2025:HHC:26661-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.6420 of 2021 Decided on: 7th August, 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vijay Kumar Guleria …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another .....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner: Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sohail Khan, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. Y.P.S. Dhaulta and Mr. L.N. Sharma, Additional Advocates General. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge On culmination of disciplinary proceedings, petitioner was visited with penalty of dismissal from service. He assailed the punishment order as well as different stages of the disciplinary proceedings. Learned Tribunal disposed of the petition by holding that order passed by the Appellate Authority was non-speaking. The Appellate Authority was directed to pass a speaking order. The Appellate Authority passed a speaking order and reaffirmed 1Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:26661-DB respondents’ decision to dismiss the petitioner. Petitioner feels aggrieved, therefore, this second petition. 2. The case 2(i). Petitioner was serving as Lecturer (Political Science) in the respondent-Education Department. While he was posted at GSSS Nabahi, District Mandi, FIR No.262 was registered against him under Sections 354, 509 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Sarkaghat, District Mandi on 28.11.2011. The FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by ‘A’- a girl student studying in 10+2 class in the said school, leveling the allegations of sexual harassment against the petitioner. 2(ii). Respondents issued memorandum against the petitioner on 21.02.2012 under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (in short ‘CCS (CCA) Rules’) for imposition of major penalty upon him. The memorandum contained following article of charge:- “Article-I That the said Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria, Lecturer in Political Science, GSSS Nabahi, Distt. Mandi, H.P. presently posted at GSSS Kungrat, Distt. Una, H.P. while working in GSSS Nabahi, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during the year 2011 has sexually harassed one ‘A’, student of 10+2 arts class, which is very unbecoming on the part of the said Lecturer being a Govt. servant and hence tantamount to misconduct, misbehavior and violation of Rule 3(1) i, ii & iii of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 3 2025:HHC:26661-DB 1964 and Rule 8.2.2 of H.P. Education Code in particular.” 2(iii). The memorandum was accompanied by following statement of imputation of misconduct/ misbehavior:- “Statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of the articles of charge framed against Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria, Lecturer in Political Science, GSSS Nabahi, Distt. Mandi, H.P. Presently posted at GSSS Kungrat, H.P. Article-I That the said Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria, Lecturer in Political Science, GSSS Nabahi, Distt. Mandi, H.P. presently posted at GSSS Kungrat, Distt. Una. H.P., while working in GSSS Nabahi, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during the year 2011 has harassed one ‘A’, student of 10+2 Arts class sexually and verbally and the matter also appeared in a section of press. On dated 24-11-2011 the Principal of the school was on casual leave and Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria being senior most lecturer was looking after the school affairs. On that day he called ‘A’ through Smt. Durge Devi, Peon from 10+2 Economics class. When ‘A’ came into the room, the said Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria, Lecturer in Political Science passed some derogatory remarks that “मœ तुʉŐ हर रोज बुलाता रहता šं तुम Ɛों नहीं आती हो | मœ तुमसे बŠत Ǜादा ɗार करता šं और कयामत तक करता रšंगा।“ The said Lecturer also tried to give a packet of mendhi and love letter to the girl student. Being a teacher the said Lecturer was supposed to be an ideal for the students and the teachers are the role model for the students as they are considered as builder of the nation. But the said Lecturer has tarnished the image of the Department in the eyes of the general public and brought a bad name to the institution, which is very unbecoming on the part of the said Lecturer being a Govt. servant and hence tantamount to misconduct, misbehaviour and violation of Rule 3(1) i, ii & iii of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 8.2.2 of H.P. Education Code in particular.” 4 2025:HHC:26661-DB 2(iv). Petitioner’s reply to the above memorandum of charges submitted on 28.02.2012 was only to the effect that charges framed against him were false; Matter is pending with the police authorities as FIR has been lodged against him. Petitioner requested that till the decision of the criminal trial, inquiry be not conducted. 2(v). Respondents appointed Inquiry Officer as well as Presenting Officer. Petitioner duly participated in the inquiry proceedings. On culmination of inquiry proceedings, the Inquiry Officer furnished his report on 26.03.2013, holding that charge against the petitioner had been proved. On 26.04.2013, the respondents issued notice to the petitioner calling for his representation against the inquiry report while proposing to impose major penalty upon him under Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Petitioner represented against the inquiry report and the proposal of the respondents to impose major penalty upon him. 2(vi). Petitioner’s representation was considered by the disciplinary authority. It was not found satisfactory. The disciplinary authority on 11.07.2013 (Annexure P-7), imposed major penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner. Appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 10.09.2014 (Annexure P-10). 5 2025:HHC:26661-DB 2(vii). Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner instituted T.A. No.1325 of 2015 before the erstwhile learned H.P. Administrative Tribunal on the grounds that charge against him had not been established; Inquiry Officer had committed illegality in conducting the proceedings; There was infraction of Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965; and that the penalty was extremely harsh & disproportionate. Learned Tribunal on 11.01.2018, quashed the order passed by the Appellate Authority on 10.09.2014 being non-speaking. Matter was remitted to the Appellate Authority with direction to consider it afresh by passing an appropriate order within the timelines indicated therein. 2(viii). Pursuant thereto, the Appellate Authority reconsidered the matter and confirmed the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner once again under order dated 31.07.2018 (Annexure P-12). The petitioner in the above background, has instituted this writ petition, seeking quashing of charge- sheet, inquiry proceedings, inquiry report, penalty order and rejection of his appeal under order dated 31.07.2018. Further prayer has been made for his reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. 6 2025:HHC:26661-DB 3. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General. To avoid repetition, the submissions urged for the petitioner & the respondent-State and discussion thereupon are being elaborated hereinafter. 4. Consideration:- 4(i). The first contention raised for the petitioner is that the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer were not conclusive, it cannot be said that charge against the petitioner had been proved. I am not in agreement with the aforesaid contention of the petitioner. This is for the following reasons:- 4(i)(a). The charge against the petitioner was that while working as Lecturer (Political Science) at GSSS Nabahi, District Mandi, he had sexually harassed ‘A’, a girl student of 10+2; Petitioner’s act and conduct was unbecoming of a government servant, tantamounting to misconduct, misbehavior and violative of Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 8.2.2 of H.P. Education Code in particular. 4(i)(b). During the course of inquiry, 11 prosecution witnesses and 03 defense witnesses were examined. 7 2025:HHC:26661-DB Statement of ‘A’ was also recorded. The inquiry report also records that petitioner had denied asking any Peon to call ‘A’ to the office of the Principal. That he never sat in the office of the Principal on the day in question. He had denied happening of the incident altogether as alleged by ‘A’. Rather, he cast aspersions on conduct of ‘A’. Statement of Smt. Durgi Devi, the Peon, who had summoned ‘A’ at the instance of the petitioner to Principal’s office, was also recorded. Smt. Durgi Devi corroborated the statement of ‘A’ that the petitioner had called ‘A’ to the office of Principal and at petitioner’s direction, Smt. Durgi Devi had entered ‘A’s classroom and directed her to go to Principal’s office on the day in question, whereafter ‘A’ went to the office of Principal. The Inquiry Officer had also taken into cognizance the statement of one Sh. Pratap Chand, posted as Lecturer (Hindi) in the said school, inter alia, to the effect that petitioner was sitting in the office of the Principal on the day in question. ‘A’ had also reported the incident to Smt. Urmila Devi-posted as Lecturer (Economics) in the school. It would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the analysis and assessment of evidence drawn by the Inquiry Officer:- 8 2025:HHC:26661-DB “1. The statement of ‘A’ that Sh. Vijay Guleria called her through Smt. Durgi Devi to the Principal's Office was confirmed by the statement of Smt. Durgi Devi (SW-2) who stated that Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria had called her to the office of the principal and asked her to call ‘A’ student of 10+2. She went to the class room and called ‘A’ who came and entered the Principal's room. At the same time on hearing the bell from the supdt. office she went to the supdt office. 2. For other part of the statement of ‘A’ that when she came into the room Sh. Vijay Guleria passed derogatory remarks, she could not provide any evidence. Smt. Anita Kumari the then DPE GSSS Nabahi (SW-8) stated that Sh. Vijay Guleria used to sit in the shed, Sh. Pravinder Kumar the then Lecturer in Chemistry GSSS Nabahi (SW-9) stated that on 24-11-2011 when his period was vacant. Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria was sitting in the shed and mostly used to sit in the shed. Sh. Sushil Kumar PET GMS Batsala/GSSS Nabahi (SW-11). Sh. Prem Bhardwaj Lecturer in Biology GSSS Nabahi (Dw-I) stated that Sh. Vijay Guleria used to sit in the shed, Smt. Usha Rani the then Craft Teacher GSSS Nabahi (DW-II) stated that Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria mostly used to sit in the shed. None of the above mention witnesses have categorically stated that on 24th Nov. 2011 Sh. Vijay Guleria did not went to Principal's office during the school hours i.e. from 9.00 AM 10 3.00 PM. Moreover these witnesses cannot watch any body continuously from 9.00 AM to 3.00 PM as they have to go to teach the students in their class rooms. As stated by Sh. Vijay Guleria that ‘A’ and Smt. Durgi Devi could not tell the time when they were called to the office on 24th Nov. 2011 but it is quite clear from the statements of ‘A’ and Smt. Durgi Devi that they were called during the school hours i.e. from 9.00 AM to 3.00 PM. Also Sh. Partap Chand Lecturer in Hindi GSSS Nabahi (SW-10) stated that on dated 28th Nov. 2011 he came to know about the incident that look place on 28th Nov. 2011 while Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria was sitting in the Office of the Principal contradicts the statement that Sh. Vijay Guleria never sit in the Principal's office in the absence of the Principal. 9 2025:HHC:26661-DB 3. Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria stated that he had not given any letter or packet of mehandi to ‘A’. ‘A’ (SW-3) had stated that on 26th Nov. 2011 her school bag was in the class room while she was attending her English Lecturer along with other class fellows in another class room in the 1st period. She further stated that when she came back to her class, she found a packet of mehandi and letter in her school bag whose written matter resembled with the handwriting of Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria. She stated that she had not told about the love letter and packet of mahendi to the teachers as well to the principal. 5. Sh. Vijay Guleria stated that on 28th Nov. 2011 as he left school during Morning Assembly he was attacked by Sh. Yaswant, Sunny, Ajay and nephew of Sh. Yaswant and was beaten by the aforesaid persons outside and later inside the school campus, against which he had lodged an FIR in Police Station at Sarkaghat. Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria stated that he did not had any conversation with Sh. Yaswant Singh, Sh. Sunny, Sh. Ajay and other person involved in the incident that took place on 28th Nov. 2011 though he met Sunny in his shop near the school who according to him used to sell intoxicated material to the student and advised him not to provide intoxicants to the students. Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria stated that perhaps he was beaten due to the reason that ‘A’ was directed by him as well as by the Principal to bring her parent to the school as her behavior and conduct was not good. The above mentioned statement of Sh. Vijay Guleria are proved to be false and misleading as is evident from the information received from the Office of the Principal GSSS Nabahi vide office letter No. EDN- GSSS(N)/Misc/2012-2020 that no complaint regarding the conduct of ‘A’ was received by his office and no complaint regarding the use/supply of drugs or intoxicants material by any shopkeeper of the Nabahi Bazaar was received by the Office of the Principal through Discipline Committee/SMC/Local Resident/ Panchayat Pradhan of Nabahi. Also Sh. Pratap Chand who had taught ‘A’ for two years in Classes 11th & 12th stated that the conduct and behavior ‘A’ was good. Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria could not give satisfactory answer to the reason that why he was 10 2025:HHC:26661-DB beaten by Sh. Yaswant, Sunny, Ajay, nephew of Sh. Yaswant and local residents. As was stated by Sh. Sunny S/o Sh. Amar Nath (SW-4) that on 28th Nov 2011 when Sh. Yashwant Singh the father of ‘A’ along with Sh. Prem Pal GP Pradhan, were going to GSSS Nabahi to meet the Principal, Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria met them on the way near Yashwant Singh's home and fell on his feet and apologized. When the letter was shown to Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria he snatched and chewed the letter and was taken out from his mouth forcefully later on he ran away and then caught by the local public in Nabahi Bazaar. This statement is supported by the written statement given by Sh. Yashwant Singh (SW-6).” The findings of the Inquiry Officer are as under:- “1. No documentary evidence was found regarding the incident that took place during parliamentary activities from 19th November to 24th November 2011. But ‘A’ reported the incident verbally to Smt. Urmila Devi Lecturer in Economics on 19th November, 2011. But the matter was not taken up with The Principal by Smt. Urmila Devi. Instead she advised ‘A’ to report the matter with Principal through her parents. 2. It is evident that ‘A’ was called to the Office of the Principal by Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria through Smt. Durgi Devi (peon) on 24th Nov. 2011 during school hours i.e. 9 A.M. to 3 P.M. 3. There was no documentary proof that packet of mehandi and letter were put in ‘A’s school bag by Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria. 4. It is evident that ‘A’ brought the matter to the notice of Sh. Sunny and her parents on 26th November, 2011. 5. The past conduct and behavior of Sh. Vijay Kumar Guleria and ‘A’ was found good but the conduct and behavior of Sh. Vijay Kumar Gularia found to be suspicious during the period of incidents stated by ‘A’. 6. It is evident that Sh. Vijay Kumar Gularia was beaten up outside the school campus by the local people on 28th November, 2011 and was brought by them to the school campus around 9.30 A.M. on the same day. 7. The statements of Sh. Vijay Kumar Gularia regarding the reasons for being beaten up by the local people were found false and baseless. 8. It is evident that Sh. Vijay Kumar Gularia showed negligence towards his duty on 28th November, 2011 11 2025:HHC:26661-DB assigned to him by the principal and remained absent from the school campus for around half an hour. 9. The purpose for which ‘A’ was called to the Principal office by Sh. Vijay Kumar Gularia seems to be closely linked with the sequence of events that happened with ‘A’ and the incident that took place on 28th November, 2011 as is evident from the statements of ‘A’, Sh. Sunny, Sh. Yashwant Singh the father of ‘A’, Sh. Prem Pal GP Pradhan Nabahi, Sh. Mehar Chand Joshi resident Nabahi Sh. Jai Ram (Lambardar) and Sh. Vinod Kumar (Ex-Pradhan Nabahi). On the basis of documentary and oral evidence adduced in the case before me and in view of the reason given above, I hold that the charge tantamount to misconduct, misbehavior and violence of Rule 3(1) i, ii, iii of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 8.2.2 (i) of H.P. Education Code in particular against Shri Vijay Kumar Guleria Lecturer in Pol. Science GSSS Gaddidhar, Distt. Mandi (H.P.) has been proved.” 4(i)(c). In view of the nature of allegations leveled by the complainant, the circumstantial evidence was justly analyzed by the Inquiry Officer to hold that charge against the petitioner had been proved. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to Indian Oil Corporation and others Versus Ajit Kumar Singh and another2, wherein well- established principles were reiterated that power of judicial review of the Constitutional Courts is restricted to evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction of 2 (2023) 19 SCC 102 12 2025:HHC:26661-DB judicial review under Article 226 would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental inquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity, i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. Scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. Relevant portion from the decision is as under:- “10. The facts of the case leading to the issuance of charge- sheet, initiation of departmental inquiry, the report of the inquiry officer and the punishment inflicted upon Respondent 1 have already been narrated in the preceding paragraphs. It is not in dispute that during the course of inquiry, fair opportunity of hearing was afforded to Respondent 1 at every stage. This was even found by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition challenging the punishment inflicted upon him. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court shows that matter was dealt with in a manner as if it was the first stage of the case, namely, the inquiry was being conducted and inquiry report was being prepared, which is not the scope in judicial review. 11. The views expressed by this Court on the scope of judicial review in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava3, are extracted below: “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is evaluation of the 3 (2021) 2 SCC 612 13 2025:HHC:26661-DB decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25-27 xx xx xx 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” (emphasis supplied) Similar view was expressed in the later judgment of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India4. In exercise of power of judicial review, the evidence led during inquiry is not to be re-appreciated by 4 (2023) 11 SCC 159 14 2025:HHC:26661-DB the Constitutional Court as if it’s a Court of appeal. Petitioner has not leveled allegations of malafides. It was not a case of no evidence. The Inquiry Officer justly analyzed the evidence and based upon just & bonafide evaluation, formed his view that charge was proved against the petitioner. The point is accordingly answered against the petitioner. 4(ii). Petitioner’s second contention is that inquiry conducted against the petitioner is vitiated as Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 had not been complied with. The said Rule reads as under:- “14. Procedure for imposing major penalties 14(18) The Inquiring Authority may, after the Government servant closes his case, and shall, if the Government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.” The precise argument raised for the petitioner is that the prosecution had completed its entire evidence on 15.12.2012. In accordance with Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the Inquiry Officer was to give an opportunity to the delinquent official-petitioner to lead defense evidence. It was only after the completion of defense evidence that the petitioner could have been asked to make statement in case 15 2025:HHC:26661-DB he had not examined himself. The petitioner in that situation could have been questioned by the Inquiry Officer for the purpose of enabling him (delinquent official) to explain any circumstances that appeared in the evidence against him. In the instant case, petitioner had cited three defense witnesses. They were required to be examined first, however, the Inquiry Officer examined the petitioner on 15.12.2012, i.e. the day when the prosecution completed its evidence. The statements of defense witnesses were recorded on 29.12.2012. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner urges that this breach in the procedure prescribed under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules vitiates the inquiry proceedings. Reliance in support of this submission has been placed upon Ministry of Finance and another Versus S.B. Ramesh5 and Moni Shankar Versus Union of India and another6. In my considered view, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that inquiry proceedings suffered from any illegality:- 4(ii)(a). The mandate of Rule 14(18) is only to ensure that the delinquent official is given an opportunity to explain any circumstance that appears in the evidence 5 (1998) 3 SCC 227 6 (2008) 3 SCC 484 16 2025:HHC:26661-DB against him. In case he doesn’t examine himself, the Inquiry Officer can also question him on the incriminating evidence that appeared against him in the inquiry. Though ideally in terms of Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, that opportunity should be given to the delinquent official after he closes his defense. In the instant case, statement of delinquent official (petitioner) was recorded before he examined his witnesses, but nonetheless after the examination of prosecution witnesses. Whatever incriminating material had to come against the petitioner, was available in light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses. It is not as if the delinquent official (petitioner) objected to recording of his statement before examination of his witnesses. No prejudice has been demonstrated to have been caused to the petitioner merely for the reason that his statement was recorded prior to recording of statement of his witnesses. The delinquent official did not examine himself thereafter. There is no such request on his part after the closure of his defense. Therefore, the plea that inquiry proceedings are vitiated only for the reason that delinquent official was examined by the Inquiry Officer prior to recording of statements of his witnesses cannot be countenanced. Mere change in order of 17 2025:HHC:26661-DB examination of witnesses will not vitiate the inquiry proceedings in absence of demonstration of any prejudice caused to the petitioner. 4(ii)(b). In S.B. Ramesh5 and Moni Shankar6, there was violation of Rule 14(16) & (18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules as the delinquent official was not afforded opportunity to lead evidence after closure of the evidence of the presenting side. Ratio of these decisions does not govern the fact situation of the present case where delinquent official was given an opportunity to respond to incriminating material presented against him by the prosecution. This point is also answered against the petitioner. 4(iii). It was further urged that the penalty order passed by the disciplinary authority is not in conformity with Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. That the disciplinary authority was required to issue notices to the petitioner at two stages. Firstly, while forwarding the inquiry report seeking comments from the petitioner & his representation against the inquiry report, if any and secondly, at the stage of imposition of penalty. This contention is also not justified. Notice was admittedly issued by the disciplinary authority to the 18 2025:HHC:26661-DB petitioner on 26.04.2013 giving him an opportunity to represent against the inquiry report. The notice clearly states that ‘matter has been inquired into…….. During inquiry, the charge stands proved against the petitioner……. Now, therefore, it is proposed to impose major penalty under Rule 11(ix) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 upon the petitioner……… The petitioner is given an opportunity to make representation as he may wish to make against the proposal to take action against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965’. The petitioner also comprehended the memorandum in its letter & intent and furnished his representation against the proposed action of the respondents. The contention urged for the petitioner that a second notice was required to be issued to the petitioner under Rule 15 for imposition of penalty cannot be accepted in view of clear provision of Rule 15(6), which states that it shall not be necessary to give the government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. The Rule reads as under:- “15(6) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed.” 19 2025:HHC:26661-DB It needs to be stated here that though mention of proposed penalty in the notice issued to the delinquent official inviting his representation against inquiry report, has been deprecated in several authoritative pronouncements of Hon’ble Apex Court and of this Court, however, in the given facts, keeping in view present to be the second round of litigation, this aspect is not being dwelled upon. This point was neither taken by the petitioner in his representation (Annexure P-8) nor before the learned Tribunal in his first round of litigation. This has also not been raised in the instant petition. The point was not urged during hearing as well. Further, this point is not required to be pondered over now since the petitioner, if felt aggrieved against this, ought to have raised it specifically, during his first round of litigation. The point relatable to violation of Rule 15 as urged during first round of litigation was that the orders passed by the disciplinary and the Appellate Authority were non-speaking, hence, in violation of Rule 15. The first round of litigation ended with learned Tribunal directing the Appellate Authority to pass a speaking order on the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Petitioner had not raised this issue (penalty being mentioned in the notice issued to him) in his appeal. The 20 2025:HHC:26661-DB point relatable to violation of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 urged during hearing of this case was that two notices should have been issued. This has been answered against the petitioner. 4(iv). Lastly, plea of penalty of dismissal being disproportionate to the charge proved against the petitioner has been raised. It has been urged for the petitioner that:- During the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner, ‘A’ and her parents entered into a compromise for withdrawing the FIR. Affidavits were sworn in to this an effect by ‘A’ that she had no objection for withdrawal of the FIR. That the allegations leveled by her were on account of some confusion; To the similar effect, an affidavit was sworn in by her father; Vide order dated 07.03.2015, learned Trial Court allowed the application under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code for withdrawing the case against the petitioner. Petitioner was acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 354, 509, 506 and 201 IPC. It has further been urged that in view of the compromise effected between the parties, the Director Higher Education, Himachal Pradesh had taken a decision on 31.03.2015 at Note No.120 (page 122 of the paper book) to reinstate the petitioner with 21 2025:HHC:26661-DB immediate effect though this was not given effect to. The punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner under these circumstances, is highly disproportionate. Learned Senior Counsel urged that in case the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer, as affirmed by the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority, are not intended to be interfered with, then, keeping in view 22 years of service rendered by the petitioner, the penalty of dismissal ought to be substituted by compulsory retirement. Learned Additional Advocate General opposed the plea and defended the penalty imposed upon the petitioner as commensurate to the charge established against him. Responding to N-120 (page 122 of the paper-book), learned Additional Advocate General submitted that said was a spur of moment decision taken solely based upon closure of the FIR. Later, facts and legal position were comprehended not only by the Director Higher Education, but by all other concerned including the higher authorities, deciding against the petitioner. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the decision rendered in The State of Himachal Pradesh & Others Versus Hoshiar Singh7, wherein, a teacher was accused of molesting a minor girl student, but later a 7 CWP No.2944 of 2018, decided by the Division Bench on 12.01.2024 22 2025:HHC:26661-DB compromise was effected between the two. State’s appeal was allowed against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition and pension paid to the respondent was ordered to be recovered from him. Relevant paras of the decision read as under:- “The respondent, while working as TGT(A) in Government Senior Secondary School, Bathu Tipri, District Kangra, was served a Charge-Sheet under Rule 14 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, on charges of molesting a minor girl student on 03.02.2001, who was studying in 7th standard. 20) In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra8, the Supreme court held: “28. … In a case involving charge of sexual harassment or attempt to sexually molest, the courts are required to examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by insignificant discrepancies or narrow technicalities or the dictionary meaning of the expression “molestation”. They must examine the entire material to determine the genuineness of the complaint. The statement of the victim must be appreciated in the background of the entire case. Where the evidence of the victim inspires confidence, as is the position in the instant case, the courts are obliged to rely on it. Such cases are required to be dealt with great sensitivity. Sympathy in such cases in favour of the superior officer is wholly misplaced and mercy has no relevance. ..” 21) The Administrative Tribunal in the impugned order ought to have looked at the matter in this perspective and applied common sense and come to a reasonable conclusion instead of taking a perverse view that there is no specific finding of grave misconduct against the respondent. 22) Counsel for the respondent sought to contend that the evidence in the inquiry did not prove the charge against the respondent. 23) In our opinion, the Inquiry Officer, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, found the respondent guilty of the misconduct, and if the respondent had any grievance about the said finding after receipt of the inquiry report on 14.05.2010, he ought to have filed a reply thereto questioning the findings, but in spite of being granted time of one month to file such a reply on 17.05.2010, he did not choose to file any reply. It is not open to the respondent to raise such a plea 8 (1999) 1 SCC 759 23 2025:HHC:26661-DB in this Writ petition filed by the petitioners/State challenging the order of the Tribunal. 26) Both these contentions are devoid of merit in view of the proceeding Annexure P-1 dt. 28.12.2010 issued by the Director of Elementary Education, Himachal Pradesh to the Principal Secretary (Education) filed in this Writ petition. The said proceeding indicates that the Director accepted the findings of the inquiry report, having been made on the basis of documentary evidence adduced, and had clearly opined that conduct of the respondent had led to putting a blot on the sacred relationship between the teacher and the taught, so much so, that the aggrieved girl had to quit her studies forever. He noted that teacher, i.e. respondent, had managed to escape himself from the clutches of law after entering into compromise with the parents of minor girl and ultimately, the innocent minor girl was the worst sufferer, who had to quit her studies forever. 30) In this view of the matter, the Writ petition is allowed; the order dt. 20.07.2017 in T.A. no.3938 of 2015 passed by the erstwhile H.P. Administrative Tribunal, is set-aside; and the order dt. 18.07.2011 passed by the petitioners/State, is sustained. Recovery be effected from the respondent of the amount which he had received as pension till date.” In Union of India and others Versus Ex. Constable Ram Karan9, Hon’ble Apex Court held that discretion vests with disciplinary authority to impose punishment commensurate with nature of offence proved which cannot be usurped by Court. The authorities being fact finding have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. The High Court while exercising power of judicial review cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It is only when the penalty imposed appears 9 (2022) 1 SCC 373 24 2025:HHC:26661-DB to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon and in appropriate case may suitably mould the relief either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation, it may itself in exceptional and rare cases impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons. It was held as under:- “24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons. 25. The principles have been culled out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others10 wherein it was observed as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High 10 (1995) 6 SCC 749 25 2025:HHC:26661-DB Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh11 as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 11 (2013) 12 SCC 372 26 2025:HHC:26661-DB 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 27. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the High Court, in our considered view, fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could lawfully be imposed by the departmental authorities for his proven misconduct. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and the interference made by the High Court is in a cavalier manner while recording the finding of penalty to be disproportionate without taking into consideration the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the respondent which is unpardonable and not sustainable in law. 28. Before we may conclude, we would like to observe that the employees who are in civil services, their disciplinary matters are being governed by their respective services (classification, control and appeal) rules and for the sake of instance, we take note of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter being referred to as the “Rules 1965”). The nature of penalties has been provided under Part V and removal and dismissal from service are in the category of “Major penalties”. If the misconduct is found proved, looking into the gravity and the nature of misconduct, either of the punishment, i.e., removal or dismissal from service, could be inflicted upon the civil servant after holding disciplinary enquiry 27 2025:HHC:26661-DB for imposing major penalties if held guilty as provided under Part IV of the Rules 1965 and this what being ordinarily understood.” The petitioner was serving as Teacher. Relationship between the teacher and student is pious relationship. Merely because the complainant had agreed & furnished an affidavit for not pressing the charges against the petitioner and on the said premise, criminal trial was closed, would not advance the case of the petitioner in the disciplinary proceedings to urge that penalty of dismissal imposed against him was disproportionate. It is well settled that criminal proceedings stand on a different footing than the disciplinary proceedings. Even acquittal in the criminal case would not ipso-facto govern the fate of the disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings were conducted against the petitioner. The charge leveled against the petitioner was duly proved in the inquiry proceedings. There is no infraction of any procedure in the inquiry proceedings. Inquiry proceedings are not even alleged to be vitiated by any mala fide or suffering from violation of principles of natural justice. The misconduct proved on part of the petitioner is serious. The Inquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of sexually harassing ‘A’-a girl student of 28 2025:HHC:26661-DB the school where he was teaching. Act of sexually harassing a student by her teacher is a grave misconduct. Petitioner’s acts put a blot on the sacred relationship between the teacher and the taught. The penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the given facts does not warrant any interference. 5. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in the instant petition. The same is accordingly dismissed alongwith pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. Jyotsna Rewal Dua August 07, 2025 Judge Mukesh