Srishti Kumari, aged about 30 years, wife of Shri Shantanu Jaiswal v. Shantanu Jaiswal, son of late Ashok Prasad Jaiswal, resident of village Jalka, PO and PS: Ghagra, District
2025-12-18
Arun Kumar Rai, Sujit Narayan Prasad
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order/judgment dated 08.01.2024 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Lohardagain Original Suit No. 15 of 2023, whereby and where under, the Suit filed by the appellant under Sections 13 (1) (i-a) (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been dismissed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case, leading to filing of the petition filed under Section 13(1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, by the appellant/plaintiff, needs to be referred herein which are as under: 3. The plaintiff's [the appellant herein] case, in brief, is that marriage of plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent was solemnized on 25.06.2011 at Dewaki Mandir, Ghaghra, District-Gumla. After that they started living together as husband and wife at Ghaghra. Out of their wedlock one daughter was born. It is alleged that the defendant-respondent was addicted to liquor and playing gamble and under the influence of liquor he used to torture the plaintiff-appellant regularly. It is further alleged that the defendant-respondent has extra-marital relation with another girl. On several occasions, the defendant-respondent assaulted her with belt, shoes and abused the plaintiff-appellant without any rhyme and reason. The defendant-respondent does not want to live with the plaintiff-appellant. It is alleged that he is very offensive in nature and does not respect her as wife and always used to assault and abuse her. The plaintiff-appellant lived in her matrimonial house at Devi Mandap Road, Ranchi. 4. It is stated that the defendant-respondent on one occasion while assaulting plaintiff-appellant entered the key of scooty in her arm due to which the plaintiff-appellant received injury for which she has taken treatment in hospital. The defendant-husband used to assault the plaintiff-appellant with fists and slaps which compelled her to return to her maike on 02.12.2018 and since then she is living in her maike. The defendant- husband refused to live with plaintiff-wife. The appellant had no source of income. Therefore, she has filed a Suit under sections 13(i)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce on the ground of extra-marital relation, cruelty and desertion. 5. The learned Family Judge has issued notice upon the respondent-husband, who appeared and filed written statement admitting the factum of marriage with the plaintiff-appellant. 6. It is pleaded that the suit of plaintiff-appellant is not maintainable.
5. The learned Family Judge has issued notice upon the respondent-husband, who appeared and filed written statement admitting the factum of marriage with the plaintiff-appellant. 6. It is pleaded that the suit of plaintiff-appellant is not maintainable. She has filed the suit suppressing the material fact. The plaintiff-appellant has willfully deserted the defendant-respondent and she was never subjected to any cruelty. His marriage was solemnized with plaintiff on 25.06.2011. Since the marriage, defendant-respondent used to stay in the State of Orissa for livelihood and he used to visit his own house in Ranchi on frequent basis, but after few months, plaintiff-appellant started quarreling with her in-laws and pressurized the defendant-respondent to provide a separate rented house. Then he started living in a rented house in Ranchi. 7. Out of their wedlock one child Bhavya Jaiswal was born on 15.09.2014 when they lived in rented house. On request of defendant-respondent, the appellant agreed to return to her matrimonial house on the condition that she will not be participating in any household work and she will be residing in her maike in every weekend, to which the defendant-respondent agreed for the sake of saving relationship. 8. It is stated that the father of defendant-respondent died on 22.10.2015, after death of her father-in-law, plaintiff-appellant never stayed in her matrimonial house rather she started living on the 3rd floor of her matrimonial house with limited interactions with her in-laws. 9. The plaintiff-appellant told for admission in B.Ed. then defendant-respondent admitted her in B.Ed course from college of Lohardaga and paid required fees. Her course was completed, but she refused to come back to her matrimonial house. 10. The defendant-husband filed an O.S. case for restitution of conjugal rights before Principal Judge Family Court, Ranchi in year 2021. After knowledge of said suit, the plaintiff-wife urged to defendant-husband that she is willing to cohabit with defendant, if he will not proceed further in the said suit. Then defendant-respondent agreed and did not pursue the said suit and the said suit was dismissed for default. The mother of defendant- respondent died on 26.05.2023 after long illness. He urged to come back to her matrimonial house after death of her mother but she refused. It is contended that even thereafter the defendant is ready to keep his wife and daughter. He has no any extra-marital relation and he is not in the habit of consuming liquor. 11.
He urged to come back to her matrimonial house after death of her mother but she refused. It is contended that even thereafter the defendant is ready to keep his wife and daughter. He has no any extra-marital relation and he is not in the habit of consuming liquor. 11. After taking into consideration the pleadings of the both the parties the learned Family Court have framed altogether six issues which are as follows:- (i) Whether the suit of plaintiff is maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiff has valid cause of action for the Suit? (iii) Whether the defendant is living in relationship outside the marriage with another lady? (iv) Whether defendant has committed cruelty with plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint? (v) Whether defendant has deserted to plaintiff without any valid reason? (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitle for relief as sought for and any other relief? 12. The evidences have been laid on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter, vide order dated 08.01.2024, the judgment has been passed dismissing the suit by holding that plaintiff/wife is not entitled to get relief as claimed. 13. Against the aforesaid order, the present appeal has been filed. Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner/appellant: 14. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Court below is contrary to Law, against the weight of evidences and the materials on record and as such the same is not sustainable and liable to be set aside. 15. The learned Court below ought to have appreciated the fact that due to acute mental pain, agony and suffering at the hands of the respondent/defendant, it was not possible for the appellant/plaintiff to live with the respondent/defendant. 16. The learned Court below had not appreciated the fact that the appellant could not be asked to live in a situation wherein frequent rudeness of language and physical torture as well as mental cruelty is in the daily routine. The learned court has also not considered the principles of “Animus Deserendi” in its proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of case. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law. Arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-husband: 18.
The learned court has also not considered the principles of “Animus Deserendi” in its proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of case. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law. Arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent-husband: 18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-husband, while defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned judgment. The learned Family Judge has considered the issue of extra marital relationship, cruelty and desertion and having come to the conclusion that appellant-wife has not been able to prove the fact of extra- marital relationship, cruelty and desertion against the defendant-husband dismissed the petition. 19. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that if on that pretext, the factum of extra-marital affair, cruelty and desertion having not been found to be established, based upon which the decree of divorce has been refused to be granted, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an error. Analysis: 20. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and had gone through the findings recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment. 21. The admitted fact herein is that the suit has been filed under Sections 13(1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce on the ground of extra-marital affair, cruelty and desertion. 22. It is evident from impugned order that the evidence has been laid on behalf of both the parties. For ready reference, the evidences laid on behalf of the parties are being referred as under: 23. PW-1 is Srishti Kumari (Plaintiff), in her examination-in-chief has reiterated her pleading. 24. In her cross-examination, she has stated that at the time of birth of her daughter, defendant was working at Orissa. It is false to say that the defendant was working in Orissa after marriage. It is false to say that she quarreled with her in-laws and made pressure on defendant-husband to live separately from matrimonial house. The occurrence of beating and torturing was started just after the marriage but she could not say its date. She had not made any complaint in Police Station regarding beating during life time of her father-in-law.
It is false to say that she quarreled with her in-laws and made pressure on defendant-husband to live separately from matrimonial house. The occurrence of beating and torturing was started just after the marriage but she could not say its date. She had not made any complaint in Police Station regarding beating during life time of her father-in-law. She could not produce any document about drinking wine and relationship outside the marriage of defendant. At present, she doesn't want to live with her husband. At the time of death her father-in- law, she was present in her matrimonial house. It is true that at the time of death of her mother-in-law, she did not go to her matrimonial house. She had no knowledge that her husband filed a suit in Civil Court, Ranchi for restitution of conjugal rights. It is false to say that in that suit of restitution of conjugal rights, she said that she will live properly, so her husband withdrew that suit. She further deposed that her husband used to beat her and her treatment was done in local clinic but she could not produce any document. It is true that she does not want to live with her husband. 25. P.W.-2 is Brajesh Prasad @ Brajesh Kr. (Father of plaintiff),who in his examination-in-chief on affidavit, has supported the case of plaintiff. 26. In his cross-examination, he has stated that his daughter is living in her maika from year 2018. His son-in-law tortured his daughter after birth of daughter child in year 2012. He further stated that her daughter does not want to live with her husband. It is false to say that his son-in-law wants to keep his daughter, but his daughter does not want to live with him. First time, he got knowledge about consuming wine and relationship outside the marriage of his son-in-law in year 2018. He or his daughter had not lodged any case about it. He could not say the date of occurrence which was occurred in the matrimonial house of his daughter. It is false to say that there is relationship outside the marriage of his daughter with any other person. So, she does not want to live with her husband. 27. P.W.-3 is Sangita Devi (Mother of plaintiff), in her examination-in- chief on affidavit, has supported the case of plaintiff. 28.
It is false to say that there is relationship outside the marriage of his daughter with any other person. So, she does not want to live with her husband. 27. P.W.-3 is Sangita Devi (Mother of plaintiff), in her examination-in- chief on affidavit, has supported the case of plaintiff. 28. In her cross-examination she has stated that she got knowledge about beating and torturing to her daughter after 6-7 months of marriage. She had not seen that occurrence of beating. She has further stated that defendant assaulted her daughter in her house in her presence. Occurrence of beating has taken place after 6-7 months of marriage. She made complaint in Lohardaga Mahila P.S. regarding beating but no any action was taken place. There is relationship of defendant with another lady and he is consuming wine. This fact came to her knowledge because the said lady threatened them through phone. We had not made any complaint regarding relationship outside the marriage of defendant. The defendant does not want to keep her daughter. She could not produce any documentary evidence regarding drinking wine and relationship outside the marriage of defendant. At the time of marriage, the defendant-respondent was doing work of contractor for construction of bridge but she could not say that at present time what work he is doing. 29. The defendant-husband has produced himself as D.W. 1, who has deposed in his examination-in-chief on affidavit. He has reiterated what has been averred in written-statement. In his cross-examination, he has stated that plaintiff is his wife. She has lodged Lohardaga Mahila P.S. case no.- 37/2021 regarding demand of dowry and torturing. His mother died on 24.05.2023. She lived in village Ghaghra. He had a house in Ranchi but he had sold it. He kept his wife in a rented house. His father died after 03 years of marriage. Prior to the marriage, he was doing the work of contractor. At present, he is not doing the said work. It is false to say that he had assaulted and tortured the plaintiff. He had deposited Rs. One Crore and Twenty Lakhs to close the S.B.I. C.C Account loan after selling the house at Ranchi. It is false to say that he had kept another lady and he is in habit of playing gambling and consuming wine, so his wife does not want to live with him. 30.
He had deposited Rs. One Crore and Twenty Lakhs to close the S.B.I. C.C Account loan after selling the house at Ranchi. It is false to say that he had kept another lady and he is in habit of playing gambling and consuming wine, so his wife does not want to live with him. 30. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the learned Principal Family Judge had framed issues for proper determination of the lis, and after due appreciation of the evidence had negated the claim of the wife/appellant and observed that the plaintiff /wife has totally failed to prove and establish the allegation of cruelty and desertion on the part of husband for dissolution of marriage. 31. Herein, the learned counsel for the appellant/wife has argued that the evidence of desertion and cruelty has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 32. While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondent that the judgment is well considered one and the learned family court has rightly come to the conclusion by denying the decree of suit of divorce in favour of petitioner-wife and accordingly, dismissed the suit which requires no interference by this Court. 33. From the pleadings available on record and the arguments advanced on behalf of parties, the issue which requires consideration is as to: “Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned family court denying the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and/or on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) requires interference?” 34. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr.
This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [ (2001) 1 SCC 501 ] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1966 Cal 31 ] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341 ] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” Issue of cruelty 35. So far the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it requires to refer herein the definition of “cruelty’ as has been defined by Hon?ble Apex in the judgment rendered in Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [ (1975) 2 SCC 326 ], wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. 36. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [ (1988) 1 SCC 105 ], wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 37. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse.
The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 37. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.” 38. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty that it is important for the Court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.” 39. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337 , the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon’ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”. 40. In Vijay kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself. 41. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which issustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouseso miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc.
The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce. 42. It requires to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction has been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into merit of the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to discuss the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. 43. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub- ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are described in the explanation to section 7(1). 44. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section 19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments. 45. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal can examine every question of law and fact which arises in the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment under question. In "Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being quoted as under: “It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as the first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit.
It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence--oral as well as documentary--and can come to its own conclusion.” 46. Now coming to the merit of the instant appeal. As per evidence of petitioner it appears that admittedly petitioner and respondent are legally wedded wife and husband whose marriage was solemnized on 25.06.2011 and after wedding they starting living as wife and husband and out of their wedlock one daughter was born. 47. It is alleged that defendant-husband, the respondent herein, was addicted to liquor and playing gamble and under influence of liquor he used to torture the appellant regularly. The defendant-husband, the respondent herein has extra-marital relation with another girl. On several occasions, the defendant-husband, the respondent herein assaulted her with belt, shoes and abused the plaintiff without any rhyme and reason. Therefore, the appellant lodged Lohardaga Mahila P.S. case no.-37/2021 regarding demand of dowry and torturing by the defendant-husband, the respondent herein. 48. It is further alleged that the respondent is very offensive in the nature and does not respect her as a wife and always used to assault and abuse her. Even one occasion, the respondent-husband assaulted by entering key of scooty in the arm of his wife due to which she received grievous injury and hasto be admitted in the hospital. The defendant-husband, the respondent herein also used to assault the appellants with fist and slaps and compelled her to return her matrimonial home on 02.12.2018 and since then she is living in her maike. 49. The averment of appellant has been denied by the respondent. It has been stated that the wife has willfully deserted the defendant/ respondent and she has never subjected to any cruelty by defendant/ respondent. He however in order to save the marriage has filed suit for restitution of conjugal right, which was dismissed for default. But admittedly before neither the case number of said suit or any document in that regard was produced. 50. The statement of the wife would show that many allegations of cruelty arose because of the excessive drinking habits of the husband. It is alleged that after consumption of the liquor in intoxicated state, the husband used to abuse and assault the wife.
50. The statement of the wife would show that many allegations of cruelty arose because of the excessive drinking habits of the husband. It is alleged that after consumption of the liquor in intoxicated state, the husband used to abuse and assault the wife. Furthermore, there is allegation of husband having extra-marital relationship with another lady. 51. It is a case where cruelty in both counts i.e., physical and mental has alleged to be meted out to the appellant-wife. So far physical cruelty is concerned, it is alleged that after taking liquor the respondent-husband used to beat her wife(appellant herein) with belt, and even one she was admitted in hospital when her husband entered the key of scooty in her body. So the fact of physical cruelty cannot be denied. The incident of torture has been substantiated from the fact that for the torture which has been meted out the appellant-wife, she lodged Lohardaga Mahila P.S. case no.-37/2021 regarding demand of dowry and torturing. 52. But the learned family court merely because in cross-examination the plaintiff-appellant failed to say that exact dates on which she was subjected to such physical assault has dismissed suitdisbelieving the version of the appellant-wife regarding the issue of physical cruelty, which cannot be said to be good reasoning to disbelieve the statement of appellant-which who in her testimony has remain consistent about such statement and other witnesses has also supported her version. Furthermore, her statement remains in-tact in cross-examination done by the respondent-husband. 53. Furthermore, there is allegation that the respondent-husband is having extra-marital relation with another girl, which fact has been supported by the testimonies of all the witnesses produced on behalf of appellant-wife and even her testimony remained in-tact during cross-examination. Though these allegations have been denied by the respondent-husband but he failed to show any reason why the appellant-wife has made such allegation, which is said to be false by the respondent-husband. 54. These aspects of the matter have not been properly considered by the learned family Court and simply came to the conclusion that no cruelty has been meted out to the plaintiff-wife, which our considered view is erroneous finding arrived at by the learned family court for the reasons as discussed hereinabove. Issue of Desertion 55.
54. These aspects of the matter have not been properly considered by the learned family Court and simply came to the conclusion that no cruelty has been meted out to the plaintiff-wife, which our considered view is erroneous finding arrived at by the learned family court for the reasons as discussed hereinabove. Issue of Desertion 55. This Court has now gone into the issue of desertion in the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect, which is also taken as a ground for decree of divorce. 56. The word ‘desertion’ has been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. 57. It is pertinent to note that the word ‘desertion’, as has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. 58. Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms: “Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.” 59. The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words: “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage.
241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words: “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. 60. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, “the home?. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. 61. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. 62. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a continuing offence. 63. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from willful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. 64. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid. 65.
64. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid. 65. The Hon'ble Apex Court in DebanandaTamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of „desertion? on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. 66. The law consistently has been laid down by this Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be “animus deserendi” on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. 67. In order to come to the conclusion as to whether it is the respondent-husband who deserted or forced to desert the appellant-wife.This Court has again delved into the testimonies of the parties. 68. It is admitted fact that marriage was solemnized on 25.06.2011 and out of their wedlock one daughter borne. It is the case of the appellant that immediately after the marriage, her husband used to beat by belt, and torture physically as also mentally. 69. It is further alleged that he used to take liquor on regular basis and further the respondent-husband has some illicit relation with another girl. For such misconduct, the appellant-wife has lodged case before Mahila Police. Submission has been made that for the reasons aforesaid the wife, the appellant herein, was forced to leave the matrimonial house on 02.12.2018 and since then she is living in her maika. Therefore, argument has been advanced that there is sufficient period of desertion between the parties, so as to grant the decree of divorce but the learned family court did not consider this aspect of the matter. 70.
Therefore, argument has been advanced that there is sufficient period of desertion between the parties, so as to grant the decree of divorce but the learned family court did not consider this aspect of the matter. 70. The respondent-husband though has denied the allegation leveled against him. 71. We on perusal of the record found that due to cruelty meted out to the appellant-wife, finding of which we have arrived at earlier paragraphs, the appellant-wife was forced to leave her matrimonial house. Furthermore, for such act of the respondent-husband, the appellant-wife was forced to leave her matrimonial house, as for a wife, whose husband has extra-marital relationship and who used to beat his wife in the state of intoxication, it is not possible to live with such type of person, as such the wife, the appellant herein has been forced to leave the matrimonial House. 72. However, an attempt was made by the respondent-husband by filing suit for restitution of conjugal right in year 2021 but the same was dismissed for default but neither the case number of said suit nor any document in that regard has been produced by the respondent. Even if it is accepted that the suit for conjugal right was dismissed for default but from the pleadings available on record it did not transpire that the respondent- husband has taken step for restoration of that suit allegedly filed for restitution for conjugal right, rather, as per submission advanced on behalf of appellant, it appears that the same would have been filed as to tool to save his skin from the case filed for demand of dowry and torturing being Lohardaga Mahila P.S. case no.-37/2021. 73. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that it is the respondent-husband who forced the appellant-wife to leave the matrimonial house in the year 2018 though the suit has been in the year 2021. Therefore, on the ground of desertion also the appellant-wife has been able to establish her case. 74. This Court after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect along with the legal position and adverting to the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment and decree has found there from that the issue of element of cruelty and desertion by the appellant-wife has not been properly considered by the learned Family Judge. 75.
74. This Court after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect along with the legal position and adverting to the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment and decree has found there from that the issue of element of cruelty and desertion by the appellant-wife has not been properly considered by the learned Family Judge. 75. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Judge is coming under the fold of the perversity, since, the conscious consideration has not been made of the evidences, as would be evident from the impugned judgment. 76. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Lohardaga in Original Suit No. 15 of 2023 is hereby quashed and set aside. 77. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. 78. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.