-1- 2025:CGHC:31079 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 88 of 2023 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Secretary, Department School Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Raipur (C.G.). 2 - The Director Public Instruction Directorate, Chhattisgarh Indrawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - The District Education Officer District Dhamtari (C.G.). ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Smt. Usha Soni W/o Late Shri G. L. Soni R/o Akash Ganga Houses, Rudri Road, Dhamtari, Tahsil And District Dhamtari (C.G.). 2 - The President/secretary Arya Shikshan Samiti, Agnideo Arya Kanya Pri. School, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.). 3 - The Controlling Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act, 1972 Office Of Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dhamtari District Dhamtari (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner/ State : Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Deputy Government Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Hemant Kesharwani, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 07.07.2025 1) The petitioner/State has preferred the instant writ petition (L) under Article 226 Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- of the Constitution of India against the order dated 06-10-2021, passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.) in Appeal Case No. 10/PGA/2020, Smt. Usha Soni vs. Director of Public Instructions, District Education Officer and President/Secretary, Arya Shikshan Samiti, Dhamtari, whereby the application filed by respondent No.1, Smt. Usha Soni, was allowed by the Controlling Authority. The Authority directed the respondents to pay gratuity for the period from 01-07-1972 to 30-06-2013, i.e., for forty-one years, and assessed the payable amount at 9,50,317/-, along with interest, bringing ₹ the total to 17,34,328/- payable to respondent No.1. ₹ 2) Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Government of Chhattisgarh has already taken a decision regarding the payment of gratuity and invited attention to the circular issued by the State of Chhattisgarh. As per the said circular, the State has adopted a policy to grant gratuity to employees of aided educational institutions who retired on or after 01-04-2013. He further submitted that the petitioner has not exhausted the statutory remedy available under the Payment of Gratuity Act and drew the attention of this Court to Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, which reads as under:- “7(7). Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period -3- by a further period of sixty days: 30 [Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.” 3) From bare perusal of the statutory scheme makes it abundantly clear that, before preferring an appeal, it is mandatory for the appellant to deposit the amount assessed by the Controlling Authority. Without such deposit, the appeal is not maintainable. 4) In the present case, the petitioner has filed the writ petition without depositing the amount as directed by the Controlling Authority and without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal. In light of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(227) No.525 of 2014 (Mahabir Shiksha Prasar Samiti vs. Shri S.K. Sawarkar and others), and other connected matters decided on 03- 09-2014, wherein it was held in paragraphs 9 to 11 as under:- “9. A bare perusal of the scheme reveals that in the event of a dispute with regard to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee or even the admissibility of any claim whatsoever towards gratuity, the employer cannot retain unto himself the final authority and decision in the matter. The adjudicatory authority is the controlling authority. If an appeal is to be preferred the amount determined by the controlling authority is required to be deposited as a pre-condition. If the argument made on behalf of the petitioners be accepted, the amount of pre-deposit has to be confined to the self assessed amount rendering the adjudication by the controlling authority irrelevant but yet subject to the appellate jurisdiction. The employer thus shall have the benefit of self assessment even after adjudication of liability continuing to deprive the employee for whose benefit the legislation was enacted. Such an interpretation in our opinion shall be doing -4- complete violence to the statutory scheme. The use of the word “deposit” does not have a different meaning under sub- section (4) (a) and (d). In the former, it talks of deposit on self-assessment. In the latter it is the amount deposited including excess amount after adjudication in excess of the self assessed amount by the controlling authority. 10. Any interpretation of a statutory provision leading to absurdity must be avoided particularly when the statute is a beneficial legislation. To hold that the pre-deposit for appeal has to be determined on basis of the self assessment made by the employer against which no appeal lies, and that the order of the Controlling Authority upon the same against which appeal lies shall be irrelevant in part for the purpose of the appeal, is an absurd interpretation which has to be avoided. 11. In (2001) 3 LLN692 (Mad) (Christian Medical College and Hospital v. Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), it was held as follows:- The contention that the second proviso to S. 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act refers to sub-r. (4) which means that the admitted amount alone is required to be deposited under sub-s. 4 (9) of S. 7 and not the disputed liability would have deserved acceptance provided the second proviso to sub-s. (7) of S. 7 had confined itself to cl. (a) of sub-s. (4), but the entire sub-s. (4) if S.7 is included in the proviso. In other words, the admitted amount of the amount adjudicated or whatever the amount as may be directed to be deposited or ordered to be paid by the controlling authority is required to be deposited by, the employer in terms of the second proviso to sub-s. (7) of S. 7. There is no justification or warrant to restrict the meaning of the, second proviso to the admitted liability alone. The Legislature intended to restrict the pre-deposit to cl. (a) of sub-s. (4) of S. 7, then it would have been provided that the required amount to be deposited under cl. (a) of sub-s. (4). This is not the statutory provision. Further, if such a contention is to be accepted, the object of legislation, which has provided for a mandatory provisions to deposit the amount, as determined by the controlling authority before filing an appeal, would be defeated. The intention and object of -5- the legislation is also very clear and the second proviso has been introduced with the object of making predeposit of the amount determined by the controlling authority as prerequisite under sub-s. (7) of S. 7. Further, in terms of cl. (a) of sub-s. (4) of S.7 the deposit is a voluntary deposit by the employer at the threshold, where the employer comes forward with a deposit. Such is not the contingency provided for in respect of other clauses in sub-s. (4) of S. 7 of the Act.” 5) Since the petitioner has neither deposited the amount determined by the Controlling Authority nor availed the statutory remedy of appeal, the present writ petition is not maintainable. The petitioner/State is granted 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority, after complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. 6) With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nadim