-1- 2025:CGHC:11089 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 29 of 2021 1 - Smt. Shanti Bai W/o Late Ramnarayan Aged About 44 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Goverdhan Prasad S/o Late Ramnarayan Aged About 26 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Raju S/o Late Ramnarayan Aged About 24 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Rajkumar S/o Late Ramnarayan Aged About 21 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Ku. Priya D/o Late Ramnarayan Aged About 19 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Mangluram S/o Laukiram Aged About 68 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. 7 - Smt. Ramkunwar W/o Mangluram Aged About 66 Years Resident of Village Raliya, Kusmunda, Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 – Dhananjay, S/o Krishnalal, Aged About 34 Years, Resident of Matiyari, Seepat, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Sharad Kumar Gobhil S/o Devprasad Resident of Nawagaon, Katghora, Korba, Chhattisgarh. Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- 3 - The Oriental Insurance Company, Through: Branch Manager, Office Geetanjali Bhawan, Main Road, Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 & 2 : Mr. Ashwell Franklin, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Samir Singh, Advocate For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 06.03.2025 1) Heard on admission. 2) With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 3) The appellants/claimants have filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against the award dated 29.09.2009 passed in Claim Case No. 07/2008 by the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora. In the said award, the claim case was partly allowed, and the liability was fastened on the respondents to pay compensation of 3,92,000/- with interest at the rate of 8% ₹ per annum. 4) Brief facts of the present case are as under:- A. The claimants filed a claim case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act on account of the death of Ramnarayan Patel. On 27.01.2007, while the deceased/Ramnarayan Patel was going by his bicycle to work from Village Raliya to Hardi Bazar College, respondent No. 1, who was driving the offending truck bearing -3- registration no. C.G.-12C -1830 rashly and negligently, collided with the deceased’s bicycle. As a result, Ramnarayan Patel sustained grievous injuries and died on the spot. B. The claimants filed a claim case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the respondents claiming a total sum of 19,51,500/- in Claim Case No. 07/2008. ₹ C. After the issuance of notices by the learned Claims Tribunal, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed their written statements denying the averments made in the claim petition. They also stated that at the time of the accident, the offending vehicle was insured and that only respondent No. 3 was the registered owner of the vehicle, making respondent No. 3 solely responsible for any liability. D. Respondent No. 3 also filed a written statement denying the averments made in the claim petition stating that they were not liable to pay any compensation. E. After framing the issues, the learned Claims Tribunal passed the impugned award on 29.09.2009 against which the instant appeal was preferred on 06.01.2021. However, there is a delay of 4024 days in filing the appeal. F. In the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the claimants have pleaded that they were not aware of the proceedings pending before the claims tribunal. They approached their counsel at a belated stage and he advised the claimants to file the appeal. 5) The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would argue that the appellants were not aware of the pending proceedings before the claims tribunal therefore they could not prefer the appeal within limitation. He would contend that the appellants are laymen having no knowledge of the law of -4- limitation. He would pray to condone the delay. 6) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants. 7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 8) A perusal of the application of condonation of delay would show that the appellants have not explained the delay properly. It is stated that on 29.09.2009, the award was passed, and thereafter, they never approached their counsel. Even the date is not mentioned when the appellants approached their counsel, when obtained the certified copy and when they approached their counsel to file the instant appeal. 9) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with -5- the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 10) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- -6- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 11) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; -7- (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 12) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- -8- “30. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- -8- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 13) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 14) In the present case, the appellants were not vigilant. The impugned award was passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Katghora, District Korba on 29.09.2009, and against the impugned award, the instant appeal was preferred before this Court on 06.01.2021; there is a huge delay i.e. of 4024 days, and the same has not been properly explained by the appellants. Accordingly, I.A. No.1, the application for condonation of delay is hereby -9- rejected. 15) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the instant appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge NADIM