( 2025:HHC:6125 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CMP(M) No.1797 of 2024 & LPA No.94 of 2025 Decided on: 12th March, 2025 ____________________________________________________ Municipal Corporation, Shimla ....Applicant/Appellant Versus Sanjeev Sood and Others ….Respondents ________________________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Applicant/Appellant: Mr. Mukul Sood, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. P.S. Goverdhan Senior Advocate with Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate, for respondent No1. Mr. Arsh Rattan, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.2 and 3. Respondent No.4 in person. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (oral) The present Appeal is filed against the judgment passed by learned Single Judge in CWP No.5136 of 2021 on 18.04.2023, which is barred by 498 days. 2. The application for condonation of delay has been 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? - 2 - opposed by filing reply on behalf of respondent No.1. The Writ petitioner, who on account of vested right, as such, has rightly opposed the same, since his Writ petition was allowed and the notification whereby the petitioner was ordered to be ceased to be a Member of Municipal Corporation, Shimla was held to be bad and not sustainable in the eyes of law by the learned Single Judge. 3. The learned Single Judge also held that he is not dwelling upon the legality of Annexure P-10 and had left the issue open and had only quashed the notification dated 26.08.2021 (Annexure P-13). 4. It is not disputed that the petitioner was nominated as a councillor vide notification dated 19.02.2020 mid way, which was only for a period of two and a half years’ and thus even effectively his period of Councillor, as such, has also expired in August 2022. 5. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay, the merits are also to be considered in view of the observations of the Apex Court in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs and others Vs. Union of India & another, (2023) 10 SCC 531 , relevant portion whereof reads as under:- “35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public - 3 - policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice. 35.2 The expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail. 35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay. 35.4 Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court. 35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness. 36. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which it is not.” - 4 - 6. A perusal of the application for condonation of delay would go on to show that after the judgment was passed on 18.04.2023, the downloaded copy was sent, as such, to the Law Branch of M.C, Shimla on 19.04.2023 and the matter was then sent to the Directorate of Urban Development on 13.09.2024 for seeking instructions. There is no explanation regarding the five months’ delay in the intervening period. The matter was then referred to the Government on 04.10.2023, and on 02.11.2023 the matter was referred back from the Principal Secretary (U.D) to the Director (U.D) with certain queries and sent back to the Government only on 10.01.2024 and it was returned to the Director on 27.02.2024 for assailing the impugned judgment. The matter was again examined by the Corporation and referred back to the Director on 19.07.2024 and thus there is no such explanation again given for the period February 2024 to July 2024 and it is only in August 2024, as per the advice of the Law Department, the case was sent to the Litigation Branch on 04.09.2024. 7. It has also been categorically averred that the certified copy of the order was apparently only applied on 30.04.2024 by the standing counsel, which is after more than one year and the LPA was then drafted and put to the competent authority for approval on - 5 - 05.09.2024 and then filed before this Court. 8. Thus, on two occasions, for 5 months each, there was no justifiable sufficient cause made out as to how the Corporation was diligent in dealing with the said case. 9. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that even though having downloaded the copy at the initial stage on the very next date, there has been inaction on behalf of the Corporation and no case, as such, is made out to condone the delay in view of the principles laid down in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649. 10. In view of the above, the present application is dismissed and appeal also stands rejected. ( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice 12th March, 2025 ( Ranjan Sharma ) (priti) Judge