2025:HHC:28476 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1752 of 2025 Reserved on: 18.08.2025 Date of Decision: 22.08.2025 Dayanand ...Petitioner versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested vide FIR No. 232 of 2023, dated 26.11.2023, registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as “ND&PS”) registered at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:28476 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested by the police at Siund Manikaran Road on 26.11.2023 at 03.25 PM. There is a variation in the quantity/ weight of the contraband in various documents. The petitioner is the sole earning member of the family; his aged parents and wife are dependent upon him. The petitioner has been behind the bar for about two years, and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded at the earliest. The matter is listed for prosecution evidence since 13.08.2024. The statements of independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case. The petitioner is ready and willing to abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 26.11.2023. They were checking the vehicles near Thakur Dhaba at Siund Manikaran road at 02.45 PM. The accused came from village Jachni at about 03.25 PM. He returned after seeing the police and threw the backpack, he was carrying, into a Naala. The police apprehended the petitioner and checked the backpack in the presence of two independent witnesses. The police 3 2025:HHC:28476 recovered 1.360 Kgs of charas from the backpack. The police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The weight of charas was found to be 1.350 Kgs in the proceedings under Section 52A of the NDPS Act. As per the result of the analyses, the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. Its actual weight was found to be 1.333 Kgs in the laboratory. The prosecution has cited fifteen witnesses, out of whom eight have been examined. The matter is now listed for recording the statement of the investigating officer on 01.12.2025. 4. I have heard Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. There is variation in the weight of the contraband mentioned in the various documents, which makes the prosecution’s case highly suspect. The learned Trial Court has listed the matter after a gap of five months, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. The charge- sheet has been filed before the Court, and no fruitful purpose 4 2025:HHC:28476 would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of 1.350 Kgs of charas, which is a commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner is unable to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, 5 2025:HHC:28476 the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the 6 2025:HHC:28476 accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms:— “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the 7 2025:HHC:28476 realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. A perusal of the status report shows that the weight of the charas was found to be 1.360 Kgs, 1.350 Kgs and 1.333 Kgs on the spot, in the proceedings under Section 52A of the NDPS Act, and in the laboratory, respectively. It was submitted that there is a variation in the weight of the charas, which makes the prosecution’s case highly suspect. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Sohan Lal alias Bhau 8 2025:HHC:28476 and others Vs. State of H.P. and others, 2019 STPL 3203 HP, that if there is a variation in the report of analysis and the certificate issued under Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act, the certificate will prevail. It was observed: - 10. It would be evidently clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that the samples drawn and certified by the learned Magistrate in compliance with sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 52-A are primary evidence and, therefore, had to be taken as true and any contradiction in such certification with the final report prepared by the prosecution, the quantity mentioned in the final report obviously had to give way to the certification so made by the Court under Section 52-A of the Act ibid. 13. Therefore, as per the judgment, the certificate issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, that the weight of the charas was found to be 1.350 Kgs has to be accepted as correct, and the weight mentioned by the police on the spot and in the laboratory is to be ignored. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the so-called variation in the weight. 14. The status report shows that the petitioner was arrested on 26.11.2023. The prosecution has cited fifteen witnesses, out of whom eight have been examined. The matter is now listed before the learned Trial Court on 01.12.2025 for recording the statement of PW13. A perusal of the photocopy of 9 2025:HHC:28476 the order sheet dated 19.07.2025 shows that two witnesses were examined on that day, and one witness was summoned for 01.12.2025, nearly five months from the date of the hearing. There is no explanation as to why the learned Trial Court had summoned only one witness out of the remaining seven prosecution witnesses and why the matter was listed after nearly five months from the date of the hearing. The fact that the matter was listed after five months and that too for the examination of one witness shows the inability of the learned Trial Court to expeditiously conclude the trial. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that if the State or any prosecuting agency, including the Court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide the right of speedy trial to the accused, then the bail should not be declined on the ground that the crime is serious. It was observed at page 820: 17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 10 2025:HHC:28476 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be. 19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 15. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127 that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. It was observed on page 298: “13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, assures that: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” and in its second sub-article, that: “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 11 2025:HHC:28476 15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)]. 16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp. 638-39, paras 86-87) “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5) ‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty 12 2025:HHC:28476 enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such a trial would constitute a violation of his fundamental right under Article 21?” 17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it.” 16. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been 13 2025:HHC:28476 deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.” 17. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335: “40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution 14 2025:HHC:28476 (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).” 18. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: - 13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kar- tar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Asso- ciation. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 15 2025:HHC:28476 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para 17) “17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can be protected against harmful activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.” 19. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178: “23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India <https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI- 2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials. 16 2025:HHC:28476 24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13) “13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [ Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “The Prison Community” published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation”, available at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/ Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speedily.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of 17 2025:HHC:28476 the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was observed at page 817: - “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5) “5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long- delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.” 11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman 18 2025:HHC:28476 Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84) “84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.” 21. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed: 7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines while being incarcerated: “I know not whether Laws be right, Or whether Laws be wrong; 19 2025:HHC:28476 All that we know who be in jail Is that the wall is strong; And that each day is like a year, A year whose days are long.” 22. It was submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and he is not entitled to bail without satisfying the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 that where the accused is entitled to bail due to his long incarceration, the fetters of Section 37 will not apply. It was observed at page 178: 22. The standard to be considered, therefore, is one where the court would look at the material in a broad manner and reasonably see whether the accused's guilt may be proved. The judgments of this Court have, therefore, em- phasised that the satisfaction which courts are expected to record i.e. that the accused may not be guilty, is only prima facie, based on a reasonable reading, which does not call for meticulous examination of the materials collected during investigation (as held in Union of India v. Rattan Mallik [Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 831] ). Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436-A which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Saten- der Kumar Antil [Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] ). Having regard to these factors, 20 2025:HHC:28476 the Court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail 23. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 24. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 21 2025:HHC:28476 25. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Superintendent of Sub Jail Kullu at Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. and the learned Trial Court through FASTER. 26. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22nd August, 2025 (Anurag) KARAN SINGH Digitally signed by KARAN SINGH Date: 2025.08.22 16:39:52 +0530