-1- 2025:CGHC:11090 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 10 of 2021 1 - Ghuraulal S/o Late Sukhuram Nayak Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Kargamar, Pavra, Bango, Katghora, District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Leela Bai W/o Ghuraulal Nayak Aged About 46 Years R/o Village Kargamar, Pavra, Bango, Katghora, District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - (A). Ramkumar Kashyap S/o Jeevanlal Kashyap R/o Village Jarhagaon, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 1.1 - (B). Smt. Rajani Kashyap W/o Ram Kumar Kashyap R/o Village Jarhagaon, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Ramadhar Dewangan S/o Late Dhaniram Dewangan R/o Holika Chowk, Dewanganpara, Takhatpur, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Reliance General Insurance Company Through Branch Manager, Office At Jai Stambh Chowk, Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate For Respondent No. 2 : Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap, Advocate Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 06.03.2025 1) Heard on admission. 2) With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 3) The appellants/claimants have filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motors Vehicles Act against the award passed in Claim Case No. 384/2017, by the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, wherein, the claim case was partly allowed and the liability was fastened with the respondents to make payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 2.90 lakhs with interest @ 8 % per annum. 4) The claimants filed a claim case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on account of the death of Rasal Singh. The claimants are the mother and father of the deceased. On 18.10.2007, while the deceased along with one Devdatta Patel was proceeding to Churi mines to load fly ash, at about 4-5 am, the driver of the Metador bearing registration No. CG-10A-4073 drove it rashly and negligently dashed the truck. The deceased as well as Devdutta Patel sustained grievous injuries, and Rasal Singh succumbed to the injuries. Thereafter, an FIR was lodged and the offence punishable under Section 304 A of the IPC was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle. The claimants pleaded that at the time of the accident, the age of the deceased was 20 years, and he was earning Rs.8,000/- per month. The learned tribunal after appreciation of evidence, awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 2.90 lakh. -3- Though an ex-parte award was passed on 19.11.2009, but this appeal was preferred on 06.01.2021, with a delay of 3973 days. 5) In the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the claimants have pleaded that they were not aware of the proceedings pending before the claims tribunal. They approached their counsel at a belated stage and he advised the claimants to file an appeal. 6) The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would argue that the appellants were not aware of the pending proceedings before the claims tribunal therefore, they could not prefer the appeal within limitation. He would contend that the appellants are laymen having no knowledge of the law of limitation. He would pray to condone the delay. 7) On the other hand, Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the appellants. 8) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 9) A perusal of the application of condonation of delay would show that the appellants have not explained the delay properly. It is stated that on 19.11.2009, the award was passed, and thereafter, they never approached their counsel. Even the date is not mentioned when the appellants approached their counsel, when they obtained the certified copy and when they approached their counsel to file the instant appeal. 10) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy -4- (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 11) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief -5- approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 12) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- -6- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 13) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay -7- merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 14) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 15) In the present case, the appellants were not vigilant. The impugned award was passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba on 19.11.2009, and against the impugned award, the instant appeal was preferred before this Court on 06.01.2021; there is a huge delay i.e. of 3973 days, and the same has not properly been explained by the appellants. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. -8- 16) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the instant appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge NADIM