Page No.1 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 2025:CGHC:21002 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Criminal Appeal No.1306 of 2022 Vinay Kumar Pandey S/o Late Chandrasen Pandey Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Jharpara, Police Station, Jainagar, Surajpur, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant (In Jail) Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station, Jainagar, Surajpur,, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent WITH Criminal Appeal No.1308 of 2022 • • Sachin Kumar Pandey S/o Late Chandrasen Pandey Aged About 25 Years R/o Village- Jharpara, Police Station- Jainagar, Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. • Smt. Saraswati @ Pinki W/o Sachin Kumar Pandey Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Jharpara, Police Station- Jainagar, Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellants (In Jail) Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. Police Station Jainagar, District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent WITH Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2019 Smt. Ranjeeta Pandey W/o Late Chandrasen Pandey Aged About 58 Years Occupation House Wife, R/o Kunjnagar Jharpara, Police Station Jainagar, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ---Appellant (On Bail) SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Date: 2025.05.12 12:37:11 +0530 Page No.2 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Jainagar, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent [Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellants : Mr. Nishikant Sinha, Advocate For Respondent: Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. Advocate General --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Single Bench: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal (Judgment on Board) 07.05.2025 (1) In these batch of criminal appeals filed under Section 374(2) of CrPC, total 04 accused-appellants were charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section 34 of IPC and also under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 before the jurisdictional criminal Court and tried in common Sessions Trial No.04 of 2018. But, initially except appellant- Ranjeeta Pandey, remaining 03 accused-appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki were absconding, therefore, appellant- Ranjeeta Pandey was firstly tried by the learned trial Court, whereby she has been convicted and sentenced by judgment dated 10.05.2019 as under: Conviction Sentence U/s. 304-B/34 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, sentenced to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months. (2) Against the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of Page No.3 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 sentence, appellant- Ranjeeta Pandey has preferred CRA-866-2019 before this Court. However, when appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki were arrested, they were put to trial and, by judgment dated 30.07.2022, in the same session trial, they have been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence U/s. 498-A/34 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years with fine of Rs.500/- each and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months each. U/s. 304-B/34 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years each. U/s. 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 Rigorous imprisonment for 01 year with fine of Rs.200/- each and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month each. [All the sentences are directed to run concurrently] (3) Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki have preferred CRA-1306-2022 & CRA-1308-2022 respectively. As such, regarding being had to the similitude of the questions of the fact and law involved and being arising out of a common crime and session trial, on the joint request of learned counsel for the parties, all these 03 appeals were clubbed together, heard together and being decided by this common judgment. (4) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 28.05.2017, at about 03:00 PM, all the accused-appellants herein, in furtherance of their common intention and being the husband and in-law’s of Page No.4 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 Kajal Pandey respectively, subjected her with cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry and, further, poured kerosene oil over the body of Kajal Pandey (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) and set her ablaze by lighting matchstick, due to which, she suffered burn injuries to the extent of 75% and died during the course of her treatment in the hospital on 16.07.2017 (i.e. unnatural death within 07 years of her marriage) and, thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offence. (5) The further case of the prosecution is that the marriage of the deceased with appellant- Vinay Pandey was solemnized in the year 2016 according to their communal rites and customs. As such, appellant- Vinay Pandey is the husband of the deceased, whereas appellants- Sachin Pandey, Sarswati @ Pinki and Ranjeeta Pandey are father-in-law, sister-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased respectively. It is also the case of the prosecution that during the course of treatment of the deceased in District Hospital, Ambikapur, on 01.06.2017, after having been certified to be in fit state of mind to give statement by Dr. Jagrani Lakra (not examined), Executive Magistrate, namely, Prerna Singh (PW-14) recorded dying declaration of the deceased vide Ex.P/32, in which, she implicated the appellants herein to be the authors of the crime by stating that on account of demand of dowry her ‘pati’ (husband), ‘saas’ (mother-in-law), ‘sasur’ (father-in-law) and ‘jethani’ (sister-in- law) caused her burn injuries. Thereafter, on 16.07.2017, the Page No.5 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 deceased during the course of her treatment succumbed to the injuries and died. (6) After the death of the deceased, merg intimation (Ex.P/38) was recorded and, wheels of investigation started running, in which, nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/28. Summons under Section 175 of CrPC were issued and inquest proceedings were conducted. On the basis of written complaint vide Ex.P/08, FIR (Ex.P/09) was also registered. The dead-body of the deceased was subjected to postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. Janeshwar Singh (PW-22) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/51), it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is shock (septicemia) caused by extensive deep burn injuries, leading to cardio-respiratory arrest. Certain articles were seized vide Ex.P/13 and sent for chemical examination. FSL report is (Ex.P/52). Thereafter, statement of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence in the competent criminal Court having jurisdiction, which was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which, the appellants abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. (7) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 24 witnesses and exhibited 52 documents, whereas the appellants in support of their defence, neither examined any Page No.6 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 witness nor exhibited any document. (8) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this judgment, against which these 03 appeal have been preferred by the appellants-accused questioning 02 impugned judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed in a common sessions trial. (9) Mr. Nishikant Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the case of the prosecution is totally based on the dying declaration (Ex.P/32). However, a careful perusal of the said dying declaration would show that the doctor, namely, Jagrani Lakra, who has certified the deceased to be in fit state of mind to give statement/dying declaration, has neither been cited as a witness nor brought to the witness-box to be examined before the learned trial Court for the reasons best know to the prosecution. As such, physical and mental fitness of the deceased at the time of recording of the dying declaration (Ex.P/32) is doubtful and not established beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the deceased in her dying declaration (Ex.P/32) has stated that in connection with demand of dowry, her saas, pati, sasur and jethani, caused her burn injuries. But, neither the exact name nor other particulars of Page No.7 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 the accused-appellants have been mentioned in the said dying declaration (Ex.P/32), therefore, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopal Singh and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another 1 , it would be totally unsafe and risk to rely upon the said dying declaration (Ex.P/32) that too in absence of any further corroboration. Learned counsel further argued that so far as the factum of deceased giving oral dying declaration to Santosh Mishra (PW-06), Anita Mishra (PW-07) and Sheela Mishra (PW-08) is concerned, the same is also inadmissible in evidence for the same reason that the date, time and place of deceased giving said oral dying declaration is not established on record and, in absence of fitness certificate of the deceased regarding her mental and physical state to give statement, the same is also fatal to the case of the prosecution. Even otherwise, taking the case of the prosecution as it, essential ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304B of IPC are also completely missing in the present case and, therefore, the appellants are entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. Hence, the present appeal be allowed in toto. (10) Per-contra, learned State counsel would submit that the prosecution has been able to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent-State that in view of 1 AIR 1972 SC 1557 Page No.8 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for the offence mentioned herein-above and, therefore, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. (11) I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. (12) In order to consider the plea, raised at the Bar it would be appropriate to extract relevant provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC which relates to dowry death:- “304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 19.11.1986. (13) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable Page No.9 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied-  The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances.  Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage.  Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband.  Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. (14) Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:- "113B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Page No.10 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." (15) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. (16) Coming back to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with appellant- Vinay Pandey in the year 2016, whereas the deceased suffered burn injuries in the incident took place on 28.05.2017 and died during the course of treatment in the hospital on 16.07.2017, due to shock (septicemia) caused by extensive deep burn injuries, leading to cardio-respiratory arrest, which is proved by Dr. Janeshwar Singh (PW-22). As such, it is quite clear that the deceased died within 07 years of her marriage that too on account of burn injuries, therefore, first and second ingredients to constitute offence Page No.11 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 under Section 304-B of IPC are established on record. (17) Now, the question would be whether the prosecution has been able to establish the remaining ingredients for offence under Section 304-B of IPC, i.e. soon before the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellants, being her husband and in-laws respectively and said cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry ? (18) In this regard, the prosecution has relied upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/32) of the deceased recorded by Executive Magistrate-cum-Naib Tehsildar, namely, Prerna Singh (PW-14) and, in both the judgments dated 10.05.2019 & 30.07.2022, the learned trial Court has found proved the said dying declaration (Ex.P/32) in order to hold the appellants guilt for the offences in question. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the dying declaration (Ex.P/32), which reads as under: “ej.kklUu dFku fnukad& 01@06@2017 le;& 04%40 PM uke& dkty ik.Ms; fuoklh& dqatuxj >kjikjk] Fkkuk& t;uxj] ftyk& lwjtiqj vLirky tgk¡ Hkjrh gS& ftyk fpfdRlky;] vfEcdkiqj Ward- Burn Ward Bed No.- 5 ejht dkty ik.Ms; c;ku nsus dh gkyr esa gSA sd/- Dr. Jagrani Lakra Date 1/6/17 dFku iz’u& D;k uke gS\ mRrj& dkty ik.Ms; Page No.12 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 iz’u& dgk¡ jgrh gS\ mRrj& fcJkeiqj] t;uxj FkkukA iz’u& dSls ty xbZ \ mRrj& nksigj esa lksbZ FkhA esjh lkl] ifr] llqj] tsBkuh vkx yxk fn,A iz’u& vkids ifjokjokyksa us vkidks D;ksa tyk;k\ mRrj& llqjky okys ngst dh ekax djrs FksA iz’u& ftl fnu vki tys] D;k ml fnu vkids lkFk vkids llqjky okyksa dh yM+kbZ gqbZ Fkh\ mRrj& ml fnu rks dqN ugha gqvk FkkA ysfdu jkr esa ngst dks ysdj yM+kbZ gqbZ FkhA vk, fnu esjs lkFk ekj&ihV dh tkrh FkhA c;ku lekfIr dk le;& 05%00 PM sd/- Naib Tehsildar 1/6/17” (19) A careful perusal of the above-quoted dying declaration would show that firstly Dr. Jagrani Lakra has certified the deceased to be in fit condition to give statement, however, said Dr. Jagrani Lakra has neither been cited as a witness nor brought to the witness-box to be examined before the learned trial Court. Even, Executive Magistrate, namely, Prerna Singh (PW-14), who has recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P/32) has nowhere recorded her satisfaction either the in dying declaration or in her statement before the Court that the deceased was in fit mental and physical condition to give statement at the time of recording of the dying declaration (Ex.P/32). (20) The Supreme Court in the matter of Sher Singh and another Page No.13 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 v. State of Punjab 2 has held that absence of doctor’s certification is not fatal if person recording the dying declaration was satisfied that the deceased was in fit state of mind, as the requirement of doctor’s certificate is essentially a rule of caution. Similarly, in the matter of Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh 3 the Supreme Court has held that the dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind and observed in Para-63 as under: “63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant.” (21) In that view of the matter, since the doctor i.e. Dr. Jagrani Lakra, who has certified the deceased the deceased to be in fit state of mind at the time of recording of dying declaration (Ex.P/32), has neither been cited as a witness nor brought to the witness-box to be examined before the learned trial Court and neither Executive Magistrate, namely, Prerna Singh (PW-14), who has recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P/32), has recorded her satisfaction either the in dying declaration or in her statement before the Court that the 2 (2008) 4 SCC 265 3 2023 SCC Online SC 1060 Page No.14 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 deceased was in fit mental and physical condition to give statement at the time of recording of the dying declaration (Ex.P/32), therefore, it is not established on record that the deceased was in fit state of mind to give statement at the time of recording of dying declaration (Ex.P/32). Moreover, though the deceased remained alive till 16.07.2017, i.e. around 02 months after the incident, but no additional dying declaration in presence of any doctor has been recorded. As such, there is no evidence brought on record to hold that the deceased was in fit state of mind at the time of recording of dying declaration (Ex.P/32) and, in absence of which, dying declaration (Ex.P/32) cannot be relied upon, as the same is not true and voluntary. Consequently, the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in relying upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/32) to convict the appellants herein for the offences in question. It is held accordingly. (22) Furthermore, the deceased in her dying declaration (Ex.P/32) has stated that in connection with demand of dowry, her saas, pati, sasur and jethani, caused her burn injuries. Neither the exact name alongwith other particulars like father’s/husband’s name or address etc. of the accused/appellants have been mentioned or spelled out by the deceased in the dying declaration (Ex.P/32). (23) The Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal Singh (supra) has clearly held with reference to Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that a dying declaration which does not contain complete Page No.15 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 names and addresses of the persons charged with the offence, even though may help to establish their identity, is not of such a nature on which conviction can be based and it cannot be accepted without corroboration and observed in Para-07 & 08 as under: “7. We have already referred to the fact that the learned Sessions Judge was not prepared to accept the evidence of Umraodas, P.W. 1 and Chhotulal, P.W. 7, that deceased Modsingh had named the appellants as assailants when they met him in the morning at 8.00 a.m. on the roadside. Detailed reasons have been given by the learned Sessions Judge why he considered their evidence unsatisfactory. The High Court, however, in one sentence expressed its opinion that the evidence of these two witnesses, amongst others, corroborated the dying declaration in respect of the identity of the appellants without giving any reasons why it differed on the point from the learned Sessions Judge. It is obvious that the High Court was so well satisfied by the written dying declaration as establishing the identity of the appellants that it ignored to consider the evidence of Umraodas, PW 1 and Chhotulal, PW 7 independently to see how far they were reliable. In an appeal against acquittal we think the High Court ought to have expressed itself more fully why it considered that the learned Sessions Judges’ conclusion was unreasonable. In our opinion that conclusion is unexceptionable. 8. But even if we assume that the High Court was right in concluding that the dying declaration established the identity of the appellants, it was certainly not of that character as would warrant its acceptance without corroboration. It is settled law that a court is entitled to convict on the sole basis of a dying declaration if it is such that in the circumstances of the case it can be regarded as truthful. On the other hand if on account of an infirmity, it cannot be held to be entirely reliable, corroboration would be required. See: Kushal Rao v. State Page No.16 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 of Bombay4. In this case, it must be first remembered that though the names of the appellants' fathers were known to Modsingh and others who accompanied him to the Police Station, their fathers' names and present residence have not been mentioned. It is rather unusual for Police Officers not to enquire and record in the first information the full name and address of the persons complained against……..” (24) As such, since the deceased in her dying declaration (Ex.P/32) has only stated that her saas, pati, sasur and jethani have caused burn injuries to her and neither the exact name alongwith other particulars like father’s/husband’s name or address etc. of the accused/appellants herein have been mentioned or spelled out by the deceased in the dying declaration (Ex.P/32), therefore, in light of the dicta of Gopal Singh (supra), the same is fatal to the case of the prosecution and, on this count also, the dying declaration (Ex.P/32) is liable to be discarded. I hereby hold accordingly. (25) Further, in the instant case, the learned trial Court has also relied upon the factum of deceased allegedly giving oral dying declaration to Santosh Mishra (PW-06), Anita Mishra (PW-07) and Sheela Mishra (PW-08). However, the date, time and place has not been brought on record, as to when the deceased has given oral dying declaration to the aforesaid witnesses. Even otherwise, in view of finding arrived hereinabove, since the written dying declaration (Ex.P/32) has not been found proved by this Court, therefore, it would be unsafe to rely upon the oral dying declaration 4 AIR 1958 SC 22 Page No.17 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 alleged to have been given by the deceased to Santosh Mishra (PW- 06), Anita Mishra (PW-07) and Sheela Mishra (PW-08). (26) Even otherwise, the law regarding oral dying declaration is well settled. In the matter of Darshana Devi v. State of Punjab5, with regard to oral dying declaration, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that an oral dying declaration can form basis of evidence in a given case, but such a dying declaration has to be trustworthy and free from every blemish and inspire confidence. (27) Similarly, in the matter of Arun Bhanudas Pawar v. State of Maharashtra6, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the oral dying declaration made by the deceased ought to be treated with care and caution since the maker of the statement cannot be subjected to any cross-examination. (28) The principle emerging out from the aforesaid decisions rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is that oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence and it can only be made the basis of conviction, if it inspires full confidence of the Court and if the Court is satisfied that the maker of the said oral dying declaration was in a fit state of mind at the time of making it and that it was not an outcome of tutoring, prompting or imagination, and where the dying declaration is suspicious and there is no other 5 1995 Supp (4) SCC 126 6 (2008) 11 SCC 232 Page No.18 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 corroborative piece of evidence on record, it would be unsafe for the Court to record conviction on the solitary evidence of such oral dying declaration. (29) As such, in the case at hand, though the first two ingredients i.e. (i) death of the deceased should be caused by burn or bodily injury other then normal circumstances and (ii) such death should have occurred within 07 years of the marriage, are established on record, but the remaining two ingredients i.e. (iii) soon before the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellants, being her husband and in-laws respectively and (iv) said cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, are not established either on the basis of dying declaration (Ex.P/32) or on the basis of oral dying declaration allegedly given by the deceased to Santosh Mishra (PW-06), Anita Mishra (PW-07) and Sheela Mishra (PW-08) under the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for offence under Section 304-B read with Section 34 of IPC and they are liable to be acquitted from the charges on the basis of benefit of doubt. It is hereby held accordingly. (30) Further, so far as conviction of the appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki for offence under Section 498- A read with 34 of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Page No.19 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 Prohibition Act, 1961 is concerned, since in view of finding arrived hereinabove, the factum of appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki committing cruelty or harassment on the deceased for or in connection with demand of dowry is not established beyond all reasonable doubt, therefore, the conviction of appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki for offence under Section 498-A read with 34 of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 are not sustainable and the same are liable to be set aside. (31) Resultantly, in view of foregoing analysis, the conviction and sentence of appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki for offence under Section 304-B/34, 498-A/34 of IPC and 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as awarded to them by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 30.07.2022, is hereby set aside, whereas the conviction and sentence of appellant- Smt. Ranjeeta Pandey for offence offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC, as awarded to her by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 10.05.2019, is also hereby set aside. They all are acquitted of the said charges on the basis of benefit of doubt. Since appellants- Vinay Pandey, Sachin Pandey and Sarswati @ Pinki are reported to be in jail, therefore, I direct that they be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other offence. Whereas, appellant- Smt. Ranjeeta Pandey is on bail, therefore, she need not to surrender, but her bails bonds shall remain in force for a further period of six Page No.20 of 20 IN CRA-1306-2022, CRA-1308-2022 & CRA-866-2019 months in view of provisions contained under Section 437-A of CrPC. (32) Consequently, all 03 criminal appeals are allowed. (33) Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are languishing for necessary information and action. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge s@if