DHARM SINGH S/O LATE ONKARMAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
CRLW/1246/2024 · 2025-02-10
Ganesh Ram Meena
Transfer Petitionbody2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 21667 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 21667 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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[2025:RJ-JP:5717] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1246/2024 Dharm Singh S/o Late Onkarmal, Aged About 41 Years, R/o Village Kirdoli, Tehsil Sikar Rural, District Sikar (Rajasthan). ----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through PP ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Tanmay Dhand For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, P.P.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Order 10/02/2025
1. The present criminal writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-complainant for issuing directions to the Court of learned Additional Judicial Magistrate No.1, Sikar, Rajasthan, to decide the case pending before him with CIS No.407/2023 titled as State v. Narayanram & Ors. arising out of F.I.R. No.340/2021, registered at Police Station Sadar, Sikar. Rajasthan, with immediate effect.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the F.I.R. was registered on 30.09.2021 and cognizance in the matter was taken on 13.02.2023. It is further submitted by the counsel that charges have not been framed so far in the matter and has also referred Section 309 of Cr.P.C., which reads as under:-
"Section 309 -Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.
(1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined,
[2025:RJ-JP:5717] (2 of 4) [CRLW-1246/2024] unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded: Provided that when the inquiry or trial relates to an offence under section 376, [section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the inquiry or trial shall] be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the charge sheet.] (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody: Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing: [Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him.] [Provided also that- (a) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party; (b) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment; (c) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his pleader is not present or the party or his pleader though present in Court, is not ready to examine or cross-examine the witness, the Court may, if thinks fit, record the statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross- examination of the witness, as the case may be.] Explanation 1.
- If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. Explanation 2. - The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted
[2025:RJ-JP:5717] (3 of 4) [CRLW-1246/2024] include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused."
3. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratiram & Ors. v. State of M.P. reported in [(2012) 4 SCC 516]. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record. 5. In the present case, the petitioner has made a prayer so as to issue directions to the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial with "immediate effect". No trial of a case can be concluded with immediate effect without following the due process as prescribed under the law. The petitioner has not even care to amend the prayer. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sangram Sadashiv Suryavanshi v. The State of Maharashtra [(2024) INSC 899], has observed as under:-
"Before we part with this order, every day we notice that in several orders passed by different High Courts while rejecting the bail applications, in a routine manner, the High Courts are fixing a time-bound schedule for the conclusion of the trials. Such directions adversely affect the functioning of the Trial Courts as in many Trial Courts, there may be older cases of the same category pending. Every court has criminal cases pending which require expeditious disposal for several reasons, such as the requirement of the penal statutes, long incarceration, age of the accused, etc. Only because someone files a case in our Constitutional Courts, he cannot get out of turn hearing. Perhaps after rejecting the prayer for bail, the Courts want to give some satisfaction to the accused by fixing a time-bound schedule for trial. Such orders are difficult to implement. Such orders give a false hope to the litigants. If in a given case, in law and on facts, an accused is entitled to bail on the ground of long incarceration without the trial making any progress, the Court must grant bail.
Option of expediating trial is not the solution. [2025:RJ-JP:5717] (4 of 4) [CRLW-1246/2024] In paragraph 47.3 of the decision of a Constitution Bench of in the case of ‘High Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.’1 , this Court has held that in the ordinary course, the Constitutional Courts should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other Courts. Paragraph 47.3 reads thus:
“47.3. Constitutional courts, in the ordinary course, should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other courts. Constitutional courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. The issue of prioritising the disposal of cases should be best left to the decision of the courts concerned where the cases are pending;” (underline supplied) A direction which can be issued in exceptional circumstances is being routinely issued by High Courts without noticing the law laid down by the Constitution Bench."
7. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioner at this stage. 8. Accordingly, this criminal writ petition is dismissed. 9. Since, the main petition has been dismissed, the stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J SAHIL SONI /59