1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 618 of 2022 1 - Rakesh Sonkar S/o Late Manglu Ram Sonkar Aged About 35 Years Village Arjuni, P.S. Dongargaon District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. 2 - Lalita Bai Sonkar W/o Bal Mukund Sonkar Aged About 50 Years Village Arjuni, P.S. Dongargaon District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. 3 - Malti Sonkar W/o Balbhadra @ Bhaddar Sonkar Aged About 48 Years Village Arjuni, P.S. Dongargaon District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. 4 - Lekhni Bai Sonkar W/o Khemlal Sonkar, Aged About 42 Years Village Arjuni, P.S. Dongargaon District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. 5 - Balbhadra @ Bhaddar Sonkar S/o Late Thukel Sonkar Aged About 50 Years Village Arjuni, P.S. Dongargaon District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, P.S. Dongargaon, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Shri MPS Bhatia, Advocate. For State : Ms. Pragya Shrivastava, Dy. Govt. Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 17.09.2025 1 The present Criminal Revision under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioners against the order dated 30.04.2022 passed by Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, whereby the charge under Section 304(B) and in alternative under Section 304(B)/34 IPC have been framed against the petitioners. 2 Facts of case in brief is that, the deceased Sangeeta Sonkar was married with the petitioner No.1 on 29.06.2018. After sometime of marriage dispute arose between them and she committed suicide on Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2025.09.18 10:28:15 +0530 2 15.01.2019 by hanging herself in her matrimonial house. FIR has been registered against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 304 (B)/34 IPC and after investigation charge sheet has been filed. During the course of trial, the trial court has framed charge on 30.04.2022 for the offence under Section 304(B) IPC in alternative 304(B)/34 IPC which is under challenge in the present criminal revision. 3 Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that though the deceased died within seven years of her marriage, but there is lack of sufficient evidence that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry by the present petitions. During her lifetime, she came to her parents house and returned back to her matrimonial house few days back from the date of her death and there is no evidence on record that she raised any allegation after coming back to her matrimonial house that she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry. The allegations levelled against the petitioners are general and omnibus to rope the entire family in the case. There is no specific overt act alleged by the witnesses against the petitioners and it is only for the reason that she died within seven years of marriage in unnatural circumstance, they have been arrayed as an accused in the offence. There is no prima facie evidence available against the petitioners to prosecute them for the offence under Section 304(B) IPC. Therefore, the charge framed against the petitioners may be quashed and the petitioners may be discharged. 4 On the other hand, the counsel for the State opposes and submitted that indisputably the deceased Sangeeta Sonkar died in unnatural circumstances within seven years of marriage. From the statement of parents and other family members of the deceased there is sufficient 3 allegation against the petitioners that they harassed the deceased for demand of dowry and for one or other reasons. In the statement of Santosh @ Kuleshwar Sonkar, brother of deceased, it specifically comes that on the date of incident itself she made a telephonic call to her parents and informed about the harassment given to her by the petitioners. From the statement of other witnesses also there is sufficient evidence to frame charge for the offence under Section 304(B) IPC. It is also submitted that at the time of framing of charge the court has to weight only the prima facie contents available in the charge sheet to proceed with the trial, irrespective of its result either conviction or acquittal. Prima facie there is sufficient material available against the petitioners to prosecute and to proceed with the trial and therefore there is no merit in the revision and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5 I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the revision. 6 In the present case the deceased Sangeet Sonkar was married with the petitioner No.1 Rakesh Sonkar on 29.06.2018 and she died in unnatural circumstance on 15.01.2019 at her matrimonial house by hanging herself. From the statement of the mother of the deceased Bisahin Bai, father Budhram, sister Smt. Ganga Sonkar, Brother Santosh @ Kuleshwar Sonkar and other relatives as well as her friends, it transpires that there is prima facie material available against the petitioners to frame charge for the offence under Section 304(B) IPC. 7 At the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had 4 committed the offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, has held that:- 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused had committed the offence: “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.” 17. A two-judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v State of U P 8 noted that in 8 (2006) 4 SCC 51 accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” or there is ground for “presuming” that the offence has been committed. Justice G P Mathur held thus: “9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: “… Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that ‘the judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’. The ‘ground’ in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime.” 10. The High Court did not at all apply the relevant test, namely, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that “as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit” and further observing that “the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste” set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of 5 Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)” 8 In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- “12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap. Relevant paras are extracted below: - “11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515, one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, Criminal 6 Appeal No. 1399 of 2023 adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 9 Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgement that:- “21. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. K. Narayana Rao5 this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarized the principles in the following terms: 12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39] relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. “4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ‘the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing’, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— … (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused’, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the 7 accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227. 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan [(2010) 2 SCC 398 wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 401-02, paras 10-11) 5 (2012) 9 SCC 512 “10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar [(2010) 9 SCC 368] , this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) “19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for 8 proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be 9 satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” 10 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgement in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- “12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr.P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.” 11 In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 12 Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case as well as the aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, this court is not inclined to quash the charge as framed by the trial court and to discharge the petitioners. 10 13 Accordingly, the present Criminal Revision being sans merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. It is made clear that the trial court shall decide the case on its own merits without being influenced by any of the observations made by this court hereinabove. Interim order stands vacated. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder