1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 883 of 2014 Judgment Reserved on 10.09.2025 Judgment Delivered on 23.09.2025  Nawal Singh, S/o Goutar Singh Meravi, aged about 28 Years, R/o Village- Bawa Talab (Khamhariya), P.S. Rengakhar, Civil and Revenue, District Kabirdham, C.G. ...Appellant versus  State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Station House Officer, Police Station- Rengakhar, Civil and Revenue, District Kabirdham, C.G. ... Respondent For Appellant : Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Senior Advocate appears along with Ms. Kanchan Kalwani, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Afroz Khan, Panel Lawyer. Division Bench Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. CAV Judgment Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.09.2014 passed in Sessions Trial No.25/2014 by the Fast Track Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirdham, Kawardha, C.G, by which the appellant stands convicted & sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for six months Under Section 201 of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for six months (Both sentences were directed to run concurrently) 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant–Naval Singh was in a love relationship with deceased Mamta Meravi, a resident of Dongaria village, for about one year. During this period, they lived together as husband and wife and travelled to Raipur and Mumbai. On 24.12.2013, a quarrel took place between them in Raipur, after which the appellant left Mamta and returned to his village, Baba Talab. On 29.12.2013, the deceased came to Baba Talab seeking reconciliation. However, another quarrel ensued between them. On the morning of 29.12.2013, both the appellant and the deceased left the house and 3 proceeded towards the Amakhodra forest. It is alleged that during this time, the appellant asked the deceased to end their relationship and leave him. When she refused and threatened to lodge a complaint with the police, the appellant, in a fit of rage, strangulated her with his hands, resulting in her death. To conceal the crime, the appellant removed the deceased’s clothes, placed a stone over her body in the forest, and then proceeded about two kilometers away, where he burnt the clothes and scattered the ashes. On receiving information, police recovered the body in the presence of witnesses. On 07.01.2014, the appellant came to the police station and disclosed the details of the incident. His memorandum statement (Ex.P-7) was recorded in the presence of witnesses, leading to the recovery of the dead body. Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-14) was recorded, and an FIR (Ex.P-16) was registered under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. Merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P-15. Inquest proceedings (Ex.P-9) were conducted, and the dead body was sent for post-mortem. PW-9, Dr. S.K. Bagh, conducted the post-mortem examination and proved the report (Ex.P-19). He opined that the cause of death was due to multiple injuries on the body. The body showed early signs of decomposition, and a foetus was found in the uterus. The duration of death was assessed as 7 to 10 days prior to the post- mortem. 3. During the investigation, a spot map was prepared and marked as Ex.P-10. From the possession of the appellant, ashes of the 4 burnt clothes of the deceased were seized and recorded vide seizure memo Ex.P-5. Further, the viscera of the deceased, her underwear, and the femur bone of the child in her womb, sealed in three separate plastic containers, were seized vide Ex.P-17. The femur bone was sent to Hyderabad for forensic examination. The DNA report (Ex.P-21) conclusively established a biological parent-child relationship between the source of Ex.A (the femur bone) and Ex.B (Mr. Nawal Singh Meravi, the appellant). 4. After due investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional Criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed the offence. 5. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 9 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 21 documents Exs.P-1 to P-21. However, the appellant in support of his defence has examined none but exhibited 4 documents i.e. Exs.D-1 to D-4. 6. The trial Court, after completion of trial and upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, by its impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, he has preferred the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC. 5 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the alleged offences, as the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the entire case is premised primarily on circumstantial evidence, namely the recovery of the dead body, the alleged love affair between the appellant and the deceased, the motive, and the DNA report. Out of these, except for the admitted fact of the relationship between the appellant and the deceased and the DNA report confirming biological linkage, no other circumstance crucial for conviction has been satisfactorily proved against the appellant. The prosecution has not effectively established the memorandum statement, recovery at the instance of the appellant, or any independent corroborative evidence. It is well settled that for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances which points unerringly to the guilt of the accused and excludes every hypothesis consistent with innocence. In the present case, such a chain of circumstances has not been conclusively proved. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence warrant interference and deserve to be set aside, and the appellant should be acquitted of the charges leveled against him. She further places reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Raja Khan vs. State of Chhattigarh reported in (2025) 3 SCC 314, Kattavellai @ 6 Devakar vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439, Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 16 SCC 510, Md. Bani Alam Mazid vs. State of Assam reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 391, Boby vs. State of Kerala reported in (2023) 15 SCC 760 as also the judgments passed by this Hon’ble Court in the matters of Kaushal Prasad Rathia vs. State of Chhattisgarh in CRA No. 167/2019 and Ramsingh Salam vs. State of Chhattisgarh in CRA No. 1790/2019. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State would support the judgment of conviction and submit that the trial Court has minutely evaluated the oral and documentary evidence on record and has rightly held that the chain of circumstances is well connected, establishing the guilt of the appellants. It is further submitted that there is no infirmity or perversity in the impugned judgment, warranting interference by this Court. He also submits that even though Gulal Singh (PW/1), in examination-in-chief, has not supported the prosecution case but in cross-examination he has admitted the recovery of dead body at the instance of appellant. This taken together with proof, proved the fact that the deceased was carrying pregnancy out of her relationship with the appellant, constitutes clinching evidence of proof for convicting the appellant. 7 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem report (Ex.P-19) proved by PW-9 Dr. S.K. Bagh, which is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, the question is whether the appellant is the perpetrator of the crime in question. 12. We will now examine the evidence presented by the prosecution one by one. PW-1 Gulal Singh, the maternal uncle of the deceased, has stated in his examination-in-chief that the recovery of the dead body was made at the instance of the appellant. However, he has not supported the memorandum statement allegedly given by the appellant. He categorically stated that such memorandum was not recorded in his presence at the police station. In cross-examination, this witness further admitted that the police had informed them that the whereabouts of deceased- Mamta had been found. Acting on this information, he along with others went to the Amakhodra forest, accompanied by the appellant, where the dead body of the deceased was 8 recovered. Thus, while PW-1 Gulal Singh sought to attribute the recovery to the appellant in chief-examination, his cross- examination reveals that the recovery was essentially at the instance of the police, not the appellant. This creates a serious doubt regarding the prosecution’s version and makes the alleged recovery at the instance of the appellant unreliable. 13. PW-2 Ram Singh is a witness to the identification memo (Panchanama). In his testimony, he has categorically stated that it was informed to him by the Police that a dead body had been found. Acting on this, he went along with the police personnel to the spot. He further deposed that it was the police personnel who instructed him to remove a stone, and upon doing so, the dead body was recovered. PW-2 Ram Singh has also admitted that the relevant documents were not prepared at the spot but were prepared later in the police station, and that he signed those documents only at the instance of the police. From his deposition, it becomes evident that the alleged recovery at the instance of the appellant is not proved in accordance with law. The manner of preparation of the documents and the role of the police, as admitted by PW-2 Ram Singh, makes the recovery doubtful and unreliable. 14. PW-8 Ram Avtar is the Investigating Officer of the case. In his testimony, he has stated that on the basis of information received, he went to the spot and recovered the dead body. He has further deposed that it had been informed to him that the 9 present appellant had murdered the deceased. From his statement, it clearly appears that the Investigating Officer proceeded only on the basis of hearsay information and suspicion against the appellant. His deposition does not disclose any independent or reliable material connecting the appellant with the commission of the offence. Rather, it indicates that in order to formally complete the investigation, the recovery was shown and the proceedings were prepared in a routine manner without strict adherence to legal requirements. Thus, the testimony of PW-8 Ram Avtar does not inspire confidence and fails to prove the alleged recovery or involvement of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 15. PW-9 Dr. S.K. Bagh, who conducted the post-mortem examination, has opined in the autopsy report that the deceased was carrying a pregnancy of about six months and the foetus was also of approximately six months’ age. He has further deposed that the body of the deceased was in a decomposed condition, due to which, it was difficult to identify the facial features and other characteristics of the deceased. Thus, from the medical evidence, while pregnancy and decomposition of the body are established, the identity of the deceased on the basis of physical features alone could not be confirmed. This further weakens the prosecution case, as the recovery and identification of the dead body solely depended upon circumstantial and documentary evidence. 10 16. From the perusal of the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that the alleged love relation of the appellant with the deceased is not in dispute. The DNA report further establishes that the foetus carried by the deceased was of about six months and its paternity was attributable to the appellant. However, beyond this admitted fact, no other incriminating circumstance has been proved against the appellant. Furthermore, the prosecution has failed to establish any cogent or convincing motive which could impel the appellant to commit the alleged offence. The alleged memorandum statement and seizure have also not been duly proved in accordance with law. The testimonies of the material prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, PW-8, and PW-9) do not conclusively support the prosecution version and, in fact, create doubt with respect to recovery, identification, and the appellant’s involvement. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Khan (Supra) has held as under:- “21. He stated that the prosecution had failed to establish motive on the part of the appellant-accused to commit the offence as there was no evidence or record to show the amount of money that the appellant- accused had borrowed from the deceased. According to him, the prosecution had failed to produce any other evidence to prove the inimical relationship between the deceased and the appellant-accused except the 11 testimony of PW 2, who vaguely deposed before the trial court that the deceased had many enemies, but did not mention the name of the appellant-accused as one of them and the testimony of PW 15 pertaining to earlier scuffle of the deceased with the appellant-accused was not reliable as she failed to state the same to police in her statement (Ext. D/2). Arguments on behalf of the respondent State 22. Per contra, Mr Prafful Bharat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State stated that the recovery of the stone which was used for commission of crime had been made at the instance of the appellant-accused. According to the disclosure statement (Ext. P-23) of the appellant-accused, the stone was thrown by him in the Kachna pond and PW 22, who is the witness to the memorandum, statement and seizure memo (Ext. P-25), had duly supported the same. As per the FSL Report (Ext. P-39), human blood was found on the seized stone. 23. He further stated that on the basis of the disclosure statement of the appellant- accused, two gold chains belonging to the deceased were also seized at the instance of the appellant-accused from the roof of the house of the appellant-accused, which had been duly proved by PW 22. 12 Additionally, he pointed out that the seized gold chains were identified by PW 2 vide memo of identification (Ext. P-10) which had been duly proved by Gopi Sahu (PW6). 30. The essential ingredients of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are threefold: (1) The information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. (ii) Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. (iii) The discovery of the facts must relate to the commission of such offence. 31. The question as to whether evidence relating to recovery is sufficient to fasten guilt on the accused was considered by this Court in Bodhraj v. State of J&K, wherein it has been held as under: (SCC pp. 58-59, para 18) "18. ... Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") is by way of proviso to Sections 25 to 26 and a statement even by way of confession made in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused. This position was succinctly dealt with by this Court in State (UT of Delhi) v. Bal Krishan and Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra². The words "so much of such information" 13 as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, are very important and the whole force of the section concentrates on them. Clearly the extent of the Information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. The ban as imposed by the preceding sections was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. If all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. The object of the provision i.e. Section 27 was to provide for the admission of evidence which but for the existence of the section could not in consequence of the preceding sections, be admitted in evidence. It would appear that under Section 27 as it stands in order to render the evidence leading to discovery of any fact admissible, the information must come from any accused in custody of the police. The requirement of police custody is productive of extremely anomalous results and may lead to the exclusion of much valuable evidence in cases where a person, who is subsequently taken into custody and 14 becomes an accused, after committing a crime meets a police officer or voluntarily goes to him or to the police station and states the circumstances of the crime which lead to the discovery of the dead body, weapon or any other material fact, in consequence of the information thus received from him. This information which is otherwise admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a police officer or did come from a person not in the custody of a police officer. The statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the information leading to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information, the same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused while in custody which led to recovery of the articles has to be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both the accused and the prosecution that information given should be recorded and proved and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any 15 information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of fact envisaged in the section. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor is the most-quoted authority of supporting the interpretation that the "fact discovered" envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect. (See State of Maharashtra v. Damu².] No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is confined to that portion of the information which "distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered". But the information to get admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of information admitted should be consistent with understandability. Mere statement that the accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given." (emphasis supplied) 16 38. This Court in Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan and Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, has held that if the recovery memos have been prepared in the police station itself or signed by the panch witnesses in the police station, the same would lose their sanctity and cannot be relied upon by the Court to support the conviction. 41. This Court is of the view that the courts below were not justified in disregarding the glaring inconsistencies with respect to the recoveries made by the police pursuant to the alleged disclosure made by the appellant-accused. Consequently, the manner of recovery and preparation of seizure memos raises grave doubts about the version of disclosure and recovery put forth by the prosecution. 43. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the chain of circumstances leading to the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt.” 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nandu Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) reported in (2022) 19 SCC 301 has held in para 9 which reads as under:- “9.In a case based on substantial evidence, motive assumes great significance. It is not as if motive alone 17 becomes the crucial link in the case to be established by the prosecution and in its absence the case of prosecution must be discarded. But, at the same time, complete absence of motive assumes a different complexion and such absence definitely weighs in favour of the accused.” 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Boby (Supra) has held as under:- “27. It can thus clearly be seen that firstly, there is a gap of at least five days from the date on which, according to PW 1, the deceased was taken away by the accused persons and the dead body was recovered. However, the crucial question would be as to whether it can be held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery of dead body wasat the instance of Boby (Accused 3-appellant herein). Only in the event the prosecution establishes that the recovery of the body was at the instance of Boby (Accused 3-appellant herein), the 18 relevancy of the gap of five days would come. 28. As early as 1946, the Privy Council had considered the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Privy Council in the said case: (SCC OnLine PC) "The second question, which involves the construction of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, will now be considered. That section and the two preceding sections, with which it must be read, are in these terms. [His Lordship read Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act and continued] Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring 19 the section into operation is that the discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr Megaw for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the "fact discovered" is the physical object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. On this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him 20 in the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity, would all be admissible. If this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear ofthe legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to Section 26, added by Section 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in 21 which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed A" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant." (emphasis supplied) 29. It could thus be seen that Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires that the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to the said fact. The information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery. The said view has been consistently followed by this Court in a catena of cases. 30. This Court in Chandran v. State of T.N.2, had an occasion to consider the evidence of recovery of incriminating 22 articles in the absence of record of the statement of Accused 1. In the said case also, no statement of Accused 1 was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act leading to the recovery of jewels. The Court found that the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court had erred in holding that the jewels were recovered at the instance of Accused 1 therein in pursuance of the confessional statement (Ext. P-27) recorded before PW 34 therein. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case: (SCC p. 103, para 36) "36.... Thus the fact remains that no confessional statement of A-1 causing the recovery of these jewels was proved under Section 27, Evidence Act." It is thus clear that this Court refused to rely on the recovery of jewels since no confessional statement of the accused was proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 31. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in State of Karnataka v. David Rozario: (SCC p. 733, para 5) "5. This information which is otherwise admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a police 23 officer or did come from a person not in the custody of a police officer. The statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the information leading to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information, the same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused while in custody which led to recovery of the articles has to be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both the accused and the prosecution that information given should be recorded and proved and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non- inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact envisaged in the section. Decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. 24 King-Emperor is the most-quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the "fact discovered" envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given mustrelate distinctly to that effect. (See State of Maharashtra v. Damu².)" (emphasis supplied) 32. A three-Judge Bench of this Court recently in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, has observed thus: (SCC pp. 299-300, paras 76-78) "76. Keeping in mind the aforesaid evidence, we proceed to consider whether the prosecution has been able to prove and establish the discoveries in accordance with law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads thus: 27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.-Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.' 77. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution 25 witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been made by the appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 78. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the appellant-accused while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that he would lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence, the site of burial of the dead body, clothes, etc. then the first thing that the investigating officer should have done was to call for two independent witnesses at the police station itself. Once the two independent witnesses would arrive at the police station thereafter in their presence the accused should be asked to make an appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he is said to have hidden the weapon of offence, etc. When the accused while in custody makes such statement before the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or rather the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act 26 is always drawn at the police station in the presence of the independent witnesses so as to lend credence that aparticular statement was made by the accused expressing his willingness on his own free will and volition to point out the place where the weapon of offence or any other article used in the commission of the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama is completed thereafter the police party along with the accused and the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) would proceed to the particular place as may be led by the accused. If from that particular place anything like the weapon of offence or bloodstained clothes or any other article is discovered then that part of the entire process would form the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects the investigating officer to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence of the investigating officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter." This Court in Subramanya case, has elaborately considered as to how the law expects the IO to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.” 27 20. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kattavellai @ Devakar (Supra) has held as under:- “36. It is settled law that, in a case of circumstantial evidence as this one is, motive forms one of the chains of circumstance which can collectively point to the guilt of the accused. According to the prosecution, robbery was the Appellant-convict's motive for ending the lives of D1 and D2. On first blush, this hypothesis appears to be attractive for the reason that the robbery of gold ornaments worn by Bhagyalakshmi at the first instance, and subsequently D2, is what eventually gave way to the crimes for which he stands convicted concurrently by the Courts below. The counsel for the Appellant-convict seeks to dispel the presence of motive by stating that there were other instruments/ornaments of the two victims, which could have been taken by the Appellant-convict and put to his own use or sold off for one sum of money or another; however, that was not the case. The ring worn by D2 and the mobile phone of D1, which undoubtedly were in their possession, were neither found in the possession of the Appellant-convict nor near the scene of the crime. 43.As we have discussed earlier in this judgment, the DNA evidence collected 28 has been rendered unusable. It suffers from various shortcomings in as much as there is large amount of unexplained delay; the chain of custody cannot be established; possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out etc. We have also referred to Instances in the recent past where, similar to the case at hand the DNA evidence was rendered unusable on account of similar lapses. A perusal of the various documents released by a number of bodies such as the Standard Operating Procedure for Crime Scene Investigation issued by the Directorate of Forensic Science Service, Ministry of Home Affairs and Government of India; Guidelines for collection, storage and transportation of Crime Scene DNA samples issued by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Directorate of Forensic Science Service, Ministry of Home Affairs and Government of India1; a Forensic Guide for Crime Investigators (Standard Operating Procedures) issued by LNJN National Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Indias show that, although, procedures have been suggested, there is no uniformity nor there is a common procedure which is required to be followed by all investigating authorities. This, obviously, has the potential to have an impact on 29 the cases investigated. When it comes to procedure followed by the police generally, differences therein are understandable keeping in view the difference in society, regional complexities as also other factors given the wide length and breadth of the Country, however, the same yardstick cannot be applied when it comes to sensitive evidence such as DNA for the concerns, causes of its dilution in evidentiary value and requirements for it to be collected and maintained in pristine condition is not subject to the same factors. So, even though 'Police', 'Public Order' are subjects mentioned in List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India that in itself cannot permit differing procedures and sensitivities to such evidence, to rule the roost. The aspects in which we find there to be errors committed regularly are in fact procedural aspects which aid the sanctity of the evidence.” 21. Likewise, in the matter of Mohd. Bani Alam Mazid (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “49. In Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, this Court after referring to the previous decisions observed that in a case where direct evidence of eye witness is available, motive loses its importance. But absence 30 of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. 50. Relying on the decision in Anwar Ali (supra), this Court in Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 5 SCC 626 observed that in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances. 51. This Court in Nandu Singh (supra) summed up the legal position that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance. It is not as if motive alone becomes the crucial link in the case to be established by the prosecution and that in its absence, the case of the prosecution has to be discarded. But, at the same time, complete absence of motive assumes a different complexion and such absence definitely weighs in favour of the accused.” 22. Applying the above principles to the present case, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant had any motive whatsoever to commit the murder of the deceased. The complete absence of motive, coupled with the failure to prove discovery or any other incriminating circumstance, seriously weakens the prosecution and weighs in favour of the accused. 31 23. It is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must establish the chain of circumstances with cogent and reliable evidence, particularly in cases based on circumstantial evidence. 24. It is profitable here to note following five golden principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra 1 which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and same read as under: “153.…. (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may 1(1984) 4 SCC 116 32 be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 25. Now reverting to the facts of the present case, from the perusal of the record, it clearly appears that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the essential circumstances appearing against the appellant. Except for the admitted fact of love affairs between the appellant and the deceased, and the DNA report establishing the paternity of the foetus, no other circumstance has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged recovery, memorandum, 33 seizure, and motive have not been established. Thus, the chain of circumstances which is a mandatory requirement in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence is wholly lacking in the present case. In absence of a complete and unbroken chain leading to the sole hypothesis of the appellant’s guilt, conviction cannot be sustained. Since the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden, the conviction of the appellant cannot be upheld. 26. It is a settled principle of criminal law that suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot substitute for proof. The entire case of the prosecution is based on weak circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances necessary to bring home the guilt of the accused has not been established. 27. In view of the above precedents, laws laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, judgments passed by this Hon’ble Court in various matters as well as the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the chain of circumstances required for conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant without credible and trustworthy evidence. The chain of circumstances is broken and incomplete, thus, the benefit of doubt must be given to the appellant. 28. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is hereby set- aside. The 34 appellant is acquitted of the charge under Sections 302 & 201 of IPC. 29. The appellant is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 30. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha