but yet again the departmental appeal was dismissed and the punishment was upheld vide order dated 29.05.2024. The petitioner also preferred a review petition dated 12.07.2024 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 11.03.2025. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts forth his arguments stating that there is no evidence to show the guilt of the petitioner and only on conjectures and surmises the petitioner has been charged of the misconduct. The learned counsel states that the departmental proceeding was initiated after a lapse of two years and the disciplinary authority intended to hold an enquiry even before submission of reply by the petitioner, which is contrary to the CDA Rules. The learned counsel submits that the petitioner was not given a fair chance to present his defence and the appellate order was passed without hearing the petitioner and recording reasons in support of the findings. The learned counsel submits that the authorities have not considered the contentions of the petitioner in appeal/ review properly. 5. The learned counsel submits that the petitioner was not given a fair chance to present his defence and the appellate order was passed without hearing the petitioner and recording reasons in support of the findings. The learned counsel submits that the authorities have not considered the contentions of the petitioner in appeal/ review properly. 5. Learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the charges have been proved against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding and same are serious in nature. The learned counsel submits that the petitioner has been given full opportunity to defend himself and present his case. The learned counsel submits that the departmental authorities have given due consideration to the petitioner’s contention and also passed a fresh order as per order of the Hon’ble Court in W.P.S. No.171 of 2023. 6. After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusal of the records, I find that the petitioner has been charged for financial irregularities during his tenure as the Assistant Manager-Finance, Ranchi Retail Regional Office and causing huge financial loss to the Corporation and maligning the reputation of the Corporation. He has further been charged for negligence and breach of rules and procedures. The aforesaid charges are serious in nature and have been found proved against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. It is pertinent to note that there has been no irregularity in the departmental proceeding and it has been conducted fairly in accordance with law following the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was given fair opportunity to present his defence. Hence, there has been no violation of any statutory rule. Further, the order of punishment of dismissal from service does not seem to be disproportionate keeping in view the nature of misconduct of the petitioner and the loss incurred by the Corporation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in many of its judgment that High Courts can exercise its power of judicial review to interfere with the punishment thus imposed in a departmental proceeding only when the punishment imposed is so harsh that it shocks the conscience of the Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sunil Kumar, reported in (2023) 3 SCC 622 has held as under: “11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sunil Kumar, reported in (2023) 3 SCC 622 has held as under: “11. Even otherwise, the Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred in interfering with the order of penalty of dismissal passed on proved charges and misconduct of indiscipline and insubordination and giving threats to the superior of dire consequences on the ground that the same is disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. In Surinder Kumar [CRPF v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 398] while considering the power of judicial review of the High Court in interfering with the punishment of dismissal, it is observed and held by this Court after considering the earlier decision in Union of India v. R.K. Sharma [Union of India v. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 592 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 767] that in exercise of powers of judicial review interfering with the punishment of dismissal on the ground that it was disproportionate, the punishment should not be merely disproportionate but should be strikingly disproportionate. As observed and held that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 or under Article 32 of the Constitution.” However, in the present case I do not find any perversity in the departmental proceeding or its punishment order, warranting the interference of this Court. Furthermore, High Courts having very limited scope under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot act as an appellate authority and re- evaluate findings of fact or the adequacy of evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 has held as under: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’” 7. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts of the case, I find no merit in this writ petition, calling for any interference with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Reviewing Authority which is under challenge in this writ petition. 8. This writ petition, is accordingly, dismissed.