2025:HHC:26853 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 715 of 2025 Reserved on: 31.07.2025 Date of Decision: 08th August, 2025. Santosh Kumar Verma ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner : Mr. Vikas Rathore, Advocate. For the Respondent/ State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 06 of 2012, dated 07.12.2012 registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468,471, 120B & 201 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) at Police Station Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that a complaint was made to the police regarding 2 2025:HHC:26853 the upgradation of Contractors, causing loss to the government exchequer. Preliminary investigation was conducted, and it was found that Surinder Kumar, Manohar Lal and Anil Kumar claimed to have executed two works, but these were actually done by the Public Works Department (PWD). A certificate was issued by Ram Naryan and Laxman Chauhan in favour of these Contractors. Similarly, the Executive Engineer, Ghumarwin, also issued a certificate in their favour. They filed an application for upgradation, and they were upgraded from B category to A category based on the certificates submitted by them. These upgradations were contrary to the Rules and caused loss to the public exchequer. 3. The police conducted an investigation and seized the record. It was found that Manohar Lal Sharma and Surinder Kumar submitted applications for upgradation of their category from B to A. An essential condition for upgradation was the execution of three works of not less than ₹25 Lakhs each, whose aggregate should be more than ₹125 Lakhs. Manohar Lal annexed a work done certificate issued by HPPWD and two work done certificates issued by the private Contractors. Surinder Kumar annexed two certificates of ₹25 Lakhs issued by 3 2025:HHC:26853 HPPWD and one certificate issued by a private Contractor. The Rules required the certificates to be issued under the signature and seal of the Executive Engineer or equivalent authority. The contractors did not fulfil the required condition for their upgradation, hence, the Committee rejected the applications in the proceedings dated 21.02.2006. However, a subsequent Committee consisting of Dharam Pal Sharma, the then Chief Engineer, HPPWD Mandi as Chairman, Ranjit Singh, the then Deputy Controller (F&A), Santosh Kumar Verma, the then Executive Engineer and Sudarshan Bir Thakur, the then Superintendent Engineer (Design) (present petitioner) approved the upgradation on 27.03.2006. The specimen signatures were obtained. The charge sheet was filed against the petitioner and other persons. The prosecution sanction was not accorded to prosecute Dharam Pal Sharma, Ranjeet Singh and Sudershan B. Thakur and no charge sheet was filed against them. 4. Being aggrieved by registration of F.I.R. and filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., asserting that the proposals were received 4 2025:HHC:26853 from the Executive Engineer through their Superintending Engineer, which were put before the Committee by the office Superintendent. The prosecution sanction was denied in respect of other Committee members. Petitioner Santosh Kumar Verma was never posted as Executive Engineer, Bilaspur, but he was posted as Executive Engineer (Design) in the office of Chief Engineer, HPPWD, Mandi. The decision was taken by the Committee members collectively. It was the duty of the field Executive Engineers to submit the complete record and satisfy themselves about the criteria for upgradation. The Dealing Assistant and Office Superintendent were also supposed to look into the discrepancies in the proposals. The petitioner was the junior-most member of the Committee, and he had no say in the proceedings. Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD issued a direction that the Performance Certificate be issued by the Executive Engineers only. The petitioner did not hold the post of Executive Engineer, and he had no role in the matter. His role was minimal. The prosecution sanction was not granted in respect of the other members, who had a major role to play. The F.I.R. was registered arbitrarily; therefore, it was prayed that the 5 2025:HHC:26853 present petition be allowed and F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings be quashed. 5. Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was the junior member of the Committee. The proposals were received from respective Executive Engineers through the Superintending Engineers. These were to be checked by the Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and office Superintendent. The prosecution sanction was declined against the other members of the Committee by the Government, and the prosecution of the petitioner is discriminatory. The petitioner had no say in the proceedings. The petitioner had retired 17 years ago, and there is a delay in filing the charge sheet. The petitioner never served as Executive Engineer, HPPWD Bilaspur. The allegations in the F.I.R., even if accepted to be correct, do not make out a case against the petitioner. The proceedings were initiated with the ulterior motive. There is insufficient evidence in support of the allegations made in the F.I.R. The charge sheet was filed after 17 years, which violates the right to a speedy trial of the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising 6 2025:HHC:26853 out of the said F.I.R. be quashed. He also filed written arguments which have been perused by me. 6. I have given considerable thought to his submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 7 2025:HHC:26853 (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 8 2025:HHC:26853 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for 9 2025:HHC:26853 invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 9. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. It is apparent from the perusal of the F.I.R. and the charge-sheet that a Committee, of which the petitioner was a member, had upgraded the co-accused Manohar Lal and Surinder Kumar from Class-B to Class-A Contractors, contrary to the Rules. Manohar Lal annexed a work done certificate issued by HPPWD and two work done certificates issued by the private Contractors. Surinder Kumar annexed two certificates of ₹25 Lakhs issued by HPPWD and one certificate issued by 10 2025:HHC:26853 private Contractor whereas Rules provided that only the certificates issued under the signatures and seal of Executive Engineer or equivalent authority in Government or Semi Government Department could be relied upon, therefore, prima facie, the Committee had upgraded these persons contrary to the existing Rules. The plea taken by the petitioner that it was for the Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer, as well as the office Superintendent, to verify the eligibility will not help the petitioner because it was for the Committee to satisfy itself about the eligibility criteria of the Contractor before recommending the upgradation. The Committee had earlier rejected the application, but the Committee of which the petitioner was a member approved the application. 11. It was submitted that the petitioner was the junior member of the Committee and had no say in the proceedings. This submission is not acceptable. All the members of the Committee were equal, irrespective of their seniority, and the petitioner was free to write a dissenting note stating that the Contractors were not eligible for upgradation. Once he failed to do so, he is bound by the proceedings of the Committee and 11 2025:HHC:26853 cannot take shelter behind the plea that he is a junior member of the Committee. 12. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner had used his official position to benefit Manohar Lal, Surinder Kumar and Anil Kumar to upgrade them from Class-B to Class- A contractors and thereby enable them to get the contracts as Class-A contractors. This was done even though they were ineligible as per the Rules. Therefore, prima facie, inference drawn by the prosecution that this was done under the conspiracy to benefit the contractors is to be accepted as correct. Hence, the submissions that allegations in the F.I.R., even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence cannot be accepted. 13. In the present case, the FIR was registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13 (2) of the PC Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh, (2023) 6 SCC 559, that corruption is eroding public life, and it is the constitutional duty of the Courts to show zero tolerance to corruption. It was observed:- 12 2025:HHC:26853 “47. We preface our discussion, leading to the answers to the above two questions, taking note of a dangerous and disquieting trend that obviously disturbs us without end. Though it is the preambular promise of the Constitution to secure social justice to the people of India by striving to achieve equal distribution of wealth, it is yet a distant dream. If not the main, one of the more prominent hurdles for achieving progress in this field is undoubtedly “corruption”. Corruption is a malaise, the presence of which is all-pervading in every walk of life. It is not now limited to the spheres of activities of governance; regrettably, responsible citizens say it has become a way of one's life. Indeed, it is a matter of disgrace for the entire community that not only on the one hand is there a steady decline in steadfastly pursuing the lofty ideals which the Founding Fathers of our Constitution had in mind, but degradation of moral values in society is rapidly on the rise on the other. Not much debate is required to trace the root of corruption. 48. “Greed”, regarded in Hinduism as one of the seven sins, has been overpowering in its impact. In fact, unsatiated greed for wealth has facilitated corruption to develop like cancer. If the corrupt succeed in duping the law enforcers, their success erodes even the fear of getting caught. They tend to bask under a hubris that rules and regulations are for humbler mortals and not them. To get caught, for them, is a sin. Little wonder, an outbreak of scams is commonly noticed. What is more distressing is the investigations/inquiries that follow. More often than not, these are botched and assume the proportion of bigger scams than the scams themselves. However, should this state of affairs be allowed to continue? Tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing them appropriately is the mandate of the PC Act. 49. “We the People”, with the adoption of our Constitution, had expected very high standards from people occupying positions of trust and responsibility in 13 2025:HHC:26853 line with the constitutional ethos and values. Regrettably, that has not been possible because, inter alia, a small section of individuals inducted in public service for “serving the public” appears to have kept private interest above anything else and, in the process, amassed wealth not proportionate to their known sources of income at the cost of the nation. Although appropriate legislation is in place to prevent the cancer of corruption from growing and developing, where maximum punishment by way of imprisonment for ten years is stipulated, curbing it in adequate measure, much less eradicating it, is not only elusive but unthinkable in present times. 50. Since there exists no magic wand as in fairy tales, a swish of which could wipe out greed, the constitutional courts owe a duty to the people of the nation to show zero tolerance to corruption and come down heavily against the perpetrators of the crime while at the same time saving those innocent public servants, who unfortunately get entangled by men of dubious conduct acting from behind the screen with ulterior motives and/or to achieve vested interests. The task, no doubt, is onerous, but every effort ought to be made to achieve it by sifting the grain from the chaff. We leave the discussion here with the fervent hope of better times in future.” 14. It was further held that ordinarily, the Court should not quash the F.I.R. related to the corruption except in exceptional cases where there is absolutely no material or even a reasonable suspicion to support the case. This would harm innocent public servants, but it is a small price to pay to ensure probity in society. It was observed:- 80. Having regard to what we have observed above in paras 47 to 50 (supra) and to maintain probity in the 14 2025:HHC:26853 system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, especially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to the quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a PC Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the High Courts to follow, in cases under the PC Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all, interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case. 81. Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant having intentionally enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation. 82. We quite appreciate that there could be cases of innocent public servants being entangled in investigations arising out of motivated complaints and the consequent mental agony, emotional pain and social stigma that they would have to encounter in the process, but this small price has to be paid if there is to be a society governed by the rule of law. While we do not intend to fetter the High Courts from intervening in appropriate cases, it is only just and proper to remind the courts to be careful, circumspect and cautious in quashing first information reports resting on mala fide of the nature alleged herein. 15 2025:HHC:26853 15. It was submitted that THE allegations in the charge sheet are incorrect. The petitioner never remained posted as Executive Engineer, HPPWD Bilaspur. These submissions will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 16. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage 16 2025:HHC:26853 of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of 17 2025:HHC:26853 Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 17. It was submitted that there is a delay in filing the charge sheet. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Vir Singh Jethi, 1994 SCC (Cri) 500, that the delay cannot be the sole factor to quash the FIR. It was observed at page 501: “3. The High Court has quashed the FIR on the grounds of delay. It has been pointed out that the offence took place in 1984, while the FIR was lodged in 1988 and the challan was presented much later. That may be a matter relevant to the question of taking cognisance under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In taking the decision whether or not to take cognisance, the Court would have to bear in mind the provisions in clauses (b) and (c) of Sections 469 and 473 of the Code as well. The High Court has not applied its mind to these provisions and has quashed the FIR, which is wrong. 18. In the present case, the investigating agency had to collect voluminous records, examine the handwriting and seek the prosecution sanction. Therefore, the delay cannot be a reason to quash the FIR. especially in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aman Kumar (supra). 18 2025:HHC:26853 19. It was submitted that the prosecution sanction was not granted in favour of the other members, and the proceedings cannot continue against the petitioner. This submission cannot be accepted. Merely because the prosecution sanction has been refused regarding the other Committee members will not absolve the petitioner of the commission of a crime. A person cannot claim a negative equality by saying that since the co-accused is not being prosecuted, therefore, he should not be prosecuted. The effect of the commission of a crime is not taken away by non-prosecution of the co-accused. 20. The charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court, and the Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We 19 2025:HHC:26853 say so because, even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 21. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage. 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same stands dismissed. 24. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) 08th August 2025 Judge (ravinder)