1 2025:CGHC:28854 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 548 of 2017 Sayet Ram S/o Late Shri Sanuk Ram, Aged About 45 Years Cast Rajwar Occupation Former, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh .............Plaintiff, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Baldew (Dead) Through Lrs., As Per Honble Court Order Dt. 28-11- 2022, Chhattisgarh 1.1 - (A) Laxman S/o Late Shri Baldev Aged About 30 Years Cast - Rajwar, R/o-Village - Kanthi, P. S.- Ambikapur Tahsil - Ambikapur, District - Surguja Chhattisgarh 2 - 1 Dinesh S/o Hakim, Aged About 25 Years Occupation Cultivation, Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 2.1 - Satyanrayan S/o Hakim, Aged About 50 Years Occupation Cultivation, Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 3 - Shivcharan S/o Khora, Aged About 56 Years Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 4 - Gulab S/o Khora, Aged About 56 Years Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 5 - Mahendra D/o Sunder, Aged About 57 Years Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 6 - Sad Ram S/o Parkash, Aged About 46 Years Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 7 - Bhukhal Aged About 46 Years Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh 8 - Arjun Aged About 81 Years Cast- Rajwar, R/o Village Kanthi, P.S. Ambikapur Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh BHUMIKA ANGARE Digitally signed by BHUMIKA ANGARE Date: 2025.07.29 10:42:40 +0530 2 9 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector Surguja, Chhattisgarh ...............Defendants ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Shahid Ahmed Ansari, Advocate For Respondents No. 1 to 5 : Mr. Ajeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate For State : Mr. Kalpesh Ruparel, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas Judgment on Board 30.06.2025 1. The second appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 100 of the C.P.C. against judgment and decree dated 04.08.2017 (Annexure A/2) passed by First Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 35A/2016 (Sayet Ram Vs. Baldew & others) affirming the judgment and decree dated 12.07.2016 passed by 4th Civil Judge Class-II, Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 269-A/2010 (Annexure A/1). 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status in Civil Suit No. 269-A/2010 which was filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction. 3. The present second appeal has been admitted by this Court vide its order dated 27.11.2017 on the following substantial question of law:- “1. Whether the Courts below were justified in holding that the plaintiff's suit is barred by jurisdiction under Section 257 of the C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959 ? 2. Whether the rights of a lessee could be taken away by the Collector vide order dated 15.2.2011 (Exhibit P/4) in exercise of its suo moto revisional power as provided under Section 50 of the C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959 ?” 3 4. The brief facts, as reflected from the plaint averment, are that the plaintiff has filed a civil suit for declaration of title and for grant of permanent injunction mainly contending that the land bearing Khasra No. 244/2 area admeasuring 2.023 Hectare situated at Village- Kanthi, Patwari Halka No. 28, Tahsil Ambikapur, District- Surguja (C.G.) is agricultural land and has been granted on lease to his father Sanuk Ram S/o Chipri in the year 1971 and since his father’s demised, the appellant being son of Sunat Ram inherited the said lease and his name is mentioned in the revenue records but he was physically disabled, therefore, he was unable to perform the agricultural work, accordingly he has given the said land to the defendants No. 1 to 7 on vf/k;k cVbZ (profit half sharing pattern) where they have started cultivation but later on they assaulted the plaintiff and taking advantage of his disability the defendants are trying to occupy the suit land which has compelled the plaintiff to file suit for injunction and possession. 5. During pendency of the suit, the Collector vide revenue proceedings dated 15.02.2011 exercising its suo moto revisional power has cancelled the lease granted to the plaintiff and declared the land as Government land. Thereafter the plaintiff moved an application for amendment before the Civil Court which was allowed on 27.08.2011 and thereafter the relief of declaration as well as prayer for quashing of the order dated 15.02.2011 passed by the Collector, Surguja in Revenue Case No. 21-A-19/2010-11 was sought and it has been prayed that if declared the plaintiff’s title over the suit property by cancelling the order of Collector. The said amendment was allowed 4 by the learned Civil Judge, thereafter on the pleadings of parties learned trial Court has framed as many as 06 issues. 6. Learned trial Court while deciding the issue No. 1 that “whether plaintiff is title holder of the property” has recorded its finding that the lease granted to the plaintiff has been cancelled by the Collector on 15.02.2011, therefore, he cannot claim decree of title and accordingly he has dismissed the suit. All the issues were answered by the learned trial Court wherein issue No. 2 was decided in favor of the plaintiff by declaring that the defendants No. 01 to 08 are in illegal possession of the suit property. The learned trial Court has recorded its finding against plaintiff regarding issues No. 3 & 5 and so far as issues 4 & 6 were answered in favor of the plaintiff and finally the suit was dismissed. 7. Being aggrieved with this judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred civil appeal and the same has been dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 04.08.2017. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 12.07.2016 passed by the learned trial Court and judgment and decree dated 04.08.2017 passed by the first appellate Court, the appellant has preferred second appeal. The second appeal has been admitted by this Court on 27.11.2017 on the abovestated substantial question of law formulated by this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the trial Court has committed illegality in holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit and the reason assigned by the 5 learned trial Court while declined the relierf of declaration that once the lease has been canceled by the State Government then the plaintiff has no right to claim title is erroneous and on a perverse finding. He would further submit that the trial Court has a jurisdiction to entertain the suit and should have decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the State and the private respondent would submit that though in specific words it has not been held by the trial Court that there is a bar to entertain the suit as per the provisions of Section 257(a) of the Land Revenue Code, still the substance of the judgment and decree is that the trial Court rightly held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit as the Section 257 of Land Revenue Code debars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, thus he would submit that judgment and decree of the trial Court affirmed by the appellate Court are legal, justified and does not warrant interference of this Court. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. Discussion and submission on substantial question of law No. 1: 12. To appreciate the substantial question of law framed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 9 of the CPC as well as Section 257 (a) of the Land Revenue Code which reads as under: Section 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred:- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 6 Explanation [I].-A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. [Explanation II .-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.] [Inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 5 (w.e.f. 1.2.1977).] 13. Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code provides that whenever a question arises before the civil Court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the Court normally feels incline to consider whether the remedy afforded by alternative provisions prescribed by any special statute is sufficient or adequate. In case where exclusion of the civil Court’s jurisdiction is specially provided for the considerable as to scheme of the statute in question and the adequate or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication and consideration is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication and consideration would be very much important and it is conceivable circumstances which might become even decisive 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dhulabhai & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Anr. reported in (1968) 3 SCR 662, a Constitution Bench reviewed the entire case law on the question of maintainability of civil suit and laid down seven propositions. Propositions 1 and 2 are relevant, which read thus: “(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts normally do in a suit. Such provision, 7 however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.” 15. The plain reading of the provision referred to above would indicate that when anything in the CPC is in conflict with anything in the special or local law or with any special jurisdiction or power conferred or in the special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law, the Code will not (in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary) prevail so as to override such inconsistent provisions. When there is no conflict between the special or local law and the Code, the Code will apply. 16. In the light of above provisions of law, law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the provisions of Section 257 of Land Revenue Code, it will be quite vivid that any decision regarding any right under sub-Section 1 of Section 57 of Land Revenue Code the suit is not maintainable. The relevant provisions of Section 257 of Land Revenue Code is reproduced below as under: 8 “257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities- Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters - (a) any decision regarding any right under sub-section (1) of Section 57 between the State Government and any person.” 17. Section 57 of the Land Revenue Code is reproduced below as under: “Section 57. State ownership in all lands- (1) All lands belong to the State Government and it is hereby declared that all such lands, including standing and flowing water, mines, quarries, minerals and forests reserved or not, and all rights in the sub-soil of any land are the property of the State Government :Provided that nothing in this section shall, save as otherwise provided in this Code, be deemed to affect any rights of any person subsisting at the coming into force of this Code in any such property. (2) Where a dispute arises between the State Government and any person in respect of any right under sub-section (1) such dispute shall be decided by the [Collector] [Substituted 'Sub-Divisional Officer'] (3) Any person aggrieved by any order passed under sub- section (2) may institute a civil suit to contest the validity of the order within a period of one year from the date of such order.' [(3-a)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) no Civil Court shall, in a suit instituted under sub-section (3) on or after 24th October, 1983, by order of temporary injunction disturb the person to whom possession is restored under Section 250 if such person furnishes a reliable surety to recompensate the aggrieved party against any loss in case the Civil Court grants a decree in favour of the aggrieved party : Provided that no surety shall be required to be furnished by a member of a tribe declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165; (b) Where a Civil Court by an order of temporary injunction disturbed the person referred to in clause (a) on or after 9 24th October, 1983 but before the publication of Revenue Department's Notification No. 1-70-VII-N-2-83, dated 4th January, 1984 such order shall abate on such publication and the Tahsildar shall restore possession to a person who is disturbed by such order.]” 18. From the perusal of the above stated provisions of Section 57 as well as Section 257(a) of the Land Revenue Code, it is quite vivid that the civil Court has been expressly debarred to entertain any suit with regard to the State ownership in the lands. The record of the case would clearly demonstrate that the Collector in its suo moto revisional power has canceled the lease granted to the plaintiff and declared the land as Government land. Thus, in view of the above stated position of law, it is quite vivid that the suit was not maintainable before the trial Court. The issue with regard to jurisdiction of civil Court to the land whose ownership is in the hands of Government has come up for consideration before the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court Court in the case of State of M.P. V/s. Balveer Singh reported in 2001 (2) MPLJ 644, in which, it has been held that the civil suit is maintainable in respect of the dispute with the State other than contemplated u/s. 57(1) and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pooran Singh V/s. Dhaniram reported in 2020 (18) SCC 704 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the suit instituted by the respondents is not maintainable in view of provisions of Section 57(1) and Section 257 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959. 19. Thus, it is quite vivid that the plaintiff’s lease was cancelled by the Collector on 15.02.2011 which clearly debars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in view of Section 257(I-a). Thus the substantial question 10 of law No. 1 is answered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. 20. So far as substantial question of law No. 2 is concerned, it has been informed that the appellant has already challenged the order passed by the Collector dated 15.02.2011 (Ex. P/4) by challenging before the Commissioner and thereafter before the Board of Revenue and the same has been decided against the appellant which is already challenged by the appellant before this Court by filing WP227 No. 308 of 2018. Thus, substantial question of law No. 2 in a separate proceeding is pending, therefore, I am of the view that substantial question of law No. 2 is not required to be answered, accordingly, it is left open. 21. Consequentially the second appeal is dismissed leaving open the substantial question of law No. 2 which will be decided in appropriate proceeding initiated by the plaintiff as stated above. 22. No order as to costs. 23. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Bhumika