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2025 DAILYLAW 2233 (PAT)

Ramesh Prasad Gupta v. The State of Bihar

CWJC/8949/2025 · 2026-04-21

Shailendra Singh, Sudhir Singh

body2025

Judgment text

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.8949 of 2025 =================================================== Ramesh Prasad Gupta, Male, aged about 60 years, Son of Late Laxman Prasad Gupta, Resident of 104, Tari Mohalla, Near Akhtar Hind Press, P.S. Ara Town, District Bhojpur, Bihar 802301. ... ... Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Minor Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. 2. The Engineer In-Chief, Minor Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. 3. The Chief Engineer, Minor Water Resources Department, Bhagalpur, Government of Bihar, Patna. 4. The Superintending Engineer, Minor Irrigation Circle, Bhagalpur, District Bhagalpur, Bihar. 5. The Superintending Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Banka, District Bhagalpur, Bihar. 6. M/s Maa Laxmi Construction, through its Proprietor Reena Devi, Resident of Village- Kairba, P.O. Saho Bigha, District Jehanabad, Bihar. ... ... Respondents =================================================== Appearance : For the Petitioner : Mr. Prabhat Ranjan, Advocate For the State : Mr. Amish Kumar, A.C. to A.G. =================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAILENDRA SINGH ORAL ORDER (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH) 3 21-04-2026 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner, in the present writ application, has sought the following reliefs: “1 (I) Quashing of the ex-parte decision of the Departmental Tender Committee dated 05.05.2025 contained in Letter No. 448 Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 2/12 corresponding to the Notice Inviting Tender No. 07/2024-25 (Group No. 16) (Annexure P/4) by which, after declaring the technical bid of the petitioner responsive, after opening of the financial bid and declaring the petitioner as Lowest Bidder, the technical bid has again been re-evaluated at the instance of third party to the bidding process and the technical bid and financial bid of the petitioner has been declared non-responsive with a further direction to award the work to M/s. Maa Laxmi Construction at a price of 17.5% below the schedule of rate; (ii) Restraining the Respondents from giving effect to the order dated 05.05.2025 (Annexure P/4) the pendency of the present writ application and/or the without the leave of this Hon’ble Court.” 3. Upon perusal of Memo No. 448 (Mo) dated 05.05.2025 (Annexure-P/4 to the writ application), it appears that the petitioner was disqualified from the tender process for the following reasons:- “4- foHkkxh; fufonk lfefr dk fu.kZ;& lfefr ds le{k miLFkkfir lays[k ij fopkjksijkUr foHkkxh; fufonk lfefr] eq[; vfHk;ark] y?kq ty lalk/ku foHkkx] Hkkxyiqj ds i=kad&787 fnukad 04-03- 2025 }kjk vuq”kalk fd;k x;k gSA mYys[kuh; gS fd mDr fufonk dk rduhdh chM Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 3/12 dk ewY;kad.k dh dkjZokbZ fnukad 19-02-2025 dks fuxZr dh xbZ gSA Jh jes”k izlkn xqIrk dks y?kq flapkbZ izeaMy] jksgrkl vUrxZr foRrh; o’kZ 2023&24 esa 10 ¼nl½ vnn vkoafVr dk;ksZa esa ls 08 ¼vkB½ vnn ;kstukvksa dk th.kksZ}kj dk;Z iwjk ugha fd;s tkus ds dkj.k dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark] y?kq flapkbZ izeaMy] jksgrkl ds i=kad 643 fnukad 12-04-2025 ds }kjk fMckj fd;k x;k gSA Li’V gS fd Jh xqIrk ds }kjk rF;ksa dks Nqikdj xyr “kiFk i= ds vk/kkj ij fufonk izkIr fd;s tkus dk iz;kl fd;k x;k gSA ftlls SBD dh IFB dafMdk 4-8 dk mYya?ku gqvk gSA vr,o budh foRrh; fufonk dks vekU; fd;k tkrk gSA” 4. The record further reveals that the aforesaid decision was based upon Letter No. 643 dated 12.04.2025 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ application), whereby the respondent authorities had indicated that out of 10 ongoing projects, 08 projects attributed to the petitioner had not been completed. 5. The said communication dated 12.04.2025 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ application) was challenged by the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 8572 of 2025, wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 01.09.2025, was pleased to pass the following order: “3. Accordingly, impugned action dated 12.04.2025 stands set aside. The matter is remanded to the concerned authority to Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 4/12 proceed to pass a fresh order after due consideration of the notice dated 24.09.2024 read with the petitioner’s reply dated 22.04.2025 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any stand disposed of.” 6. In pursuance to the aforesaid order, the respondent authorities passed a fresh order vide Letter No. 69 dated 11.12.2025, which reads as follows: “ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] iVuk }kjk ikfjr mDr U;k;kns”k ds vkyksd esa dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark] y?kq flapkbZ izeaMy] jksgrkl] lklkjke ds i=kad&1912 fnukad& 20- 09-2025 }kjk laosnd dks fMckj djus laca/kh vkns”k i=kad&643 fnukad&12-04-2025 dks fujLr dj fn;k x;k] ,oa dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark] y?kq flapkbZ izeaMy] jksgrkl] lklkjke ds 2113 fnukad&22-10-2025 ,oa v/kh{k.k vfHk;ark] y?kq flapkbZ vapy] iVuk ds i=kad&2759 fnukad&29-10-2025 }kjk laosnd dks fMckj djus gsrq Hksts x;s izLrko ds vkyksd esa eq[; vfHk;ark] y?kq ty lalk/ku foHkkx] iVuk ds i=kad&3532 fnukad&31-10-2025 }kjk laosnd ds fo:) fMckj dh dkjZokbZ gsrq fofgr izi= esa vuq”kalk lfgr izLrko ,oa lacaf/kr vfHkys[kksa dh izfr bl dk;kZy; dks miyC/k djk;h x;hA mDr izLrko ds vkyksd vxzsrj dkjZokbZ ds iwoZ laosnd dk i{k izkIr fd;k tkuk mfpr izrhr gksus ds dkj.k fcgkj Bhdsnkjh fuca/ku fu;ekoyh] 2007 ds fu;e 11¼[k½ ds rgr bl dk;kZy; ds i=kad&1126 fnukad&11-11-2025 }kjk laosnd ls dkj.k i`PNk dh Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 5/12 x;h ftldk tcko muds i=kad Ref No. -RAM/71 fnukad&17-11-2025 }kjk bl dk;kZy; dks miyC/k djk;k x;k ftlesa laosnd }kjk mUgsa vkoafVr 10 vn~n ;kstukvksa dk th.kksZ)kj dk;Z esa ls 08 ¼vkB½ vn~n ;kstukvksa dk dk;Z iw.kZ ugha djus gsrq LFkkuh; fookn ,oa Hkwfe dh vuqiyC/krk dks dkj.k crk;k x;k gS] ijUrq foHkkx }kjk bl laca/k esa tkap gsrq vij lfpo] y?kq ty lalk/ku foHkkx] iVuk dh v/;{krk esa xfBr tkap ny }kjk lefiZr izfrosnu ds voyksdu ls Li’V gksrk gS fd dqN ,d ekeyksa tgka fookn Fkk] dks NksM+dj laosnd }kjk mu dk;ksZa dks Hkh iwjk ugha fd;k x;k gS] tgkWa dksbZ fookn ugha gSA vr% laosnd dk Li’Vhdj.k iw.kZr% Lohdkj djus ;ksX; ugha gSA vr% of.kZr ifjizs{; esa laosnd dk tcko iw.kZ :i ls Lohdkj ;ksX; ugha gksus ds dkj.k lE;d fopkjksijkUr izkIr Li’Vhdj.k ds tokc dks vekU; djrs gq, laosnd Jh jes”k izlkn xqIrk] firk& LOk0 y{eh izlkn xqIrk] eksgYyk&rjh eksgYyk] v[kkM+k fgUn izsl ds utnhd] iks0&vkjk pkSd] Fkkuk& vkjk “kgj] ftyk Hkkstiwj] fiu dksM&802301 ¼fuca/ku la0& MWRD0924C1IN492057 Js.kh&1½ dks fcgkj Bhdsnkjh fuca/ku fu;ekoyh] 2007 dh dafMdk 11 ¼d½ dh mi dafMdk&(ii) esa fufgr izko/kkuksa ds vkyksd esa vxys vkns”k rd fufonk esa Hkkx ysus ls oafpr@fMckj fd;k tkrk gSA” 7. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which came to be decided vide Memo No. 1847 dated 17.03.2026. The Appellate Authority, in paragraph nos. 7 and 8, held as under: Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 6/12 “7- Jh xqIrk ds vH;kosnu dh leh{kk vihyh; izkf/kdkj }kjk dh x;hA leh{kksijkUr fuxZr foHkkxh; vkns”k la0&1613 fnukad&06-03-2026 dks fujLr@jn~n fd;k tkrk gSA lkFk gh eq[; vfHk;ark ¼;ks0$vuq0$Hkw0½] y?kq ty lalk/ku foHkkx] iVuk dk ldkj.k vkns”k la0&69 lg&ifBr Kkikad&1284 fnukad&11-12-2025 }kjk laosnd Jh jes”k dqekj xqIrk dks vxys vkns”k rd fufonk esa Hkkx ysus ls oafpr@fMckj fd;s tkus laca/kh vkns”k ds fo:) muds vihy vH;kosnu dks rRdky izHkko ls Lohd`r fd;k tkrk gSA 8- mDr vk”k; ds izLrko ij vihyh; izkf/kdkj dk vuqeksnu izkIr gSA” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the issue relating to the alleged 08 pending projects is subject matter of consideration before the Appellate Authority and interim protection has been granted in favour of the petitioner, the respondents were not justified in issuing Memo No. 448(Mo) dated 05.05.2025. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that the order dated 05.05.2025 has to be examined on the basis of the materials available on that date. It is submitted that on the relevant date, Letter No. 643 dated 12.04.2025 was in existence and formed the basis of the impugned decision. It is further submitted that although the said letter was subsequently set aside and reconsidered, even the fresh decision dated Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 7/12 11.12.2025 records that 08 projects remained incomplete, thereby justifying the action of the respondents. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials on record, the core issue which arises for consideration is as to whether the subsequent order passed by the Appellate Authority vide Memo No. 1847 dated 17.03.2026 can be applied retrospectively so as to invalidate the decision of the Departmental Tender Committee dated 05.05.2025. 11. It is a settled principle of law that the validity of an administrative or executive action is to be adjudged on the basis of the facts and materials which were available at the time when such decision was taken. Subsequent developments cannot ordinarily be relied upon to either validate or invalidate an action which was otherwise lawful on the date of its issuance. 12. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405, wherein it has been held that an order must stand or fall on the reasons contained therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons or subsequent developments. The relevant part of the said order reads as follows: Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 8/12 “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji,] : “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” 13. Apart from the above, it is equally well settled Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 9/12 that in matters relating to award of contracts, the scope of judicial review is extremely limited. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraphs 70 and 94, held that the Court does not sit as an appellate authority over administrative decisions in tender matters and judicial review is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 10/12 qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” 14. The said principle has been further reiterated in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818, wherein in paragraph 15, it has been held that the employer is the best judge of its requirements and the Court should exercise restraint unless the decision is found to be arbitrary, mala fide or in violation of statutory provisions. The relevant extract of said order reads as: “15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 11/12 and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given.” 15. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that on the date of issuance of Memo No. 448 dated 05.05.2025, the communication dated 12.04.2025 was in existence and formed the basis of the impugned decision. The subsequent setting aside of the said communication and remand of the matter would not, by itself, render the earlier decision illegal by putting the clock back. More so, when upon reconsideration, the competent authority, vide order dated 11.12.2025, has again recorded that 08 ongoing projects attributed to the petitioner remained incomplete. 16. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the subsequent order passed by the Patna High Court CWJC No.8949 of 2025(3) dt.21-04-2026 12/12 Appellate Authority dated 17.03.2026 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to invalidate the decision dated 05.05.2025, which was otherwise based on the materials available at the relevant point of time. 17. In view of the aforesaid, we find no merit in the present writ application and the same stands dismissed. 18. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. U.K./-A.F.R. (Sudhir Singh, J) ( Shailendra Singh, J) U