JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN , J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing the order contained in Memo No. V- 11014 / Pukh / Vivin / Revision-10/2014- 12556 dated 14.11.2014, passed by Director General of Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Eastern Division, Headquarter, Boring Road, Patna; whereby the revision petition dated 23.07.2014, preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed affirming the Appellate order dated 13/09/2013, contained in Memo No. V- 11014/E2/Ad II/Ap1-15/BS/2013-619, passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Patliputra Headquarter, Patna; whereby the appellate authority has modified the order dated 14/05/2013, passed by Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, C.T.P.S. Chandrapura, Bokaro in the following manner "Reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of Const/GD for a period of three years with immediate effect with cumulative effect to that of Reduction of pay by one stage from Rs. 7,830/- GP Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 7,540/- + GP Rs. 2,000/- (in the pay band of PB-I Rs. 5,200-20,200/-+ GP Rs. 2,000/-) for a period of three years. It is further directed that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and on expiry of the period of reduction, it will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay." Initially in a departmental proceeding the petitioner who is a constable in Central Industrial Security Force, CTPS, Chandrapura, Bokaro was imposed major penalty vide order dated 14/05/2013, contained in Memo No. V- 15014/CTPS/Anu/Major-4/13- 1632, passed by Commandant, Central Industrial C.T.P.S., Security Force, Bokaro, Chandrapura in the following manner "Reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of Const/GD for a period of three years with immediate effect. It is further directed that he will earn increment of pay during the period not of reduction and on expiry of the period of reduction, it will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay. The period from 18.02.2013 to 18.03.2013 is treated as suspension only for all purposes". II. Further prayed for direction upon the respondent authorities to pay all the monetary benefits for which the petitioner is legally entitled for. 3. The period from 18.02.2013 to 18.03.2013 is treated as suspension only for all purposes". II. Further prayed for direction upon the respondent authorities to pay all the monetary benefits for which the petitioner is legally entitled for. 3. Briefly stated, as per the pleadings in the writ application is that on 21.02.2013, a Memo of charge against the petitioner was served and a show cause was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause on 27/02/2013 within stipulated time. Thereafter, Mr. B.N.Murmu was appointed as enquiry Officer and he submitted his brief note of Departmental Proceeding on 13/04/2013 and the petitioner submitted his reply to the brief note on 22/04/2013. Thereafter, Inquiry Report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 27.04.2013 under CISF Rules 2003, Rule 36 and the petitioner submitted his written defense regarding the enquiry report on 10.05.2013. On14.05.2013, the Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, C.T.P.S., Chandrapura Bokaro, passed the punishment order in following manner "Reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of Const/GD for a period of three years with immediate effect. It is further directed that he will earn increment of pay during the period not of reduction and on expiry of the period of reduction, it will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay. The period from 18.02.2013 to 18.03.2013 is treated as suspension only for all purposes". Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Eastern Zone HQ, Patliputra on 01.7.2013 and the same was dismissed with modification vide order dated 13.09.2013 contained in Memo No. V-11014/E2/Ad II/Ap1-15/BS/2013-619, passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Industrial Security Force, Patliputra Headquarter, Patna; whereby the appellate authority has modified the order dated 14/05/2013, passed by Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, C.T.P.S. Chandrapura, Bokaro in the following manner "Reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of Const/GD for a period of three years with immediate effect with cumulative effect to that of Reduction of pay by one stage from Rs. 7,830/- GP Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 7,540/- + GP Rs. 2,000/- (in the pay band of PB-I Rs. 5,200-20,200/-+ GP Ras 2,000/-) for a period of three years. 7,830/- GP Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 7,540/- + GP Rs. 2,000/- (in the pay band of PB-I Rs. 5,200-20,200/-+ GP Ras 2,000/-) for a period of three years. It is further directed that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and on expiry of the period of reduction, it will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay." Then the petitioner preferred a Revision before the Director General of Police CISF, East Zone HQ, Boaring Road, Patna against the order dated 13.09.2013 and the same was dismissed vide dated 14/11/2014.Hence, this writ petition. 4. Ms. Nirupama, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the revisional as well as appellate authority had passed the impugned order without scrutinizing the material available on record and they have failed to take into account the reply to the show cause submitted by the petitioner and also the statement of witnesses where it has been categorically stated that the alleged occurrence occurred in a spur of moment and why only petitioner has been made a scapegoat and others were left. 5. Per contra it has been contended by Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned ASGI that there is no procedural error and looking to the charge, the petitioner should have been satisfied by modification of the original order of punishment because he works in a disciplined force. Further, he relied upon the judgment passed in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. N. Gangaraj , (2020) 3 SCC 423 , wherein it has been reiterated that the scope of judicial review is confined only to the decision-making process. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits it appears that the main grievance of the petitioner is that only he has been made a scapegoat and others were left. However, after going through the documents, the same ground has not been taken either in the reply to the second show cause or in the memo of appeal. Even otherwise, the appellate authority, after considering each and every aspect of the matter, has reduced the punishment from reduction of three annual increment to one annual increment. 7. It further appears on perusal of the inquiry report, that the same has been conducted after giving full opportunity to the petitioner and after examining all the witnesses. Even otherwise, the appellate authority, after considering each and every aspect of the matter, has reduced the punishment from reduction of three annual increment to one annual increment. 7. It further appears on perusal of the inquiry report, that the same has been conducted after giving full opportunity to the petitioner and after examining all the witnesses. In other words, there is no procedural error. The fact further reveals that a punishment order has been passed after taking into consideration the reply to the second show cause and the disciplinary authority has imposed punishment upon the petitioner with regard to reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of const/GD for a period of three years with immediate effect. 8. At this stage, it is also pertinent to mention that the disciplinary authority has taken each and every aspect of the matter including the contention of the petitioner and thereafter imposed the punishment of reduction of pay scale. Aggrieved petitioner filed an appeal and the appellate authority, after going through each and every aspect of the matter, reduced the punishment from three stage to reduce the punishment from reduction of pay for a period of three years to “reduction of pay by one stage from Rs.7830/-+ GP Rs.2000/- to Rs.7540/- +G.P. Rs.2000/- (in the pay band of PB-I Rs.5200-20200/- +GP Rs.2000) for a period of 3 years with a further direction that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and on expiry of the period of reduction it will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay.” 9. After perusing the appellate order, I find that the same is well-reasoned order. Thereafter, petitioner has also filed revision against the order of appellate authority but the same was also dismissed and the order passed by the disciplinary authority, modified by the appellate authority has been sustained. 10. At the cost of repetition, after going through the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities, I don't find any error either with respect to the merits of the case or any error in the procedure. In other words, neither there is any perversity in the orders impugned; nor there is any procedural irregularity. As such, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 11. Even otherwise, the law with regards to judicial review is also well settled. In other words, neither there is any perversity in the orders impugned; nor there is any procedural irregularity. As such, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 11. Even otherwise, the law with regards to judicial review is also well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Gangaraj (supra) , by a judgment dated 14th February, 2020 has reiterated that scope of judicial review is confined only to the decision- making process. Power of judicial review conferred on Constitutional Court or Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority but is of a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that that conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the Court. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment read as under – 9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp.1726-27, para 7) “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13) “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 ] , this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 12. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the instant application stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to cost. Pending I.A., if any, is also closed.