1 Reserved on : 19.12.2024 Pronounced on : 10.01.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.3488 OF 2023 BETWEEN: 1 . ANAND RATHI S/O NANDKISHORE RATHI AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 DIRECTOR OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 2 . PRADEEP KUMAR GUPTA S/O LATE NAVARATANMAL GUPTA AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 MANAGING DIRECTOR OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 2 3 . PRITI PRADEEP GUPTA W/O PRADEEP GUPTA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 MANAGING DIRECTOR OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 4 . JUGAL KISHORE MANTRI S/O MANKARAN MANTRI AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 DIRECTOR OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 5 . ROOP BHOOTRA S/O SOHANLAL BHOOTRA AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 6 . SHANKAR RAJA M.P., S/O MR .PETCHI MUTHU AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR 3 WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 REGIONAL HEAD AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 7 . AMARNATH H.S., S/O LATE H.P. SUNDAR RAJ SHETTY AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 MANAGER OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 8 . REKHA C., D/O CHANDRASHEKHAR M., AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 DEPUTY MANAGER (ARSSBL) AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 9 . B.L.NAGARAJA S/O B.S.LAKSHMINARAYAN SETTY AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 BRANCH MANAGER OF ARSSBL AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 4 10 . AMIT ANAND RATHI S/O ANAND RATHI AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING 10TH FLOOR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063 MANAGING DIRECTOR AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. 11 . NIMAL CHANDAK S/O SATYA NARAYAN CHANDAK AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS EXPRESS ZONE A WING, 10TH FLOOR, WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY, GOREGAON EAST MUMBAI – 400 063. AUTHORISED SIGNATORY AS PER IMPUGNED COMPLAINT. ... PETITIONERS (BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI SHRIKARA P.K., ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA BY CID(EOD), SQUAD BANASHANKARI POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY SPP HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001. 5 2 . VISHWANATH PUJARI S/O MALLAYYA PUJARI AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS NO.116, SRI SADASHIV KRUPA 28TH CROSS, 12TH MAIN BSK 2ND STAGE BENGALURU – 560 070. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R-1; SRI VISHWANATH PUJARI, PARTY-IN-PERSON – R-2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO i) QUASH THE ORDER DATED 19.12.2022 (ANNEXURE-A) PASSED IN CR.NO.32/2017 PASSED BY THE I ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU REJECTING THE B-REPORTS FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 IN CR.NO.32/2017; ii) QUASH THE FIR BEARING CR.NO.32/2017 FILED BY BANASHANKARI POLICE STATION PENDING ADJUDICATION BEFORE THE I ADDL.C.M.M., AT BENGALURU (ANNEXURE-B) FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 120-B, 418, 403, 409, 406, 420, 468, 471 AND 410 OF IPC; iii) QUASH THE COMPLAINT DATED 27.01.2017 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 AGAINST THE ACCUSED BEFORE THE BANASHANKARI POLICE STATION ALLEGING FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 403, 406, 409, 410, 418, 420, 468, 471 AND 120-B OF IPC PENDING ADJUDICATION BEFORE THE I ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU (ANNEXURE-C). THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 19.12.2024, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- 6 CAV ORDER The petitioners/accused 1 to 11 are before this Court calling in question an order dated 19-12-2022 passed by the I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru in Crime No.32 of 2017 rejecting ‘B’ report and taking of cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 403, 406, 409, 410, 420, 468, 471 r/w Section 34 of the IPC. 2. 2. Heard Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Vishwanath Pujari, respondent No.2 - party in-person. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:- The 2nd respondent/complainant is an investor in Anand Rathi Shares and Stock Brokers Limited (‘ARSSBL’ for short) which is into the business of stock broking. The said Company is under the CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA 7 control of the petitioners who are either in management positions or as employees. The complainant is said to be a seasoned investor and actively trading in securities at the stock exchange platform. The complainant is said to have invested certain amount in stocks through ARSSBL/petitioners. A loan against shares agreement is entered into between the 2nd respondent and the petitioners/ARSSBL or Anand Rathi Global Finance Limited. The 2nd respondent is said to have defaulted in clearing the loan after about 4 years of his securing the loan. The 2nd respondent is said to have been informed that his stocks which are held as security would be liquidated. Accordingly, an amount of ₹1,04,05,222.10 is sought to be liquidated. 4. The complainant then files a suit seeking injunction against the petitioners not to liquidate the amount towards the loan. The complainant also approaches the Investment Grievance Redressal Cell under SEBI for redressal of the dispute on 27-10-2016 and later registers the complaint on 28-01-2017 in Crime No.32 of 2017 for the afore-quoted offences. The suit filed by the complainant, as aforesaid, comes to be dismissed on 09-07-2019 on the score that 8 arbitration clause is available in the agreement between the parties. In the interregnum investigation in Crime No.32 of 2017 continues and the Police after investigation file a ‘B’ report before the concerned Court on 24-01-2019. The learned Magistrate refers the matter for further investigation on the ‘B’ report. On 30-06-2021 a second ‘B’ report comes to be filed by the jurisdictional Police. The complainant files a protest petition on 19-07-2022. Now the concerned Court rejects the ‘B’ report and takes cognizance of the aforesaid offences. This has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition. 5. The learned senior counsel Sri Sandesh J. Chouta representing the petitioners would contend that the issue which is purely a commercial transaction or a civil dispute is given a cloak of criminality. The agreement also contains an arbitration clause. The complainant has vented out his grievances before various fora. Criminal proceedings in such cases should not be permitted to be continued. Apart from the aforesaid contention, the learned senior counsel would submit that the order of rejection of ‘B’ report and taking of cognizance is contrary to the law laid down by the 9 coordinate Bench of this Court in DR. RAVIKUMAR v. MRS. K.M.C. VASANTHA1. 6. Per-contra, the 2nd respondent/complainant who appears in person takes this Court through the application seeking vacation of the interim order and the documents. He would admit that loan was secured from the hands of the petitioners. But, he would seek to project as to what the petitioners had done. It is his submission that several crores of rupees of transaction has happed in his account. Not a rupee has come into the coffers of the complainant. Tomorrow if the statutory authorities would question him with regard to huge transaction in his account, he would be caught in the loop as he is not aware as to why the petitioners have transacted such huge amount in the account of the complainant. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned senior counsel and the 2nd respondent in person and have perused the material on record. 1 2017 SCC OnLine Kar. 4731 10 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The primary issue projected by the learned senior counsel is that the order of taking cognizance on rejection of ‘B’ report is contrary to the law laid down by the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of RAVIKUMAR supra. The coordinate Bench in the case of RAVIKUMAR has held as follows: “5. The procedure followed by the Learned Magistrate is not in accordance with law. It is well recognized principle of law that, once the Police submit ‘B’ Summary Report and protest petition is filed to the same, irrespective of contents of the protest petition, the Court has to examine the contents of ‘B’ Summary Report so as to ascertain whether the Police have done investigation in a proper manner or not and if the Court is of the opinion that the investigation has not been conducted properly, the Court has got some options to be followed, which are,- i) The court after going through the contents of the investigating papers, filed u/s 173 of Cr. P.C., is of the opinion that the investigation has not been done properly, the court has no jurisdiction to direct the Police to file the charge sheet however, the Court may direct the Police for re or further investigation and submit a report, which power is inherent under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C., but before taking cognizance such exercise has to be done. This my view is supported by the decisions of the Hon’ ble Apex Court in a decision reported in between Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra [AIR 1968 S.C. 117.] (para 15) and also Full Bench decision of Apex Court in between Kamalapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal [(1980) 2 SCC 91.] (second head note.) ii) If the court is of the opinion that the material available in the ‘B’ Summary Report makes out a cognizable 11 case against the accused and the same is sufficient to take cognizance, and to issue process, then the court has to record its opinion under Sec. 204 of Cr. P.C., and the Court has got power to take cognizance on the contents of ‘B’ Summary Report and to proceed against the accused, by issuance of process. iii) If the court is of the opinion that the ‘B’ Summary Report submitted by the Police has to be rejected, then by expressing its judicious opinion, after applying its mind to the contents of ‘B’ report, the court has to reject the ‘B’ Summary Report. iv) After rejection of the ‘B’ Summary Report, the court has to look into the private complaint or Protest Petition as the case may be, and contents therein to ascertain whether the allegations made in the Private complaint or in the Protest Petition constitute any cognizable offence, and then it can take cognizance of those offences and thereafter, provide opportunity to the complainant to give Sworn Statement and also record the statements of the witnesses if any on the side of the complainant as per the mandate of Sec. 200 Cr. P.C. v) If the court is of the opinion that the materials collected by the police in the report submitted under section 173 of Cr. P.C. are not so sufficient, however, there are sufficient materials which disclose that a cognizable offence has been committed by the accused, the court can still take cognizance of the offence/s under Section 190 read with 200 Cr. P.C. on the basis of the original complaint or the protest petition as the case may be. After taking cognizance and recording sworn statement of the complainant and statements of witnesses if any and also looking into the complaint/Protest Petition and contents therein, if the Magistrate is of the opinion that, to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations further inquiry is required and he thinks fit to post pone the issue of process he can still direct the investigation under section 202 of Cr. P.C., to be made by a Police officer or by such other officer as he thinks fit, to investigate 12 and submit a report, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In the above eventuality, care should be taken that, the case shall not be referred to the Police under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C., once the magistrate takes cognizance and starts inquiring into the matter himself. vi) After taking such report under section 202 of Cr. P.C., and looking to the entire materials on record, if the magistrate is of the opinion that there are no grounds to proceed against the accused, then the Magistrate is bound to dismiss the complaint or the Protest Petition u/s. 203 of Cr. P.C. as the case may be. vii) If in the opinion of the Magistrate there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, on examination of the allegations made in the Protest Petition or in the complaint, as the case may be and also after perusal of the sworn statement, then he has to record his opinion judiciously, and issue summons to the accused by exercising power u/s. 204 of Cr. P.C.” The options open to the learned Magistrate to pass orders on the ‘B’ reports are five-fold as the Court observes. There were two ‘B’ reports in the case at hand. The first ‘B’ report was filed on 23-01-2019. The learned Magistrate does not accept the said ‘B’ report but directs further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Then comes the second ‘B’ report on 30-06-2021. Both the ‘B’ reports are dealt with by the learned Magistrate in his detailed order. The narration while rejecting the ‘B’ report and taking 13 cognizance captures minutes details of handling of the account of the complainant. What drove the learned Magistrate inter alia to reject ‘B’ report is documents produced by the complainant in his protest petition. The reasons recorded are as follows: “…. …. …. 15. However, as rightly pointed out by complainant and as rightly argued by his counsel, the I.O. has failed to consider the nature of agreement or contract of operation of aforesaid account of HDFC Bank by accused persons in violation of public policy. Further it shows that the I.O. has accepted the ledger and other related documents pertaining to aforesaid transactions in the account of informant as truthful documents without going into the deep root of such transactions in the light of contract much less by considering the volume of share trading entered into by informant. Further despite specific allegation that the accused persons have treated the profits earned by informant in his share trading as loan amount and they have charged heavy interest on such amount of profits and reinvestment, the I.O has not considered the said fact nor he has given any explanation with regard to right of aforesaid companies to treat such profit as a loan to informant. Further, the I.O. has also not specifically considered each and every transactions in aforesaid HDFC Bank, despite serious allegations by informant that the accused persons have operated said account and withdrawn money as per their whims and fancies by illegal use of GPA deed. It further shows that the I.O. has not at all secured any of accused persons calling upon them to explain about documents availed by them during opening of aforesaid D-MAT and share trading account of complainant and he has also not recorded their statements with regard to opening of HDFC Bank account of informant and nature of its operation. It further shows that the I.O. has not properly investigated the flow of money and huge share trading transaction in foresaid HDFC Bank account nor he has given any finding that the transactions carried on by ARSSBL and ARGFL in respect of shares and securities of informant are valid and as per guidelines of RBI, NSE and BSE. Further though the I.O. has 14 strongly relied upon the statements of staff of ARSSBL, he has not made any efforts to consider the documents put forth by concerned Bank in the light of such ledger accounts furnished by aforesaid companies to ascertain that no irregularity or misappropriation has taken place during said process. On perusal of entire materials on record it clearly shows that the aforesaid opening of share trading account of informant in HDFC Bank and huge transactions entered into said account is not denied and disputed by investigating agency, but the I.O. has come to opinion that same is done in pursuant to rules and regulations of share trading, without considering the validity of such transactions in the light of prescribed rules of share trading. The I.O. has ignored the allegations of money laundering by accused persons in operating the aforesaid account of HDFC Bank against the interest of informant and also against the rules prescribed under law. 16. Considering all these materials it appears that the ‘B’ reports filed by I.O. are not supported with cogent reasons and I.O. has not deeply considered the actual dispute and serious allegations of misappropriation of huge funds by accused persons in the share trading and bank account of informant. Hence, it shows that looking to facts and peculiar circumstances of the case, an opportunity has to be given to informant to prove his case much less the allegations against accused persons by examining himself and his witnesses and also by producing relevant documents. Further in view of prior investigation and further investigation of the matter, absolutely thee are no grounds to refer the matter once again to I.O. for further investigation. Hence, in view of reasons stated above, complainant has definitely made out prima facie case to take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 403, 406, 409, 410, 420, 468, 471 and 120(B) R/w Section 34 of IPC and to permit complainant to examine himself on oath u/s 200 of Cr.P.C. Consequently the ‘B’ report filed by I.O. does not inspire the confidence of the Court so as to believe that absolutely no offence is made out as averred in such reports. Hence, the ‘B’ report filed by I.O. deserves to be rejected. Hence, point Nos. 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative. 17. Point No.3: For the reasons stated and findings given on point Nos. 1 and 2, the following is order: 15 O R D E R The ‘B’ reports filed by I.O. dated 23-01-2019 and 30.06.2021 are hereby rejected. Further cognizance is taken for offences punishable under Sec. 403, 406, 409, 410, 420, 468, 471 and 120(B) R/w Sec. 34 of IPC. Call on for sworn statement of complainant by 04-02-2023.” The learned Magistrate clearly observes that there are unauthorized transactions in the account of the complainant inter alia and, therefore, rejects the ‘B’ report and takes cognizance of the offence. I do not find any error in the order of rejection of ‘B’ report or taking of cognizance by the learned Magistrate for it to be in violation of the law laid down by the coordinate Bench in RAVIKUMAR supra. The order impugned is in strict consonance with law. 9. The submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that the issue is purely civil in nature; the concerned Court could not have rejected the ‘B’ report and taken cognizance of the offence; ‘B’ report was filed not once but twice. This submission is neither here nor there, as the reasons rendered by 16 the concerned Court to reject the ‘B’ report and taking of cognizance are cogent and the allegations against the petitioners are a maze of facts. Entertainment of this petition would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KAPTAN SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. “9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the investigating officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482 CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. However, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the 2 (2021) 9 SCC 35 17 investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation. Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held that that question is required to be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further observed it is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 9.2. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] after considering the decisions of this Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , it is held by this Court that exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Arvind 18 Khanna [CBI v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 94] , Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] and in XYZ [XYZ v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 10 SCC 337 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 173] , referred to hereinabove. 9.3. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. 10. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that there are very serious triable issues/allegations which are required to be gone into and considered at the time of trial. The High Court has lost sight of crucial aspects which have emerged during the course of the investigation. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that the document i.e. a joint notarised affidavit of Mamta Gupta Accused 2 and Munni Devi under which according to Accused 2 Ms Mamta Gupta, Rs 25 lakhs was paid and the possession was transferred to her itself is seriously disputed. It is required to be noted that in the registered agreement to sell dated 27- 10-2010, the sale consideration is stated to be Rs 25 lakhs and with no reference to payment of Rs 25 lakhs to Ms Munni Devi and no reference to handing over the possession. However, in the joint notarised affidavit of the same date i.e. 27-10-2010 sale consideration is stated to be Rs 35 lakhs out of which Rs 25 lakhs is alleged to have been paid and there is a reference to transfer of possession to Accused 2. Whether Rs 25 lakhs has been paid or not the accused have to establish during the trial, because the accused are relying upon the said document and payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010. It is also required to be considered that the first agreement to sell in which Rs 25 lakhs is stated to be sale consideration and there is reference to the payment of Rs 10 lakhs by cheques. It is a registered document. The aforesaid are all triable issues/allegations which are required to be considered at the time of trial. The High Court has failed to notice and/or consider the material collected during the investigation. 19 11. Now so far as the finding recorded by the High Court that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court itself has noted that the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010 is seriously disputed, however as per the High Court the same is required to be considered in the civil proceedings. There the High Court has committed an error. Even the High Court has failed to notice that another FIR has been lodged against the accused for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC with respect to the said alleged joint notarised affidavit. Even according to the accused the possession was handed over to them. However, when the payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit is seriously disputed and even one of the cheques out of 5 cheques each of Rs 2 lakhs was dishonoured and according to the accused they were handed over the possession (which is seriously disputed) it can be said to be entrustment of property. Therefore, at this stage to opine that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is premature and the aforesaid aspect is to be considered during trial. It is also required to be noted that the first suit was filed by Munni Devi and thereafter subsequent suit came to be filed by the accused and that too for permanent injunction only. Nothing is on record that any suit for specific performance has been filed. Be that as it may, all the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered at the time of trial only. 12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the merits of the allegations as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. 13. Even the High Court has erred in observing that original complaint has no locus. The aforesaid observation is made on the premise that the complainant has not placed on record the power of attorney along with the counter filed before the High Court. However, when it is specifically stated in the FIR that Munni Devi has executed the power of attorney and thereafter the investigating officer has conducted the 20 investigation and has recorded the statement of the complainant, accused and the independent witnesses, thereafter whether the complainant is having the power of attorney or not is to be considered during trial. 14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. Now, the trial is to be conducted and proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own merits. It is made clear that the observations made by this Court in the present proceedings are to be treated to be confined to the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC only and the trial court to decide the case in accordance with law and on its own merits and on the basis of the evidence to be laid and without being influenced by any of the observations made by us hereinabove. The present appeal is accordingly allowed.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. In the light of the facts narrated hereinabove and the law laid down by the Apex Court, I find no merit to entertain this petition. Accordingly, the petition stands rejected. Interim order of any kind operating shall stand dissolved. Consequently, I.A.No.2 of 2023 also stands disposed. Sd/- (M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ