( 2025:HHC:24724 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.1206 of 2023. Reserved on: 16.07.2025. Date of Decision: 29.7.2025. Kulwant Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 71 of 2021, dated 26.05.2021, registered at Police Station Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323 and 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that respondent No.3/informant made a complaint to the police regarding the altercation with him and causing injuries to him on his neck and shoulders. The police registered the FIR and filed a charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court. The matter was also reported to Up Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Jol Sapper on 26.05.2021. Gram Panchayat directed the parties to get the land demarcated from the Revenue Agency. A compromise was effected between the parties on 30.05.2021, and both the parties agreed to carry out their respective construction work on their own land. The contents of the FIR show that both parties were continuing with the construction of their residential houses on adjoining land. Minor altercations and manhandling occurred between both parties during the construction. No injury was inflicted upon the informant, his wife and mother. A false story was propounded by the informant in the FIR. The medical examination of the informant was conducted, and other persons were not medically examined. The dispute between the parties is civil. Petitioners are working in the Indian Army and are facing 3 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) hardship due to their false implication. The petitioners have to attend the hearing before the Court, which is causing them harassment. The witnesses cited by the informant are interested, and their testimonies cannot be relied upon. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 3. The petition is opposed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by filing a reply making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the police investigated the FIR No. 71 of 2021 and submitted a charge-sheet before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadaun. The parties had a dispute over possession, which resulted in an altercation between them. Respondents No.4 and 5 sustained injuries. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction in the present matter. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) 4. A status report was filed along with the reply, asserting that the informant had made a complaint to the police that Kulwant Singh and the informant were carrying out the constructions over the respective areas allotted to them. Kulwant Singh and his two sons came to the informant’s house on 26.05.2021 and gave him beatings. He sustained injuries to his neck and shoulder. The petitioner, Kulwant Singh and his sons also gave beatings to the informant’s wife and mother. Panchayat was brought to the spot, and Panchayat decided that the constructions would not be carried out until the demarcation. The police conducted the investigation and filed a charge-sheet before the Court on 20.07.2021. 5. A separate reply was filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 5, making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merit. It was asserted that the learned Trial Court had taken cognisance and issued the summons. Charges have been framed, and the present petition is not maintainable without challenging the orders of summoning the petitioners and framing the charges. The petitioners took the law into their own hands and caused injuries to the informant, his wife and mother. The 5 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) compromise was initially effected before the Panchayat, however, the petitioners did not adhere to the terms of the compromise. The pleas taken by the petitioner can be adjudicated during the trial; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply filed by respondents No.3 and 5 and affirming those of the petition was filed. 7. I have heard Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, with Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.3 to 5. 8. Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations made in the FIR disclose a boundary dispute between the parties. The matter was compromised before the Panchayat, and continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the 6 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) same be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of other High Courts in Anil Kumar Vs. State of Kerala [2024/KER/19951], Kishore Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [2024:RJ-JD:40597] & judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Sahib @ Shalu @ Salim Vs. State U.P. & ors. [2023 SCC Online SC 947], in support of his submission. 9. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The police have filed a charge-sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court has framed the charges. Learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the present matter. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for respondents No.3 to 5, adopted the submissions of Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and submitted that this Court has to see a prima facie case while exercising inherent jurisdiction. The documents produced by the petitioners cannot be looked into at this stage. The petitioners 7 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) themselves violated the terms and conditions of the compromise, and they cannot rely upon it; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an 8 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 9 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are 10 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. A perusal of the FIR clearly shows that the petitioners trespassed into the house of the informant and gave beatings to the informant, his mother and his wife. These allegations, prima facie, show the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, read with Section 34 of IPC. 16. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties pertained to the land and the raising of the constructions over it. It is a civil dispute, and the criminal Court should not take 11 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) cognisance of the same. This submission is only stated to be rejected. As per the FIR, the petitioners entered into the house of the informant and gave him beatings. They also gave beatings to the informant’s wife and mother. Causing injury to two persons after entering their house is not a civil dispute but a criminal case of trespass and hurt. Hence, the judgments of Randhir Singh’s Case (supra) and Devender Rana’s Case (supra), dealing with the breach of contract, and Kishore Singh’s Case (supra), dealing with the cheating, do not apply to the present case. 17. It was specifically mentioned in the status report dated 20.06.2025 that the charges have been framed, and the matter was listed on 04.07.2025 for recording the statements of witnesses. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed at page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional 12 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the 13 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 19. It was submitted that the Court should read the FIR carefully when it was registered to wreak vengeance. Reliance was placed upon Sahib’s Case (supra). Even if the FIR is read carefully, it can lead only to one conclusion that beatings were given to the informant, his wife and his mother. 20. It was submitted that the FIR has been filed due to a dispute between the parties. It is mala fide and should be quashed on this ground. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in 14 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 22. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground that it is mala fide. 23. No other point was urged. 15 ( 2025:HHC:24724 ) 24. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 25. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th July, 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)