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2025 DAILYLAW 21931 (CHH)

VIRENDRA KUMAR MOSES v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/4756/2019 · 2025-06-24

Shri Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:27575 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4756 of 2019 Virendra Kumar Moses S/o Late George Moses, Aged About 62 Years Bakshi Nagar, Ward No. 31 Main Road, Lakholi, District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Director, Directorate Of Public Instructions, 1st Floor, 3rd Block, Indrawati Bhawan, H O D Building, Atal Nagar, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Collector, Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. 4 - District Education Officer, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Anup Majumdar, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 25/06/2025 1. With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. This petition has been preferred by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following relief(s):- 10.1 That, the Hom’ble Court may be pleased to call the relevant records pertaining to petitioner’s employment and his service tenure. BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP Date: 2025.06.26 17:04:20 +0530 2 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash such impugned order dated 17.3.2017 passed by the District education officer, Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. 10.3 That, It may be declared that the principle of No Work No Pay will not be applicable to petitioner after granting him the benefits of promotion and seniority as granted to his juniors on the post of Upper Division Teachers and Upper Division Teacher Head masters. 10.4 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant the petitioner arrears of salary along with interest @ 9% per annum till date of payment, of the promoted post of Upper Division Teacher and Upper Division Teacher Head Master, Middle School with effect from 1987 and 1997 respectively. 10.5 That, the Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to pass any other order in favour of the petitioner as it may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case along with cost of the petition. 3. Facts of the case, in nutshell are that, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher/LDT (Lower Division Teacher) on 03.11.1973 in Kallu Banjari Primary School, Distt. Rajnandgaon. The petitioner belongs to ‘Gond’ caste of Scheduled Caste community, but in the Service Book, his Caste/Religion has been mentioned as ‘Christian’. In the year 1987, juniors to the petitioner who were appointed in the year 1977 to the post of Assistant Teacher, were promoted to the post of Upper Division Teacher (UDT), but the petitioner was deprived from the same only because, his caste/religion was mentioned as Christian in his service book, whereas, he belongs to ‘Gond’ caste of Scheduled Tribe Community. In the year 1997, his juniors were again promoted to the post of Head Master Middle School, however, the 3 petitioner was again denied promotion for aforesaid reason. On 20.11.2008, the petitioner was promoted to the post of UDT and thereafter he was promoted to the post of Head Master Middle School on 26.6.2011. The petitioner filed various representations, despite that his caste/category was not changed in the Service Book and ultimately his representation was considered by the respondents authorities and vide Order No/.Estt.3/2007/836, Rajnandgaon dated 03.09.2007 (Annexure-P/4) his caste and his seniority were recognized in the category of Scheduled Tribe from 03.11.1973, the date of his initial apportionment. However, vide Order dated 17.3.17 (Annexure-P/11), the petitioner was directed to be granted notional promotions to the post of UDT from 18.6.1987 and Head Master from 11.12.1997, but monetary benefit was not granted to him for that period, i.e. from the date of notional promotion to the date of actual promotion. Aggrieved by said order, various representations were filed by the petitioner (Annexure-P/5, P/9 etc.), but the same were rejected, therefore, he filed instant petition seeking relief, as has been stated in the opening paragraph. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner belongs to ‘Gond’ caste of Scheduled Tribe community and since he changed his religion from Gond (ST) to Christianity, therefore, in his Service Book, his religion has been mentioned as ‘Christian’ instead of Gond (ST). He further submits that various representations were filed by the petitioner, ultimately it was allowed by respondent No.4 and he was granted notional promotion to the post of UDT along with pay scale from 18.6.1987, thereafter he was also granted notional promotion to the post of Head Master Middle School from 11.12.1997, but applying the principle of ‘No work No pay’, he was granted monetary benefit from the actual date of his joining to the post of UDT i.e. from 20.11.2008 and Head Master Middle School from 26.6.2011. Learned 4 counsel further submits that the petitioner has been denied two promotions for no fault of his and despite repeated representations made by him, the same were considered belatedly. Therefore, he cannot be denied monetary benefits from the date of his promotion, which has been granted subsequently from back date. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner in the matter of BR Khuntte vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. passed in WPS No.2330 of 2015 passed vide Order dated 20.4.2023. 5. State has filed its reply. Learned counsel for the State referring to its reply would submit that, though vide order dated 17.3.2017 ( Annexure-P/11 ), promotions were ordered to be granted to the petitioner from backdate i.e. from 18.6.1987 and 11.12.1997 to the post of UDT and Head Master Middle School respectively, but since he had not performed actual duty on the said posts, therefore, adopting the principle of ‘No work No pay’, the petitioner has not been granted monetary benefit from the date of his two notional promotions, hence, this petition is liable to be rejected. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. As per the record, the petitioner belongs to ‘Gond’ caste (Scheduled Tribe community). It seems that since he had converted his religion to Christianity, therefore, in his Service Book, his religion has been mentioned as ‘Christian’ instead of ‘Gond’ (Scheduled Tribe community). Perusal of Order dated 17.3.17 (Annexure-P/11) issued by respondent No.4/O/o. District Education Officer, Distt. Rajnandgaon shows that, the petitioner was recognized as member of Scheduled Tribe category by the respondents department vide Order dated 03.9.2007 issued by Office of District Education Officer, Rajnandgaon and seniority was granted to him from initial date of appointment i.e. from 03.11.1973. Annexure-P/11 further shows that after 5 recognition of said category, i.e. Scheduled Tribe category, the petitioner has been granted notional promotion from 18.6.1987 to the post of UDT and subsequently, he has been granted notional promotion from 11.12.1997 to the post of Head Master Middle School along with pay scales. However, applying the principle of ‘No work No pay’, the petitioner has not been granted actual monetary benefit, whereas there was no fault on the part of the petitioner in not being given promotion despite belonging to Gond caste(ST category). 8. While considering similar issue in the matter of BR Khuntte (supra), vide Order dated 20.4.2023, this Court has observed in para 8 as under:- 8. In case of Kunwar Sing Pawar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh in WPS No. 12 of 2006 decided on 12.11.2013 has held in para 5 to 9 as under :- “5. In Union of India and Others v. K.V. Jankiraman and Others {(1991) 4 SCC 109}, the Supreme Court held that normal rule of 'no work, no pay is not applicable to the cases where the employee, although, is willing to work, is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault on his part. It was held as under: "25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of "no work no pay" is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases." 6. The Supreme Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah {(2007) 7 SCC 689}, held as under: "33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of 6 law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of Law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs the Authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the Authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged. 34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of 7 the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.” 7. The matter needs to be examined in the light of Fundamental Rule 31-A (for short "FR"), which is reproduced hereunder : "FR 31-A. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in these rules, the pay of a Govt. servant whose promotion or appointment to a post is found to be or to have been erroneous, shall be regulated in accordance with any general or special orders issued by the State Govt. in this behalf." 8. The State has issued a circular on 25-4-1974 in furtherance of the power conferred under FR 31-A. Para 5 of the said circular reads Court of Chhattisas under: 5. In the case of those Government servants whose promotion were/are delayed due to wrong assignment of position in the gradation list which after due consideration is revised and proper place is assigned in the gradation list, he should be deemed to have been promoted to the higher post with effect from the date his junior was promoted and from the date of actual promotion he be allowed the same pay which he would have got but for wrong place in the gradation list. However, in such cases the persons concerned will not be entitled to pay arrears of pay any allowance during the period for which they did not perform the duties of the higher post on the basis of principle of 'No work No pay'." 9. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in R.B. Guhe v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, while dealing with the similar issue in respect of second part of circular dated 25-4-1974, held that the second part of the circular providing that in case where an employee was denied promotion because of wrong fixation of seniority and is later on promoted will not be entitled to arrears of pay on the principle of 'no work, no pay is bad in law.” 8 10. The judgment rendered by this Court in the case of BR Khuntte (supra) has further been relied by learned Division Bench in WA No.357/2024 (State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. vs. Dhan Singh Patel & Ors.). 11. It is quite vivid that, case of the present petitioner is squarely covered by the order passed by this Court in the case of BR Khuntte (supra) and relied by learned Division Bench in the case of Dhan Singh Patel (supra). It is clear from Order dated 17.3.17 (Annexure P/11) that the petitioner has been granted promotion to the post of UDT and Head Master Middle School with retrospective effect from 18.6.1987 and 11.12.1997 respectively, which he was denied on account of wrong mentioning of the Caste/category of the petitioner as Christian instead of Gond/ST category, that too without his fault. 12. In that view of the matter, the petitioner is entitled to get the arrears of salary/monetary benefit right from 18.6.1987, i.e. from the date on which he has been granted notional promotion to the post of UDT and from 11.12.1997, i.e. from the date of his notional promotion to the post of Head Master Middle School. During course of submission, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been retired. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get revised pension and further consequential benefits applicable as per law/rules along with interest @ 6% per annum. The State is directed to pay all the arrears amount payable to the petitioner within 90 days from today, else outstanding amount shall carry interest @ 9% till the date of actual payment. 13. With aforesaid direction, the writ petition is allowed. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Bini